China’s aid all part of geopolitical strategy
Pandemic aid to Italy intended to play on growing divisions within the European Union
On April 8, the head of the European Research Council quit due to his disillusionment with the response of the EU to COVID-19. Mario Ferrari stated he had “seen enough of both the governance of science and the political operations at the European Union,” and that he “lost faith in the system itself.”
The inability of the EU to respond to COVID-19 leaves an opportunity for its competitors. Beijing has realized this opportunity.
In Italy, China sent thousands of ventilators, respirators, protective suits and test kits — and two millions masks — to help the fight against the virus. Aid began being distributed in the early part of March — when fellow European countries, including Germany and France, were protecting their own medical resources.
At that time, Italy’s call for help fell on deaf ears among its fellow EU members. A poll published in mid-March states that 88 per cent of Italians feel the “EU is not helping them.” This is where China stepped in. And the material resources provided by China to Europe shouldn’t be downplayed.
In Hungary, Viktor Orban personally welcomed an envoy from China. According to Orban himself, Hungary received “more than 3 million masks, 100,000 test kits, (and) 86 ventilators.” On April 5, The Bank of China donated 80,000 surgical masks to the country.
Serbia, a country that has not received official membership status from the EU, is also drawing itself closer to Beijing. Frustrated by the European Community, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said that “European solidarity does not exist.” He even kissed China’s flag upon the arrival of epidemiologists and medical supplies in Belgrade.
From a political perspective, it’s important to understand the strategic ambitions of Beijing. Josep Borrell, the EU’s foreign policy chief, says the pandemic entails “a struggle for influence through spinning and the ‘politics of generosity.’ ”
To varying degrees, Italy, Hungary and Serbia have growing sentiments of animosity toward the EU that long predate the pandemic.
Italy’s strains with the EU are self-evident in the success of leaders like Matteo Salvini, who’s rhetoric slams the EU’s handling of the ongoing migrant crisis.
What’s more, is that Italy is the only G7 country to open itself up to Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative that sees China funding infrastructure and other projects in order to form “partnerships.” Rome’s Westerns allies have condemned this move.
Luigi di Maio, a former leader of the anti-establishment and populist Five Star movement, claims that “those who scoffed at our participation in the Belt and Road Initiative now have to admit that investing in that friendship allowed us to save lives in Italy.”
Serbia has especially opened itself to Beijing’s “economic diplomacy.” Serbia receives approximately $2.2 billion from China, mostly in the form of loans. In recent years, Serbia has also been a hot spot for Huawei and other telecommunications technologies. Part of Belgrade’s interest in Beijing is that it can ensure Kosovo never receives full independence, since, China is one of the P5 on the United Nations Security Council.
In Hungary, Viktor Orban’s authoritarian governing style makes it a deviance from the democracy-promoting EU. Orban has had ongoing clashes with Brussels over abuses of the rule of law and freedom of expression. Hungary has even been called the “black sheep” of the EU. Another survey places the country as the “most disappointing” EU member among respondents.
These countries could be crucial for Beijing’s geopolitical strategy precisely because they already have tensioned relationships with the larger European Community.
The COVID-19 pandemic won’t last forever. If the EU is to maintain its legitimacy among its citizens post-COVID-19, it must show that there are crisis-relief benefits included in being a member of the union.
If, on the other hand, Italians, Serbians, Hungarians and other Europeans feel they can attain economic and political advantage via a more invested partnership with China, Beijing will have achieved significant geopolitical goals. This would be to the detriment of Brussels.
Fortunately, the EU has intensely ramped up its efforts to battle COVID-19 in joint fashion. It has demonstrably repealed some of its failings of earlyMarch.
Time will tell whether the wounds of the EU’s late response will amount to strategic gains for Beijing.