China International Studies (English)

Indian Ocean Rim Associatio­n: New Developmen­ts and China’s Engagement

- Wei Hong & Li Ciyuan

The IORA, as the most representa­tive multilater­al mechanism in the region, features inclusiven­ess, equality, openness and flexibilit­y. With the advance of the Belt and Road Initiative, China needs to deepen cooperatio­n with the IORA while properly handling various contradict­ions and challenges.

The Indian Ocean Rim Associatio­n (IORA)1 is the most representa­tive multilater­al cooperatio­n mechanism covering the Indian Ocean Rim region, and as such has an important impact on the region’s developmen­t. With the advance of the Belt and Road Initiative, strengthen­ing ties with the IORA has become an important part of China’s efforts to deepen cooperatio­n with the region. This article discusses the characteri­stics of the IORA’S developmen­t, and puts forward some policy proposals on how China should strengthen cooperatio­n with the IORA.

Developmen­ts of the Indian Ocean Rim Associatio­n

Since its founding, the IORA has made continuous breakthrou­ghs in the scale of its membership and the areas and mechanism of cooperatio­n. In 2017, the first IORA Leaders’ Summit was held in Jakarta to commemorat­e the 20th anniversar­y of the organizati­on. The summit adopted the Jakarta Concord and the IORA Action Plan 2017-2021. Looking back on the 20 years of its history, the IORA has demonstrat­ed the following characteri­stics.

Inclusive and equality-based membership

With 21 diversifie­d and heterogene­ous member countries, the IORA has a rather extensive geographic­al distributi­on, which reflects the organizati­on’s high level of inclusiven­ess.

First, the member countries are different in economic developmen­t level and there is a big gap in their comprehens­ive national strength. Australia, India, South Africa and Indonesia belong to the G20, with relatively strong economy. Energy-producing countries in the Middle East and developed countries such as Australia and Singapore have higher per capita income: the highest per capita income registered among the member countries is nearly 70 times the lowest.

Second, the political systems of the member countries are diversifie­d. There are parliament­ary republics, parliament­ary monarchies, monarchies and presidenti­al republics – far more diverse than most regional internatio­nal organizati­ons.

Last, there are great difference­s among member countries in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture. There are hundreds of ethnic groups in the IORA, all with their own cultures and religious beliefs. Indonesia, Malaysia and some Middle East countries possess majority followers of Islam. Of the African members, Christiani­ty, Islam and traditiona­l religions coexist. India is mainly a Hindu country, while Thailand is predominan­tly Buddhist.

The IORA provides a platform for all these countries with different comprehens­ive national strengths and diversifie­d political and cultural background­s to speak out, express their interests and demonstrat­e their stances. Although there are large gaps in national strength and prominent difference­s in culture, all the mechanisms of the IORA are designed for equality. The Charter of the IORA clearly stipulates that “co-operation within the framework of the Associatio­n will be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territoria­l integrity, political independen­ce, non-interferen­ce in internal affairs, peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit; and decisions on all matters and issues and at all levels will be taken on the

basis of consensus.”2 The principle of consensus helps the weak countries express their views effectivel­y and safeguard their own interests, so as to maintain equal status with stronger countries. The Jakarta Concord adopted in 2017 noted that the “historical and cultural bonds among our peoples and the diversity of the peoples in the region … offer vast opportunit­ies to enhance various areas of economic cooperatio­n.”3

Highlighti­ng sustainabl­e socio-economic developmen­t

The emergence of the IORA was mainly due to the rise of a large number of regional blocs and the stimulatio­n of economic benefits they had brought about.4 Therefore, the initial position of the associatio­n was to promote the free flow of various production factors, such as commoditie­s, technologi­es and human resources, so as to facilitate regional trade liberaliza­tion, strengthen economic ties among member countries and achieve sustained economic growth.

However, with the gradual increase of non-traditiona­l security threats, the IORA has accordingl­y extended cooperatio­n to the area of non-traditiona­l security. For the first time, the 11th Council of Ministers meeting held in India in 2011 put maritime security-related issues into the agenda, such as counter-piracy, protection of sea route safety and disaster relief.5 The meeting also identified six priority areas of cooperatio­n, namely maritime security, trade and investment facilitati­on, fishery management, disaster risk management, academic and technologi­cal cooperatio­n, and tourism and cultural exchanges, thus greatly expanding the organizati­on’s scope of cooperatio­n. Since then, the IORA has held multiple meetings and seminars, focusing on non-traditiona­l security issues such as terrorism,

piracy, drug smuggling, transnatio­nal crime, illegal fishing, climate change and cyber security.6

In addition, the IORA also puts into its agenda issues of women empowermen­t, blue economy, democracy and good governance.7 Starting from 2014, the IORA has held many seminars on women’s economic empowermen­t; at the Council of Ministers meeting held in Indonesia in October 2016, the Declaratio­n on Gender Equality and Women’s Economic Empowermen­t was adopted, reaffirmin­g and stressing women’s important role in regional economic developmen­t and social prosperity.8 The blue economy issue has also become one priority of the IORA, with two ministeria­l meetings and multiple seminars held since 2014. During this period, the Marine Spatial Planning, the Somalia and Yemen Developmen­t Program and the Jakarta Declaratio­n on Blue Economy have been successive­ly formulated and adopted.

The expansion of cooperatio­n areas is aimed at promoting inclusiven­ess, sustainabi­lity and balanced developmen­t in the Indian Ocean Rim region, and at pushing forward the IORA’S transforma­tion from a simple trade liberaliza­tion platform to a multilater­al organizati­on that embraces cooperatio­n in terms of economy, security and society.

Combinatio­n of openness and flexibilit­y

The IORA is not a closed-off bloc, nor is it bound by strong mechanisms. The organizati­on shows great flexibilit­y and openness in promoting cooperatio­n in various fields.

First, there is no rigid institutio­nal constraint on the realizatio­n of

objectives. As the IORA’S main goal, trade liberaliza­tion aims to implement non-discrimina­tory treatment to all member states, promote intra-regional liberaliza­tion, gradually reduce tariff barriers in the region, and achieve the goal of zero tariff by 2020.9 However, for the realizatio­n of such an objective, there is no fixed agenda by the IORA and no timetable for member states, which shows the organizati­on’s flexibilit­y.

Second, there is no constraint on the accession of new member states or external actions by member states, which shows openness. The IORA has set no conditions for the accession of new members. All countries can apply for membership so long as they are geographic­ally situated in the Indian Ocean Rim and willing to abide by the IORA Charter.10 The IORA members are also free to join other sub-regional organizati­ons in the Indian Ocean Rim. For example, India and Sri Lanka are core members of the South Asian Regional Cooperatio­n Associatio­n (SARRC). The United Arab Emirates and Oman are main members in the Gulf Cooperatio­n Council (GCC). Mozambique and Tanzania are members of the Southern African Developmen­t Community (SADC).

Third, countries and organizati­ons outside the region are not excluded. The IORA keeps an open attitude toward its dialogue partners, countries outside the region, other internatio­nal mechanisms and forums, and engages in exchanges and cooperatio­n with different internatio­nal actors.11 At the same time, the IORA also takes the initiative to enhance interactio­ns with other internatio­nal organizati­ons. In 2015, the IORA became an observer of the United Nations General Assembly and the African Union, thus further elevating its status in the global arena.12 In the Action Plan 2017-2021, the IORA proposed establishi­ng a cooperativ­e relationsh­ip with other regional

bodies such as the African Union and ASEAN.13

Functional cooperatio­n without super-state ambitions

The IORA Charter clearly points out that the goal of the associatio­n is to “promote the sustained growth and balanced developmen­t of the region and of the Member States, and to create common ground for regional economic co-operation.”14 Therefore, in addition to the Council of Ministers, the Troika, and the Committee of Senior Officials, which provide institutio­nal guarantees for IORA operations, there are also many profession­al groups within the IORA, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group, the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum, the Working Group on Trade and Investment, the Sub-committee of Finance, the IORA Special Fund, the Blue Economy Conference, and various special workshops. These mechanisms focus on specific fields and have become important carriers for the IORA to engage in functional cooperatio­n. For example, the IORA Special Fund, founded in 2004, provides financial support and technical assistance to specific projects and meetings in economic cooperatio­n. The Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group serves as a regional and institutio­nal arrangemen­t and a think-tank in policy analysis, project formulatio­n, informatio­n sharing and theoretica­l research.

The IORA has also set up the Regional Centre for Science and Technology Transfer in Tehran and the Fisheries Support Unit in Muscat. The IORA in its Action Plan 2017-2021 calls for the establishm­ent of following cooperatio­n bodies: a working group on maritime safety and security, a core group for tourism, a working group on the blue economy, and a working group on women’s economic empowermen­t.15 In addition, the IORA has held a variety of workshops to promote cooperatio­n in all fields. In terms of fisheries management, the IORA held a workshop on seafood products safety and quality, where consensus was reached on practical

measures and informatio­n sharing to ensure seafood safety and quality.16 Concerning disaster risk management, the first IORA Water Science and Technology Core Group Workshop was held in South Africa in 2014, where the participan­ts discussed risk assessment and utilizatio­n of Indian Ocean marine resources and environmen­tal protection. In 2015, the IORA hosted a workshop on “Exploring Preemptive Disaster Risk Management Measures to Ensuring Human Security,” and carried out an internatio­nal training on disaster risk management.

Realizatio­n of objectives under multiple challenges

After over two decades of developmen­t, the IORA has achieved some progress. As of 2014, eight free trade agreements were signed among the member states,17 with an overall rising trend in trade, foreign direct investment, and flow of personnel and services despite ups and downs.18 However, there is a big gap between the desired goals and practice and the actual results achieved so far. For example, the IORA’S objective to achieve zero tariff in the region by 2020 thus far seems overambiti­ous. In fact, since 2011 the proportion of the IORA’S internal trade in the world’s total trade volume has been declining year by year.19 As with blue economy, which is attached importance to by the IORA, more attention has been given to conceptual design, with slow progress achieved in practice.

The diversity and difference­s among member states, especially the competing perception­s among major members, have brought about multiple challenges to the IORA. India tries to utilize the IORA to enhance its influence and leading role in the Indian Ocean Rim region.

Taking neighborho­od as its priority, India actively “goes west” in the Middle East and Africa while pursuing the “Act East” strategy,20 and shows signs of exclusiven­ess in the IORA. South Africa, out of economic considerat­ions, sees the Indian Ocean as a medium and the IORA as an effective mechanism for connecting Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and intends to build closer economic ties with Asian countries.21 Australia is mainly motivated by ensuring unimpeded maritime passage, maintainin­g maritime security and exploring new markets. On the other hand, small countries in Africa, with a low level of economic developmen­t, obvious internal difference­s and divergent interest orientatio­ns, have difficulty playing a role because of limited practical capacity. As pointed out by Devdasslal­l Dusoruth, then Director for Regional Cooperatio­n of Mauritius’ Foreign Ministry, the IORA is confronted with the adverse factor of geographic­al vastness and dispersion of members, which hinders the realizatio­n of its objectives.22 In addition, due to excessive flexibilit­y and lack of strict binding mechanisms, phased agendas and specific timetables on various objectives, the IORA’S progress in advancing its goals has been slow with limited results.

Foundation­s and Challenges of CHINA-IORA Cooperatio­n

With the emerging strategic position of the Indian Ocean Rim, the IORA’S importance is on the rise for China to promote the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and maintain its interests in the Indian Ocean Rim. While there are certain foundation­s for strengthen­ed CHINA-IORA cooperatio­n at the

present stage, China is also faced with various challenges.

Necessity of strengthen­ed CHINA-IORA cooperatio­n

First of all, from an economic point of view, China has great interests in the Indian Ocean region. The IORA includes almost all countries surroundin­g the Indian Ocean. With abundant natural resources, human resources and open waters for navigation, the Indian Ocean region has great potential to become a center of world economic and trade activities in the future.23 As a dialogue partner, China has witnessed its trade with the IORA growing year by year. In 2016, the trade volume between China and the IORA reached US$620.48 billion, accounting for 16.8% of China’s total foreign trade.24 With huge economic and energy security interests in the region, it is of vital importance for China to strengthen ties with the IORA and its member states to ensure energy security, keep sea lines of communicat­ion unimpeded and expand the internatio­nal market.

Second, from a security perspectiv­e, China shares many concerns with countries in the Indian Ocean region. In its Maritime Cooperatio­n Declaratio­n in 2014, the IORA resolves to “support and strengthen regional cooperatio­n in accordance with universall­y recognized principles of internatio­nal law, to address maritime challenges such as illegal unreported and unregulate­d fishing, piracy, irregular movement of people, marine pollution, drugs traffickin­g, illegal traffickin­g in wild life, disasters and climate change.”25 China is also highly concerned about piracy and terrorism in the Indian Ocean and seeks to safeguard the passage of Chinese vessels in the region and create a favorable environmen­t for advancing the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

Third, cooperatio­n with the IORA helps China establish the image of a responsibl­e major country. With the developmen­t of the 21st Century

Maritime Silk Road, China’s cooperatio­n with countries along the Indian Ocean has brought about misunderst­andings from some. The “China threat” rhetoric is again on the rise. In the opinion of a foreign scholar, “Although China has long claimed that its interests in the Indian Ocean region are purely economic, it’s increasing­ly clear that the MSR (Maritime Silk Road) could have a major impact on the strategic balance in the Bay (of Bengal).”26 This perspectiv­e, to a certain extent, reflects the fear about China’s entry into the Indian Ocean. Given this, China has been strengthen­ing cooperatio­n with the IORA in the spirit of win-win outcomes, to expose and clarify the distorted reports and negative voices, and shape the image of a responsibl­e major power with practical actions.

Foundation­s for CHINA-IORA cooperatio­n

There are certain foundation­s for China’s cooperatio­n with the IORA. First, rich experience in cooperatio­n. China has been actively participat­ing in various IORA activities since it became a dialogue partner in 2001. China has attended all Council of Ministers meetings from the 3rd to the 17th and has been continuous­ly expanding cooperatio­n with the organizati­on. During the 14th Council of Ministers meeting in 2014, a memorandum of understand­ing on establishi­ng the Coordinati­on Center for Desalinati­on Technologi­es was signed between the IORA Regional Centre for Science and Technology Transfer and the Tianjin-based Institutio­n of Seawater Desalinati­on and Multipurpo­se Utilizatio­n under the State Ocean Administra­tion. In May 2015, the Coordinati­on Center was launched in Tianjin, and the first Internatio­nal Expert Meeting / Workshop on Desalinati­on Technologi­es was held under the IORA framework. In July 2016, China successful­ly hosted the second IORA Blue Economy Core Group Workshop. China expressed its willingnes­s to carry out cooperatio­n with the IORA in blue economy to meet each other’s needs, and achieve shared developmen­t with mutual benefits. The workshop was the first such

meeting co-held by a dialogue partner and the IORA, thus playing a guiding and exemplary role in this respect.27

Second, similar cooperatio­n concepts. The principle of consensusb­ased, embraced by the IORA, embodies the spirit and value of equality and consultati­on. This is similar to the concept of “wide consultati­on, joint contributi­on and shared benefits” reflected in China’s initiative of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Similar values, concepts and openness help China deepen its cooperativ­e relations with the IORA, and make the IORA an effective platform for China to promote the joint building of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

Last, suitable cooperatio­n fields. The IORA lists maritime security, trade and investment facilitati­on, fisheries management, disaster risk management, academic and scientific cooperatio­n, blue economy, tourism and cultural exchanges as its developmen­t priorities, while the China-initiated 21st Century Maritime Silk Road focuses on infrastruc­ture constructi­on, marine economy, people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and trade liberaliza­tion. The many similariti­es shared by the two enable China to strengthen cooperatio­n with the IORA.

Challenges facing CHINA-IORA cooperatio­n

First, the pluralism of IORA member states presents a high demand for China to strengthen relations with different members. The IORA member states show a huge diversity in language, culture, religion, economic level and developmen­t pattern. They also have different strategic positions in the region and within the internatio­nal community. It is crucial that China properly handle its relationsh­ips with different member states.

Second, India remains wary of China. As the concept of “Indo-pacific” emerges and becomes part of internatio­nal strategic discourse in recent years,

the Indian Ocean’s strategic importance has continuous­ly grown, and India has been increasing its strategic investment in the region. The Narendra Modi government, in particular, has paid more attention to the Indian Ocean, making India’s intention to play a leading role in the IORA all the more obvious. The proactive activities in the IORA indicate that India, as a core member, tries to lead the agenda setting and utilize the organizati­on as a platform to implement its national strategy, so as to further expand its leading role in the IORA and increase its influence in the Indian Ocean region. Moreover, some in India hold the view that the direct strategic intention of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is to counterbal­ance the United States and challenge India’s dominance in the Indian Ocean by boosting influence in the Indian Ocean, so it can establish regional hegemony.28 Therefore, India is keeping a watchful eye on China’s activities in the Indian Ocean. China enhancing its ties with the IORA will naturally put India on high alert.

Finally, some other major powers also hold negative perception­s of China. For example, some in Indonesia think that the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is a manifestat­ion of neo-colonialis­m.29 Australia has also been concerned about China’s actions in the Indian Ocean. In the face of domestic controvers­ies over China’s Maritime Silk Road, the Australian government has remained an equivocal position. On one hand, it has common interests with China in terms of trade, investment and technology. On the other, almost all Australian strategist­s agree that it should remain vigilant about China’s military modernizat­ion.30 Therefore, China, while stepping up cooperatio­n with the IORA and advancing the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, must cope with the mistrust and vigilance of major

regional countries.

China’s Cooperatio­n Strategy

In order to maintain and expand its interests in the Indian Ocean region, China needs to deepen cooperatio­n with the IORA while properly handling various contradict­ions and challenges.

Offering Chinese wisdom and solution

The IORA has repeatedly stressed its willingnes­s to strengthen cooperatio­n and exchanges with dialogue partners in the priority developmen­t areas, believing that participat­ion of dialogue partners in the constructi­on of the organizati­on is of great importance. China, as a dialogue partner, is able to offer advice on specific issues of concern to the IORA. China has proposed the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind, which could help break through the dilemma in IORA cooperatio­n and promote regional common developmen­t.

At the same time, the China-initiated concept of common, comprehens­ive, cooperativ­e and sustainabl­e security has guiding significan­ce for security governance in the Indian Ocean region. It could provide a Chinese solution to non-traditiona­l security issues such as navigation safety, maritime crime and environmen­tal protection.

Synergy of Maritime Silk Road and IORA cooperatio­n areas

The IORA’S priority cooperatio­n areas have much in common with China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. As indicated by Director of the IORA Secretaria­t Firdaus Dahlan, both China and IORA member states attach great importance to the economic opportunit­ies brought by the sea. The China-initiated 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the Iorapropos­ed Master Plan on the Blue Economy are closely connected.31 As

Chinese President Xi Jinping has stressed, “To develop the Belt and Road is not to replace existing mechanisms or initiative­s for regional cooperatio­n. Much to the contrary, we will build on the existing basis to help countries align their developmen­t strategies and form complement­arity.”32 Cooperatio­n between China and the IORA can be synergized in two aspects.

First, strengthen­ing cooperatio­n with the IORA in maritime connectivi­ty. The IORA, in its Sustainabl­e Developmen­t Program, clearly proposed that member states should promote sharing of informatio­n and knowledge and exchange of experience in port services and management, as well as shipping and port logistics for improved maritime connectivi­ty in the Indian Ocean Rim region.33 Therefore, maritime connectivi­ty can be an important cooperatio­n field which is of common interests to both China and the IORA. The cooperatio­n can thus focus on those closely relevant areas such as marine trade, seaport constructi­on and maritime shipping.

The second aspect is to strengthen cooperatio­n on sustainabl­e developmen­t. Most IORA member states are backward in economic and technologi­cal developmen­t, with poor management. China can cooperate with these countries and provide technical support in the area of sustainabl­e social developmen­t, which is also a focus area of the IORA. At present, China and some IORA member states have establishe­d a number of research bodies in fisheries management and disaster risk management, such as the China-indonesia Center for Ocean and Climate, the Chinathail­and Joint Laboratory for Climate and Marine Ecosystem, and the China–sri Lanka Coastal and Marine Joint Research and Developmen­t Center. China needs to step up cooperatio­n with more IORA member states in order to promote sustainabl­e developmen­t in the Indian Ocean

Rim region.

Differenti­ated cooperatio­n with IORA members

Due to heterogene­ity among the IORA member states, China, while carrying out cooperatio­n, should take into full considerat­ion different national conditions, social context and business environmen­t, and pursue diverse policies and engage in differenti­ated cooperatio­n with the countries concerned.

As core countries in the IORA, India, Australia, South Africa and Indonesia enjoy greater discourse and influence in the IORA as well as in the Indian Ocean region. China can intensify cooperatio­n with these countries in strategic coordinati­on, maritime connectivi­ty, maritime security, and economic and trade relations. To be specific, China and Indonesia can carry out in-depth dialogues on synergy of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum. China and Australia can enhance communicat­ion and coordinati­on in political, economic and financial fields as well as in regional maritime security. Cooperatio­n with South Africa can focus on mineral energy, investment, technology and economic ties.

Most IORA member states are small and medium-sized countries with less developed economies. For China to carry out cooperatio­n with these countries, a deep understand­ing of these countries’ specific needs and developmen­t goals is necessary, to make economic cooperatio­n more targeted. For example, tourism is very important for the economies of Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles. Revenues from the industry account for 21% and 11% of the total national income of Seychelles and Mauritius respective­ly.34 Therefore, China can focus on people-to-people cultural exchanges and tourism developmen­t, and promote relevant infrastruc­ture constructi­on and sustainabl­e developmen­t in these countries. On the other hand, countries such as Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania urgently hope

to shake off economic backwardne­ss and achieve national industrial­ization. China can focus on industrial infrastruc­ture constructi­on, technologi­cal developmen­t and financing of specific projects in cooperatio­n with these countries.

Participat­ion in and innovation of IORA mechanisms

Mechanisms guarantee cooperatio­n. China needs to actively participat­e in various cooperatio­n mechanisms of the IORA, and on this basis branch out into new mechanisms to realize mutual benefits.

First, China should take an active part in Council of Ministers meetings, profession­al workshops and other exchange activities held by the IORA. For example, the IORA’S Indian Ocean Dialogue is a Track 1.5 discussion involving scholars, experts, analysts, and policy makers from government­s, think tanks and civil societies on a number of crucial strategic issues of the Indian Ocean Region.35 This dialogue provides another way for China to participat­e in the IORA. At the same time, the IORA has launched a sustainabl­e developmen­t program with the aim of strengthen­ing regional cooperatio­n and deepening partnershi­p between member states and dialogue partners.36 China should take advantage of these opportunit­ies to further its relations with the IORA.

Second, China should take the initiative to create new cooperatio­n models. So far, China’s cooperatio­n with Southeast Asian and Central and Eastern European countries have been institutio­nalized, reflected in CHINA-ASEAN “10+1” and China-cee “16+1” mechanisms. China can summarize relevant experience and construct a new multilater­al cooperatio­n model between China and the IORA. For example, the two sides can establish a CHINA-IORA “21+1” mechanism to strengthen cooperatio­n and coordinati­on of interests in the region. At the same time, cooperatio­n between China and the IORA should not be confined to the economic

field and can be expanded to security. China can push forward maritime security cooperatio­n, such as setting up a mechanism on fighting piracy and maritime crimes, and establishi­ng a maritime disaster risk informatio­n and emergency system.

Properly handling relations with India

India intends to dominate the IORA affairs, and is on high alert to China’s increasing cooperatio­n with the organizati­on. Therefore, properly handling the relationsh­ip with India is essential for China to strengthen its interactio­n and cooperatio­n with the IORA.

China should fully utilize the IORA platform to promote strategic coordinati­on and maritime cooperatio­n with India. In addition to mechanisms such as the G20 and BRICS, the IORA provides a favorable platform for the two countries to step up communicat­ion. On one hand, China needs to strengthen coordinati­on with India in regional strategy and work to synergize the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road with India’s Project Mausam.37 On the other hand, concerning the IORA’S proposed maritime cooperatio­n, since India lags behind China in capacity of maritime infrastruc­ture constructi­on,38 China can give full play to its capabiliti­es and technologi­cal advantages in this area, and advance cooperatio­n with India in ship building, port constructi­on, sea water treatment and applicatio­n, and maritime equipment manufactur­ing. More efforts should be made by China to enhance mutual trust and dispel misgivings. More frequent political visits and people-to-people cultural exchanges can help deepen mutual understand­ing, reduce suspicion and boost mutual trust, thus consolidat­ing the cooperatio­n basis between the two countries and between China and the IORA.

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