PRO-REP SYSTEM WILL RAISE SPENDING, TAXES

Proponents of system are unlikely to discuss this, writes Herbert Grubel.

B.C. voters will soon be flooded with information about the “superiority” of proportional representation (pro-rep) over the first-pastthe-post (FPTP) system presently used for allocating seats in the legislature. If the past is any guide, this information will be almost entirely about how pro-rep produces a “fair” distribution of seats, and avoids having a government whose members received less than one-half of the votes and thus leads to “wasted” votes.

But there is likely to be little detailed explanation of the three different types of pro-rep systems under consideration, mainly because the explanation is extremely difficult. Each system involves complex, wide-ranging and fundamental changes to the size of electoral districts, the number of candidates in each, and the procedures for allocating votes.

The proffered information can also be expected to be short on the discussion of important changes that prorep will bring to our political environment and institutions.

First, the political environment will be fundamentally changed by the probable increase in the number of parties contesting elections. This prediction is based on a review of academic studies by Lydia Miljan and Taylor Jackson, which showed that the number of political parties averages 2.5 in FPTP countries and 4.6 in pro-rep countries.

Most of the additional parties that B.C. can expect under pro-rep are likely to be small groups representing narrow regional, industrial, religious or labour interests and, most disturbingly, members of distinct ethnic populations. The higher number and objectives of the increased number of parties will raise the divisiveness of election campaigns, parliamentary debates and the adoption of laws.

Second, the time it takes to form government after elections averages 32 days under FPTP, and 50 days in pro-rep countries.

Such an increase reflects the more turbulent political environment brought about by the enlarged number of parties and will reduce the efficiency of the electoral system.

Third, coalition governments formed under the pro-rep system have shorter lifespans than those under the FPTP system, mainly because political differences among parties in the coalition over time turn out often to be irreconcilable.

The costs of the extra elections fall on taxpayers, and the shortness of the lifespan of governments impedes their ability to adopt complex legislative programs. The coming information campaign will also be short on the effects pro-rep has on economic performance. The pro-rep system gives small, single-issue parties leverage over the passage of legislation that is greater than is justified by the share of the vote they received. This leverage arises because large parties need the votes of these smaller parties to form government, which they get only on the condition that they adopt some of the smaller parties’ legislative priorities.

This problem already exists in B.C., where the large New Democratic Party has formed a coalition with the smaller Greens to form government. The legislative agenda of this government includes a resolute opposition to the construction of a pipeline, which was the priority of the Green party but played a much less important role in the NDP election platform.

The political agendas of small parties in pro-rep countries often are designed to advance the ideology of the extreme political left, which they have not been able to achieve under the FPTP system, and which explains why demands for the adoption of pro-rep comes from them. More income redistribution, spending on social programs, culture, the environment and subsidies to select economic activities, all these policies result in higher government spending.

The extent to which government spending under pro-rep exceeds spending in FPTP countries has been the subject of a number of academic studies, which were summarized by Fraser Institute executive Jason Clemens and others: spending as a percentage of national income in recent years has been 2.3 per cent for FPTP countries and 2.9 per cent for pro-rep countries, or 26 per cent higher.

Important is the fact that this higher spending leads to correspondingly higher taxes to pay for it, and often is financed through deficits, which raise taxes on future generations.

Why should the expected increase of government spending under pro-rep be the focus of the public discussion?

As revealed by many academic studies, increased spending beyond a certain level leads to lower economic growth, lower per capita incomes and reduced freedom.

The present levels of spending and taxation in B.C. have been determined in past FPTP elections.

Voters in the coming referendum should consider that under pro-rep their taxes will go up to finance increased spending that may or may not benefit them.

Let us hope that this fundamental issue will receive the attention it deserves, especially since supporters of pro-rep are highly unlikely to bring it up.

Herbert Grubel is a professor (emeritus) of economics at Simon Fraser University.

Most of the additional parties that B.C. can expect under pro-rep are likely to be small groups representing narrow regional, industrial, religious or labour interests and, most disturbingly, members of distinct ethnic populations.