China International Studies (English)
Australia’s Strengthened South Pacific Diplomacy: Measures, Motives and Constraints
Under the framework of Indo-pacific strategy, Australia has in recent years increased its diplomatic, economic and security input in the South Pacific, which will exert a profound impact on regional geopolitics. However, some factors may affect whether Australia’s South Pacific policy could achieve its expected strategic goals.
Taking the South Pacific region as its backyard, Australia has been closely observing this region for an extended period of time. However, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, Australia followed the lead of the United States and got involved in the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War, thus scaling down its activities in the South Pacific. With the US shifting its strategic focus back to the Asia-pacific or Indopacific region in recent years, Australia has switched its attention back to its surrounding areas as well. Meanwhile, as China’s influence increases in the South Pacific, Australia has begun revising its policies toward its island neighbors while enhancing its capacity for strategic planning and resource investment in the region.
Measures to Upgrade Diplomacy in the South Pacific
In the past few years, Australia has reassessed the strategic importance of the South Pacific region and readjusted its corresponding policies so as to increase its diplomatic, economic and security input in the region.
Strengthening high-level exchanges
To demonstrate its regional leadership, Australia has increased its highlevel exchanges with South Pacific countries. In April 2017, then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull visited Papua New Guinea (PNG). In June
2018, then Foreign Minister Julie Bishop visited Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands successively. Since taking office in October 2018, the current Prime Minister Scott Morrison has visited this region frequently, promising to place South Pacific island countries “front and center” of Australia’s foreign policy. Morrison participated in the 26th Informal Leaders’ Meeting of the Asia-pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC) while visiting Papua New Guinea in November 2018. In January 2019, Morrison visited Vanuatu and Fiji, thus becoming the first Australian leader to visit Vanuatu in 30 years, and the first Prime Minister to ever visit Fiji. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation commented that Morrison made history in the sense that previous Australian Prime Ministers had only visited the island states for attending the annual summit meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), but no such formal bilateral visit had ever been conducted. After being reelected in May 2019, Morrison paid his first state visit to the Solomon Islands, seeking to “design a more dynamic and strategic set of goals” in the region.1 Moreover, Australia has expanded its diplomatic representation in the South Pacific by adding several high-ranking positions, including dispatching a high commissioner to Tuvalu and promising to set up diplomatic missions in Palau, the Marshall Islands, French Polynesia, Niue and the Cook Islands.
Increasing economic assistance
Nearly one third of Australia’s foreign aid budget has been appropriated to the Pacific region. In recent years, Australia has increased its aid provision to the Pacific island countries despite its financial difficulties. In the 2018 fiscal year, Australia’s economic aid to the Pacific increased by 18%, reaching a record A$1.3 billion.2 In November 2018, the Australian government announced to set up a A$2-billion fund, which would aim to offer loans for infrastructure construction in the Pacific island countries, including telecommunication networks, natural resources development, transportation and water supply
projects. Furthermore, the Australian government is pursuing plans to provide an additional A$1 billion, issued through export financing facilities and insurance companies, to promote construction and commercialization of relevant projects.3
Melanesia is geographically nearest to Australia and a major recipient of Australian foreign aid. As the largest island country in the South Pacific, Papua New Guinea, once under Australian trusteeship, is a major beneficiary of Australian assistance. In the fiscal year of 2017-2018, Australia provided A$546 million of aid to PNG.4 On the APEC meeting held in November 2018, Australia, the United States, Japan and New Zealand released a Us$1.7-billion infrastructure investment plan, with the purpose of constructing a power grid for Papua New Guinea. Meanwhile, Australia and Vanuatu signed an agreement in June 2018, in which Australia agreed to fund the laying of submarine cables connecting Port Villa of Vanuatu with Honiara of the Solomon Islands. In July of the same year, Australia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea on the construction of the tri-state submarine cables, promising to provide A$137 million. In May 2019, Australia declared to allocate A$250 million to its aid programs in the Solomon Islands.
Australia has taken actions to increase the size of labor force coming from the Pacific states. In November 2018, Australia promulgated a new labor regulation, extending the length of stay of seasonal workers from the Pacific islands from six to nine months. Meanwhile, the age limit for working holiday visas for some island states was extended from 30 to 35.5 Australia also signed agreements with Samoa, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, which allows citizens from these countries to work up to three years in Australia’s rural and township areas.
Enhancing security cooperation
Strengthening bilateral defense cooperation. Australia customarily works out its plans for defense cooperation with the Pacific island countries on an annual basis, giving support in terms of providing military training, upgrading military infrastructure and offering technical consultation. In recent years, Australia has been strengthening security cooperation and has signed bilateral defense agreements with the island states. For instance, it has elevated its defense cooperation with PNG by planning to deploy more troops there and conduct rotations regularly. There are currently about 30 Australian officers serving in the PNG defense force. Australia also signed bilateral security agreements with the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru and conducted a military dialogue with Tonga in June 2018. Taking aid as a means of cooperation, the Turnbull administration negotiated with Vanuatu on the signing of a bilateral security treaty, promising to provide “technical support” to help Vanuatu forge its first national security strategy. Australia also declared to establish a police academy in Vanuatu to support the training of over 300 police officers. During his visit of Vanuatu in January 2019, Morrison reiterated to expedite talks on the signing of the Australia-vanuatu security treaty.
Establishing regional security training centers. Australia released its Foreign Policy White Paper in December 2018, promising to establish an Australia Pacific Security College to provide training for the Pacific island states in national defense and law enforcement, in the hope of forging a powerful alumni network in the region. In case those countries would seek security guarantees, they would naturally turn to Australia instead of others for backing. Australia is also committed to funding Fiji’s rebuilding of the Blackrock Camp, seeking to make it the training center for defense troops in the South Pacific region and the potential location for the Australia Pacific Security College in the future. To enhance rule of law and border management in the region, Australia declared in January 2019 that it would consult with South Pacific countries on the establishment of centers of excellence, for which Australia would dispatch police officers to assist in practical instructions and in the
creation of regional police training networks. The first such center of excellence would be set up in PNG.
Improving the security function of regional mechanisms. Australia has long played a predominant role in the Pacific Islands Forum. In recent years, it has repeatedly put forward proposals on regional security issues such as national defense, police affairs and law enforcement cooperation. At the PIF summit held in September 2018, Australia advocated that PIF members should agree on a more comprehensive security agreement than the Biketawa Declaration signed in 2000, covering defense, law and order, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, while restricting any military engagement of non-signatories in the region. Concetta Fierravanti-wells, then Australian Minister for International Development and the Pacific, noted that the upgraded version of the Biketawa Declaration would guide Forum members and other regional organizations to deal with security cooperation as their priority and provide a framework to respond to emerging threats. Meanwhile, more importance would be attached to the improved arrangement than to the bilateral security agreements between Australia and its island neighbors.6 Integrating regional security cooperation into the Australia-us alliance. Australia has established military bases in the South Pacific islands and integrated them into the United States’ second island chain in the Pacific. In November 2018, Australia rebuilt the Lombrum Naval Base on PNG’S Manus Island, 1,060 miles south of Guam. During World War II, this installation was used by the US Army to support its military actions against Japan in the Philippines. A deep-water port could be developed on Manus Island to harbor large naval vessels and task forces. The Australian Defense Force administered the base until PNG gained independence in 1975. At present, Australia has declared that its security cooperation with PNG is a “natural extension of our longstanding and collaborative defense partnership.”7
Promoting people-to-people exchanges
Launching the “rugby charm offensive.” Taking advantage of the South Pacific islanders’ joy of rugby, Australia seeks to make the most of the shared enthusiasm between Australians and Pacific islanders for this game so as to foster their cultural ties. In 2017, 44% of the rugby players in Australia’s National Rugby League were ethnically Pacific islanders or Maoris. The League is also planning to hold a series of pre-season games and invite rugby teams from the Pacific islands to participate in Australia’s Second Division Rugby League games with their travel costs covered.
Amplifying Australia’s impact on public opinion in the South Pacific. In 2018 Australia initiated a design to invest A$17 million in broadcasting 1,000 hours of Australian TV programs each year to Pacific media networks in the coming three years. Based on surveys of the Pacific audience’s preference for TV programs, the Free TV Australia would present news, sports, drama series and children’s programs to them. When Morrison visited Fiji, Australian representatives also signed an agreement with the University of the South Pacific for spending A$84
million within six years to help improve its education and training qualities.8
Strengthening coordination with other Western countries
Australia interacts closely with other Western countries regarding its policy toward the Pacific island states, which is reflected in three perspectives. First, Australia cooperates with New Zealand, which is its geographically closest Anglosaxon neighbor and a major supporter in the South Pacific region. In March 2018, Australia urged New Zealand to enter into closer coordination, rebuild the two countries’ common regional strategic dominance and sign a more in-depth security agreement with the island states. The second aspect is to cooperate with the US and Japan. To strengthen its alliance with the US, Australia is integrating South Pacific affairs into the Us-australia strategic dialogue. During the “2+2” talks involving Foreign and Defense Ministers of the two sides in July 2018, the two countries reiterated to cooperate closely in matters of South Pacific security, for which the US would send military personnel to engage in interactions between Australia and South Pacific island states. In November of the same year, Australian and Japanese leaders met at the APEC summit held in PNG, stressing that the two nations would jointly advance a “free and open Indo-pacific” and pledging to step up engagement with the Pacific states, especially in terms of infrastructure investment in the islands.9 The third level is to cooperate with the United Kingdom and France. When attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in April 2018, Turnbull and Bishop called on the UK to allocate more aid to the Pacific region after Brexit. Subsequently, the UK declared to open up high commissions in Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga. The British Foreign Office further announced in a statement that “an increased global footprint will also ensure that Britain and its allies are able to counter the malign influence of countries who seek to undermine the UK.”10 France is the major European
country Australia seeks to woo, as it possesses three overseas territories in the Pacific region. When French President Emmanuel Macron visited Australia in May 2018, leaders from the two countries agreed to strengthen defense cooperation on the basis of the 2016 submarine supply agreement worth US$38 billion. Denise Fisher, a visiting fellow at the Australian National University and former consul-general to New Caledonia, noted that “any Australian strategic analyst would see the benefit of having a Western ally, a global leader, in the South Pacific to share the strategic burden, especially as we face geo-strategic change with China coming into the region.”11
Reasons for Australia’s Increasing Input in the South Pacific
Taking the South Pacific as its traditional backyard, Australia’s major strategic goal is to put the security and development of the region under control and prevent the emergence of any security threats against itself from this area. Australia seeks to play the leading role in providing development aid and promoting defense cooperation, aiming to enhance the capacity of the Pacific island countries to respond to security risks and natural disasters while catering to its own strategic demands. Australia seeks to build a solid foundation for its grander strategy by readjusting its policies toward the South Pacific islands, intensifying its penetration and control over the region in all aspects and consolidating the South Pacific as its traditional buffer zone.
Consolidating the traditional “sphere of influence”
The South Pacific region is perceived by Australia as the maritime portal to Asia with utmost strategic importance. Vigilant to any outside forces which may seek asymmetrical influence in the South Pacific, Australia has consistently tried to deny any foreign powers access to the region which may weaken its regional leadership.
In its historical past, Australia was always concerned about external powers seeking spheres of influence in its surrounding islands. In the 1860s,
the colonial parliament of Australia, political elites and the media strongly petitioned the British Colonial Office to annex all “unclaimed” islands of the South Pacific, lest any part should fall into the hands of hostile forces. Australia particularly urged the British Colonial Office to annex Vanuatu, known at the time as the New Hebrides, to keep it out of the hands of the French. The federated Commonwealth of Australia was established in 1901, partly because Australia feared that Britain could not be relied upon to offer security guarantees, and that independent security forces were needed to enforce the Australian Monroe Doctrine in the Pacific. The French threat in the New Hebrides was resolved through a joint governance agreement between Britain and France signed in 1906. However, as Japan later emerged to become the major foreign threat in the Pacific, Australia urged the UK to cede its stake in the islands entirely to France so as to have a third power to balance against Japan and to forge a Western defense line in the region.
During WWII, when the UK focused on resisting German aggression in Europe, and had to relocate its military forces away from the Pacific region, Australia had to ally with the US to resist Japan in places like Papua New Guinea. British power declined in the course of WWII and its capacity to maintain its sphere of influence in the South Pacific sharply reduced. Shortly after WWII, South Pacific islands, such as Vanuatu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands, achieved independence from British colonial rule. Since the onset of the Cold War, the US has forged its security alliance system in the Pacific, further weakening British influence in the region. In 1967 Britain declared to gradually withdraw its troops from areas east of the Suez Canal, creating a power vacuum in the South Pacific, which the US stepped in to fill. As the United States’ “deputy sheriff” in the South Pacific, Australia administered the region on its behalf. As a result, all newly independent island countries mimicked Australia in terms of their political system, governance and economic management.12 Whenever political disorder and social upheaval broke out in the South Pacific, Australia would intervene promptly, as its national defense forces were able to react quickly.
Australia views the South Pacific region as the weak spot in its security system, deeming that the island countries may turn out to be “failed states” due to bad governance and ethnic tensions, thus threatening Australia’s own security. That is why Australia sent military police to the Solomon Islands to restore peace in 2003 and dispatched military ships to Fiji’s neighboring waters to monitor its coup d’état in 2006. History keeps reminding Australia that it should stay vigilant to any rival power emerging in the region, and exhaust diplomatic and strategic means to prevent, restrain or counterbalance any foothold those rival forces could gain, which would make the South Pacific islands “a potential point of vulnerability for Australia.”13 Morrison once stated that Australia holds long-term interests and “special responsibilities” in the South Pacific region, and that the Australian government is seeking to restore the core status of the South Pacific in its strategic and diplomatic relations.14
Enforcing the “middle power” strategy
Australia has long harbored the desire to be a “middle power.” In the United Nations (UN) General Assembly of 1945, then Australian Foreign Minister H. V. Evatt announced to the world for the first time that Australia would pursue a more independent path as a “middle power.” In his first public address as Australian Prime Minister in 1972, Edward Gough Whitlam stated that Australia should be built into a more independent state in international affairs and a widely respected nation with unique characteristics in the Asiapacific and even across the globe. After taking office as Prime Minister in 2007, Kevin Rudd ambitiously put forward the “creative middle-power diplomacy,” seeking to “lead, not follow,” which clearly redefined Australia’s strategic ambition.15 In recent years, Australia has been forging its Indo-pacific strategy
while initiating the quadrilateral security dialogue with the US, Japan and India, demonstrating a keener ambition of pursuing the middle-power status in the broader Indo-pacific region.
The South Pacific is the strategic backyard for Australia to fulfill its middle-power ambition as well as its stepping stone to project influence to the West Pacific, East Asia, Southeast Asia and even the east coast of the Indian Ocean. Since, the limited national power prevents Australia from engaging in global strategic deployment like major powers do, it has to behave more realistically and concentrate on its closest neighborhood so as to project power into a broader area in its proximity. Given that it is envisioning a grander Indopacific strategy, Australia is obliged to readjust its South Pacific policy and secure control over its backyard. Wielding its economic and military power, Australia seeks to influence the strategic development of the South Pacific so that it could consolidate its regional leadership in political, economic and security fields.
The South Pacific has been the test field for Australia on how to forge its regional influence. In history, Australia took the South Pacific region as its starting point to conduct multilateral diplomacy and construct international institutions. In August 1971, Australia, together with New Zealand, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Nauru and the Cook Islands, held a seven-party meeting in Wellington and founded the South Pacific Forum, which opened a new chapter in Australia’s ambition to lead the efforts to establish a new regional order. The Forum was later renamed the Pacific Islands Forum. Crusading against nuclear tests on behalf of the South Pacific Forum, Australia urged nuclear powers to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and set up a nuclear free zone in 1985. Later on, Australia re-oriented itself as a middle power of the Asia-pacific instead of the South Pacific. In January 1989, then Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke called for the convening of the ministerial meeting of Asia-pacific countries. Under Hawke’s promotion, the first Asia-pacific Ministerial Meeting on Economic Cooperation was held in Canberra in November 1989, which symbolized the founding of the Asia-pacific Economic Cooperation Meeting, the predecessor of APEC. Since the unfolding of the new century, Australia
has been expanding its strategic interests to the Asia-pacific region. Australia joined the East Asia Summit in 2005 and started participating as an official member in dialogues concerning East Asian political and economic affairs, thus transforming from a country with a South Pacific orientation to a member of the family of East Asian nations. With its formulation of an Indo-pacific strategy in recent years, Australia is presently pursuing clear strategic objectives with a broader vision and greater ambition, which include joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
Given the central function of the South Pacific in Australia’s middle-power strategy, Australia has been employing its geopolitical and historic advantages to take the initiative and achieve a more favorable status in the region. By increasing input in all issue areas and refining its strategic priorities, Australia seeks to solidify its position in the South Pacific to provide support for its actions in the broader Indo-pacific region.
Coordinating with the United States’ Indo-pacific strategy
Relying upon the US for its security, Australia treats its alliance with the US as its strategic backbone in both its Defense White Paper and the Foreign Policy White Paper. Under the guidance of these national directives, Australia has followed the US closely in foreign policy. Since President Barack Obama took office, the US has reduced its engagement on the anti-terrorist frontier while shifting its strategic focus to Asia. Australia has thus become the strategic pivot in the US rebalancing to the Asia-pacific and functioned as the “southern anchor” in Washington’s Pacific strategy, which includes the supply of a military base in Darwin for the rotation of US troops.
President Donald Trump has been committed to implementing the Indopacific strategy since taking office. The strategic position of the South Pacific in American policy has been raised, to perform as the key link in the United States’ second island chain. Matt Matthews, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, noted that the US should not take its long-term friendship with the Pacific island countries for granted, but instead increase investment there. The US allocated over US$350 million of aid to the Pacific
islands in 2018, assisting in their law enforcement and fishery management. Under US guidance, the World Bank’s development budget for the Pacific islands has doubled in the past three years, reaching US$808 million in 2018.16 The US has been expanding its military presence in the Pacific island states as well. In December 2018, the US military held talks with the Federated States of Micronesia on opening new naval facilities and adding runways to its airport, and also on conducting joint military exercises in the area.
The US has been employing the inflammatory rhetoric of “China threat in the South Pacific” as a pretext for its forceful intrusion into the region. In the Assessment on US Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access released in January 2019, Washington alleges that China seeks to establish a military base in Vanuatu in order to provide logistic facilities for the Chinese Navy, with security implications for the overseas deployment, training and logistic support of US troops. The US also uses the Taiwan issue to restrain China from expanding its influence in the South Pacific. During the Micronesia Presidents’ Summit held in February 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo praised Taiwan as a “democratic success story, a reliable partner and a force for good in the world” and encouraged South Pacific countries to continue maintaining friendly relations with Taiwan.17
Australia benefits from the US Indo-pacific strategy, since it can rely upon American power to repel the “infiltration” of hostile forces into the South Pacific region. Therefore, Australia corresponds to and coordinates with Washington’s policy adjustments. Australia has established the Indo-pacific Group in its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which consists of five offices. The Australian Defense Force is also setting up an Indo-pacific navy taskforce. The Australian Navy has been enhancing its presence in the first and second island chains since 2017, conducting the annual “Indo-pacific Endeavor” exercise to interact closely with the military forces of Palau, Micronesia and Papua New Guinea, among other countries.
Pushing back China’s influence in the South Pacific
In recent years, China has upgraded its cooperation with South Pacific island countries in political, economic, trade and cultural areas, which has resulted in great progress.
First, political relations between China and South Pacific countries have been on a steady rise. After attending the G20 summit held in Australia in November 2014, President Xi Jinping visited Fiji to meet with the eight island countries having diplomatic relations with China, and all of the countries agreed to establish strategic partnerships with China based on the principles of mutual respect and common development. In November 2018, prior to attending the APEC Informal Leaders’ Meeting held in PNG, President Xi held another round of talks with leaders of the island countries, who agreed to upgrade their bilateral relations with China to comprehensive strategic partnerships featuring mutual respect and common development.
Second, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been warmly welcomed by South Pacific island countries. Then PNG Prime Minister Peter O’neill visited China in June 2018, signing the first MOU with China on building the BRI among Pacific island countries. At present, all island countries having diplomatic relations with China have joined the BRI. This joint action has triggered a ripple effect in the South Pacific region, and some nations without diplomatic ties to China hope to take part in the BRI as well.
Third, China’s aid to South Pacific countries has been catching up. According to a report published by the Lowy Institute in Australia, China has committed US$5.9 billion of aid to South Pacific island countries, concentrating on over 200 projects. China now offers up to US$1.3 billion of grants and preferential loans to the region, which makes up 8% of China’s total aid expenditure. Chinese aid far exceeds that of New Zealand (US$1.2 billion), and is secondary only to Australia, which offers US$6.6 billion. All of China’s aid projects are linked directly with the national economy and people’s livelihood of the recipient countries, not only bringing job opportunities for local residents, but also helping them improve their work skills. David
Lipton, First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, once stated that Chinese investments have brought positive benefits to many developing countries, taking account of the impact on governance, capacity building, sustainable development and environmental protection.18 The rise of Chinese influence in the South Pacific coincides with a reduction of Australia’s financial commitment to the region. Although Australia is currently still the largest donor to the South Pacific region, its “patriarchal” way of aid allocation has been constantly criticized by officials of the recipient countries.
Fourth, China has been stepping up defense exchanges and cooperation with South Pacific island states. In August 2018, the Chinese naval hospital ship “Peace Ark” visited Fiji. In October of the same year, China delivered a hydrographic survey vessel to the Fiji Navy, enhancing its hydrographic monitoring and maritime surveillance capabilities. China has also donated computers to the Fiji Defense Ministry, trained officers from PNG, and built office buildings for the East Timor Ministry of Defense and Security. On the other hand, the Australian media is hyping up a report that China assisted Vanuatu in building a port, asserting that it may become China’s naval base. Though the allegation was strongly denied by the Vanuatu government, the news has propelled Australia to immediately enhance security cooperation with Vanuatu.
Fifth, China’s cultural and people-to-people exchanges with South Pacific countries have intensified. China’s investment and immigration to the South Pacific have been rising steadily. The number of Chinese tourists choosing the South Pacific as their destination has been growing, with an annual average of more than 100,000. Among these, the number of Chinese tourists to Fiji have been growing most rapidly, reaching over 50,000 in 2018. With the development of tourist attractions and the upgrading of tourist infrastructure in the island countries, more Chinese tourists will be attracted in the future. Chinese broadcasting services are already operating in the South Pacific, such as China Radio International (CRI), which has taken over more than 10 radio
bands relinquished by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation to transmit Chinese programs. Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa, the Solomon Islands and New Caledonia are all able to receive broadcasts from China.
In view of China’s recently rising influence in the Pacific, Australia, with anxiety and even uneasiness, has been prompted to strengthen its control over the region so as to counterbalance, weaken and even push back China’s growing status.
Major Restraining Factors of Australia’s South Pacific Policy
Integrating its South Pacific policy into the broader framework of Indo-pacific strategy, Australia has accelerated the implementation of its commitments to the region in areas like diplomacy, aid and security, which is going to exert a profound impact on the geopolitics and economic development of the South Pacific. However, the following factors may affect whether Australia’s South Pacific policy could achieve its expected strategic goals.
Contradictions between Australia and South Pacific island countries
First, the island countries reject Australia’s interference into their internal affairs. Australia often acts in a condescending, patronizing manner toward South Pacific island countries, and meddles in their internal matters. Disregarding the sovereignty of South Pacific countries, former Australian Prime Minister John Howard once referred to them as “our tiny lands.” For instance, Australia joined New Zealand in imposing sanctions against Fiji after the country’s 2006 coup d’état, causing a long-term confrontation between the two sides. Their relations slightly improved after Fiji’s general election in September 2014, but have once again been tainted by a diplomatic dispute over the issue of the Australian nationality of terrorist Neil Prakash. In addition, there are Australian consultants in key positions of almost all departments of South Pacific governments, who not merely offer advice, but also seek to control the development directions of the island countries and interfere in any
projects deemed as not in line with Australia’s interests. In July 2017, Australian intelligence officials abruptly warned Micronesia not to allow Chinese companies to carry out its submarine cable project, even threatening to destroy it with military force.
Second, Australia and the island countries fundamentally disagree on the issue of climate change. As one of the largest countries in terms of per capita carbon emissions in the world, Australia signed the Paris Agreement and made relevant commitments to reduce carbon emissions, but its behavior in recent years has shown the opposite. It supports petroleum producing countries like the US, who oppose the conclusion of the report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and openly advocates the expansion of the coal industry. On the contrary, the South Pacific islanders, feeling their safety and even their nations’ survival threatened by climate change, have made rallying international support to tackle climate change and terminate the use of fossil fuels their primary diplomatic goal. The Pacific island countries have been dissatisfied with Australia’s position on climate change. Tuvaluan Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga warned that the Australian government’s “Pacific pivot” risks being fatally undermined by its climate change policies. “We cannot be regional partners … genuine and durable partners … unless the Government of Australia takes a more progressive response to climate change,” he said.19 Vanuatu Foreign Minister Ralph Regenvanu also declared that “Misrepresenting or covering up facts on climate change isn’t just killing people; it may well bring about the end of our civilization. Vanuatu will not allow this to go unchallenged.”20 At the Pacific Islands Forum in August 2018, the Pacific island countries submitted a draft of the Biketawa Plus declaration to Australia, urging the Morrison administration to fulfill its commitments to the Paris Agreement.
The third issue concerns refugees. Australia keeps refugees in various offshore detention centers, thus triggering disputes with the Pacific island countries. Since 2013, Australia has taken measures to strengthen border protection. Asylum seekers who attempt to arrive in Australia by sea are first sent to detention facilities in PNG, Nauru and other Pacific island countries, where their refugee status would be reviewed. However, no Australian law ever stipulates a clear-cut duration for such a review process. The offshore camp policy has led to much controversy among the Pacific island states, who point out that Australia is merely exporting its own problems. Fiji Foreign Minister Inoke Kubuabola harshly criticized the Australian government for being “highhanded and arrogant” and trying to dump its own problems on the doorstep of the Pacific island countries, which has put its small and weak neighbors under pressure.21 Scott Morrison has implemented a tougher refugee policy since assuming office, setting an annual entry limit of 18,750 refugees in Australia. This goes against the principles of international human rights Australia has endorsed. In May 2019, over 800 refugees were housed in Nauru’s refugee center and PNG’S Manus refugee camp, where living conditions were so cruel that many refugees attempted suicide, triggering vehement criticism among the Pacific island countries.
Regionalism of South Pacific island countries
Besides taking part in the Pacific Islands Forum led by Australia and New Zealand, South Pacific island countries have also been promoting regional integration to forge consensus among themselves. They have intensified interactions in economic, cultural and diplomatic areas, and have coordinated closely to establish various regional or sub-regional cooperation mechanisms, greatly enhancing their internal cohesion while reducing their economic and diplomatic dependency on Australia.
First, the island countries intend to establish regional organizations
that cover all small island countries. Seeking not to be dominated by Australia or New Zealand, Fiji advocated for the founding of the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) in 2013, covering 14 island countries in the Pacific region. The PIDF has been designated as a platform for Southsouth coordination, which, through structural and inclusive cooperation, promotes sustainable development and the integration of economic, social and environmental spheres. At the third PIDF summit held in 2015, the PIDF Charter was adopted and a special fund established to support the economic development of the Pacific island countries. Participants of the summit discussed measures taken by the Pacific island countries to tackle climate change, and urged developed countries like Australia to reach legally binding agreements at the UN Climate Change Conference to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and cope with global warming
Second, the island countries are promoting the development of subregional organizations in the South Pacific. Geographically proximate countries which share similar ethnic and cultural origins and pursue similar goals in terms of social and economic development have formed relatively smaller sub-regional groups in the South Pacific. On the basis of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Trade Agreement, the four countries of Fiji, PNG, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu signed the Agreement Establishing the Melanesian Spearhead Group in March 2007, formalizing the group as an official international organization with conferences held once a year. The MSG aims to catalyze regional economic development by strengthening economic and trade ties, and it provides a political framework to manage regional affairs and coordinate all members on relevant issues. The MSG has increasingly gained influence in the South Pacific region and is ready to accept Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and Brunei.
Third, South Pacific countries wish to expand their diplomatic relations on the basis of the Cotonou Agreement. Back in the mid-1970s, the Pacific island countries, together with African and Caribbean countries, formed the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), through which they strived for common interests and became the model for South-south cooperation. Uniting with African and Caribbean developing nations, the Pacific island countries
signed the Cotonou Agreement and formed a partnership with the European Union (EU) in June 2000. With a term of 20 years, the Agreement aims mainly at jointly addressing climate change, food security and raising aid effectiveness.22 Given that the Agreement is going to expire in 2020, South Pacific countries amended their partnership agreement with the EU in June 2018, which covers the three pillars of development cooperation, political dialogue and trade in a bid to find new approaches to dealing with global challenges and realize inclusive growth and sustainable development.23 In February 2019, South Pacific island countries held consultations with the EU again for a postcotonou treaty, in which they outlined cooperation priorities between the EU and the Pacific ACP members, including maritime governance, coping with climate change and promoting the green and blue economies.24
Diversification of South Pacific island countries’ foreign relations
With the deepening of globalization, South Pacific countries have increasingly opened up and formed closer political, economic and trade, cultural and people-to-peole ties with the world, enjoying more choices when interacting with others. There are diverse interest groups within South Pacific countries, each with distinct overseas concerns. Although the population size of the island countries is comparatively small, there are multiple ethnic groups and political parties engaging in rather intense competition for interests. Since various political parties pursue different interests and have diversified options available to them, Australia is the prioritized but far from the only country for the island states to deal with in their foreign relations.
Moreover, major countries in the South Pacific region are seeking to gain more leverage in regional affairs by counting upon multilateral and external forces in order to balance against Australia. Deeming itself as a major power in the South Pacific, PNG has been attaching more importance to multilateral diplomacy. It hosted the 16th Melanesian Spearhead Group summit, the 5th South Pacific Tourism Organization (SPTO) conference, the 46th PIF summit, the 8th ACP summit, and the 2018 APEC Informal Leaders’ Meeting. Apart from maintaining traditional relations with Australia and other Western countries, PNG has been putting greater focus on East and Southeast Asian countries. In recent years, PNG has been expanding its relations with Asian countries like China and Indonesia, hoping to take advantage of external forces to reduce their dependency on the US or Australia.
Besides focusing on its relations with Australia, Fiji has also been exploring multilateral cooperation. It now hosts the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and is a member of multiple organizations such as the MSG, the ACP, and the Group of 77. It also initiated the founding of the PIDF. Peter Thomson, Permanent Representative of Fiji to the UN, was elected the 71st President of the UN General Assembly in 2016. In the same year, Fiji was selected to preside over the 23rd Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP23). In recent years, Fiji has been strengthening its relations with Asian countries, with India being its key target to expand influence. 37% of Fijians are ethnically of Indian descent, and have historically been closely connected with India. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Fiji in 2014, while Fiji Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama visited India in 2015 and 2018 to attend the summit of the Forum for India-pacific Islands Cooperation and the International Solar Alliance meeting.
To carry out diversified foreign relations, South Pacific countries have to rely on other forces to increase their bargaining chips and reduce their reliance on Australia in terms of aid and foreign relations. With weak infrastructure, the island countries are faced with particular challenges like geographical isolation,
small economic output, consequences of climate change, and ecological fragility. For these countries, the domestic political priorities are to enhance the capacity of tackling challenges, develop their national economies and improve people’s living standards, thus making the attraction of foreign aid one of their major diplomatic goals. As a developed middle power adjacent to the island countries, Australia is naturally the leading source of foreign aid for them; but Australia has long been attaching political strings when delivering aid to South Pacific island countries, forcing them to give up parts of their autonomy and become overly dependent on Australian aid. Being aware of the negative consequences of relying on Australian aid, the island countries have started searching for diversified sources of investment. To enable diplomatic diversification, the island countries have welcomed Chinese aid and the BRI. Therefore, leaders of the Pacific island states refuted Australian Minister for International Development and the Pacific Concetta Fierravanti-wells when she criticized Chinese aid as “white elephant projects.” Samoa Prime Minister Tuilaepa indicated that Fierravanti-wells’ comments were “insulting” to leaders of South Pacific island countries and could destroy the excellent relationships existing between Australia and the Pacific island countries.25 Sione Vuna Fa’otusia, Tonga’s Minister of Justice, noted that “it is sad indeed for Australia to start accusing China for helping the poor and needy countries of the Pacific,” adding that his country hopes that China, Tonga and countries along the Belt and Road could learn from each other.26
In general, South Pacific island countries will resist any country seeking to establish their exclusive sphere of influence in the region, be it Australia or other forces. To protect their own interests, the island countries will employ diversified diplomatic policies instead of putting all eggs in one basket. This trend is forcing Australia to reflect upon its policies toward the South Pacific and revise its strategic goals in the region.
Conclusion
Australia is a major power relative to South Pacific island countries and it plays the predominant role in regional affairs. Australia will continue to place the South Pacific region as the priority in its diplomatic and strategic agendas and increase input in the area based on assessment of the effectiveness of its existing policies. In the meantime, Australia aims to tighten its ties with countries in the region in order to avoid the infiltration of other major powers.
With the progress of globalization and regionalization, the world today is undergoing profound changes. The South Pacific region has become an important member of the global village, which is increasing and intensifying profound exchanges with other countries. Presiding over the South Pacific region in the traditional manner, Australia does not allow other forces to enter the region, nor does it allow the island nations to “reach out.” Such a patriarchal manner of governance may lead to opposition from other regional countries, thus undermining Australia’s long-standing privileges. Witnessing the changes in attitude of South Pacific island countries, and the uncertainties incurred by such changes, Australia should shake off its antiquated mentality and instead promote open and inclusive regional integration with the island countries. Only by conforming to the trend of the times could Australia continue earning the respect of countries in the region.
China and Australia, by refraining from zero-sum competition, could cooperate in their relations with the Pacific island countries. In terms of assisting the island countries’ development, both sides could learn from each other. Using bilateral and multilateral platforms, China and Australia could expand cooperation on issues like infrastructure construction, poverty reduction, climate change, earthquake and natural disasters, and environmental protection. Through win-win cooperation, they could forge the South Pacific region into a model for both South-south and North-south cooperation.