China International Studies (English)

South China Sea Issue: A Dispute Over the Order in East Asia

- Shi Yongming

The constructi­on of the future East Asian order must return to the track of political dialogue, consultati­on, and step-by-step efforts. It is necessary to review the process of establishi­ng the order of the South China Sea to understand this.

The dispute in the South China Sea between China and the Philippine­s has turned from one over rights and interests into one over order because of the internatio­nal arbitratio­n filed by the Philippine­s and the interventi­on of the United States. The US is taking advantage of the South China Sea issue to reshape East Asia, primarily by hijacking internatio­nal law to justify its military deployment. Against this backdrop, the award by the Permanent Court of Arbitratio­n in the Philippine­s’ arbitratio­n case is astonishin­g, and shows obvious signs of political influence. The unfair arbitratio­n award has increased the possibilit­y of conflict in the South China Sea. The so-called process of establishi­ng rule of law in the South China Sea has reached a dead end since the US and the Philippine­s have abused internatio­nal law. The constructi­on of the future East Asian order must return to the track of political dialogue, consultati­on, and step-by-step efforts. It is necessary to review the process of establishi­ng the order of the South China Sea to understand this.

The Constructi­on of Post-war Order in the South China Sea

First of all, the South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippine­s is a struggle over sovereignt­y. Is the China-philippine­s dispute

brought about by history? This is obviously not the case.

From the perspectiv­e of internatio­nal order, the end of World War II marked the advent of the constructi­on of contempora­ry internatio­nal order. The core reason is that World War II was triggered by the contradict­ions among imperialis­ts left by World War I and later turned into the global war against fascism. After World War II, the United Nations was founded for all the countries in the world to join and address common security issues. Therefore, the end of World War II means the end of the age when imperialis­ts could partition the territorie­s of other countries by means of war. In this regard, any new territoria­l claim after World War II is an act of illegal territoria­l expansion.

Under the circumstan­ces of this new age, whether territoria­l disputes exist between two countries should be determined by their affirmatio­n of territory activities after World War II. On the territoria­l issue of the South China Sea islands, both China and the Philippine­s made clear territoria­l affirmatio­ns, which have been widely recognized by the internatio­nal community.

First, the Philippine­s got rid of American colonial rule and won independen­ce after World War II. Its territory defined by its constituti­on is based on three treaties signed between the United States and Spain after the United States defeated Spain and took over the Philippine­s in 1898. The territory of the Philippine­s in all these treaties does not include the South China Sea islands claimed by China. Therefore, the territory of the independen­t Philippine­s naturally does not include these islands. In other words, all the territory outside these treaties is from illegal expansion after World War II and the newly gained territory of the Philippine­s is thus against internatio­nal law.

Second, China’s original sovereignt­y over the South China Sea islands is indisputab­le. Since it is indisputab­le, China can legally regain the South China Sea islands occupied by Japan with no resistance after World War II. In accordance with the Cairo Declaratio­n and the Potsdam Proclamati­on, the then Government of the Republic of China dispatched warships

to officially resume its sovereignt­y over the South China Sea islands in 1947. It also officially promulgate­d the location map of the South China Sea islands in February 1948 in the attached maps of the Administra­tive Area Map of the Republic of China openly published by the Department of National Areas of the Ministry of the Interior, using the dash line to identify China’s sovereignt­y over the South China Sea islands and its surroundin­g waters.1 It is an unequivoca­l expression of internatio­nal law. The action was not questioned then and so was recognized by the internatio­nal community.

The recognitio­n of the internatio­nal community can be found in several aspects.

First, although China wasn’t invited to the peace deal between the United States and Japan due to certain historical reasons, the San Francisco Peace Treaty adopts the solution of owned territory when dealing with

the sovereignt­y of the South China Sea islands. The San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 has two solutions over the territorie­s occupied by Japan. The Treaty uses the expression “Japan renounces” regarding the status of owned territorie­s. The Peace Treaty has a special explanatio­n of unclaimed territorie­s such as Ryukyu Islands, authorizin­g the United States to serve as trustee on behalf of the United Nations. The self-evident logic is why must Japan renounce the territorie­s if they are not owned and not under the trusteeshi­p of the United Nations. Hence all the territorie­s renounced by Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty have their owners and the owners are clear. Article 2 of Chapter 2 of the Peace Treaty stipulates that the territorie­s which Japan should renounce include the Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands) and the Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands). It should be underscore­d particular­ly that the Nansha Islands and Xisha Islands are stated as a whole. Since the Peace Treaty was signed after the Government of the Republic of China officially took back the South China Sea islands in 1947, the expression of the Peace Treaty implies the recognitio­n of China’s sovereignt­y over the South China Sea islands. As a signatory of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Philippine­s then did not claim the South China Sea islands. Therefore, legally speaking, this means that the Philippine­s recognized China’s sovereignt­y over the South China Sea islands.

Second, China’s Kuomintang government signed a peace treaty with Japan when the San Francisco Peace Treaty entered into force. In the treaty, Japan reaffirmed that it renounced its occupation of the South China Sea islands, which means that Japan recognizes the South China Sea islands are China’s territorie­s. This explains the expression of Japan’s renunciati­on of the South China Sea islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

Third, internatio­nal practice demonstrat­es that the internatio­nal community widely recognizes China’s sovereignt­y over the South China Sea islands. The 1947 edition of Collier’s World Atlas and Gazetteer rediscover­ed in Vancouver, Canada in 2015 uses the Chinese names to identify the islands and marks China’s territory on a number of them. This

exactly reflects the universal knowledge of the internatio­nal community toward the South China Sea at that time.2 It is not an isolated atlas. In fact, it is not difficult to find similar atlases in the libraries of Western countries.

China and the Philippine­s did not have any territoria­l disputes in the South China Sea after World War II. Why has the territoria­l dispute come up now? The cause lies in the illegal expansioni­st activities conducted by the Philippine­s. On May 15th, 1956, Tomas Cloma, President of the Manila Navigation School, published the Declaratio­n to the World, arguing the discovery and occupation of parts of the Nansha Islands. After this, the Philippine government first supported the private occupation of Mr. Cloma and then began resorting to official actions to occupy the Nansha Islands. Ironically, the reasons for the Philippine­s’ occupation of the islands are a series of baseless arguments such as proximity to the Philippine­s. The failure of territoria­l affirmatio­n after World War II has resulted in the territoria­l disputes. Such kinds of territoria­l disputes did not exist before between China and the Philippine­s. The Philippine­s’ occupation of the Nansha Islands is overtly aggressive, and severely damages the post-war order. The post-war order should be restored first for there to be discussion of the South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippine­s.

The Legal Order of UNCLOS

The constructi­on of the contempora­ry internatio­nal order will gradually move toward the road of legalizati­on, which seems an easy principle. The legal framework needs respect for the fundamenta­l spirit of the law to solve existing conflicts instead of abusing the law to create conflicts. The appearance of the South China Sea issue shows that the emerging oil

crisis in the 1970s caused the surroundin­g countries to pay attention to the oil reserves beneath the South China Sea. Interests alone cannot lead to conflict, though. The evolution of the maritime system is a vital factor complicati­ng the South China Sea issue. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was launched in 1982. The regulation of UNCLOS on the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone of the coastal countries brings two problems to “the big lake” of the South China Sea, which has very complicate­d geomorphol­ogy and maritime conditions and is surrounded by many countries. The first problem is the overlappin­g of the exclusive economic zones and their conflicts with traditiona­l rights and interests. The second problem is that the status of islands in maritime rights is an uncertain factor. On the one hand, islands can possibly bring tremendous maritime rights and interests. On the other hand, the claim of maritime rights of 200 nautical miles can possibly cover some islands which don’t belong to the countries.

Due to these problems, countries such as the Philippine­s, Malaysia, and Vietnam sought to expand their maritime rights by seizing islands, while at the same time abusing UNCLOS to claim sovereignt­y over islands according to the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. This kind of action began even before UNCLOS was adopted. On June 11th, 1978, the Philippine­s promulgate­d Presidenti­al Decree No. 1596 signed by President Ferdinand Marcos, which claimed 33 islands, reefs, shoals, and cays of the Nansha Islands with a maritime area of 64,976 square nautical miles as a part of the Philippine­s. The Philippine­s imposed executive administra­tion over that area, naming the islands as the “Kalayaan Islands.” Other Southeast Asian countries followed the example of the Philippine­s. Later, Malaysia and Vietnam started to seize islands in the South China Sea, which finally resulted in military conflict between China and Vietnam in 1988. It is very obvious that some countries have attempted to utilize UNCLOS to change the post World War II order due to the complexity of the topographi­c structure of the South China Sea. This adds maritime rights and interests disputes to the existing disputes over territory and

sovereignt­y between China and the Philippine­s.

The Senate of the Philippine­s passed Bill No. 2699 after a third reading on January 28th, 2009. The Bill is known as the Archipelag­ic Baselines Law of the Philippine­s. The Bill adopts the tactic of using maritime rights to grab land rights. It utilizes the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone to include some islands and reefs (including the Taiping Island) of the Nansha Islands and the Huangyan Island (Scarboroug­h Shoal) of the Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfie­ld Islands) among those already owned by the Philippine­s. The Philippine­s once again pursued territoria­l expansion through domestic legislatio­n, which caused the rapid deteriorat­ion of relations between China and the Philippine­s over the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China’s capability and will to safeguard its rights and interests have been strengthen­ed. The Reed Tablemount incident in 2011 and Huangyan Island standoff between China and the Philippine­s in 2012 made the Philippine­s realize that its route of expansion by force over the past several decades had come to an end. The alternativ­e for the Philippine­s is either to confront China until the outbreak of military conflict or seek other solutions. The primary policy of the Philippine­s has been to lobby the United States to endorse its position. In 2015, the Obama administra­tion advised the visiting Philippine President Aquino to turn to internatio­nal arbitratio­n.

Why does the Philippine­s dare to take the so-called rule of “law” when it is disrupting the post-world War II order? The reason mainly lies in the existence of some features of UNCLOS. First, UNCLOS grants absolute authority to judges. The right of explanatio­n of maritime law solely belongs to the tribunal with no appeal. Since the internatio­nal legal system is different from the domestic legal system, different tribunals have no subordinat­e relationsh­ip. It is logically understand­able this is in order to safeguard the authority of the law. Second, UNCLOS is quite loose in choosing tribunals under the circumstan­ce of unlimited judicial authority. For instance, Article 287 of UNCLOS lists four means of dispute settlement: “(a) the Internatio­nal Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

establishe­d in accordance with Annex VI; (b) the Internatio­nal Court of Justice; (c) an arbitral tribunal constitute­d in accordance with Annex VII; (d) a special arbitral tribunal constitute­d in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.” Article 287 of UNCLOS also states that, “If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitratio­n in accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.” Third, UNCLOS leaves a big loophole in ensuring the impartiali­ty of judges, as the judges of the UN organs can serve their respective government­s. According to common sense, the impartiali­ty of judges should be based on their political and economic independen­ce. However, Shunji Yanai, President of the Internatio­nal Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, is not a profession­al judge. He previously served for many years as a Japanese diplomat and subsequent­ly lectured in internatio­nal law at post-secondary education institutio­ns for only three years. More recently, he has served as Chairman of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruc­tion of the Legal Basis for Security for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The arbitral tribunal constitute­d in accordance with Annex VII is not only a temporary body but also comprised judges who receive funding from the concerned parties to perform their duties. UNCLOS confers the right of compulsory arbitratio­n on the temporary arbitral body, which is operated commercial­ly. This actually weakens the authority of internatio­nal law.

The South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippine­s is a hybrid dispute of two kinds of order. It can only be settled through negotiatio­ns since the two issues cannot be handled separately. The South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal from the very beginning completely disregarde­d the complexity of the case, which involves territoria­l

The South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippine­s is a hybrid dispute of two kinds of order. It can only be settled through negotiatio­ns since the two issues cannot be handled separately.

sovereignt­y and the post-world War II internatio­nal order. It disregarde­d the attempts of the Philippine­s, which endeavored to legalize its illegal occupation through arbitratio­n. It easily endorsed the deceit of the Philippine­s that it had exhausted negotiatio­ns with China. Its final award is also one-sided, lacking the legal attitude of impartiali­ty, caution, and balance, which should be exercised in internatio­nal legal arbitratio­n. This is, at the very least, an overt radical inclinatio­n in law, forcing the UN Internatio­nal Court of Justice and Internatio­nal Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to declare that the Arbitral Tribunal has nothing to do with them.

When the arbitratio­n award was released, we notice one peculiar phenomenon. The Arbitral Tribunal judged the Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island) as a reef. However Taiping Island can support nearly 100 residents, having fresh water and land. Japan on the one hand has urged China to abide by the arbitratio­n on various diplomatic occasions, while on the other hand explaining to the internatio­nal community that its Okinotori reef is an “island.” Actually the Okinotori reef is as big as one bed, being connected by cement. It reflects the power politics of Japan. Since power politics is manipulati­ng internatio­nal law, China’s refusal to accept the arbitral result is safeguardi­ng the integrity of internatio­nal law.

The Order Dominated by the United States

One very noticeable expression in post-cold War internatio­nal politics is “the internatio­nal order is dominated by the United States.” In terms of the South China Sea, the so called “order” is that everything should be dominated by the United States. The standard of judging right and wrong is whether it is in the strategic interests of the United States.

In fact, the Philippine­s started to disrupt the post-world War II internatio­nal order and seek territoria­l expansion in the 1950s. This can be attributed to the United States “domination.” In 1954, the United States signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty with the Philippine­s

and other Southeast Asian countries. The Treaty put the whole South China Sea under its jurisdicti­on.3 This means that the United States placed the South China Sea under its military control. Just after the signing of the treaty, the Philippine­s started its expansion in the South China Sea, taking advantage of the fact that China was still recovering from the civil war and the two sides across the Taiwan Strait could not pay adequate attention to the issue.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States has always intervened in the South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippine­s. The United States’ partiality has been evident. During the Mischief Reef dispute between China and the Philippine­s in 1995, the US House of Representa­tives passed Resolution No. 114, using the word “aggression” to define Chinese activities in the South China Sea and stating the United States should express concern over the claims of any non-democratic countries in the South China Sea. The Resolution urged the US President to “assess the defense needs of the democratic countries among the claimants.”4 Because of the endorsemen­t in the US House of Representa­tives, the Philippine­s sent its navy to destroy the survey marks erected by China in Wufang Jiao (Jackson Atoll), Banyue Jiao (Half Moon Shoal), Xian’e Jiao (Alicia Annie Reef), Xinyi Jiao (First Thomas Shoal), and Ren’ai Jiao (Second Thomas Shoal) using warships and planes to attack unarmed Chinese fishermen.

Since the United States has already included the South China Sea within its sphere of influence during the Cold War, its core policy is to ensure its dominance in the so-called issue of safeguardi­ng the order in the South China Sea. Its basic approach is to encourage the Philippine­s and Vietnam to struggle with China for rights. It is the Philippine­s which built an airstrip at Zhongye Island (Thitu Island) yet the United States

has never made any comment on it. After China and the members of the Associatio­n of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed the Declaratio­n on the Code of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, Vietnam violated the spirit of the DOC by carrying out massive constructi­on of islands in the South China Sea and militarizi­ng all the islands illegally occupied by it. The United States also remained silent over this, but continuall­y criticized China’s actions to protect its rights instead. When China is forced to take counter-actions, the United States responds with a strongly confrontat­ional attitude.

On the ways and means for settling the South China Sea issue, the United States is clearly against the Chinese policy of promoting bilateral negotiatio­ns and trying to carry out joint developmen­t with the Philippine­s and Vietnam. The United States has internatio­nalized the South China Sea issue, attempting to turn the issue into one between China and ASEAN.

The US also seeks to mediate between China and ASEAN in an effort to obtain favor from the latter. As such, the policy of the United States is to drive China out of the South China Sea or use it as a tool to divide China and ASEAN and thus create conditions for the United States to gradually increase its military presence in the South China Sea.

During the South China Sea arbitratio­n, the United States took center stage by using its military power to create momentum. Just before the release of the arbitratio­n result, the United States even dispatched two aircraft carrier groups to the South China Sea. This is a typical action to influence the process of the Arbitral Tribunal. From the Middle East to the South China Sea, we can see that the so-called order dominated by the United States is one which exports disorder globally.

The East Asian Order of Win-win Cooperatio­n

The South China Sea issue involves too many interests such as the socalled maritime lifeline of Japan, and the resource security of East Asian countries. The key to the problem, however, is what kind of East Asian security order should be built. East Asian order must reflect unity and cooperatio­n instead of the division and confrontat­ion dominated by a lone superpower.

The United States and Japan argue for ensuring the safety and freedom of navigation. This is a false statement, which only serves as an excuse for the United States and Japan to intervene in the South China Sea issue. The safety of internatio­nal shipping lanes can only be realized if the situation in the South China Sea remains stable. Through their provocatio­ns, the United States and Japan are making the situation in the South China Sea more complicate­d, actually endangerin­g navigation in the South China Sea.

Among the neighborin­g countries of the South China Sea, there is a conflict of interests instead of strategic contradict­ions. Strategica­lly speaking, our sole choice is to peacefully coexist and pursue joint

developmen­t. On the basis of this strategic direction, we can solve the issue by pursuing shared interests. This is the origin of the proposal of “shelving disputes and seeking common developmen­t” put forward by Deng Xiaoping years ago.

In the past, China always followed a friendly route between itself and the Philippine­s. During the first oil crisis in the 1970s, China continuous­ly supplied the Philippine­s with crude oil at a price much lower than the internatio­nal market price for several years. In the 1990s, China showed restraint even when the Philippine­s used military violence against unarmed Chinese fishermen. At the beginning of this century, China, the Philippine­s, and Vietnam started to seek common developmen­t. However, when the United States pivoted to the Asia-pacific region and implemente­d its so-called rebalancin­g strategy, it deliberate­ly sowed the seeds of antagonism between China and the Philippine­s as well as between China and Vietnam. It is even trying to make ASEAN one regional organizati­on united against China. This situation is hindering regional developmen­t, essentiall­y harming the common strategic interests of China and the ASEAN countries.

Therefore, regarding the future of the South China Sea issue, all regional countries should first consider the interests of the whole region, with an open mind to explore potential solutions. The only way to thoroughly settle the issue is political dialogue. During the process of settling the South China Sea issue, we should build a cooperativ­e framework of lasting stability and developmen­t in East Asia through such dialogue. The South China Sea should be made the sea of regional cooperatio­n, which becomes the bond for close connection among the neighborin­g countries.

 ??  ?? Cui Tiankai, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, reiterated that China has the firm will to safeguard its own interests and rights, and internatio­nal justice, in his speech at the Center for Strategic and Internatio­nal Studies on July 13, 2016.
Cui Tiankai, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, reiterated that China has the firm will to safeguard its own interests and rights, and internatio­nal justice, in his speech at the Center for Strategic and Internatio­nal Studies on July 13, 2016.
 ??  ?? China and ASEAN reaffirmed their efforts to "promote peace, stability, mutual trust and confidence" in the South China Sea, in Vientiane, capital of Laos, on July 25, 2016.
China and ASEAN reaffirmed their efforts to "promote peace, stability, mutual trust and confidence" in the South China Sea, in Vientiane, capital of Laos, on July 25, 2016.

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from China