Compromise needed in electoral reform
Since Justin Trudeau’s formal confirmation that his pledge of a reformed electoral system will not occur, he has been on the receiving end of a great deal of criticism, most of it characterizing him as a liar and a cynic. This is all fair game in politics, but it should be noted that his opponents are just as guilty of promoting their self interest.
When Trudeau first suggested that the 2015 election should be the last one based upon the “first past the post” plurality system, the Liberals were languishing in third place, with little prospect of being able to implement any such change. Once the electorate had smiled upon him things changed, and it is reasonable to assume that the reform he most favoured was the alternative vote, or preferential ballot system of ranking choices 1, 2,3, etc. This system should normally tend to advantage parties in the middle of the ideological spectrum such as the Liberals, although Trudeau never publicly acknowledged that preference.
Perhaps he originally thought that a committee structured proportionate to parliamentary seats giving the Liberals a majority, could push through his preference. However the backlash to that proposal meant that the committee’s composition would be based upon popular vote, and a bipartisan compromise of some sort would be required. Just as the Liberals had their preferred system, so did each of the other parties.
The New Democrats and Greens favoured some variation of proportional representation, which would be expected to boost the number of seats they would win. The Conservatives and Bloc Québécois favoured the status quo for differing reasons. The Conservatives recognized that the present system afforded them the best chance of forming a majority government, while the BQ with a regionally concentrated vote isn’t harmed by the current plurality system, as their more regionally diffuse support does to the NDP and Greens.
Rather than acknowledging they were motivated by political expedience in their choice, the Conservative decision was to demand a public referendum on the matter, probably assuming that voters would reject any change at all, just as they previously had in Ontario, British Columbia and Prince Edward Island votes.
While the Liberals might have preferred the ranked ballot, they too have prospered under the current system, and a change to proportional representation would probably mean the end of any party gaining a parliamentary majority again, and a new world of coalition government, however fairer that system would seem.
In such a circumstance, the only compromise that could have emerged was some kind of hybrid combination of parallel systems. This might have allowed the Liberals to implement the ranked ballot system, but also to authorize a certain proportion of seats to be allocated proportionally, perhaps 20 or 25 per cent, meaning the smaller parties would gain something from the change, but not so much as to permanently prevent the possibility of majority government. This might have been discussed privately, but there was no public mention of such an arrangement, and so all the participants insisted on their first choice, and deadlock resulted with no change at all.
Without a willingness to water their wine, groups like Fair Vote as well as the NDP and Greens might be appalled by the outcome. However they can hardly be surprised, and it should have seemed inevitable to them that the Liberals who have formed majority governments for much of the last 120 years, were not going to embrace a reform that would have prevented it from ever happening again.
It didn’t help that the pertinent Liberal minister for most of the process, Maryam Monsef, was inexperienced in Ottawa’s cut and thrust, but at the end of the day, this isn’t why the proposal failed. If those involved were not prepared to compromise, it probably never had a chance.