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责任编辑：陈诗静

（Law School of Shenzhen University and Theoretical Economics Postdoctoral Workstation in Shenzhen University，Shenzhen

518060，Guangdong，China）

Abstract：The era of artificial intelligence has seen a significant expansion in data scale and continued optimization of algorithmic strength. Taking advantages of the close integration of big data and algorithm，business operators with strong technology and market power are able to collect and analyze relevant information that reflects characteristics and behaviors of consumers. Further，personalized pricing schemes can be implemented through charging each individual consumer a price that is personalized to match that consumer’s maximum willingness to pay. However，personalized pricing gives rise to the differential treatment of transaction prices for trading partners with identical conditions，which may constitute price discrimination prohibited by the Anti- monopoly Law. Unlike the exclusionary abuses which are constantly under the radar of enforcement authorities， personalized pricing practices are prominently manifested as exploitative abuses directed at end consumers，resulting in varied anti-competitive effects under different circumstances and dual restraints on the ability and scope of consumer choice. In view of this，it is necessary to adopt an antitrust regulatory approach that accurately identifies the conduct involved，comprehensively assesses the competitive effects and carefully chooses welfare standard. Personalized pricing that reduces both consumer surplus and total welfare can be deemed as having the effect of restricting competition without any justifications，thus violating the price discrimination clause of the Anti- monopoly Law；personalized pricing that reduces consumer surplus whereas increases total welfare can be deemed as unlawful under the consumer welfare standard as opposed to lawful under the total welfare standard. In addition，personalized pricing that improves both consumer surplus and total welfare involves surplus transfers between different consumers，therefore，further clarification as regards its legality needs to be given in the future antitrust enforcement.

Key words：big data discrimination；personalized pricing；price discrimination；exploitative abuse；consumer welfare