Research on Risk Control of Inventory Financing Considering the Income of SMEs

Task Group1，2 （1.Chengdu Normal University，Chengdu，Sichuan611130，China；2.Southwest Jiaotong University， Chengdu，Sichuan610031，China）

Abstract：Inventory financing is a new kind of business model that financing enterprises (borrowing enterprises) deposit their inventory in logistics enterprises (the Third Party) appointed by banks (lending enterprises)，and apply for loans from the bank. Due to the information asymmetry，SMEs' default risk and moral hazard exist objectively；and there exists multilateral games in the decision-making behaviors among banks，logistics enterprises，and SMEs. Under the conditions of market-based lending rates，with the comprehensive consideration of such factors as SMEs’investment rate of return and project success rate， bank’s loan interest rate and pledge rate，and reputation value，for default risk and moral hazard in SMEs’borrowing，the authors establish the incomplete information static state game between banks and SMEs，and the evolution game model under the precondition of bounded rationality and find out the solution of that. It is found that banks can effectively control the financing risk of small and medium-sized borrowing companies by setting appropriate loan interest rates and pledge rates to realize the satisfied loan performance ratio；and reducing verification costs，increasing penalties for breach of contract，and adopting a dual incentive mechanism combining reputation value and honesty and rewards can effectively prevent SMEs' moral hazard and encourage them to adopt an honest business strategy.

Key words：inventory financing；default risk；moral hazard；incomplete information；bounded rationality；evolutionary game