Contradictions in the Trump Administration’s Russia Policy

The duality and ambivalence of Trump’s Russia policy is the result of differences among US policy-makers on strategic interests and their perception of Russia. It is also deeply influenced by the structural contradictions and interactions between the two countries. There will be no “new Cold War” between the US and Russia, and “limited partnership” will be the new normal of the bilateral relationship in the 21st century.

Since President Donald Trump took office, the United States’ policy toward Russia has experienced upswings and downturns, oscillating between opposite sides and demonstrating starker contradictions. An in-depth study of the Trump administration’s Russia policy will assist in deepening our knowledge and understanding of the nature of Usrussia relations, so that we can better grasp the development trend of the relationship and provide a useful reference for China to more proactively handle its own relations with other major powers.

Duality of the Trump Administration’s Russia Policy

Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Us-russia relations have witnessed continuous deterioration to a “freezing point.” The inauguration of the maverick Donald Trump as the US President once cast a ray of light upon the ice of Us-russia relations, but it did not change the general direction of the further souring of bilateral relations.

Trump’s high-profile goodwill gestures toward Russia

First, Trump has publicly praised Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump did not shy away from his favorable attitude toward Putin during his 2016 presidential campaign. He repeatedly showed his recognition of Putin on Twitter, and even in the face of tremendous pressure from the investigation

about his alleged collusion with Russia after his election, he did not stop expressing his appreciation for the Russian President. Trump frequently made comparisons between his predecessor Barack Obama and Putin, sarcastically stating that Obama was less competent and had a lower IQ than Putin, praising Putin as a “good rival” with strong control over his entire country, and declaring that he would get along well with him.1 When refuting the accusations of collusion with Russia, Trump repeatedly cited Putin’s denial of interference in the US presidential election as an argument.

Second, Trump has objected to the Democratic Party’s policy toward Russia. During the election campaign, Trump fiercely criticized Hillary Clinton’s uncompromising position toward Moscow, claiming that improving Us-russia relations was beneficial to the United States, and that he would actively consider lifting the sanctions against Russia once he was elected. He even hinted at accepting Russia’s annexation of Crimea should he win the election. After his election victory, Trump repeatedly criticized Obama as the culprit of tension between the US and Russia. While blaming the deterioration of Us-russia relations on “many years of US foolishness and stupidity and now the rigged witch hunt,” he reiterated that it was “good” for the two countries to achieve friendly coexistence. In addition, Trump claimed that he did not see any reason why Russia would interfere in the US election,2 and denounced the US intelligence agencies for taking the alleged Russian interference as an excuse.

Third, Trump has been seeking active communication with Russia. In addition to phone calls, Trump took the initiative of holding informal meetings with Putin during G20 summits and the APEC Leaders’ Meeting, and in 2018 held a high-profile summit meeting with Putin in Helsinki. In May 2019, Trump arranged a 1.5-hour-long phone conversation with Putin. Additionally, he sent Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov twice to conduct in-depth discussions

on bilateral, international and strategic stability issues, demonstrating his political will to repair bilateral relations. At the G7 summit in 2018, Trump surprisingly proposed to invite Russia to return to the grouping. Before the G7 summit in Biarritz, France, in August 2019, Trump made an identical move, emphasizing that “it is much more appropriate to have Russia in the G7,” adding that “it should be the G8, because a lot of the things we talk about have to do with Russia.” He asserted that he would certainly invite Putin to participate in the G7 summit held in the United States in 2020. “Trump seems to be the only person in the US government that is interested in keeping in touch with Russia,” said Vladimir Dzhabarov, First Deputy Chair of the Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs.3

Fourth, Trump has boldly employed “pro-russian” figures. During the election campaign, a number of key members in Trump’s campaign team were accused of “colluding with Russia” because of their frequent contacts with Russians. After his election, Trump defied criticism and boldly appointed “pro-russian” figures such as Michael Flynn, Steve Bannon and Rex Tillerson, who advocated improving relations with Moscow. Among them, Tillerson had participated in the Sakhalin-i and multiple other cooperation projects with Russia when he served as the representative of Exxon Mobil in Russia, and was awarded the Friendship Medal by the Russian government in 2013. Bannon regarded Putin as an ally and proposed that the US and Russia should unite in fighting terrorism. Flynn also publicly stressed the importance of improving relations between the US and Russia, and was invited to attend the 10th anniversary of the establishment of Russian TV network RT, where he met with Putin. In addition, the media has considered Jared Kushner and other important figures of Trump’s team as “pro-russian,” because of their frequent business contacts with Russia.

Full-scope containment of Russia

First, clearly characterizing Russia as a rival. In the latest US National

Security Strategy released by the White House in December 2017, the Trump administration claimed that “the revisionist powers of China and Russia are actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners. China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests.”4 In his State of the Union address in January 2018, Trump declared: “Around the world, we face rogue regimes, terrorist groups, and rivals like China and Russia that challenge our interests, our economy, and our values.”5 In September of the same year, Trump signed the National Cyber Strategy, clearly listing Russia, Iran, North Korea and China as main cyber threats faced by the United States, charging that these countries would “all use cyberspace as a means to challenge the United States, its allies and partners, often with a recklessness they would never consider in other domains.”6

Second, continuously imposing sanctions on Russia. In July 2017, an overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate successively passed new bills on sanctions against Russia, Iran and North Korea, and imposed additional economic sanctions on individuals and entities related to Russia on the grounds of Russia’s suspected interference in the 2016 US presidential election.7 In August 2017, Trump signed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which is aimed at Russia, Iran and North Korea.8 In January 2018, the US government released the “Kremlin List” on the basis of the above-mentioned bills, bringing almost the entire Russian political leadership and well-known entrepreneurs into the scope of

potential sanctions.9 One month later, the White House officially announced a one-year extension of its sanctions against Russia.10 In August 2019, Trump signed a new Russian sanctions document, prohibiting international financial institutions to provide funds for Russian state-owned enterprises, making it illegal for US banks to participate in the primary market for nonruble denominated bonds issued by the Russian sovereign and lend non-ruble denominated funds to the Russian sovereign.11 In the same month, the US State Department issued a notice in the Federal Register, arguing that Russia had violated international law by using chemical weapons against its own citizens, and decided to impose sanctions on Russia for at least one year.12 The United States has also terminated all assistance to Russia under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 except for urgent humanitarian assistance and food or other agricultural commodities or products.

Third, limiting personnel exchanges with Russia. On the one hand, the US has launched a “diplomatic war” against Russia. In July 2017, the United States suspended non-immigrant visa issuances throughout Russia, allowing only a small number of visas to be granted by the US embassy in Russia. Soon after that, the US conducted a search and closure of the Russian Consulate General in San Francisco and two diplomatic facilities respectively in Washington and New York, while removing the national flags at the Russian Consulate General in San Francisco and the Head Office of the Russian Trade Representative in Washington. In the wake of the nerve agent poisoning incident in the United Kingdom in March 2018, the US, the

UK, France and Germany issued a joint statement, condemning Russia’s “clear violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and a breach of international law,”13 after which Trump immediately ordered the expulsion of 60 Russian diplomats.14 On the other hand, the US launched a “media war” against Russia. In November 2017, the US ordered RT, the Russian state-funded TV network with a weekly audience of two million, to register as a foreign agent according to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and revoked the network’s congressional press credentials, which led to its suspension of broadcasting services in the US on April 1, 2018.

Fourth, escalating military confrontation with Russia. Since early in his office, Trump has expressed his disapproval of the Us-russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),15 arguing that the US would expand its nuclear arsenal to ensure its upper hand in this competitive field. In the new Nuclear Posture Review issued in February 2018, the US Department of Defense pledged to continue the implementation of the Columbia-class program,16 accelerating research and development for new types of strategic bombers, submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles and other nuclear weapon carriers, in pursuit of the goal to continuously update its strategic nuclear triad strike force and strengthen the overall deterrence against Russia. In addition, the United States is fully committed to forging a global anti-missile encirclement around Russia by deploying land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense systems in Poland and Romania, and promoting the deployment of THAAD and Aegis Ashore missile defense systems in South Korea and Japan. The US is also competing with Russia for military frontier

deployment advantages. Since March 2017, the US and NATO allies have successively held the “Poseidon 2017” naval exercise in Romanian territorial waters and international waters in the western Black Sea, the “Saber Guardian 2017” military exercise in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and the “Aurora 17” and “Dragon 17” military exercises in Sweden and Poland respectively. At the same time, the US and NATO are deploying combat forces in Poland and the Baltic states, strengthening military infrastructure near the Russian border, and plan to deploy new US nuclear bombs in Europe. In October 2018, Trump suddenly announced that he would withdraw the US from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on the grounds that Russia had long violated treaty provisions and thus there is necessity for the US to develop weapons under the category.

Fifth, taking the leading role in tackling flash point issues. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the United States has provided military assistance to Ukraine on several occasions and assisted Ukraine in building a naval command center. According to the budget for the fiscal year 2018, the US provided $350 million in military assistance to Ukraine17 and announced that it is considering to deliver “lethal weapons” to Ukraine to defend its eastern border.18 The US has also significantly increased its strategic involvement in the Middle East, trying to reverse the unfavorable process of “Russia advances where the US retreats” in the region, through direct military strikes in Syria, strengthening traditional alliance with Saudi Arabia, declaring Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and relocating its embassy, and withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement. Following the outbreak of a presidential crisis in Venezuela in January 2019, the US immediately announced its recognition of the opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the nation’s interim president. At the same time, it demanded Russia to withdraw its military presence in Venezuela and stay away from the Western hemisphere, claiming