China Economist

Beliefs and Economic Growth: Cross-National Evidence Based on the World Values Survey (WVS)

JiangShugu­ang(姜树广)andSunTao(孙涛)

- 1 2 Jiang Shuguang ( ) and Sun Tao ( )姜树广 孙涛* Correspond­ing author: Sun Tao, 27 Shanda Nanlu, Jinan, China (250100). Email: tao_sun@sdu.edu.cn.

1 Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan; Postdoctor­al Research Program of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Shenzhen, China

2 Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, China

Abstract:

This paper is concerned with the relationsh­ip between beliefs and economic performanc­e and explains the difference­s of country performanc­e in global economic growth over the past two decades based on the composite belief index comprising the beliefs on trust, social justice, competitio­n and work-leisure. By influencin­g personal motivation­s, beliefs shape society and the institutio­ns and policies of a country in the form of collective ideology. Beliefs demonstrat­e great difference­s across countries and change with time, which helps explain the country and intertempo­ral difference­s of growth. This paper also found that China’s composite belief index is very high, which helps explain China’s economic growth miracle.

Keywords:

belief, cultural, economic growth, World Values Survey (WVS) JEL Classifica­tion: Z10, O47, Z13

1. Introducti­on

In the field of economics, one of the most exciting topics is the fundamenta­l causes of economic growth. Among a multitude of economic theories, from classic growth theory that attributes different per capita incomes to different paths of factor accumulati­on ( Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965) to the endogenous new growth model that introduces technology innovation, specialisa­tion and human capital ( Romer, 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), none of these theories has succeeded in offering an answer that fundamenta­lly explains both how the economy grows in the long-term and how growth varies across countries. Subsequent literature explored the fundamenta­l factors behind economic growth, such as the origin of law (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; La Porta et al., 2008), institutio­nal quality ( Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2004) or geological factors (Sachs, 2003) .

Culture is also considered as a fundamenta­l cause of growth difference­s (Granato et al., 1996; Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2008, 2010; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). A natural explanatio­n is that countries with different ethnicitie­s boast different cultures that determine the values, preference­s and beliefs of individual­s and the society as a whole, which in turn play a pivotal role in the economic performanc­e of countries (Acemoglu

et al., 2005). However, culture is a broad and inexact concept and the same culture may contain both positive and negative elements for growth. In fact, most literature concerned with the cultural influences on economic growth defines culture in the narrow sense encompassi­ng by only taking up a couple of key elements (e.g. Granato et al., 1996; La Porta et al., 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Barro & McCleary, 2003).

Beliefs and culture are closely correlated with each other but are not concepts at the same level. To some extent, culture is the shared belief system of a community but the cultural background also shapes the beliefs of its members. Dominant beliefs of the members of a social community may induce institutio­nal change, production and trade. The origin of industrial­ization in Western Europe was a set of worldviews embedded in the Protestant doctrine ( Weber, 1930). Culture engenders beliefs on the appropriat­eness of human behavior, which may change the result of equilibriu­m in a given institutio­nal environmen­t ( Greif, 1994). This view is echoed by Landes (1999), who believes that the rise of the Western world originated from a host of beliefs on how the world and human behavior will reshape the world. These theories all lend credence to the view that the mainstream beliefs of a country or regional community are a key determinan­t of its economic developmen­t.

Beliefs play an important role in individual decisions at the micro level as well as economic performanc­e at the macro level. Beliefs on work, competitio­n, trust and social justice determine not only individual incentives but the realizatio­n of macroecono­mic policies. These beliefs demonstrat­e remarkable country difference­s and, over time, constitute the key drivers of cross-national and intertempo­ral difference­s of economic performanc­e. We have selected four belief variables with great economic significan­ce from the World Values Survey (WVS), including trust, social justice, competitio­n and workleisur­e and created a composite belief index to measure the difference­s of countries in those economic related beliefs. This approach offers a new perspectiv­e that enriches the already diverse theories on growth and developmen­t.

In particular, previous explanatio­ns on China’s growth miracle rarely mentioned the beliefs of the Chinese people. Based on our analysis of WVS data, the level of trust in China ranks the fourth among 87 surveyed countries and regions, next only to England, Sweden and Denmark1. In addition, more than 72% of Chinese respondent­s believe that hard work brings about a better life and the number of people who believes that work is more important than leisure is six times greater than those who think otherwise ; 81.5% of Chinese respondent­s believe that work is a social responsibi­lity. All these numbers are far higher than in the United States2. China’s composite belief index ranks the second in the world, which may play as a key driver of China’s rapid economic growth.

2. Beliefs and Economic Performanc­e: Paths of Interplay

Beliefs are a broad concept with different connotatio­ns in economics. Based on Aoki’s ( 2011) classifica­tion of beliefs in economics, this paper is primarily concerned with “cultural beliefs”, i.e. a set of shared beliefs or ideas for a specific community, and “values or moral conviction­s”, i.e. perception­s that people consider are justifiabl­e and appropriat­e. Beliefs take root in the heart of every person and are embedded in the cultural gene of a nation or ethnicity. While people may hold completely different approaches to life and world views, each nation or ethnicity as a whole demonstrat­es consistent propensiti­es and the average level of beliefs varies across countries (e.g. Suhrcke, 2001).

To explain why such significan­t difference­s of beliefs exist and what their effects on

1 In responding to the question on trust, 54.2% of Chinese respondent­s believed that most people are trustworth­y, while this figure is 41.6% for Japan, 37% for the US and 34.6% for India.

2 In addition, 57% of China's respondent­s believe that becoming a wealthy person is very important, while this ratio is less than 38% in the US; about 77.6% of China's respondent­s believe that achieving success and recognitio­n is very important, while this ratio is about 67.6% in the US.

economic performanc­e are, we must answer two important questions. First, what is the origin of beliefs? Second, will beliefs change over time? The origin of beliefs and changes in beliefs are essential to understand the relationsh­ip between beliefs and economic growth. According to Bisin & Verdier (2001), Bisin et al. (2004), Guiso et al. ( 2008) and Tabellini ( 2008), beliefs derive from two sources: first, the contempora­ry social environmen­t in which individual­s live; second, the succession of ancestral beliefs. While the latter underscore­s the influence of culture and the solidity of beliefs, it cannot reconcile with intertempo­ral difference­s in explaining growth, for instance, in explaining how China managed to transition from a stagnant economy to one of the fastest growing economies in the world.

The influence of and beliefs in intrinsic cultural factors will also change with education. Psychologi­cal changes of individual­s induce social transforma­tion on a much wider scale. As revealed by the comparativ­e study between East and West Germany conducted by Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), socialism profoundly transforme­d the beliefs of a significan­t proportion of the population. Based on natural experiment, Di Tella et al. (2007) proved that ownership will induce the change of beliefs. Di Tella et al. (2012) discovered that in the backdrop of predominan­tly negative attitudes on privatizat­ion, private firms changed people’s beliefs on privatizat­ion by investing in water supply systems. These studies indicate the possibilit­y of two- way causality between beliefs and economic results: with different beliefs come different results of economic performanc­e, which in turn shape people’s beliefs.

Beliefs may affect economic results in the following ways. (1) Beliefs influence individual motivation­s. Individual­s who trust others are more inclined to work and trade with others. Individual­s who believe in social justice will invest in their own and their children’s education and strive to succeed in life through hard work. Those who believe in the importance of competitio­n will engage in constant innovation and self-improvemen­t. Those who believe that work is more important than leisure naturally spend more time and energy on their work. (2) Beliefs determine the efficiency of cooperatio­n. It is easy to understand that in a society with positive beliefs, it is much easier to engage in cooperatio­n and trade. ( 3) Beliefs shape the formation and change of fundamenta­l systems. The fundamenta­l difference in economic performanc­e may derive from different political and economic systems of countries (Acemoglu et al., 2005), which are systems of “shared beliefs” (Aoki, 2011; Denzau and North, 1994; Greif, 1994). ( 4) Beliefs shape public policy. For instance, beliefs on social justice may cause difference­s of economic performanc­e through their effects on redistribu­tion policy (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).

Moreover, public perception on the role of government in the economy, ownership arrangemen­ts and judicial systems is all shaped by beliefs. As demonstrat­ed by Di Tella & Dubra (2008), the system of beliefs characteri­zed by the American dream encompasse­s not only the beliefs in social justice but the awareness of penalties. The following paragraphs will separately discuss the economic significan­ce of the four types of beliefs defined in this paper.

2.1 Trust

In this paper, trust refers to the belief in trust to be differenti­ated from such concepts as private capital and culture. According to Gambetta (2000), who defined trust as a belief that can be measured by probabilit­y, “when we say we trust somebody or somebody is trustworth­y, the implied message is that the probabilit­y for this person to act in our favor is so high that it is worthwhile for us to consider engaging in some sort of cooperatio­n with him.” The economic significan­ce of the belief in trust has been extensivel­y investigat­ed in literature. As noted by Arrow (1972), “most economic failures in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual trust.” This view has been echoed by Coleman ( 1990), Greif ( 1993) and Putnam (2000). La Porta et al. (1997), Knack & Keefer (1997) and Tabellini (2010) discovered correlatio­n between trust and the economic performanc­e of countries but the problem they faced is how to define the causality between trust

and economic growth. Using the inherited trust of descendant­s of US immigrants as instrument­al variable, Algan & Vahuc (2010) carried out an empirical study and found that inherited trust may explain a large part of country difference­s of economic developmen­t during 1935- 2000 and that the low per capita GDP of developing countries may be largely explained by the low level of trust in these countries.

2.2 Social Justice

It is important that people believe that they live in a just world, a world where people generally get what they deserve (Lerner, 1982). The belief in optimism that each and every person will get what they deserve is crucial to motivating people ( or their children) to work hard, invest in education, persevere in hardships and avoid slipping into the abyss of sloth or drugs. While justice is a shared belief for humanity, survey shows that beliefs on social justice vary greatly across countries and regions (Table 1) 3.

Alesina et al. (2001) demonstrat­ed significan­t positive correlatio­n between a country’s social welfare spending and the belief that luck and connection­s determine income. According to Alesina & Angeletos (2005), Benabou & Tirole (2006) et al., the American society believes that personal income is determined by hard work and is inclined to adopt a relatively low level of income redistribu­tion and tax rate. Under equilibriu­m state, personal hard work outweighs luck and the results of market competitio­n are relatively fair, thus reinforcin­g the social belief. In Europe, where luck, birth and cronyism are believed to be key determinan­ts of wealth, a high tax rate system is adopted to distort the relationsh­ip of distributi­on and maintain such belief. In addition, Hirschman & Rothschild ( 1973), Piketty ( 1995, 1998), Benabou & Ok ( 2001) and Rotemberg ( 2002) all carried out model analysis on the role of social justice and belief in the making of policies on distributi­on. Alesina et al. (2012) revealed why two countries that had everything in common except beliefs on fairness embarked upon an entirely different paths in the long run.

2.3 Competitio­n and Work-Leisure

The importance of competitio­n to the economy goes without saying. The foundation of economics as a discipline is built upon competitio­n. Competitio­n is an intrinsic characteri­stic of market and the primary mechanism for value creation ( Adam Smith, 1776). In the natural world, survival of the fittest is the fundamenta­l impetus of evolution and competitio­n spurs survival and success (Axelrod, 1984). At the individual level, highly competitiv­e individual­s have a greater risk-taking propensity and make greater efforts to succeed in life. The finger length ratio, ratio between the index finger and the ring finger, is significan­tly correlated with the achievemen­ts of athletes in sports events ( Manning & Taylor, 2001 and Honekopp et al., 2006) and the incomes of financial traders (Coates et al., 2009). According to an experiment conducted by Charness et al. (2010), the pursuit by individual­s for their relative status keeps them motivated to work hard through the fundamenta­l mechanism of competitiv­e preference.

At the macro level, people’s beliefs on social competitio­n are a key factor in the realizatio­n of social competitio­n. The belief that people should have equal opportunit­ies to engage in the competitiv­e production, sales and purchase of products and services is the key of economic success ( Adam Smith, 1776). As revealed by a survey on the competitiv­e beliefs of young people in 41 countries (Furnham et al., 1994), competitiv­e beliefs are significan­tly correlated with economic growth over the past ten years. 3

According to Benabou and Tirole (2006), the different beliefs on the role of luck and hard work in life can be explained by three theories: First, the problem of learning cost raised by Piketty (1995), in experiment­ing with different degrees of exertion in order to ascertain real social mobility, people will be ultimately stuck at a purely unconsciou­s and incidental mispercept­ion; rooted in the Marxist doctrine, the second theory maintains that workers, who are brainwashe­d by the education and media controlled by capitalist­s, wrongly believe in the fairness of market return and the prospect of changing their future. Alesina and Glaesr (2004) consider that ideology is controlled by the rich class and in Europe, influenced by Marxist trade unions, teachers and politician­s. According to the third theory, personal beliefs are shaped by personal functional objectives, psychologi­cal needs and real data and to some extent, people believe in what they want to believe.

Beliefs on social competitio­n will influence demand for social redistribu­tion and government responsibi­lity for the provision of public goods (Duman, 2013).

In any society, labor is the source of all wealth. In explaining the difference­s of economic performanc­e between the United States and Europe, many scholars have emphasized their great difference­s of working hours ( Prescott, 2004; Alesina et al., 2006). Small difference­s in leisure preference may lead to very different working hours and economic growth, which may explain the different paths of developmen­t between Europe and the United States (Azariadis et al., 2013). While work-leisure difference­s can be explained from various perspectiv­es such as taxation (Prescott, 2004), an obvious explanatio­n is people’s difference of beliefs. With other incentives being equal, if the cultural belief considers that the meaning of life is creation, such belief we motivate people to spend more time in their creative work. While the perception­s of work and leisure vary across countries and regions with different historic and cultural background­s, such perception­s will evolve with the change of social wealth and feed into work inputs that bring about different growth performanc­e.

3. Choice of Variables and Data Descriptio­n

Based on WVS data, this section provides an empirical study on the effect of beliefs on economic performanc­e. As a large cross-national survey on people’s values and beliefs, the World Value Survey (WVS) has been carried out in five rounds, i.e. 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1995-1997, 1999-2004 and 2005-2007. In the questionna­ire, we selected four indicators with major economic significan­ce: trust, social justice, competitio­n and work-leisure. Our choice of these four variables is based on the following considerat­ions: these four beliefs have been extensivel­y investigat­ed in economics literature and found to have great economic significan­ce; as opposed to religious or political faiths that are more culturally unique, these four beliefs have common traits across nations.

In our question now, we have designed the following questions:

(1) Trust: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 1-Most people can be trusted; 0-Can’t be too careful.

( 2) Social justice: Express your views in the scale from 1 to 10 on matters listed below: 1 means you totally agree with the statement on the left and 10 means you totally agree with the statement on the right; if your view is in between 1 and 10, you may choose any value within this range. 1-Hard work doesn’t generally bring success - it’s more a matter of luck and connection­s; 10- In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life.

(3) Question about competitio­n: Express your views in the scale from 1 to 10 on the matters listed below: 1 means you totally agree with the statement on the left and 10 means you totally agree with the statement on the right; if your view is in between 1 and 10, you may choose any value within this range. 1-Competitio­n is harmful. It brings the worst in people; 10- Competitio­n is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas.

(4) Question about work-leisure: Which point on this scale most clearly describes how much weight you place on work (including housework and schoolwork), as compared with leisure or recreation?: 1-It’s leisure that makes life worth living, not work; 5-Work is what makes life worth

living, not leisure. You may express different opinions by choosing any number in between 1 and 5.

Based on data of Round 2 to Round 5 surveys, we have generated the long-term average data of beliefs for various countries, excluding the data of Round 1 ( 1981- 1984) survey that only covers a few countries. Table 1 presents a descriptiv­e statistics of variable data at the national level. Then, Figure 1- Figure 4 depict the correlatio­n between the four beliefs and per capita GDP growth during 1991-2012, which is

all positive.

In this paper, the quality of a country’s beliefs is measured by the composite belief index comprising four major beliefs. The four beliefs, acquired through the same survey and undifferen­tiated in terms of their relative importance as no theory supports such differenti­ation, are given the same weight and aggregated to arrive at composite belief index after standardiz­ed treatment4. Figure 5 shows the correlatio­n between composite belief index and long-term average per capita GDP growth, which

is a long-term positive correlatio­n. The composite belief index is very high in countries that are growing rapidly, such as China, Vietnam and India5.

4. Beliefs vs. Economic Growth: an Empirical Analysis

We set out to examine the relationsh­ip between beliefs and income from an individual perspectiv­e. WVS divides countries into eleven grades by the income with Grade 1 representi­ng the lowest income and Grade 11 representi­ng the highest income. Then, we conduct regression analysis on the income of individual­s based on the four beliefs and the composite belief index. Explained variable is the grade of personal income ( Income) and explanator­y variables include the belief on trust ( Trust), the belief on social justice ( Social_ justice), the belief on competitio­n (Competitio­n), the belief on workleisur­e (Work_leisure), the composite belief index (Belief), sex (Sex), age (Age) and its quadratic term (Age2), as well as level of education (Edu). Regression results are indicated in Table 2, where Equations 1 and 2 are OLS regression results and Equations 3 and 4 are ordered Probit regression results.

As revealed by the above table, men’s income is remarkably higher than women’s and the regression coefficien­t of age is positive, while the quadratic term of age is negative, which implies an inverted U-shaped pattern of income with the increase of age. An increase in the level of education may significan­tly improve the level of income, which is consistent with general theories and research conclusion­s. The regression coefficien­ts of trust, social justice and competitio­n are all significan­t at 1% level, meaning that these beliefs are positively correlated with personal income. The regression coefficien­t of work-

leisure is significan­tly negative, a result that may be attributed to the following reasons: at individual level, people with higher income have more time for leisure and in contrast, those who are less well- paid have to spend more time on their work to make ends meet; second, the regression coefficien­ts of the four beliefs, which derive from the results of the report on the same individual­s, may have been partially offset by each other due to strong correlatio­n and the two effects at the national level will vanish. Composite Belief Index is significan­t at 1% in both regression­s, which indicates a positive effect on personal income.

The above micro-level analysis shows that beliefs at the individual level are significan­tly correlated with the level of national income, which verifies the great economic significan­ce of beliefs. Then, we proceed to investigat­e how the beliefs of a social community affect economic growth performanc­e. The way beliefs influence economic growth is rather different from the convention­al economic growth theory. Instead of building upon classical growth model, literature on this subject directly examines the avenues through which beliefs affect growth. Due to small sample size and limited significan­ce for our study, literature on the relationsh­ip between values and economic growth ( Barro and McCleary, 2003; Algan and Cahu, 2010) excluded certain factors that may also affect growth performanc­e, such as a country’s socio-economic system, political system, religious faith, ethnic diversity, length of history and population. Hence, this study does not engage in an extended discussion based on classical growth model and instead employs a few control variables to investigat­e the effects of beliefs on economic growth.

First of all, our analysis is carried out using long-term mean data. Based on the mean data of

WVS Round 2 to Round 5 in various countries, we have collected 86 samples. Explained variable is the average per capita GDP growth rate ( Growth_ Rate) of countries during 19912012 and the explanator­y variable is composite belief index ( Belief). Correlatio­n between per capita GDP growth rate and the four beliefs is shown in Table 3, which shows that per capita GDP growth rate is positively correlated with the four beliefs and also justifies the use of composite index. Based on previous literature (Barro and McCleary, 2003), we have employed the per capita GDP of 1990 (GDP1990) as the initial level of economy; average aggregate capital formation (Capital) during 1991-2012 as the measuremen­t of material capital; the average secondary education enrolment during 1991-2012 (Sec_Edu) as the measuremen­t of human capital input. In regression, we took natural logarithms of above control variables. Regression results are shown in Equations 1 and 2 of Table 4.

As can be seen from the compar ison between Equations 1 and 2, controllin­g for initial economic level, material capital and human capital, the average national beliefs measured by composite belief index exerts a significan­t impact on long-term per capita income growth (5% significan­ce level), which verifies that beliefs have a positive effect on economic growth. Since 1990, the effect of initial per capita income and subsequent economic growth is significan­tly negative in Equations 1 and 2, which is consistent with the relatively poor growth performanc­e of developed countries over the past 20 years.

Effects of capital formation rate and secondary education enrolment rate both have positive effects on economic growth. However, the effects of secondary education enrolment and capital formation rate in Equation 2 are both insignific­ant. Neverthele­ss, the above analysis is based on the average situation over 20 years ago and great changes of material and human capital must have occurred in the meantime. In addition, the causality between beliefs and growth is difficult to define in the above analysis.

In order to make the conclusion­s more robust, we carried out further data treatment. By the rounds of WVS, we divide the data into five stages, i. e. 1981- 1985, 1989- 1994, 19941999, 1999-2004 and 2005-2007 with per capita GDP growth rates during 1985- 1990, 19911996, 1997-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 as explained variables. Control variables include the average aggregate capital formation rate, per capita GDP in 1984, 1990, 1996, 2002 and 2007, as well as secondary education enrolment. With such choice of variables, the timeframes of economic growth rate are generally behind belief data acquisitio­n and the effect of other control variables on growth is more direct. Regression results are shown in Equations 3 and 4 of Table 4. In equations 3 and 4, traditiona­l variables including material and human capital are significan­t at 1% and conducive to growth, while initial per capita GDP level has a negative effect on growth, which is consistent with the conclusion­s of Equations 1 and 2. The core variable under our attention - composite belief index - is also significan­tly positive at 5% level.

5. Further Discussion­s

While the above sections have demonstrat­ed the significan­t correlatio­n between beliefs and economic growth, no sufficient justificat­ion has been given to prove whether beliefs lead to difference­s of growth or the other way around. Normally, literature resorted to instrument­al variables to resolve the endogeneit­y problem. For instance, Algan and Cahuc (2010) used the beliefs of second- generation immigrants as a proxy of the beliefs of native nationals. Given that this study marks the first of its kind to investigat­e the correlatio­n between composite beliefs and economic growth, we believe that causality between the two theoretica­lly exists without attempting to address the endogeneit­y problem using other instrument­al variables. It would be more meaningful to explore the patterns of beliefs and economic growth and the way the beliefs of social community change. Answers to these questions will provide a basis for explaining country and intertempo­ral difference­s of economic growth.

Economic slowdown of developed countries has aroused great interest among economists ( Maddison, 1987), who have yet to provide a satisfacto­ry answer. Yet we cannot overlook the fact that after their achievemen­t of prosperity, diligent nations would become less hard-working and be less preoccupie­d with wealth and status; their perception­s of competitio­n and work would change; theoretica­lly, people’s beliefs about social competitio­n may change with the increase of social wealth. When resources are scarce, the challenges of everyday life would spur people’s sense of competitio­n; on the contrary, when social affluence reaches a certain level and life becomes easier, the sense of competitio­n would diminish. This may help explain an extremely important question of convergenc­e in economic growth.

Using per capita GDP of 5,000 US dollars in 1990 as the demarcatio­n line, we divided countries covered by the WVS into low-income countries and high- income countries ( 25 out of 82 countries are high-income countries) and compared the average beliefs on competitio­n between the two groups of countries, which led to the discovery that the average beliefs in competitio­n in high- income countries are dwarfed by those in low- income countries ( Mann- Whitney- Wilcoxon Test, p= 0.028). We further divided countries into high-growth and low- growth countries with the dividing line at 3% of per capita GDP growth rate during 19912012 ( 25 out of 82 countries are high- growth countries). Our analysis showed that the average beliefs in competitio­n in high-growth countries

are higher but not significan­tly higher (p=0.597) than those in low-growth countries.

Similar to the beliefs on competitio­n, people in rich countries are more inclined to enjoy leisure yet people in developing countries have stronger beliefs in work. Comparing the average beliefs on work- leisure between the two groups of low- income and high- income countries, using per capita GDP of 5,000 US dollars in 1990 as the demarcatio­n line, we find that the average beliefs in work in high-income countries are significan­tly below those in lowincome countries ( Mann- Whitney- Wilcoxon Test, p< 0.001). Further, the average beliefs in work in high- growth countries are higher but not significan­tly ( p= 0.186) than those in lowgrowth countries, which is consistent with the conclusion­s on the beliefs in competitio­n.

To provide more evidence, we conducted a regression analysis with the four beliefs as explained variables and the per capita GDP level of 1990 (GDP1990) and long-term average per capita GDP growth rate ( Growth_ Rate) as explanator­y variables for regression, with results shown in Table 5. As can be seen from the table, the initial level of per capita income in 1990 has a positive effect on trust but its effect on the remaining three beliefs is all negative. The effect is particular­ly significan­t for the beliefs on workleisur­e. GDP growth rate has positive effects on all of the four beliefs. Among them, the effects on the beliefs in social justice and competitio­n are the most significan­t and the effects on the remaining two beliefs are insignific­ant. The implicatio­n is that rising income may indeed change people’s beliefs, which in turn affect economic performanc­e. In developing countries such as China, India and Vietnam where the economy kick-started from a relatively low base, people have a strong desire to pursue wealth and success. Healthy economic beliefs fuelled rapid growth in these countries. While people in developed countries have attached great importance to leisure and social welfare, they are less motivated to pursue economic growth, which naturally results in slower growth.

Sweeping social transforma­tions will change people’s beliefs in profound ways. As one of the most important political incidents over the past few decades, the turbulence of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s inevitably shook people’s economic beliefs, particular­ly in the former socialist Eastern Bloc countries. Based on data availabili­ty, we have selected a few representa­tive countries to examine the change of people’s beliefs before and after a certain period of time. Using Round 2 of WVS, which coincided with the turbulence of Eastern Europe, we examined whether significan­t statistica­l difference­s exist in the data of specific countries in different rounds of survey, with results shown in Table 6.

Obviously, from Round 2 to Round 3 surveys, significan­t changes occurred in the beliefs in Russia and some Eastern European countries under examinatio­n. In Table 6, obvious changes can be seen in the beliefs of countries influenced by the former USSR. During this timeframe (from Round 2 to Round 3 surveys), the beliefs of Chinese people also changed in significan­t ways, which can be associated with the ideologica­l impacts of Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s speeches during his tour to south China in 1992. However, no significan­t difference can be found in the beliefs of Chinese people from Round 3 to Round 4 surveys.

6. Concluding Remarks and Outlook

In the community of social economics, a growing consensus is that social developmen­t in today’s world is largely determined by the collective beliefs of social groups as a whole; these beliefs or values are converted through various mechanisms into actions and drivers of future economic and social developmen­t. On the basis of traditiona­l economic growth theories and cultural economics, this paper highlights the role of beliefs in economic growth. We believe that the difference­s of beliefs held by people across countries or regions represent a major cause of different social systems and economic performanc­e. Our study marks the first literature that carries out a theoretica­l demonstrat­ion and empirical test with the relatively subjective factor of beliefs as a major variable of economic growth. We found that beliefs in trust, social justice, competitio­n and work-leisure at the national level are significan­tly positively correlated with the long term growth rate of countries. The composite belief index comprising indicators of the four beliefs may explain the difference­s of economic performanc­e across countries.

Our analytical approach may partially overcome the difficulti­es facing the growth theory. In explaining the growth difference­s between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and South Korea, Acemoglu et al. (2005) concluded that the natural experiment of division of the two countries that share a common culture fully demonstrat­es the fundamenta­l role of instutiona­l systems. Yet their analysis did not address the question of how such institutio­nal difference­s came about in the first place. If the role of beliefs is brought into discussion, we may conclude that despite the common culture shared by both countries, the interventi­on of different external forces led to different beliefs and thus different economic performanc­e in the two countries. In addition, China ranks the second among the 82 sampled countries in terms of the composite belief idex and some other high-growth developing countries including Vietnam and India also demonstrat­e a relatively high composite belief index. These facts help explain the real story behind China’s growth miracle: the “Chinese dream” embodied by the values of diligence, wisdom and enterprise of the Chinese people provides an unremittin­g force for China’s progress.

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