China International Studies (English)

The “New India” Vision and the Building of a Closer China-india Partnershi­p

- Rong Ying & Zhang Lei

Prime Minister Modi’s “New India” vision, which has blossomed into a great-power strategy for India’s rise, will not only bring about changes in India and in India’s relationsh­ip with the outside world, but also reshape China-india relations. Building a closer China-india developmen­tal partnershi­p is conducive to mutual enhancemen­t of the two countries’ developmen­t and complement­arity of their respective advantages.

The “New India” vision, the administra­tive goal proposed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his first term of office, has blossomed into a great-power strategy for India’s rise. Implementa­tion of the strategy will not only bring about changes in India and in India’s relationsh­ip with the outside world, but also influence, indeed reshape, China-india relations.

New India: From Administra­tive Goal to Great-power Strategy

In May 2014, following the election victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) after a lapse of ten years, Modi put forward the “New India” vision, declaring his intention of building a country that is “poverty-free, corruption-free, clean, terrorism-free, and communalis­m-free.” The vision was subsequent­ly subject to detailed planning with concrete implementa­tion measures proposed. With the BJP’S overwhelmi­ng victory in May 2019 general election and Modi winning his second term of office, the “New India” vision has advanced at an accelerate­d pace.1 Over the five years, “New India” has been transforme­d from a slogan of the Modi government into a strategy and an action plan outlining India’s rise as a major power, and

containing the following characteri­stics.

First, a magnificen­t economic growth target is outlined.2 For Modi, the “New India” vision is a strategic plan that propels India’s national rise and rejuvenati­on. India will become the country with the biggest population in the world by 2030, and is expected to be the world’s third-largest economy. It took 70 years for India’s economy to grow to US$2 trillion, but only one year to grow to a further $3 trillion, with the estimate of an additional $2-trillion expansion of the Indian economy over the next five years within reach. In his address to the nation on India’s Independen­ce Day in 2019, Modi unveiled the economic growth target in his second term of office, which foresees a $5-trillion economy by 2024.3 Previously, Modi also indicated that India’s economic size could well surpass $10 trillion before 2030 should its growth rate be maintained. By that time, India’s per capita GDP would then be around the current level of average income in countries such as Argentina or Chile.

Second, a Modi-style developmen­t concept is promoted. To win more popular participat­ion and support, Modi has vowed to create a “New India” that lives up to Mahatma Gandhi’s dreams, “which is clean and environmen­tally-friendly, where every individual is fit and healthy, where every mother, every child is nourished, where every citizen feels safe.” The “New India” that Modi pledged to build would be “free from discrimina­tion, and possess harmony,” following the ideals of Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas (everyone’s support, everyone’s developmen­t and everyone’s trust).4 To achieve this, Modi has announced a number of social welfare plans, such as “Modicare,” which aims to provide 500 million people under poverty with quality medical care and offers up to 500,000 rupees in support to qualified families, and “Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY),” which

targets Indian families below the poverty line and aims at reducing the burden on women of impoverish­ed households by replacing unclean fuel with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Launched in May 2016, PMUY has now benefited 72 million people.

Third, developmen­t of the manufactur­ing sector is strongly encouraged. Modi’s “Make in India” initiative, as the flagship project of his “New India” vision, aims to build India into a new global manufactur­ing center. To this end, Modi has establishe­d more than 400 special zones after taking office, and launched plans such as “Digital India,” “Skill India” and “Startup India,” vowing to increase the share of the manufactur­ing sector in the country’s GDP to over 25% and creating an additional 100 million jobs.5 Modi has also promised to increase government investment, accelerate the process of reforms, promote infrastruc­ture constructi­on, and attract more foreign capital, hoping investors at home and abroad will take full advantage of India’s tremendous demographi­c dividend to boost manufactur­ing developmen­t.

Fourth, the “New India” vision strives for building an effective and strong government. First, Modi has proposed “cooperativ­e federalism” to streamline central-local relations and reduce the institutio­nal barriers for advancing “New India.” A symbolic event in this regard is the establishm­ent of the National Institutio­n for Transformi­ng India (NITI), replacing the Planning Commission, which played a major role in India’s macro-economic policy-making process since national independen­ce. This measure has provided Modi with an important platform to coordinate the developmen­t plans of the central and state government­s.6 Second, Modi has worked to strengthen the consciousn­ess of “one nation.” By promoting “one nation, one tax, one election, one constituti­on,” Modi aims to consolidat­e the federal government’s dominant position through

tax, electoral and legal reforms.7 Third, Modi has leveraged the power of BJP to advance domestic political and social transforma­tion.8 Since taking office, Modi has made historic progress in implementi­ng the BJP’S three core agendas, namely revoking the special status to Jammu and Kashmir granted under Article 370 of the Indian constituti­on, rebuilding a grand temple for the Hindu warrior god Ram on a plot of land in Ayodhya, and pushing for a uniform civil code for all citizens. The first two promises have been fulfilled. In addition, Modi has proposed rewriting the narrative of India’s history, accelerati­ng an amendment to the Indian citizenshi­p law, and passing legislatio­n against violent terrorist activities. By giving priority to the interests and political appeals of Hindu religious groups, Modi hopes to win support from the BJP’S conservati­ve forces for his policy objectives and especially his major reforms.9

Fifth, the “New India” vision puts national interests first in the country’s diplomacy as a major power. In May 2015, less than a year after taking office, Modi explicitly set forth the goal to build India into a leading global major power. Guided by this strategic objective, India has further broken through the shackles of non-alignment in its foreign policy concept and is actively promoting all-round majorpower diplomacy.10 Meanwhile, India has shifted its diplomatic focus in order to turn the favorable external environmen­t into a positive factor for domestic developmen­t, hoping to facilitate its overall rise through proactive economic diplomacy. To optimize its diplomatic profile, while actively maneuverin­g its way among great powers, India has concentrat­ed on maintainin­g and strengthen­ing its dominant position

in South Asia, expediting engagement in East Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and seeking new breakthrou­ghs in multilater­al diplomacy. First, in South Asia, India has advanced the building of subregiona­l and cross-regional cooperatio­n mechanisms that it leads, while sticking to isolating and countering Pakistan, and guarding against any external forces that may pose a challenge to its regional dominance. Second, with the “Act East” policy, India has actively deepened relations with ASEAN and Southeast Asian countries, and expanded interactio­ns with Japan, Australia and South Korea. Third, India has put forward its own version of the Indo-pacific vision, and made great efforts to play a leading role in Indo-pacific maritime affairs and security cooperatio­n. By demonstrat­ing strategic autonomy in Indopacifi­c great-power competitio­n, India is seeking for more substantia­l economic benefits. Fourth, India has accelerate­d its westward advance into the Middle East and the Gulf region, increasing its presence by active engagement in regional affairs. In recent years, Modi has paid frequent visits to major regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, and continued its energy cooperatio­n with Iran despite US sanctions, in an effort to safeguard its energy and economic security interests.11 Fifth, India has been playing an active role in global governance reform. Whether in climate change, disaster prevention and relief, humanitari­an assistance, or other global and regional challenges, India has become actively involved and is seeking to create new multilater­al cooperatio­n mechanisms. For example, the Internatio­nal Solar Alliance, establishe­d by India in partnershi­p with France, has been endorsed by more than 120 countries worldwide, which greatly enhances the influence and voice of India on the issue of climate change.

Achievemen­ts and Challenges of the “New India” Vision

Since its independen­ce in 1947, it has been the aspiration of the whole Indian nation and the political ambition of the Indian leadership to build the country into a proactive major power with global status and influence.12 For the first time, Modi’s “New India” vision turned the strategic goal of India’s rise into specific and clear objectives, with a program of action and the means of implementa­tion clearly formulated. Over the five years since the proposal of “New India,” the overall effect has been significan­t, especially in projects aimed at the well-being of society and people’s livelihood.

Politicall­y, the “New India” vision has brought massive benefits for Modi and the BJP. In particular, India’s ordinary citizens are willing to support Modi and the BJP due to their expectatio­n of specific developmen­t achievemen­ts as they have already enjoyed. As India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmany­am Jaishankar publicly revealed, the BJP and Modi’s reelection victory in May 2019 should be attributed to the “New India” vision and the timely implementa­tion of social welfare projects such as affordable housing, clean toilets, micro-finance, and household fuel gas.13

Economical­ly, a series of major reforms have been made to realize the “New India” vision, which not only stimulates India’s economic growth potential but also boosts confidence for investors at home and abroad. Since 2014, India’s economy has witnessed an average growth rate of more than 7%, which surpasses other emerging market economies in the same period. India’s business environmen­t is also constantly improving. According to relevant reports, India is one of the ten major economies that have experience­d the most remarkable progress in terms of business environmen­t. In 2018, India ranked 63rd globally in this regard, up from

merely 142nd in 2013.14

Internatio­nally, the “New India” vision has consolidat­ed India’s geostrateg­ic position. The decisivene­ss of Modi’s strong government over the past five years has not only attracted attention from the Western strategic studies community, but has also been well recognized by global business circles. As economic and trade frictions between China and the United States have intensifie­d since 2018, a variety of interest groups in India, while closely following the negotiatio­n process between the two countries, have begun discussing how they can reap benefits from the situation. The Indian business community has proposed that the government and enterprise­s should actively get prepared for industrial and investment transfer.15

With the advance of Modi’s “New India” vision, however, India is also witnessing mounting difficulti­es and challenges, which have become increasing­ly prominent after Modi was re-elected.

First is the slowing economic growth rate. Since the first half of 2019, various internatio­nal organizati­ons and transnatio­nal bodies have revised their forecasts downward for India’s economic growth rate. Internatio­nal ratings agency Moody’s Investors Service has downgraded India’s economic outlook to negative from stable, with a forecast of 5.6% for the country’s actual growth rate in 2019, which is significan­tly lower than 7.4% in 2018.16 The Indian government’s research institute has also come to the conclusion that there has been an economic slowdown, with more focus on the extent of the slowdown. According to the latest forecast by the OECD, India’s GDP growth rate from 2020 to 2024 would be 6.6%, compared to 7.4%

from 2013 to 2017. The sluggish growth of the Indian economy is mostly attributed to the combined influence of structural and cyclical factors, and is to some extent also affected by the external environmen­t. Besides the economic slowdown, problems like environmen­tal deteriorat­ion, which concern India’s sustainabl­e developmen­t, are becoming more and more serious. Since the winter of 2019 began, air pollution in New Delhi’s neighborho­od has reached an unbearable level. What is more worrisome for investors at home and abroad, the Modi government seems unable to come up with an effective response to the country’s economic slowdown. The existing stimulus measures have failed to have an effect, and the marginal benefits of relevant policies are diminishin­g. The decelerati­on of India’s reform process results in the overall flagging confidence of the domestic business community.17

Second is the rising religious nationalis­m in the country. The chronic sectarian and ethnic contradict­ions and conflicts in India have been a breeding ground for extreme nationalis­m, religious fanaticism and separatism. For a long time, successive government­s in India of different partisan views have insisted on secularism and adopted a policy of “unity in diversity,” which has to some extent maintained social harmony and domestic stability. However, a number of social policies carried out by the Modi government to advance economic reform are highly controvers­ial. For example, the attempt to promote a new law against “forced religious conversion” in the Indian parliament has aroused concern from the country’s social elite, who worry about the emergence of new sectarian conflicts.18 Even today, sectarian relations and social policy are still sensitive issues in domestic politics.19 While recently the Modi government has taken the opportunit­y of the 150th anniversar­y of Mahatma Gandhi’s birth

to advocate his spirit of mutual respect and caring among different ethnic and sectarian groups, the effect of this remains to be seen.20 In addition, due to religious, historical, cultural as well as geopolitic­al reasons, sectarian conflicts within India usually spill over the border to affect the country’s relations with its neighbors. In fact, religious factors have been highly visible in recent years in the continuous strained relationsh­ip between India and Pakistan .

Third is the widening gap between the need to accelerate openingup and the pressure to protect disadvanta­ged population­s. India’s political system requires parties and their leaders to participat­e in elections to win a mandate from voters on a regular basis, which poses a complicate­d challenge for the government and its leader to promote economic reform and handle domestic politics at the same time. This constitute­s a main reason for the slow progress of the country’s economic reform and the long-time absence of major breakthrou­ghs. After taking office, Modi has forcefully advanced drastic measures including banknote demonetiza­tion and tax reform, which boosts the confidence of investors at home and abroad. They expect the Indian Prime Minister to take a further step and resolve land, labor, and other intractabl­e issues that hinder the country’s economic developmen­t. However, India’s negotiatio­n stance on regional and bilateral free trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehens­ive Economic Partnershi­p (RCEP) casts doubt upon the sustainabi­lity of Modi’s reform. In early November 2019, India failed to conclude textbased negotiatio­ns of the RCEP together with the other 15 countries. According to Modi, the decision to opt out of the trade deal was made because “neither the Talisman of Gandhiji nor my own conscience permits me to join RCEP.” Foreign Minister Jaishankar also asserted that “no agreement at this time was better than a bad agreement.” BJP President and Minister of Home Affairs Amit Shah even wrote an article, in which

he indicated that Modi’s action has safeguarde­d India’s national interests and “kept India first,” demonstrat­ing the country’s resolution to resist any external pressure. He claimed that the Indian government has begun to reevaluate the free trade agreement with ASEAN and is working on getting into trade relations with Japan, the US and EU countries.21

India’s withdrawal from RCEP negotiatio­ns is the result of its failure to deepen structural reform, which demonstrat­es in a negative way that the country’s relevant reform measures are so lagging behind that an immediate response has become a must. Sanjay Baru, who was an advisor to Modi’s predecesso­r Manmohan Singh, criticized the Modi government’s position on the RCEP, saying that India’s withdrawal is not worth celebratin­g, let alone a diplomatic victory. There is also expert opinion which says the Modi government should take the opportunit­y to advance its developmen­t strategic plans, including those for special economic zones, as soon as possible to enhance India’s competitiv­eness in a fundamenta­l way.22

It has been nearly 30 years since India launched economic reform in 1991. Despite major progress, some outstandin­g structural problems have been accumulate­d in the process. In the context of accelerate­d economic globalizat­ion and regional integratio­n, these issues have become rather complicate­d with a lack of domestic consensus to address them. However, if left unresolved for long, the issues may eventually hinder the reform process itself. Modi’s “New India” vision is an effort to promote domestic consensus and make some breakthrou­ghs on these issues, which ultimately is conducive to the fulfillmen­t of the vison itself. The strong reaction of the internatio­nal community to India’s withdrawal from RCEP negotiatio­ns and the relevant domestic debate of the same is to some extent a reflection of the controvers­y over Modi’s reform process and even India’s developmen­t

model. Some Western scholars have begun to doubt whether India is truly able to face up to and address the constraini­ng factors in its domestic political system.23 Admittedly, the internatio­nal community should show full understand­ing for India’s national conditions. However, it is not beneficial to India’s own reform and developmen­t if the country stubbornly sticks to its position when participat­ing in regional integratio­n and the evolving global governance system, insisting on “India first” or even “India superiorit­y,” politicizi­ng economic and trade issues, or laying the blame on negotiatio­n partners when difficulti­es arise, counting on other countries to make concession­s.

Building a Closer China-india Developmen­tal Partnershi­p

There are commonalit­ies between the objectives of Modi’s “New India” vision and China’s “two centennial goals.” Only four months after Modi put forward “New India,” Chinese and Indian leaders agreed to build a closer developmen­tal partnershi­p between the two countries.24 The strategic planning at the top level, made in view of the realistic needs of the bilateral relationsh­ip, reflects the unity of strategic and pragmatic dimensions and that of long-term and intermedia­te considerat­ions in China-india relations, which is conducive to the mutual enhancemen­t of the two countries’ developmen­t and the complement­arity of their respective advantages.

Despite twists and turns, China-india relations over the past five years have eventually returned to the right track with a steady and positive trend. In April 2018 and October 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping had informal meetings with Modi in China’s Wuhan and India’s Chennai

respective­ly. The “Wuhan Spirit” and the “Chennai Connect,” as the toplevel design and strategic guidance for future developmen­t of China-india relations, have synergized the Chinese Dream and the “New India” vision. For their interactio­ns in the next stage, the two sides should hold fast to their strategic vision for common developmen­t, resolutely advance the strategic objective of building a closer developmen­tal partnershi­p, actively participat­e in and support each other’s developmen­t based on principles of mutual respect, equality and reciprocit­y, enrich the content of cooperatio­n while enhancing its effectiven­ess, and improve the stability, maturity and sense of gain in bilateral relations.

First, China and India should actively exchange their experience in national governance in order to enrich their closer developmen­tal partnershi­p. The difference between the two countries in terms of historical and cultural background­s as well as political systems determines their disparate developmen­t paths. However, neither developmen­t model is superior to the other, and the discrepanc­y should not undermine normal dialogues and communicat­ion between the two countries. With similar national conditions and developmen­t interests, there is sufficient need for China and India to communicat­e and exchange ideas in this regard. The two sides should take full advantage of the various dialogue mechanisms and deepen their exchanges with regard to their experience of governance, while exploring opportunit­ies for participat­ing in each other’s new round of reform and developmen­t. At the same time, the relevant authoritie­s of the two countries should actively promote communicat­ion and cooperatio­n in agricultur­e and rural affairs, poverty alleviatio­n and poverty reduction, basic health care, and other social developmen­t issues, in order to expand the scope of bilateral connection­s.

Second, China and India should take the opportunit­y to explore a bilateral manufactur­ing partnershi­p to deepen their pragmatic cooperatio­n and enhance the effectiven­ess of their cooperatio­n. Government­s of the two sides should step up policy guidance and assistance for investment and business operations of their respective enterprise­s, especially small and

medium-sized ones, in the other’s country. By helping relevant companies understand local regulation­s and policies, indiscrimi­nate investment can be reduced and risk management enhanced. The two countries should also give full play to the newly establishe­d high-level economic and trade dialogue mechanism, continue their negotiatio­ns on bilateral trade arrangemen­ts, and show an active attitude towards the other’s concerns. Based on the principles of equality and mutual benefits, they can collective­ly work to resolve issues in bilateral trade and investment, and address each other’s concerns with regard to market access in a reciprocal manner. In addition, they should accelerate energy cooperatio­n to effectivel­y respond to climate change and achieve sustainabl­e developmen­t.

Third, under the “China-india plus” model, the two countries should together play a leading role in the reform of global economic governance. They should strengthen coordinati­on and cooperatio­n in internatio­nal and multilater­al mechanisms, explore the possibilit­y of a China-india developmen­t cooperatio­n fund, and encourage enterprise­s of both sides to expand third-party markets through mutual equity participat­ion and financing. Under the “China-india plus” model, the two countries can jointly formulate infrastruc­ture project standards and principles that suit the local conditions of relevant countries and regions, and advance high-quality infrastruc­ture constructi­on and regional connectivi­ty. In particular, third-party cooperatio­n can be accelerate­d in South Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean region, with the focus on connectivi­ty projects and ecological conservati­on. Moreover, China and India should fully mobilize mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperatio­n Organizati­on, the Russia-india-china grouping and BRICS, to advance partnershi­ps in the era of a new industrial revolution. At the same time, the two countries should work together to establish and lead new mechanisms and enrich bilateral scientific and technologi­cal cooperatio­n, particular­ly stepping up cooperatio­n in areas such as artificial intelligen­ce, to actively handle opportunit­ies and challenges in the new phase of the industrial revolution. As India is to host the G20 summit in 2022, the two nations can deepen

coordinati­on on the issue of global economic governance reform, and enhance the collective voice of developing countries. Last but not least, China and India can cooperate on the issue of WTO reform, with the aim of safeguardi­ng multilater­alism and building an open world economic system.

Fourth, China and India should continue their security dialogue to improve strategic mutual trust while managing disputes and contradict­ions. To make the bilateral communicat­ion in the security field more effective, the two sides should conduct in-depth exchange of their respective views on developmen­t and security. The content of such dialogues on military and security affairs should also be enriched to enhance mutual trust and mutual understand­ing. While resolutely implementi­ng the strategic consensus of the two countries’ leaders, the tranquilit­y and stability of the border area should be guaranteed in order to create the proper conditions for final settlement of border disputes in a just and rational manner.

Fifth, cultural and people-to-people exchanges create the basis in public opinion for amicable bilateral relations. China and India should jointly promote the dialogue of Asian civilizati­ons, and turn the pride of Chinese and Indian peoples in their respective developmen­t achievemen­ts into pride in the rise of Asia as a whole. The government­s of the two countries should continue to support and encourage the universiti­es and research institutes of both sides to conduct basic studies in each other’s national conditions, in particular in the social, cultural, religious, political and local dimensions, as well as in the history of civilizati­onal mutual learning. Additional­ly, in-depth dialogue between the two countries’ media outlets is necessary to help them comprehens­ively and objectivel­y understand the significan­ce of China-india common developmen­t, thus cultivatin­g a favorable opinion for harmonious co-existence of the two sides, who will be playing a leading role in the sustainabl­e developmen­t of Asia and of the vast number of developing countries.

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