China International Studies (English)

India’s Involvemen­t in Global Governance: Principles and Practices

- Shi Hongyuan

India is actively involved in global governance and has made positive contributi­ons in a number of areas. The internatio­nal community looks forward to India’s greater participat­ion. At the same time, India also needs to participat­e in global governance.

As a newly emerging power, India’s role in global governance­1 cannot be ignored. Investigat­ing the principles and practices of India’s involvemen­t in global governance can help China expand its cooperatio­n with India in this field.

Principles of India’s Involvemen­t in Global Governance

Global governance, in India’s understand­ing, is all about creating an internatio­nal order that addresses the interests of big and small nations.2 India’s principles of global governance have gradually taken the form of its long-time participat­ion in and handling of internatio­nal affairs based on its own national conditions, the regional environmen­t and the changing internatio­nal situation. They are mainly reflected in the following four aspects.

Promoting the formulatio­n of global governance rules. This principle is consistent with India’s long-cherished aspiration to become a

major power. Given India’s status and long-term record as a stable, secular society and multicultu­ral democracy, the Indian political elite envisions its rank in global affairs in the top echelon.3 As stated in the Indian Foreign Ministry’s annual report, India is willing and able to claim a place at the global high table. India’s voice has played a prominent role in shaping the global debates on issues ranging from global governance reform, climate change, multilater­al trade negotiatio­ns, internet governance and cyber security, and transnatio­nal terrorism.4 But to become a global leader in governance, one must first become a global governance rules maker. Otherwise, a country can only accept the rules developed by others, which prevents it from playing a proactive role in the governance. Based on this, India emphasizes the role of emerging powers in internatio­nal affairs, believing that after World War II, some internatio­nal rules developed by Western countries have lagged behind the changes in the internatio­nal situation and need adjustment­s. India’s leaders have repeatedly said that to achieve democratiz­ation in global governance, the role of emerging and developing countries in multilater­al forums must be recognized, and the order brought about by the Bretton Woods system is incompatib­le with the reality of contempora­ry internatio­nal relations.5 Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once talked about the gap between the mechanism of global governance and the changing reality. “The mechanism of global governance is mainly concentrat­ed in the United Nations, which was mostly designed after WWII, reflecting the political and economic realities of that era. But since then, the world has changed dramatical­ly from bipolarity to multipolar­ity… And it is very clear that today’s mechanism should be very different.”6 “In the face of the transfer of global power and its impact, we need to adapt… in an uncertain world,

where India can become a pole of political stability… And the existing global governance system needs to be changed to accurately reflect the reality of today’s power shift.”7 India’s former foreign secretary Shyam Saran contends that India has already contribute­d to changing the norms of global governance in several areas.8

Sticking to strategic autonomy in global governance. India hopes to maintain friendly relations with the major powers, internatio­nal organizati­ons and transnatio­nal corporatio­ns while maintainin­g its strategic autonomy, so that it has friends but does not feel bound by them. This idea is closely related to its pursuit of multilater­alism and pragmatism. Manmohan Singh once said, “India is a very large country. It will not seek coalition with any regions or sub-regions, regardless of trade, economic or political aspects.”9 In the post-cold War era, India has become more practical and is no longer guided by the principles of Third World solidarity and non-alignment.10 India’s attitude to the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies best explains India’s position of multilater­alism and pragmatism. It wants to be able to maximize its impact at the higher-level negotiatin­g table in order to enhance its internatio­nal status rather than guide developing countries in action and ideology.11 David Malone, President of the United Nations University, said that in the area of trade and climate governance, India does not necessaril­y form a loose alliance with developing countries.12 In fact, in the Doha Round of World Trade Organizati­on (WTO) negotiatio­ns, India and five stakeholde­rs formed an alliance; at the Copenhagen Climate Conference, India stood with China, South Africa and Brazil; in pursuing permanent membership in the United Nations Security

Council, India allied with Brazil, Japan and Germany. These are all typical examples of India’s pursuit of multilater­al pragmatism. As Raja Mohan has pointed out, “Unlike in the past - when it was either guided by ‘innocent internatio­nalism’ or saw itself as the leader of the South contesting the global hegemony of the North - India is now open to negotiatio­n with the other powers on the management and modernizat­ion of internatio­nal economic and political systems … Delhi continues to press for structural changes in the internatio­nal system and to negotiate hard to preserve its national interests, but no longer as an adversary.”13

Global governance must respect national sovereignt­y and not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. This is different from the Western concept of governance. In the case of humanitari­an assistance, for example, India insists on full respect for the sovereignt­y of territoria­l integrity and national unity of the recipient country.14 India opposes the practice of conflating human rights with humanitari­an assistance, and is reluctant to call aid for victims of war humanitari­an assistance, instead using terms such as “disaster relief” or “developmen­t cooperatio­n.”15 Some scholars have suggested India’ can thus avoid taking sides should a civil war break out in a recipient state. In peacekeepi­ng operations, India also advocates respect for national sovereignt­y, and only with the consent of the relevant country will India participat­e in UN peacekeepi­ng operations. It insists that “the role of the UN must be based on impartiali­ty, equity and non-interferen­ce.”16 India opposes the use by some major powers of “humanitari­an interventi­on” as a pretext

for trampling on the sovereignt­y of other countries, arguing that this will only be counterpro­ductive, leaving behind a weak national structure. As for the reasons for pursuing these principles, Raja Mohan explained that India, “as a country that was establishe­d less than seventy years ago and that faces many challenges in turning its population into a nation, is deeply committed to state sovereignt­y as the most important principle in internatio­nal relations. Since the end of the Cold War, India has been concerned both about the threats to its own sovereignt­y from external interventi­on and, more generally, about the nature of the internatio­nal community’s approach to the question of state sovereignt­y when facing humanitari­an crises and transnatio­nal security threats. India is wary of the cavalier manner in which the Western powers have intervened in various parts of the world in the name of nation building, promoting democracy, and fixing failed states. And it is deeply concerned that new tools, including cyberwarfa­re, social media, and nongovernm­ental organizati­ons, are being used to undermine state sovereignt­y.”17

South Asia should become a key area of global governance. South Asia is riddled with contradict­ions, and non-traditiona­l security issues are prominent. This region has one-third of the world’s Muslim population and has over 200 Islamic extremist groups and Jihadi organizati­ons of various names and sizes. Most of the Islamic terrorists who have struck in different parts of the world have had some link or the other with the region.18 Terrorism, drugs, money laundering, the smuggling of small arms, state support for non-state groups and illegal migration are all threats to South Asian countries, relations between countries and the

India’s fate is inextricab­ly linked with South Asia’s governance. Poor governance in South Asia will directly affect India’s going beyond Asia.

17 “Changing Global Order: India’s Perspectiv­e,” p.55

18 Ajit Doval, “Islamic Terrorism in South Asia and India’s Strategic Response,” Policing, Vol.1, No.1 (2007), p.63.

region as a whole.19 India’s fate is inextricab­ly linked with South Asia’s governance. Poor governance in South Asia will directly affect India’s going beyond Asia. Only with good governance in South Asia will India be able to participat­e more in global governance.20 For India, maintainin­g stability in South Asia and keeping friendly relations with its South Asian neighbors remain critical geopolitic­al goals. “A nation’s destiny is linked to its neighborho­od,” as Prime Minister Narendra Modi has said.21

Main Areas of India’s Involvemen­t in Global Governance

India participat­es in global governance in a wide range of fields with the focus on the following areas:

Security field. This is reflected in India’s active participat­ion in peacekeepi­ng operations and advocacy on internatio­nal counterter­rorism efforts. As of October 2015, India had participat­ed in the United Nations peacekeepi­ng operations 48 times out of 69, sending 180,000 peacekeepe­rs, first place in the total number of people dispatched.22 In July 2016, out of the UN’S total 101,674 peacekeepe­rs, India’s peacekeepe­rs accounted for 7,713, second only to Ethiopia, ranking second in the world.23 India has been called “an indispensa­ble participan­t in peacekeepi­ng operations” because of its large number of peacekeepe­rs.24 India insists on taking action under the UN’S unified command and abiding by the three principles of peacekeepi­ng operations, namely neutrality, no use of force unless for self-defense, and consent.25

As a result of its outstandin­g performanc­e, India has been praised by the internatio­nal community. “India is well ahead of most others in this field, and we will continue to look to India for insights and advice,” said former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan.26 Some academics have suggested that being one of the traditiona­l peacekeepe­rs with vast experience and demonstrat­ed strengths in UN peacekeepi­ng, India should be the “leader” in new thinking on peacekeepi­ng in the 21st century.27 “India is fast becoming an “active contributo­r of public goods in internatio­nal security.”28

With regard internatio­nal counter-terrorism efforts, India has actively appealed to the internatio­nal community to fight terrorism and promote internatio­nal counter-terrorism cooperatio­n. In 1994, at the initiative of India, the United Nations adopted the Declaratio­n on Measures to Eliminate Internatio­nal Terrorism, which for the first time made it clear that a state cannot support terrorism and a state has the obligation to combat and extradite terrorists. In 1996, India was responsibl­e for drafting the Comprehens­ive Convention on Internatio­nal Terrorism.29 In 1999, the UN passed a resolution on the Declaratio­n on Measures to Eliminate Internatio­nal Terrorism, which mainly discussed India’s draft on terrorism, calling on states not to encourage terrorist activities, and not to provide funds, training camps or other support.30 After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, India has made joint efforts, for example, sharing intelligen­ce, flagging the bank accounts of suspected terrorists, and constructi­ng transporta­tion corridors in Afghanista­n with many countries, including the United States, Russia, members of the European Union, China and Japan. India also actively supported the UN Security Council in adopting a series of resolution­s on

combating terrorism.31 In November 2014, Prime Minister Modi urged the UN General Assembly to adopt the Comprehens­ive Convention on Internatio­nal Terrorism and called on the internatio­nal community to unite in the fight against terrorism and extremism.32 At the BRICS Summit in Goa in October 2016, India joined the other BRICS countries in calling on all nations to adopt a comprehens­ive approach to combating terrorism, blocking the sources of finance for terrorism, dismantlin­g terrorist bases, and countering misuse of the internet, including social media, by terrorists.33 In addition, India regularly participat­es in the meetings of the Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Executive Directorat­e and works closely with the Council’s al-qaeda and Taliban monitoring team. Commenting on India’s performanc­e, some commentato­rs have pointed out that India has firmly grasped the counterter­rorism issue at the United Nations level and demonstrat­ed it is able to achieve multilater­al outcomes in internatio­nal peace and security, which it had been unable to do since the era of Jawaharlal Nehru. India has gained more confidence since it is seen as one of the world’s new economic performers, evident in its guidance and leadership of the UN counterter­rorism mechanisms.34

Economic field. India is actively seeking to increase the voice and voting rights of emerging countries in the internatio­nal financial institutio­ns. India has said that the formula for the allocation of quotas in the Internatio­nal Monetary Fund and the World Bank should be so devised that apart from a country’s share of world economic output and trade, it also includes the size of a country’s population and the average rate of growth of GDP over the previous five years. The inclusion of these two variables will make the formula more dynamic, as it will reflect

the future potential of the member countries and will make the formula forward-looking rather than predominan­tly influenced by historical circumstan­ces.35 “A reformed and more stable financial architectu­re will make the global economy less prone and more resilient to future crises … there is a greater need for a more stable, predictabl­e and diversifie­d internatio­nal monetary system … The IMF and World Bank urgently need to address their legitimacy deficits” and the reform is to meet the need for “a substantia­l shift in voting power in favor of emerging market economies and developing countries to bring their participat­ion in decision making in line with their relative weight in the world economy.”36

At the BRICS summit in Goa, India and the other BRICS members called for the advanced European economies to meet their commitment to cede two chairs on the Executive Board of the IMF, and ensure that the increased voice of the dynamic emerging and developing economies reflects their relative contributi­ons to the world economy. India also proposed an independen­t BRICS Rating Agency.37 Driven by India and other emerging powers, the share of the United Kingdom, France and Italy in the IMF has declined while the share of eight emerging economies, including India, has increased from 12.42 percent to 15.91 percent;38 India’s share in the IMF now stands at 2.8 percent, with its voting right rising to eighth,39 and its share in the World Bank has risen to 3.15 percent and its voting power now ranks seventh.40 In July 2014, the BRICS members establishe­d the New Developmen­t Bank (NDB) and the Contingenc­y Reserve Agreement (CRA), with an initial authorized capital of $100 billion and an initial subscripti­on capital of $50 billion, to further enhance reform of the internatio­nal financial system. The first president of the bank is from India.41 “The setting up of the BRICS bank was a significan­t step for inclusive global economic growth,” Prime Minister Modi declared.42 John Mashaka, a US financial analyst, commented that India’s proposal for a BRICS bank shows “the emerging nations are trying to pull out of the western dominated World Bank and the IMF.”43 In addition to advocating the establishm­ent of the BRICS bank, India also actively joined the China-initiated Asian Infrastruc­ture Investment Bank (AIIB), and became the second largest shareholde­r with an 8.52 percent

stake and 7.5 percent of the voting rights.

Climate change. India has been active in internatio­nal cooperatio­n on climate change. In 1993, India ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and in 2002 ratified the Kyoto Protocol. In July 2005, the Asia-pacific Partnershi­p on Clean Developmen­t and Climate, whose mission is to accelerate the developmen­t and applicatio­n of clean energy technologi­es, was establishe­d with India as a party. India has also made use of the Clean Developmen­t Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto Protocol to vigorously develop clean developmen­t projects. In fact, India and China have been major internatio­nal exporters of CDM projects. In the global climate negotiatio­ns, India always adheres to the principle of Common but Differenti­ated Responsibi­lities, requiring developed countries to assume more obligation­s. In December 2015, after arduous negotiatio­ns, the Paris Agreement was reached between all the parties. India is committed to reducing the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35 percent by 2030 from 2005 level, and creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tons of CO2 equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030.44

Global commons. On the issue of cyberspace governance, India’s position previously vacillated, On the one hand it advocated the Undominate­d global cyberspace governance, thus being labeled by the United States as “having lost the prestige necessary to continue building a new order in cyberspace,”45 while on the other hand it proposed a multi-stakeholde­r model.46 Not until 2015 did India’s attitude become clear. “The internet must remain plural. It must be managed by a multistake­holder system,” said the Indian Minister of Communicat­ions and Informatio­n Technology Ravi Shankar Prasad, at the meeting of the

Internet Corporatio­n for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) held in June 2015, “Not only do we support multi-stakeholde­rism, but also we encourage multi-stakeholde­rism itself to embrace all geographie­s and all societies.”47 However, India also stressed that if national security is involved, the national government should have supreme power of management and control.48 India in fact takes a middle position. On the one hand, India hopes to provide security for its many internet users and active private and public sectors. The security of these users and that of global cyberspace governance are closely related.49 On the other hand, India is also concerned about a recurrence of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack. All the planning for the attack “was done via Google Earth … The terrorists used cellular phone networks as command and control, and social media to track and thwart the efforts of Indian commandos.”50 Given this, India set up the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and asked the various department­s to set up similar bodies. These teams work around the clock. In 2013, India issued a national internet security policy that aimed to train 50,000 internet security profession­als over five years.51 By the end of 2015, India had signed Memorandum­s of Understand­ing with the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore to combat cybercrime­s and cyberattac­ks.52

Although far away from the Antarctic and the Arctic, India believes that it is closely concerned with polar governance. India’s view is that both the Antarctic and the Arctic are “global commons” and the common heritage of mankind. Polar governance cannot be decided by just the

polar countries or developed countries. Ashish Gautam, a researcher at the Institute for Defense Research and Analysis in India, has commented that only through the participat­ion of internatio­nal organizati­ons, nonpolar stakeholde­rs (both state and non-state) and indigenous peoples’ organizati­ons will the legitimacy, authority and effectiven­ess of polar governance be ensured.53 India in the 1950s put forward some suggestion­s in the United Nations on Antarctic governance, which laid an important foundation for the drafting and adoption of the Antarctic Treaty.54 India hopes to apply the experience of the Antarctic to the Arctic. “India has been actively involved in all law of the sea negotiatio­ns for well over 50 years and its contributi­on has been significan­t,” said Sivaramkri­shnan Rajan, a member of the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continenta­l Shelf, “India has strong experience in deep sea exploratio­n as well as more than 30 years of scientific research and expedition­s to the Antarctic, which makes India’s position unique for an important role in the Arctic Council.”55 In 2007, India began an Arctic expedition. In July 2008, India establishe­d the first scientific expedition station in the Svalbard Islands. In 2013, India planned to invest $12 million over five years on its Arctic expedition. In the same year, India became an official observer of the Arctic Council.56

Restraints on India’s Involvemen­t in Global Governance

Although India is actively involved in global governance and has made positive contributi­ons in a number of areas, its limitation­s are also

evident. As Raja Mohan has put it, although India has traditiona­lly played a prominent role in multilater­al organizati­ons, its participat­ion has not been able to keep pace with the external expectatio­ns of the role India should play.57 In addition to the complexity of global governance itself, some factors restrict India from playing a bigger role.

Gap between goal and ability. Global governance is dependent on national strength. Strong national strength enables a country to play a bigger role in global governance. India’s interest in global governance is constraine­d by its strength, and its ability to participat­e in global governance and rules making lags behind its ambitions.58 Although India’s strength has greatly improved, with its total GDP in 2015 ranking among the world’s top 10 (at about $2.1 trillion according to the current exchange rate), it lags largely behind the United States (about US$18 trillion at current exchange rate) and China (about US$11 trillion at the current exchange rate). India’s per capita GDP is only $1617, compared with the US’ $56,000 and China’s $7,990.59 In fact, India’s domestic developmen­t is full of contradict­ions. Its political, economic and social developmen­t is incoherent and unbalanced and it still has a severe poverty problem. India has the largest number of people still living in poverty in the world, according to estimates by the World Bank, and about 400 million people in India earn less than $1.25 a day, about a third of its population, and accounting for one-third of the world’s extremely poor.60 According to the United Nations Human Developmen­t Index 2015 report, India ranked 130 out of 188 countries, no better than many African countries.61 The poverty rate in India is 53.7 percent, according to multidimen­sional poverty criteria (education, health and life).62 The Nobel laureate Amartya Sen talks of two Indias: “the first … lives a lot like

California, the second (and more populous) … lives a lot like Sub-saharan Africa.”63

In the security field, India is confronted with various challenges, and the Communist Party of India (Maoist) poses a growing threat. The Communist Party of India (Maoist) opposes the Constituti­on, is attempting to overthrow the government by force, and plans to achieve its goal in five steps by 2050.64 Today, the Indian Communist Party has influence in up to 10 states, involving 106 regions65 with 35 percent of India’s total population.66 In addition, India also has various political disputes, sectarian conflicts, ethnic conflicts, separatist forces, corruption and other issues, that will require a lot of commitment and resources to deal with, greatly restrictin­g India’s ability to participat­e in global governance.

Weak discourse power. The existing discourse and decision-making powers of global governance are mainly in the hands of Western countries, and they are worried that emerging countries will break the existing world order and build a new one unfavorabl­e to Western countries. The conflicts between traditiona­l powers and emerging countries are most likely to occur on three fronts: one on the systematic level, another on distributi­on, and the third on institutio­nal effectiven­ess.67 However,

India and other newly emerging countries are stakeholde­rs in the existing global governance system and are less likely to support a revolution­ary change in the pattern of global governance. Their proposals for change in global governance are well within the scope of existing reforms, past and present.

there are no indication­s that the newly emerging countries of India, China and Brazil desire drastic changes in the existing global governance structures, since their economic success is achieved through economic integratio­n. They only seek to gain greater influence to match their rising economic, military and political capabiliti­es. These countries are stakeholde­rs in the existing global governance system and are less likely to support a revolution­ary change in the pattern of global governance. Their proposals for change in global governance are well within the scope of existing reforms, past and present.68 For example, in the context of global rules, although India has its own ideas, it does not seek fundamenta­l or structural changes in the global governance system. India is only interested in strengthen­ing its role in the existing system, rather than creating a new governance model.69 However, the developed economies are reluctant to give more room to emerging countries and they are taking steps to limit the role of emerging countries in global governance. The possibilit­y of emerging countries taking advantage of the global governance mechanisms to enhance their internatio­nal status has been greatly reduced.70

Contradict­ion between global governance and national interests. The goal and purpose of global governance is to solve global problems and make the situation better, not the other way round. But India faces a dilemma in balancing global governance with national interests, particular­ly on the issue of nuclear non-proliferat­ion. India carried out nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 respective­ly, and refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-proliferat­ion of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehens­ive Nuclear-test-ban Treaty. India believes that nuclear weapons remain a significan­t security guarantee, and India’s size and geographic­al location are such that it cannot withstand the serious security implicatio­ns of a ban on the developmen­t of nuclear weapons. Not a signatory to the Nonprolife­ration Treaty, India has reasons and the right to develop nuclear

68 Ibid., p.726.

69 “India’s Aspiration­s in Global Politics,” p.5.

70 “Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiatin­g Change in a Resilient Status Quo,” p.726.

weapons. There is nothing that can force India to change its position unless the nuclear non-proliferat­ion regime can completely eliminate nuclear weapons.71 India sees itself as a “responsibl­e” nuclear country,72 claiming that its record on nuclear non-proliferat­ion is exemplary and does not violate any internatio­nal law because it is not a signatory to the Non-proliferat­ion Treaty.73 However, this view is absurd. India’s behavior lowers the threshold of responsibi­lity for internatio­nal nuclear nonprolife­ration and has a disruptive effect on the mechanism. Not only has India delivered to other nuclear ambitious countries a wrong message that “noncomplia­nce with internatio­nal rules brings rewards,” but it has also indicated to other treaty signatorie­s such as Brazil, Argentina and South Africa that “compliance will only lead to deception.”74 In addition to nuclear nonprolife­ration, India’s approach to other issues is also inconsiste­nt with the purpose of global governance. Barbara Crosette, a veteran journalist, has pointed out that India is the “headache of global governance” on some global issues such as nuclear non-proliferat­ion, human rights and corruption.75 In some internatio­nal negotiatio­ns, India has even become obstructiv­e, and it has become known as Dr. No.76

Suspicious and fearful neighborin­g countries. As a large country in South Asia, South Asia should be the priority of India’s participat­ion

Without the participat­ion and cooperatio­n of neighborin­g countries, regional governance in South Asia is out of the question and India will lack a solid foundation to play a leading role in regional governance.

in global governance, but the complex relationsh­ip between India and neighborin­g countries is a constraint on India’s leadership in promoting regional governance. Although India since the mid-1990s has begun to adjust relations with its South Asian neighbors and shown some goodwill, the effect is not obvious. This is mainly due to three reasons. First, India’s strength far exceeds other South Asian countries, and neighborin­g countries are full of doubts and worries about India’s regional strategic aspiration­s.77 Second, India has had disputes and conflicts with a number of neighborin­g countries in South Asia, and these countries distrust India.78 Third, the disputes in one way or another still exist between India and many of its neighbors. To this day, India is still an important factor in the politics of some countries in South Asia. Because some countries fear India and still feel hostile toward it, politician­s in these countries often use India as a means to support their political stance.79 Handling entangleme­nts with neighborin­g countries will cost India a lot of resources and energy, which will limit India’s strategic ambitions within South Asia. India’s ability to function in the internatio­nal arena depends largely on its ability to manage its relations with its South Asian neighbors. The past 60 years of history have proven that India’s ambitions to try to bypass its “nasty” neighbors and concentrat­e on pursuing bigger strategies have never been unimpeded.80 Without the participat­ion and cooperatio­n of neighborin­g countries, regional governance in South Asia is out of the question and India will lack a solid foundation to play a leading role in regional governance.

The internatio­nal community looks forward to India’s greater participat­ion. At the same time, India also needs to participat­e in global governance.

Conclusion

As a rising power, India is needed in global governance. India’s support and participat­ion play an important role in promoting global governance, which would be incomplete without India. Sometime between 2025 and 2030, India, the United States, China, and possibly Europe, will be the four key players in global governance and they will largely determine governance on the 21st century’s global issues and decide the role of developing countries in world politics and the global economy. From this point of view, the internatio­nal community looks forward to India’s greater participat­ion.

At the same time, India also needs to participat­e in global governance. This is not only because some of the problems that exist in India and in the region are the objects of global governance that need to be addressed and improved, but also because, with the overall rise in strength, India hopes to leverage global governance as a platform to expand its influence, elevate its status, and increase its discourse and rules making powers in the global governance system. In this regard, India will continue to pursue its multilater­al pragmatism, and will devote more resources and energy to global governance in areas and regions that can promote its own interests. It is foreseeabl­e that India will increasing­ly participat­e in global governance and its role will continue to expand, but as a stakeholde­r in the existing global governance system, since only integratio­n in the existing economic system can lead to economic growth and the rise of the country. India has neither the intention nor the ability to build a new global governance system. It will choose to advocate reform within the existing system to achieve and maximize its own interests.

 ??  ?? The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the leaders of China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa meet at the 8th BRICS Summit in Goa, India on October 16, 2016.
The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the leaders of China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa meet at the 8th BRICS Summit in Goa, India on October 16, 2016.

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