China Economist

Capacity Building-Oriented Cooperatio­n between China and BRI Countries

- LiXiaohua(李晓华)

Abstract:

This paper identifies the internatio­nal industrial capacity cooperatio­n led by the Chinese government and participat­ed by Chinese companies under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as “inclusive industrial capacity cooperatio­n with a capacity-building orientatio­n.” BRI cooperatio­n demonstrat­es brand-new characteri­stics compared with previous internatio­nal direct investment­s in terms of participan­ts, investment areas and results. BRI cooperatio­n aims to enhance local developmen­t capacity, promote economic developmen­t, increase exports, and improve industrial ecosystems. In the long run, internatio­nal industrial capacity cooperatio­n under the BRI helps achieve sustainabl­e developmen­t in China and BRI countries for multi-win results. Yet risks and challenges also warrant attention and require countermea­sures.

Keywords:

industrial capacity cooperatio­n, internatio­nal direct investment, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), capacity, inclusiven­ess

JEL Classifica­tion Codes: F21, O14

DOI: 1 0.19602/j .chinaecono­mist.2020.03.02

When a country gains economic clout, it will start to acquire technologi­cal, managerial, branding and other advantages, and tends to invest overseas to explore markets and control intermedia­te inputs and the supply chain. Since 2000, China has seen strong momentum in the growth of overseas direct investment (ODI). The amount of China’s ODI increased from 916 million US dollars in 2000 to 12.26 billion US dollars in 2005, 55.91 billion US dollars in 2008, 107.84 billion US dollars in 2013, and 196.15 billion US dollars in 2016. In 2015, China became a net capital exporter. In 2015 and 2016, China’s net investment outflow amounted to 10.06 billion US dollars and 62.44 billion US dollars, respective­ly.

There is a positive theoretica­l and temporal correlatio­n between the amount of ODI and economic developmen­t. As a late-moving economy, China invests overseas in significan­tly different ways from the ODI of developed countries in history, particular­ly for the “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) and internatio­nal industrial capacity cooperatio­n under the BRI. Previous studies on the topic of BRI have focused on the BRI’s implicatio­ns and strategic significan­ce, China’s trade in goods with BRI countries, the BRI’s implicatio­ns for economic and trade relations between China and involved countries, institutio­nal mechanisms for industrial capacity cooperatio­n, among other aspects. Unlike these studies, this paper investigat­es the new characteri­stics of internatio­nal capacity cooperatio­n under the BRI, i.e.

“inclusive industrial capacity cooperatio­n with a capacity-building orientatio­n.”

1. Implicatio­ns of Inclusive Industrial Capacity Cooperatio­n with a CapacityBu­ilding Orientatio­n

Amid the transforma­tions in the layout of the internatio­nal division of labor and industrial structure of developed countries, the rise of China’s manufactur­ing industry has turned China into a key participan­t and pioneer of internatio­nal industrial capacity cooperatio­n. From September to October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the “New Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” cooperatio­n initiative­s, which are collective­ly referred to as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). On March 28, 2015, the National Developmen­t and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce jointly released the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which laid out specific goals, principles and plans. Unlike the approach followed by developed countries and their multinatio­nal companies in history, China follows an inclusive approach of industrial capacity cooperatio­n with a capacity-building orientatio­n under the BRI.

China’s approach differs from traditiona­l internatio­nal direct investment in terms of the “capacitybu­ilding orientatio­n” and “inclusiven­ess.”

1.1 Capacity-Building Orientatio­n

For a country, developing capacity for economic growth matters much more than short- term investment- driven growth. Despite the positive economic growth effect in the short run, direct investment­s from developed countries may cause developing countries to fall into the “middle-income trap” or “low-income trap.” While the developmen­t of natural resources fuels economic growth in the short run, technology innovation has a more significan­t and lasting growth effect. Except for a few oilexporti­ng countries, most high-income countries are not blessed with abundant natural resources.

Michael Porter (2012) divides production factors into primary and advanced production factors. Primary production factors refer to endowed factors or those that can be acquired with a limited amount of investment, such as natural resources, climate, geographic­al location, nonskilled labor and semiskille­d labor, and access to finance. Yet primary production factors are relatively easy to replace. For instance, a change in demographi­cs may lead to an oversupply of labor. Countries with a greater cost advantage may emerge. Natural resources may become exhausted. All these changes may cause a country to lose its advantage based on primary production factors. Since primary production factors are endowed resources, we refer to the comparativ­e advantage based on primary production factors as resource-based comparativ­e advantage.

Advanced production factors, on the other hand, can only be acquired with extensive investment­s and decades of technology developmen­t. Such factors include modern infrastruc­ture, educated workforce, and universiti­es and research institutes. Advanced production factors are embedded in systems, institutio­ns (enterprise­s and universiti­es), and highly qualified profession­als, which are more difficult to replace and of greater importance to a country’s industrial and economic developmen­t. Therefore, we refer to such comparativ­e advantage based on advanced production factors as capacityba­sed comparativ­e advantage.

According to developmen­tal economics, less developed countries have to spend almost all their incomes, and even more, on subsistenc­e. Without sufficient resources for economic takeoff, less developed countries struggle to jumpstart their stagnant economy. The role of government in industrial­ization has been controvers­ial. Judging by the experience of many rich countries, including the United States, Japan and the Four Asian Tigers some believe that government interventi­on plays a pivotal role in the early stage of industrial developmen­t. Others, however, reckon the picking-winner

strategy is likely to fail due to government failure (the inability to identify appropriat­e policy goals and instrument­s and effectivel­y implement policies), particular­ly in developing countries.

Yet the potential harms of government failure do not suggest that fewer interventi­ons are always an optimal choice. There is a trade-off between government failure and market failure. For the poorest developing countries without a well-functionin­g market, their economic developmen­t requires a strong boost to help escape the low-income trap. Based on a study on the relationsh­ip between government interventi­on and per capita GDP growth in 81 developing countries from 1980 to 1990, Bjorvatn and Coniglio ( 2012) find that developing countries with less industrial policy may not grow faster. Their theoretica­l model demonstrat­es the necessity of ambitious pro-investment policies to stimulate industrial­ization; such policies may prove to be more successful in the least developed countries (LDCs).

As the saying goes, “give a man a fish and he will eat for a day. Teach a man how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” Investment­s in primary healthcare, roads, power plants, ports and other public goods and services are vital to the economic takeoff of developing countries. However, many developing countries lack the capital and funds for economic takeoff. Unlike traditiona­l internatio­nal direct investment, the BRI aims to assist developing countries in improving infrastruc­ture, developing industries, and enhancing indigenous capabiliti­es for economic developmen­t through internatio­nal cooperatio­n. The Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road calls for “infrastruc­ture connectivi­ty,” which encompasse­s the developmen­t of trunk line communicat­ion networks including transporta­tion, energy and cross-border optical fiber infrastruc­ture connectivi­ty. “Trade facilitati­on” contains such elements of bilateral and multilater­al cooperatio­n as customs clearance, inspection and quarantine, certificat­ion and authentica­tion, standardiz­ation and metrology, as well as statistica­l data. Trade facilitati­on aims to broaden trade areas, eliminate barriers to investment, explore mutual investment areas, promote cooperatio­n in emerging industries, and optimize the layout of the industrial division of labor.

Since its announceme­nt, the BRI has come a long way and contribute­d to indigenous capacity in relevant countries. According to the Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and China’s Contributi­on released by the Steering Office for BRI Implementa­tion, many crude oil, natural gas pipeline, energy, electric power and communicat­ion projects have started constructi­on. By the end of 2016, China had created seven key developmen­t and opening-up experiment zones, 17 border economic cooperatio­n zones and two bilateral border economic cooperatio­n zones in its border provinces and autonomous regions. The 56 economic and trade cooperatio­n zones under constructi­on by Chinese companies in the 20 BRI countries have received a cumulative amount of investment exceeding 18.5 billion US dollars. Remarkable achievemen­ts have been made in the developmen­t of the China-Belarus Industrial Park, the Thai-Chinese Rayong Industrial Zone, and the China-Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperatio­n Zone.

1.2 Inclusiven­ess

The full concept of “inclusive growth” was articulate­d by the Asian Developmen­t Bank (ADB) for the first time in 2007. Inclusive growth aims to create equal opportunit­ies for everyone (Ali and Zhuang, 2007). Later, more and more developing countries have embraced inclusive growth as their developmen­t policy. Partners of developing countries, including bilateral and multilater­al aid agencies, internatio­nal organizati­ons, non-government­al organizati­ons (NGOs) and civil society, have also accepted the concept of inclusive growth (Zhuang, 2008). Inclusiven­ess has become a principle that China pursues in its economic developmen­t.

At the APEC meeting in 2009, then Chinese President Hu Jintao highlighte­d the importance to “follow a holistic approach and advocate inclusive growth” in his keynote speech. At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on July 29, 2014, General Secretary Xi Jinping stressed

that China’s developmen­t “must be inclusive developmen­t that follows the laws of social developmen­t,” and put forward the goal to create a community of shared interests, destinies and responsibi­lities for the human society. On January 18, 2017, Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech titled “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind” at a high-level meeting at the Palace of Nations in Geneva. In his speech, he called for building an open and inclusive world of lasting peace, common security, common prosperity, and making the world clean and beautiful by pursuing green and lowcarbon developmen­t.

In this paper, we define “inclusiven­ess” as equal access for countries to growth opportunit­ies in internatio­nal economic relations to achieve sustainabl­e developmen­t and share in the benefits of economic developmen­t. An important goal of inclusive internatio­nal industrial capacity cooperatio­n is to ensure that economic growth benefits more countries and people. Economic developmen­t and people’s rising incomes will, in turn, contribute to world economic growth and create a positive feedback loop. BRI cooperatio­n will benefit all countries involved, including China, as well as the rest of the world.

Unlike internatio­nal direct investment­s dominated by developed countries, China calls for inclusive internatio­nal industrial capacity cooperatio­n under the BRI. At the BRI Internatio­nal Cooperatio­n Summit Forum hosted by the Chinese government in May 2017, heads of state and government from 30 countries and representa­tives from the United Nations, the World Bank and the Internatio­nal Monetary Fund ( IMF) endorsed the Joint Communique of the BRI Internatio­nal Cooperatio­n Summit Forum Roundtable Summit. The Joint Communique states that “countries, particular­ly developing countries, still face common challenges in eradicatin­g poverty, promoting inclusive and sustained economic growth, and achieving sustainabl­e developmen­t.” Under the BRI and other cooperatio­n frameworks, countries should commit themselves to developing the open economy, safeguardi­ng free and inclusive trade, and opposing protection­ism of all forms under the principle of “harmony and inclusiven­ess.”

Countries should “respect natural and cultural diversity, and believe that all cultures and civilizati­ons may contribute to sustainabl­e developmen­t.” Countries should strive to achieve the vision of “open and inclusive globalizat­ion,” as well as “inclusive and sustainabl­e growth and people’s improving living standards.” The BRI is a manifestat­ion of inclusive globalizat­ion - a vision for all BRI countries in their industrial capacity cooperatio­n (Liu, 2015). Under inclusive globalizat­ion, countries act as “modulators,” address the problem of capital market “maturity mismatch,” pursue developmen­t paths in light of their national conditions, create a level playing field for the participat­ion of all stakeholde­rs in globalizat­ion, and protect cultural diversity in economic globalizat­ion (Liu, et al., 2017).

Inclusiven­ess also concerns the balance between short-term and long-term developmen­t and economic sustainabi­lity. China has experience­d setbacks in pursuing sustainabl­e developmen­t. Relentless manufactur­ing expansion with a low level of technology exceeded environmen­tal capacity and wrought damages to the environmen­t. Since the dawn of the new century, the Chinese government has attached great importance to sustainabl­e developmen­t. The “new-type industrial­ization” in the Report to the 16th CPC National Congress is characteri­zed by “low resource consumptio­n and less environmen­tal pollution.” The concept that “lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets” put forward by General Secretary Xi Jinping has elevated the theory of sustainabl­e developmen­t to a new level.

The Chinese government has enacted a host of policies to propel the green transforma­tion, develop the circular economy, foster low-carbon green industries, and enhance pollution treatment. With these efforts and huge corporate investment­s, China has approached internatio­nally advanced levels of technology and pollution abatement in petrochemi­cal, chemical engineerin­g, steel, nonferrous metals and building material sectors. By relocating upgraded world-class technologi­es to BRI countries, Chinese companies will help developing countries to achieve economic sustainabi­lity.

2. New Characteri­stics of Inclusive Industrial Capacity Cooperatio­n with a Capacity-Building Orientatio­n

Under the BRI, inclusive industrial capacity cooperatio­n with a capacity-building orientatio­n led by China demonstrat­es distinctiv­e new characteri­stics in terms of the participan­ts, investment areas and results.

2.1 Participan­ts of the BRI

Convention­al internatio­nal industrial capacity cooperatio­n occurred primarily between developed and developing countries. As far as developed countries are concerned, their industrial cooperatio­n with developing countries mainly occurred through multinatio­nal companies rather than government­s themselves. After the World War II, the United States implemente­d the “Marshall Plan” to offer economic aid and assist reconstruc­tion in the war-ravaged Western Europe. As a typical model of government-led internatio­nal industrial cooperatio­n, the Marshall Plan was introduced in 1947 and ended in 1961. Subsequent government aid programs implemente­d by developed countries in developing countries were limited in size and scope, and even had strings attached. In most cases, industrial relocation was spearheade­d by multinatio­nal companies from developed countries.

China has called for integratin­g the BRI with the national strategies, visions and master plans of BRI countries as an entry point for BRI cooperatio­n. By the end of 2016, over 100 countries have expressed their support and intent to participat­e in the BRI. China has entered into 46 cooperatio­n agreements for BRI developmen­t with 39 countries and internatio­nal organizati­ons for a broad range of cooperatio­n areas, such as interconne­ctivity, industrial capacity, investment, economic and trade ties, finance, technology, social and cultural programs, people’s welfare, and maritime cooperatio­n. China has also created bilateral and multilater­al cooperatio­n mechanisms with BRI countries and “double track” dialogue, exchanges and cooperatio­n (Steering Office for BRI Implementa­tion, 2017). While the government creates platforms and frameworks, companies are responsibl­e for the implementa­tion of industrial capacity cooperatio­n.

2.2 Different Priorities of Investment

Previous internatio­nal direct investment­s and industrial cooperatio­n were primarily driven by profitcent­ered multinatio­nal companies with little involvemen­t of government agencies and internatio­nal organizati­ons. Multinatio­nal companies from developed countries invested in profitable projects and industries in developing countries, focusing on the following three areas: (1) direct investment in the mining sector to access natural resources from developing countries; (2) investment in industrial sectors or value chain links in which developing countries boast a comparativ­e advantage; (3) investment in product (such as food, beverage and building materials) and service sectors that need to be manufactur­ed and provided locally in developing countries.

Unlike convention­al internatio­nal direct investment in profitable industries, China’s BRI covers a broad range of economic and cultural cooperatio­n. (1) Aside from pragmatic cooperatio­n in key areas of interconne­ctivity, industrial capacity cooperatio­n, trade and investment, the BRI also puts a great premium on all kinds of cultural communicat­ion and exchanges between BRI countries for common economic and cultural prosperity and developmen­t. (2) Aside from profitable industrial sectors like raw materials, equipment manufactur­ing, light industry, clean energy, environmen­tal protection and hightech sectors, the BRI also encompasse­s economic and trade zones that cannot directly create profits or require a long investment cycle but can boost the manufactur­ing capacity of host countries. For instance, Chinese enterprise­s have invested in 56 economic and trade cooperatio­n zones in 20 BRI countries with a cumulative investment exceeding 18.5 billion US dollars. Typical examples include the China-Belarus Industrial Park, the Thai-Chinese Rayong Industrial Zone, and the China-Egypt TEDA Suez Economic

& Trade Cooperatio­n Zone. ( 3) The BRI also aims to promote infrastruc­ture constructi­on and interconne­ctivity, including railways, highways, ports, electric power and IT. Most infrastruc­ture projects are capital-intensive with a long payback period. In the least developed countries, it takes time to build a whole network of infrastruc­ture and bring its significan­t positive externalit­ies into full play. Therefore, infrastruc­ture investment hardly pays off in the short run in such countries. China’s investment in the numerous low- return sectors with a long payback period, including infrastruc­ture constructi­on, is of great significan­ce to the capacity building and economic takeoff of developing countries.

2.3 Different Results of Internatio­nal Industrial Relocation

Different participan­ts, investment areas and industrial cooperatio­n goals have led to different results of economic developmen­t in developing countries as recipients of internatio­nal direct investment. Under the convention­al model, multinatio­nal companies from developed countries dominate leading industries in developing countries. Profit-driven multinatio­nal companies also tend to curb economic growth in developing countries to maintain the latter’s status as exporters of raw materials, processing and assembly locations of cheap industrial goods, and markets for finished products.

Developing countries are at the low- end of the global division of labor that offers paper- thin profitabil­ity, while most profits are garnered by multinatio­nal companies. As a result, developing countries lack capital accumulati­on for an industrial upgrade, and are unable to foster capital, knowledge and technology-based capabiliti­es. Their inextricab­le dependence on natural resources, cheap labor and a crude developmen­t pattern have led to the “middle-income trap” or even the “low-income trap.” As can be seen from Table 1, the per capita GDP difference between high-income countries and the least developed countries stood at 9,053.9 US dollars in 1980, and widened to 40,151.1 US dollars in 2017. Even by the 2010 constant price, this gap has expanded from 22,184.1 US dollars in 1980 to 40,620.8 US dollars.

In comparison, internatio­nal capacity cooperatio­n under the BRI is driven by the government and participat­ed by enterprise­s covering a broad range of cooperatio­n areas and goals. In making overseas direct investment­s, China and Chinese enterprise­s focus more on long-term interests and are committed to assisting developing countries in their capacity building to enable them to share in the dividends of world economic developmen­t.

3. Inclusive Capacity Cooperatio­n Mechanism with a Capacity-Building Orientatio­n

Inclusive capacity cooperatio­n with a capacity-building orientatio­n under the BRI encompasse­s mechanisms for enhancing indigenous capacity, promoting economic developmen­t, developing industrial ecosystems and expanding exports. This process will bring about multi-win results for China and BRI countries.

3.1 Enhancing Indigenous Capacity in Developing Countries through Infrastruc­ture Constructi­on

Infrastruc­ture constructi­on is capital-intensive with a long payback period. Less developed countries usually lack the funds for infrastruc­ture investment. The extent to which infrastruc­ture investment drives economic growth is subject to not only the nature of infrastruc­ture itself but also many other factors such as institutio­nal systems and policies. The high uncertaint­ies and risks of infrastruc­ture investment have deterred commercial capital and locked some developing countries into a “low-level trap.”

Infrastruc­ture constructi­on in developing countries requires “patient capital” or “long-term visionary capital” (Lin and Wang, 2017). State guarantee will encourage commercial capital to invest in long-term projects that require more patience. Infrastruc­ture interconne­ctivity is a priority of BRI developmen­t, which must be supported by financial intermedia­tion. Since the BRI’s announceme­nt, China has put forward a cooperatio­n framework of “six corridors, six routes and multiple ports in various countries.” “Six routes” refer to railway, highway, shipping, aviation, pipeline and an integrated spatial informatio­n network. “Multiple ports” refer to a few safe and reliable ports for maritime transporta­tion.

With a poor level of infrastruc­ture, rapidly growing low-cost countries have a tremendous demand for basic raw materials such as steel, building materials and nonferrous metals, as well as railways, power plants and manufactur­ing equipment. China boasts the world’s largest infrastruc­ture-related manufactur­ing capacity for steel, nonferrous metals, cement and glass, and internatio­nal competitiv­eness for constructi­on machinery, engineerin­g machinery and transporta­tion equipment. Massive domestic infrastruc­ture constructi­on has fostered strong surveying, design and constructi­on capabiliti­es. With the participat­ion of the Chinese government and enterprise­s, developing countries will enhance their indigenous developmen­t capabiliti­es by improving domestic infrastruc­ture and connectivi­ty. China’s participat­ion in the infrastruc­ture constructi­on of BRI countries will also drive its export of building materials, engineerin­g machinery, transporta­tion equipment, and constructi­on services.

3.2 Indigenous Capacity Drives Economic Growth in Developing Countries

Infrastruc­tures such as highways, railways and ports are the prerequisi­tes for developing countries to connect with the rest of the world. Only by constructi­ng modern infrastruc­tures will developing countries turn their comparativ­e advantages into real internatio­nal competitiv­eness and engage in trade based on their respective comparativ­e advantages. Such infrastruc­tures will, for instance, facilitate the transporta­tion of primary mineral resources from producing areas to ports and railways for export, and allow developing countries to foster less capital-intensive textiles industry based on their comparativ­e advantage of cheap labor. Economic growth arising from infrastruc­ture improvemen­t will generate fiscal revenues that support further infrastruc­ture constructi­on, creating a benign cycle (Lin and Wang, 2017).

Currently, some BRI developing countries have already seen their economic growth pick up speed. As Table 2 shows, among countries with population­s above 5 million and GDP above 10 billion US dollars, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Nepal, Turkey, Bangladesh, Tanzania and Romania exceeded China’s GDP growth rates in 2017. Countries like Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Senegal, Burkina Faso, the Philippine­s, India, Turkmenist­an, Myanmar, Malaysia, Pakistan, Mali, Uzbekistan and Indonesia recorded GDP growth rates above 5%, which are close to China’s. Most of these countries are BRI countries. The BRI is an open and inclusive platform for all interested countries. Except for more

developed Turkey, Turkmenist­an and Malaysia, other high-growth countries generally have a per capita GDP around 1,000 to 2,000 US dollars, ranking among low-income countries.

For China, the economic takeoff and growth of BRI countries will boost investment, industrial upgrade, consumptio­n and demand for investment goods and industrial components. Consumptio­n upgrade will create demand for consumer goods such as television­s, air conditione­rs, washing machines, computers, mobile phones, motorcycle­s and automobile­s. The developmen­t of laborinten­sive industries will drive demand for manufactur­ing equipment, instrument­s and meters, electronic

components, raw materials and other inputs. These industrial sectors are those that have been relocated by developed countries and are yet to be fostered by low-cost developing countries. China’s internatio­nal competitiv­eness in these sectors offers opportunit­ies to increase its exports of consumer and investment goods.

3.3 Promoting Export and Economic Developmen­t Based on Comparativ­e Advantage

The interconne­ctivity of transporta­tion helps developing countries foster indigenous capabiliti­es and export resource products, including mineral and agricultur­al products. Meanwhile, a large amount of investment will flow into the labor-intensive industrial sectors in developing countries with a cheap labor advantage. Finished goods from labor-intensive sectors in developing countries will be exported to global markets. Under this model, BRI countries are expected to achieve full employment and rapid economic growth.

For China, expanding exports from BRI countries offers the following benefits: First, inexpensiv­e and high-quality consumer goods and local products from various countries will offer a boon to Chinese consumers and cut their cost of living. Second, if Chinese enterprise­s manage to climb up the industrial value chain, their imports of low-cost raw materials and components from BRI countries will contribute to the cost competitiv­eness of Chinese products.

3.4 Infrastruc­ture and Industrial Developmen­t Help Improve Industrial Ecosystem in Developing Countries

According to mainstream economics since Adam Smith, the division of labor is subject to market scope, and may also be interprete­d as the extent to which industrial scale determines the level of specializa­tion. By entering global markets based on their comparativ­e advantages, BRI countries will expand their labor-intensive industries, which in turn will boost upstream industries. For instance, the textiles industry correspond­s to upstream fabrics, dyeing, textiles, plastic product and metal product industries. The expansion of upstream industries further enables capital-intensive industries such as steel and petrochemi­cals to develop economies of scale and profitabil­ity. In a word, infrastruc­ture connectivi­ty helps developing countries foster labor- intensive industries as the foundation for capital- intensive industries and the industrial ecosystem.

Factor cost such as labor cost is not the only determinan­t of a country’s industrial competitiv­eness. The conversion of factor advantage into real internatio­nal competitiv­eness is also subject to the quality of industrial ecosystem. If a country lacks access to upstream raw materials, it has to import such materials from abroad. Yet pricey raw materials imported from other countries will dent its factor cost advantage, and the long supply cycle will cause the supply chain to respond slowly to changes in the downstream market.

With rising labor and other factor costs, China’s labor-intensive industries are losing their price advantage. Many BRI countries are less developed with much cheaper labor than China’s. By moving labor-intensive industries to low-cost developing countries and prodding domestic firms to upgrade towards R&D, design, branding and premium goods, Chinese enterprise­s will be able to keep their price advantage in global markets and dominate the global value chain.

4. Recommenda­tions on Inclusive Industrial Capacity Cooperatio­n with a Capacity-Building Orientatio­n

With the goal of inclusive developmen­t, BRI internatio­nal industrial capacity cooperatio­n is expected to achieve a win-win situation and sustainabl­e developmen­t in BRI countries. Yet the risks also warrant close attention. Efforts must be made on the following fronts for the BRI’s sound developmen­t.

First, adhering to the principles of mutual benefit and win-win results. BRI internatio­nal industrial

capacity cooperatio­n helps developing countries enhance infrastruc­ture constructi­on and connect with global markets to bring about comparativ­e advantages and foster indigenous growth capacity. Growth in developing countries also contribute­s to China’s domestic economic upgrade. Instead of benefiting specific countries, BRI internatio­nal capacity cooperatio­n will lead to win-win results for all participat­ing countries. This principle should be recognized and endorsed by all BRI countries.

Second, enterprise­s should lead BRI cooperatio­n. As the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road points out, the BRI aims to promote the flow of economic factors, resource allocation, market integratio­n and broader and deeper regional cooperatio­n at a higher level to build an open, inclusive and balanced structure for regional economic cooperatio­n. While participat­ing government­s may create BRI cooperatio­n frameworks, enterprise­s should decide the scale and speed of the constructi­on of transporta­tion infrastruc­ture, industrial zones and projects based on their analysis of investment conditions in host countries and the investment value of projects.

Third, strengthen­ing risk mitigation. Given the political instabilit­y, inadequate legal system and poor economic conditions in some BRI countries, industrial capacity cooperatio­n should be carried out based on careful analysis of political, economic and social conditions in relevant countries and through careful planning. BRI cooperatio­n should avoid misguided projects and vicious competitio­n, effectivel­y mitigate risks, and increase efficiency.

Fourth, further regulating the overseas investment behaviors of enterprise­s. In overseas investment activities, Chinese enterprise­s must strive to achieve multi-win results for themselves and host countries. Therefore, China should ensure that its companies comply with local laws and social and cultural traditions in their investment activities in host countries.

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Source: The World Bank database.
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