In defense of the CE and his decision on Wang Chau
Geoffrey Somers writes that Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying deserves credit for making the difficult decision to scale back and re-phase the Wang Chau housing project in Yuen Long
Decisions, decisions... Constantly throughout life we have to make decisions, and when we do so we try to carefully weigh the pros and cons of the matter concerned, always striving to choose the better of the two choices — yes or no. We now know that it was Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying who made the decision to scale back and re-phase the Wang Chau public housing project in Yuen Long. Manfully, and despite the considerable loss of “face” it involved, he has owned up to the fact, for which he deserves full credit, despite the knock-on effects of his decision.
In the present bubbling stew of controversial political and administrative affairs in Hong Kong, much criticism is being directed at Leung over what the media has dubbed the “Wang Chau scandal”, especially since we are now caught up in such a serious public housing crisis.
In the present poisonous atmosphere it would be very hard indeed to find objective observers expressing support for the CE, but he made that decision on Jan 27, 2014 when, admittedly, the public housing situation was quite worrying but nothing like the state into which it has now fallen.
In many cases where the decision turns out to be wrong the hapless culprit points out in his defense that “hindsight is 20-20 vision”, and indeed that is correct. Were it possible to wind the clock back we would be inclined to believe that not only would Leung reject the proposed cutback and re-phasing of the project, but those three uppermost officials attending that policy meeting with the CE — Chief Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam Cheng Yuetngor, Financial Secretary John Tsang Chunwah and Secretary for Justice Rimsky Yuen Kwok-keung — would all have opposed the proposal. Further, it is hard to imagine that they were prevented from expressing their opinions on the measure, which was the last item on the agenda at the actual meeting.
Like Leung, their judgment was strongly influenced by the Housing Department (HD) recommendation to go ahead with the first phase of building an initial 4,000 housing units but to defer Phases Two and Three. This delay was recommended to provide the time required to rehabilitate the worst section of the site, a large field of ruined former farmland presently being used by a rural businessman for car-parking and outdoor storage that hopefully will ultimately yield 13,000 more housing units.
To go against the professional advice of the HD would have meant building high-rise residential blocks on potentially unsafe land requiring extensive piling for reinforced foundation works. Since Leung was one of Hong Kong’s foremost land valuers before assuming his present position, he would have been well aware of the pros and cons of the HD proposal, and the full ramifications of its request.
Furthermore, almost certainly Leung and all three senior officials had in the back of their minds another very real public housing scandal in Yuen Long — when in the late 1990s HD officials investigated why it was proving so difficult to safely excavate land to make way for elevator shafts beneath some residential blocks under construction at Tin Shui Wai New Town. Tests soon revealed that short piling of as much as seven meters had taken place on the sites.
This appalling breach of basic safety pre- cautions was all the more serious when the history of the site was taken into account. Originally farmland, the area had later been flooded, turning much of the site into marshes and swamps. The then villagers took this opportunity to convert large stretches into a fishpond area. Thus special care had to be taken to bolster the foundations so that multistory residential blocks could safely be positioned on such seriously compromised land.
In 1999 the HD reported the case to the Independent Commission Against Corruption, and in February 2001, 20 suspects connected with the contractors responsible for the short piling were arrested. The ensuing court case saw the main two culprits jailed for four years and 10 months.
To ensure that there had been no other “funny business” a round of investigations was carried out across the large project, while the Housing Authority had to undertake extensive remedial works to the foundations of the affected blocks at a cost of HK$250 million.
Taking into account the history of the gradual spread of public housing across the New Territories and the difficulties often encountered with inferior sites, plus Leung’s expertise as a valuer acutely aware of the problems caused by such sites, isn’t it time that his critics weighed all the cogent points involved and ended their caustic barrage?
Time may prove that the flawed sections of that Yuen Long “brownfield” may first The author is former chief information officer of the Housing Authority and Housing Department, and subsequently editor of several English-language publications.
He (the CE) made that decision on Jan 27, 2014 when, admittedly, the public housing situation was quite worrying but nothing like the state into which it has now fallen.”
require very costly bolstering by way of reclamation plus extensive foundations.
Finally, let us not forget that the CE did not shrink from making a decision. He did not take the easy way out so often used by officialdom of referring it to a committee, where a decision would be made via the anonymous votes of its members, and, as the saying goes, “No names, no pack drill.”