Motive behind Russia’s Syrian expansion unclear

Moscow could be attempting to reclaim superpower status with military expansion

Russia’s military pivot to Syria has set off ripples of anxiety through the West, along with unsettling questions about President Vladimir Putin’s agenda.

Is Moscow’s expanded footprint — a new military base in Latakia and the arrival of more than 200 marines and a few dozen tanks, howitzers and armoured personnel carriers — a signal of new territorial ambitions?

Is it a scheme to claw back superpower status, or to woo back western countries alienated by Russia’s incursions in Ukraine with the prospect of a coalition against Islamic State? Is Putin waving a gun or an olive branch?

Putin himself claims he’s defending Bashar Assad’s regime in the face of “terrorist aggression,” saying Russia is providing “necessary support” and inviting other nations to join in.

The mission even has a humanitarian edge, he said in a speech in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. “If Russia had not supported Syria then the situation in the country would be even worse than in Libya, and the stream of refugees would be even greater.”

Russia’s interest in Syria is not new. The Soviet Union’s alliance with Syria dates back to the aftermath of the Second World War, and its small naval base in Tartus, north of Lebanon, to 1971. The post-Cold War relationship has become warmer with the threat of regime change and the breakup of the country.

Western countries have lashed out at Moscow’s escalation in Syria, at least publicly. Behind the scenes, there may also be relief that Russia is ready to join the fight against Islamic State militants in spite of Washington’s avowed abhorrence for Assad.

“The way Russia is pitching in is clearly part of an attempt to reopen a more positive relationship with the West,” says Mark Galeotti, a Russian security expert and professor of global affairs at New York University. “It’s saying ‘we can be useful to you or we can be problematic, so you need to think about what kind of deal we can strike.’ ”

Relations between Russia and the West plummeted after it annexed Crimea in 2014. The resulting sanctions sparked a firestorm of antiwestern rhetoric and reprisals.

But while Moscow’s wish list may include a new welcome mat in the West, its national security is also a factor in its Syria strategy, Galeotti says.

“People (in the security services) were frankly gleeful because Syria acted as a sponge, drawing off young radicals from the North Caucasus.” A drop in domestic attacks by Russian Islamists followed. But there were fears of an upsurge after the U.S. failed to score more victories against the rebels in Syria, possibly prompting direct action by Moscow.

With Russia’s limited elite forces reportedly committed to eastern Ukraine, there is little chance of opening another front with Syria to defend Assad. And there is also debate about whether Putin is willing to support him to the end of an increasingly bitter conflict.

“For Putin, Assad is a domestic Russian issue,” says Russia expert Mark Katz of George Mason University. “He has to defend a fellow authoritarian leader. Knuckling under to the West would be worse.” Syria also raises red flags for Central Asian authoritarians, who could edge closer to China if Putin is seen deserting a fellow despot, he adds. And there is also a belief that, if Assad falls, Muslim rebellion could explode in Russia.

But Putin’s embrace of Assad may not be forever, says Kamran Bokhari, who teaches national security and foreign policy at University of Ottawa. Reports that Moscow is sounding out Saudi Arabia on an exit strategy to replace Assad — the Sunni state’s Alawite enemy — hint that “the Russians, the Saudis and the Iranians all realize at some point Assad has to go. The problem is what kind of easing-out scenario is likely? At the end of the day there’s no assurance that any would work.”

There’s more at stake for Putin in supporting Assad’s Syria than maintaining a foothold in the Middle East, says Leonid Kosals of Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, a visiting professor at the University of Toronto. And, he says, the road to Damascus may lead through Ukraine. “Putin has failed in Donbas. And if it isn’t a success story, his idea of ‘Novorossiya’ (New Russia) has failed. Most people in Russia support the invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, but the numbers are less than a year ago. It’s obvious that Russians have paid a high economic price.”

That could put a damper on any ambitions Putin may have for the 2018 presidential election. “People are not as happy as they were. Syria is the next show that can prove he is an efficient president with unquestionable authority. It’s not just a PR exercise, it’s (the basis) of his legitimacy and of his whole regime.”

In Washington and other world capitals, the stakes are also high — and highest for the suffering civilians of Syria and the swelling tide of refugees heading for the West — something Putin may be counting on as he continues his Syrian campaign.

“Imagine Assad losing Damascus,” says Bokhari. “If his armed forces devolve into another militia and Assad into another warlord, and rebel groups are fighting each other, it’s a free fall. Does anybody think that the day after will be better?”