India’s “Connect Central Asia” Policy: Elements and Outcomes

India’s current “Connect Central Asia” policy, motivated by strategic considerations to shape the regional security pattern, safeguard energy security, expand economic opportunities and highlight the country’s major-power influence, has achieved remarkable results in political and security fields but failed to meet expectations in economics and connectivity. There are both advantages and disadvantages for India to advance its Central Asia agenda.

Although India is not geographically adjacent to Central Asia, it has made great efforts to formulate its own Central Asia policy. In recent years, India’s “Connect Central Asia” policy (CCAP) has served as the leading concept of India’s policy towards Central Asia. Studying the implementation of CCAP is of great significance for a comprehensive understanding of India’s diplomacy in Central Asia.

Origin of “Connect Central Asia” Policy

Since the five Central Asian countries gained independence from the former Soviet Union, India’s Central Asia policy has gone through three successive stages. In the 1990s, without a clear positioning of its Central Asia policy, India pursued a rather vague “Look North” policy”1; in the first decade of the 21st century, India defined Central Asia as one of its many “extended neighbors”; in 2012, India formally proposed CCAP, which included 12 specific elements. There has been a constant pursuit of national security, energy security, economic opportunities, and the status as a major power throughout the development of India’s Central Asia policy, with different emphasis in different periods.

Vague “Look North” policy: utilizing traditional cultural ties to squeeze Pakistan’s strategic depth

At the early stage of five Central Asian countries gaining independence, India did not pay enough attention to the Central Asian countries.2 In contrast to the Central Asian countries’ active diplomacy towards India, India failed to positively respond to their enthusiasm and expectations of rebuilding bilateral relations. After 1993, however, India’s inactive stance on Central Asia began to change with the visit of then Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Rao claimed that Central Asia was a high-priority region for India, pointing out that India’s objective in Central Asia was to maintain long-term engagement and promote regional stability and bilateral cooperation without jeopardizing the interests of any third country.3

By the mid to late 1990s, with a growing awareness of the importance of Central Asia, India conducted a more active diplomacy in Central Asia. Nevertheless, India’s Central Asia policy was still not clearly defined. India only positioned itself as a “good neighbor” and “old friend” of Central Asia, without specific policy visions or paths to realization. Therefore, the Rao government’s Central Asia policy was rated as a “policy of symbols but without substance.”4 Some scholars defined India’s policy towards Central Asia in the mid and late 1990s as the “Look North” policy.5 However, objectively speaking, the adjustment in India’s Central Asia policy was more aimed at highlighting India’s influence as a rising power without exploring any practical approaches for cooperation and exchanges.6 The

“Look North” policy was meant as rhetoric and even not explicitly stated in India’s diplomatic documents.

In India’s “Look North” policy, there were two objectives: first, to reshape its relations with the Central Asian countries by leveraging historical and cultural ties; second, to diminish Pakistan’s strategic space in Central Asia. However, objectively speaking, in terms of cooperation and exchanges with Central Asia, India had much lagged behind other major powers and lost its advantages of historical and cultural ties.7 In addition, India regarded the development of Pakistan-central Asia relations as a threat to its own interests and focused on offsetting Pakistan’s strategic maneuvering space in Central Asia, thus resulting in the failure of India’s “Look North” policy.

Broad “extended neighborhood” policy: attaching importance to energy security and anti-terrorism cooperation

At the beginning of the 21st century, “extended neighborhood” became a key word in Indian foreign strategy. The 2000-2001 Annual Report issued by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs for the first time identified Central Asia as India’s “extended neighborhood.”8 In 2003, Shri Yashwant Sinha, then India’s External Affairs Minister, even called Central Asian countries as India’s “immediate and strategic neighborhood.”9

India’s Central Asia policy under the “extended neighborhood” framework is all-round and multi-dimensional, and its policy objectives include political, economic, security and cultural aspects such as antiterrorism, energy security, new export markets, and major-power relations.

During this period, India and the five Central Asian countries established a number of mechanisms such as the foreign affairs consultation, intergovernmental committees and joint working groups on specific issues. Generally speaking, India’s Central Asia policy during this period highlighted three chief priorities: first, to ensure India’s national security; second, to achieve its political and economic interests; and third, to get access to energy resources.10 Some scholars have put it more bluntly, claiming that India’s Central Asia policy in this period was driven by two factors: security and energy.11 During the eight months from June 2002 to February 2003, India set up joint working groups in the field of counterterrorism with Kazakhstan (June 2002), Tajikistan (January 2003) and Uzbekistan (February 2003), and held regular meetings to circulate and exchange relevant time-sensitive information. In the energy sector, India made efforts to secure oil and gas exploration and extraction contracts in Central Asia, especially in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, by investing in shares of Central Asian oil and gas companies, joining and promoting the Turkmenistan-afghanistan-pakistan-india (TAPI) project, and actively seeking for access to nuclear fuel supplies from Central Asia.12 By so doing, India intended for a stable and diversified energy supply to meet its growing energy demand. It can be seen that under the framework of “extended neighborhood,” India has altered its previous passive posture in its Central Asia policy to a more proactive approach.

“Connect Central Asia” policy: expansion of Indian interests

In the first round of the Track II initiative India-central Asia Dialogue held in June 2012, India’s Minister of State for External Affairs Shri E. Ahamed proposed for the first time the “Connect Central Asia” policy and put forward a cooperation framework

covering political, economic, security, people-to-people and other exchanges. After Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, the importance of Central Asia in India’s foreign strategy has increased significantly, as Modi visited all five Central Asian countries, and gradually raised the level of the India-central Asia Dialogue. In addition, the intergovernmental India-central Asia Development Group was established. All of this has promoted India’s CCAP to become a multi-dimensional and multi-level platform. CCAP covers politics, economy, security and culture, and is divided into 12 specific elements.13 According to Annual Report 2012-2013 published by the Ministry of External Affairs, the core elements of CCAP include exchange of highlevel visits, strengthening of strategic and security cooperation, stepping up multilateral engagements, improving land and air connectivity and people-to-people contacts.14 The introduction of CCAP indicates that India has not been satisfied with a vague positioning of Central Asia as its “extended neighborhood.” Instead, India aspires to prioritize Central Asia over its other extended neighbors with a more clearly defined and explicit policy approach.

The goal of CCAP is to safeguard and promote India’s interests in Central Asia. The policy is directly motivated by India’s strategic considerations such as shaping the regional security pattern, safeguarding energy security, expanding economic opportunities and highlighting India’s influence and existence as a major power. The upgrading of India’s Central Asia policy is mainly driven by five factors.

First, since the “Look North” policy has failed in general and the “extended neighborhood” targeting Central Asia has not met expectations, India’s Central Asia policy needs a “new paradigm.” In the 20 years since the end of the Cold War, India’s Central Asia policy has evolved from a

vague “Look North” to a broad “extended neighborhood.” However, due to a lack of direct land connections, coupled with other factors emanating from the regional and international environment, India’s foreign strategic focus and its overall strength, India’s Central Asia policy has not fulfilled its expectations, and its interests and appeals in the region were far from being realized. Therefore, it has become an imperative for India to adjust its interaction paradigm with Central Asian countries and find a new way for cooperation between the two sides.

Second, energy cooperation has encountered difficulties. India needs to expand its cooperation with Central Asia in multiple areas to effectively deepen bilateral relations. Central Asia’s abundant oil and gas resources have durably been India’s vital interest, but India’s efforts of obtaining oil and gas from Central Asia to reduce its over-reliance on Middle Eastern oil and gas resources have failed to meet expectations. On the one hand, the TAPI and IPI (Iran-pakistan-india) oil and gas pipeline projects have been blocked. The US embargo on Iran has put IPI under pressure, while instability in Afghanistan, tensions between India and Pakistan, and disagreement on oil and gas prices have also hindered the TAPI project. On the other hand, compared with Russia, Western countries and China, India is a latecomer in Central Asian oil and gas exploration and development. Therefore, if India intends to take Central Asia as a long-term partner in energy and natural resources cooperation, it is in urgent need to give full play to its advantages in the fields of information technology, health care, education, training and construction, explore new areas of cooperation with Central Asian countries, and consolidate the basis of their bilateral relations.

Third, India needs to consolidate and step up its anti-terrorism and security cooperation with Central Asia, so as to foster a favorable situation in Afghanistan. Since 2011, the situation in Afghanistan has witnessed a number of changes. In June 2011, the Obama administration announced a gradual withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and its peace talks with the Taliban were resumed. The US pull-out plan made

the security situation in Afghanistan face greater uncertainties. Besides, while the situation in Afghanistan remains under control, the Taliban has been expanding its sphere of influence in eastern and northern Afghanistan, with potential spillover effects. It has extended eastward to the border close to the Pakistani tribal area, and northward to the regions connected with Central Asia. In addition, the Central Asian terrorists in Afghanistan have actively sought to return to Central Asia, establishing closer links and even seeking to merge with forces outside the region. Last, as Central Asian countries continue to participate in Afghan affairs, the Taliban’s hostility against Central Asian countries has increased. In this context, Central Asian countries are very concerned about the situation in Afghanistan, and have actively participated in the reconstruction of the country.15 The above four changes have prompted India to consider urgent measures to consolidate cooperation with Central Asia in the areas of counter-terrorism and security, with a view to affecting the situation in Afghanistan.

Fourth, the lack of land connections has seriously restricted the economic, trade and investment relations between India and Central Asia, adding momentum to the importance and urgency of exploring multi-path connectivity. One of the driving forces behind India’s CCAP is to focus on market potential and resource reserves in Central Asia, and to deepen economic and trade cooperation with the region. However, the lack of a direct land route has limited bilateral trade scale. India’s total import and export trade with Central Asia in the 2011-2012 fiscal year was only US$677 million,16 while in 2011, the total trade of Central Asia with China, Russia and the United States reached $39.6 billion, $28.3 billion and $30.4 billion respectively.17 India’s cooperation in the economic and trade field has obviously lagged

behind other major countries. In this context, the “connectivity” with Central Asia has become a core objective in India’s Central Asia policy. In September 2000, India signed the framework agreement for the International North-south Transport Corridor (INSTC) with Iran and Russia, planning to build a multi-modal transport corridor connecting India and Russia via Iran and Central Asia. Although the agreement came into force in May 2002 and 13 formal members has signed the agreement by 2012,18 the status of corridor construction has not satisfied expectations. Consequently, the important drivers of India’s CCAP include connecting “breakpoints” of the INSTC, improving the “hard links” along the corridor, promoting direct investment into Central Asia to build industrial parks, and increasing services trade through network construction.

Fifth, with an intensifying power play among major countries in Central Asia, India hopes to show its presence and enhance its influence in the region. Central Asia is situated at the junction of Eurasia, a position of utmost strategic importance. Especially since the anti-terrorist war erupted in Afghanistan, extraterritorial major powers have further developed their Central Asia policy. Russia strategically regards Central Asia as its traditional sphere of influence and a support base for building up its role as a key player in the world. In terms of security, Russia has included Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Economically, Russia has promoted the establishment of the CIS FTA and the Eurasian Economic Commission, and proposed to forge the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The United States has been involved in the region by promoting “democratic transformation” in the Central Asian countries, supporting their economic independence to distance them from Russia, pushing forward the construction of multilateral mechanisms in Greater Central Asia, introducing the New Silk Road initiative, and strengthening

its economic ties with Central Asian and South Asian countries.19 At the same time, China has developed in-depth pragmatic cooperation with the Central Asian countries. The influence of Japan and the ROK is also on the rise in Central Asia. In the context of the increasing influence of external powers in Central Asia, India strongly desires to become a participant of the regional power play, in its prolonged pursuit of the status as a major country.

Main Elements of “Connect Central Asia” Policy

The CCAP in 2012 clearly pointed out 12 policy elements to promote interactions between India and Central Asian countries. After Modi took office in 2014, India has continuously focused on building institutions on counter-terrorism and security cooperation, increased strategic input into Afghanistan to ease its restrictions to India, deepened strategic communication with the US on Central Asia, and attached importance to its cooperation with Russia. In addition, India also values its connectivity with Central Asia. It has fully explored regional advantages enjoyed by the Central Asian countries and cooperation opportunities on the multilateral platform of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, vigorously promoted the development of partnerships, and encouraged and guided the participation of the private sector.

First, looking upon connectivity from a geopolitical angle. Indian academia and policy-makers have a profound and clear understanding of the urgency and importance of improving current regional connectivity so as to solve the bottlenecks in economic cooperation and trade, while Indian officials have even regarded connectivity as a geopolitical issue. Promoting connectivity has always remained a vital aspect in India’s Central Asia policy. Especially after China put forward the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India is in urgent need to promote its connectivity with Central

Asia. Driven by various factors, the Modi government may consider India’s connectivity-building with Central Asia as an important element for CCAP, and seek breakthroughs in advancing the INSTC initiative, building the Chabahar Port and implementing the Ashgabat Agreement.

Second, attaching importance to Turkmenistan’s pivotal role in Central Asia. Turkmenistan has a unique geographical advantage in interregional connectivity, bridging Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, and Central Asia with West Asia through Iran. In September 2014, the Parliament of Turkmenistan passed a resolution to create a comprehensive transport connectivity plan with Turkmenistan at its center. The resolution was affirmed and passed by the UN General Assembly in December 2015. At present, Turkmenistan is an important participant in initiatives or plans of internal and external connectivity in Central Asia, as it actively promotes the construction of the Caspian Sea-black Sea transit transport corridor, the “Lazurite corridor,” and the Turkmenistan-afghanistan-tajikistan railroad project. Turkmenistan is also a formal member of the Ashgabat Agreement, and is exploring the possibility of joining the INSTC. In view of this, the Modi government pays great attention to the importance of Turkmenistan as a regional gateway to other Central Asian countries and the Caspian Sea. The two countries have agreed to support each other in constructing transport corridors and infrastructure to strengthen regional connectivity. Therefore, Turkmenistan may become India’s target country on interregional connectivity.

Third, relying on overseas development assistance to propel forward India’s partnerships with Central Asian countries. The rise of India’s overall strength, especially its economic strength, has provided crucial support for its in-depth “development partnership.” Increasing economic and diplomatic investment has become a powerful tool for the Modi government’s CCAP. At present, the geographic scope of the sustainable development partnership advocated by the Modi government continues to expand, and accompanying policy tools include credit lines

and grants, technical consultation, education scholarships and a series of capacity-building programs. Moreover, India also encourages the private sector to play a greater role in development cooperation. India and Central Asian countries have now reached consensus on solving development problems of Central Asian countries through planning and implementing specific development projects. The main path for the Modi government to consolidate the foundation of CCAP should include giving full play to the role of credit lines and various other mechanisms, emphasizing on development cooperation, and promoting development partnerships through active diplomacy. Both the India-central Asia Development Group and the India-central Asia Business Council proposed by India will elaborate specific approaches for India to explore the extension of its development partnership to Central Asia.

Fourth, deepening multilateral cooperation within the framework of the SCO. India was admitted as a full member to the SCO at the Astana summit in June 2017. The SCO has become another key platform for India to intensify its interactions with Central Asia. With the backing of the SCO, India has gained at least three benefits: first, to strengthen economic and trade ties with Central Asia through improving regional (South Asian and Central Asian) connectivity; second, to combat the “three evil forces of terrorism, separatism, extremism” by strengthening security cooperation with other members; and third, to play a key role in the Afghanistan peace process. Ever since its inception, strengthening antiterrorism cooperation and deepening regional economic and trade ties have been the SCO’S main objectives, which are also the two pillars of India’s CCAP. Connecting with Central Asia is the core issue of India’s Central Asia policy, and the SCO will undoubtedly help India achieve its CCAP goals.

Fifth, encouraging the private sector’s participation in India’s interactions with Central Asia, and pursuing in-depth cooperation in areas of strength. In implementing its CCAP, the biggest challenge India faces is how to translate plans and proposals into reality, which requires not

only a tremendous amount of input, but also the long-term and sustained promotion of various proposed projects. To this end, the Modi government needs to further consolidate domestic consensus on the significance of Central Asia in foreign policy-making, encourage greater interactions between India’s private sector and the Central Asian market in investment cooperation, and help Central Asian countries to create a more attractive investment environment for the Indian private sector.

Outcomes of “Connect Central Asia” Policy

India’s CCAP has achieved remarkable results in the political and security fields. However, at the same time, policy expectations on economic and trade cooperation and connectivity have been dampened due to its inherent weaknesses.

First, high-level visits between India and Central Asia have increased, and bilateral political relations have significantly improved. At the bilateral level, India has established strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan (2009), Uzbekistan (2011), Tajikistan (2012) and Kyrgyzstan (2019), except Turkmenistan, which has maintained neutrality. India has established diplomatic consultation mechanisms at the vice foreign ministerial level with five Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan clearly support India as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and Turkmenistan has explicitly voiced its support for UN Security Council reform. At the multilateral level, India has formally established the “C5+1” dialogue mechanism at ministerial level with Central Asian countries in 2019, which also include Afghanistan in the dialogue process.

Second, the scale of economic and trade cooperation has remained limited, failing to meet policy expectations. It has been over seven years since India’s CCAP was issued, but the economic and trade cooperation between India and Central Asia has not yielded the anticipated results. The main obstacles affecting bilateral economic and trade cooperation is the

lack of direct land channels between India and Central Asia.20 According to statistics, from 2000 to 2001, India’s total trade with Central Asia was $114 million, accounting for about 0.12% of its total foreign trade volume ($95.097 billion). In 2018-2019, India’s annual foreign trade reached $844.157 billion, yet India’s trade with Central Asia totaled $1.305 billion, accounting for only 0.15% of its total foreign trade volume.21 Although the trade between India and Central Asia has increased more than 11 times in the past 20 years, the scale of bilateral trade is still very small, and the potential for bilateral economic and trade cooperation is far from being fully released. At present, the geopolitical dilemma has prevented direct land connections between India and Central Asia, aggravating trade barriers.

Third, cooperation on counter-terrorism and security has deepened, and mechanism building has matured. Counter-terrorism is the core issue in the Modi government’s foreign policy. With the help of the mechanism of joint working group on counter-terrorism (JWGCT), India has established anti-terrorism consultation and dialogue with 23 countries and three multilateral organizations (or institutions).22 In the Central Asian region, India has set up joint counter-terrorism working groups with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, holding regular meetings to brief on the regional situation and exchange information. In the area of defense cooperation, India has established a joint working group on defense cooperation (JDG-DC) mechanism with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. By the end of 2018, the India-kazakhstan JDG-DC had held five rounds of consultations, and the India-tajikistan JDG-DC had seven rounds of talks. During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Kyrgyzstan in June 2019, the two countries decided to deepen their defense cooperation

and establish the JDG-DC. At present, India has formed an annual anti-terrorism exercise mechanism with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, India, together with four Central Asian countries, participated in anti-terrorism exercises within the SCO framework.

Fourth, the building of development partnerships has begun to accelerate. Development cooperation and development partnership are important content in India’s diplomacy. India’s development cooperation does not focus exclusively on its neighbors, but also extends to many countries and regions such as Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Pacific island countries. According to Indian official data, from 2005-2006 to July 2019, India had provided 279 credit lines totaling US$27.91 billion to 63 countries, of which 54 were provided to Asian countries for a total of US$15.27 billion.23 At the same time, India’s technical assistance under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program and the scholarship project rendered by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) have covered all Central Asian countries, and become a cornerstone for development partnerships between India and the Central Asian countries. At the first ministerial India-central Asia Dialogue held in January 2019, then Indian Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj said that India wishes to explore specific ways of expanding the development partnership to Central Asia.24 The joint statement adopted thereafter listed specific paths for the building of mutual ties between India and Central Asian countries, including formulating and implementing relevant projects based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and respect for each other’s interests, and coordinating and solving problems and tasks facing Central Asian countries in their economic development.

Finally, the connectivity plan of important nodes has achieved initial results, but it is still far from the goal of CCAP. First of all, India has actively promoted the construction of INSTC, and took the initiative to host the 2012 meeting of its member states. India was also committed to completing several unfinished road and railway projects in Iran, and organizing expert meetings to address issues such as tariff, infrastructure and financing. India, Russia and Iran also resumed their INSTC consultation in April 2018. The second is to develop the Chabahar Port with Iran. India and Iran signed an agreement in May 2015 to carry out cooperation in the development of the Chabahar Port. In May 2016, India, Iran and Afghanistan jointly signed the agreement on transit arrangements of the Chabahar Port. The tripartite agreement on goods transportation through Chabahar was officially put into effect in February 2019. Third, India joined the multilateral Ashgabat Agreement in February 2018, intending to build international transport and transit corridors with Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. And fourth, India has invested in the construction of regional highway and railway links. In addition to the two key nodes of Iran and Afghanistan, India has reached consensus with Central Asian countries on the importance of regional road and railway connectivity, and decided to promote the construction of mutually beneficial regional connectivity projects through bilateral and multilateral channels. At present, India and Turkmenistan have established a joint working group mechanism to explore various connectivity options between the two countries.

India’s Advantages and Disadvantages in Advancing CCAP

India has both advantages and disadvantages in advancing CCAP. Factors such as the recognition of India’s image among Central Asian countries, India’s relations with the United States and Russia, and the shaping of India’s external soft power, all contribute to India’s Central Asia policy. However, India’s hard power and the status of India-pakistan relations can

restrict India from further promoting its Central Asian policy.

India’s advantages

The advantages for India’s CCAP are mainly reflected in three aspects: first, Central Asian countries generally have a positive perception of India; second, India’s strategic relations with the US and Russia is favorable to its role in Central Asia; and third, India enjoys its own benefits in soft power and certain fields.

First, from the perspective of Central Asian countries, India is a much-welcomed strategic balancer and potential economic and trade partner. In terms of diplomacy, Central Asian countries have basically pursued a pragmatic and balanced foreign policy towards the world’s major powers since their independence, and focused on deepening their cooperation with external powers in their diplomatic practices. With the rising influence of extraterritorial big countries such as China, Russia and the United States, Central Asian countries need to introduce an element of strategic balancing to restrain the predominance of these major powers and increase their bargaining chips in political deals. Economically, India, as a potential large consumer of energy and a rising emerging economy, is of practical significance to the diversification of Central Asia’s energy export and the layout of their future economic and trade development. Moreover, the relationship between India and Central Asian countries is positive and relatively straightforward, as there is no major divergence of interests between the two sides. Therefore, Central Asian countries do not oppose India’s involvement in Central Asia,25 which lays a foundation for India’s expansion and influence in the region.

Second, from the perspective of the United States’ Central Asia policy goals, India is regarded as an important force to counterbalance the influence of Russia and China. The National Security Strategy report issued by the Trump administration in December 2017 pointed

out that the US should seek “presence in the region proportionate to threats to the homeland and our allies,” and prevent “rival powers” from dominating the Central Asian region.26 At present, Russia has the greatest influence in the region. Through building the EAEU and setting up the CIS CSTO, Russia has incorporated the Central Asian countries into its Eurasian integration strategy. China has vigorously promoted pragmatic cooperation with the Central Asian countries through the BRI, increasing its influence in Central Asia. In this context, along with the constantly improved SCO cooperation mechanism, the US is getting ever more concerned about the presence and influence of China and Russia in Central Asia. The Trump administration believes that China and Russia pose challenges to Washington’s strength, influence and interests. To this end, the US welcomes India’s rise as a leading global power and a strong strategic and defense partner, supports India’s leading role in the Indian Ocean security, and encourages the economic integration, connectivity, and trade between Central Asia and South Asia.27 Therefore, the US has been emphasizing the geographical and policy relevance between Central Asia and South Asia, striving to bring India into Central Asia in an attempt to offset China and Russia during its strategic contraction.28

Third, India is also a reliable partner for Russia to counter other major powers’ influence in Central Asia. India is Russia’s traditional ally, an important market for Russian arms exports, a potential future consumer for Russia’s energy exports, and an important cooperation partner in Russia’s connectivity initiative. India and Russia established a strategic partnership in 2000 and upgraded this relationship to a “special and privileged strategic partnership” in 2010. In 2019, the two nations decided to explore possible areas of cooperation in third countries, particularly in Central Asia,

Southeast Asia and Africa,29 in such fields as railway and energy, with repeated emphasis on the cooperation of INSTC projects. At present, India has initiated FTA talks with the EEU. Taking into consideration the rapidly increase of China’s influence in Central Asia, Indian scholars believe that India, Russia and other major countries do not want any hegemonic dominance in the region, and may take measures to deal with this eventuality.30 Thus, this is also a vital motive for Russia to hold a positive attitude towards India’s increasing presence in Central Asia.

And finally, India has certain advantages in its soft power and specific areas. Since the beginning of the 21st century, India has actively unlocked and improved its soft power. At present, soft power is an important means for the Modi government to promote its Central Asia policies, among which development assistance, education and cultural exchange are significant carriers of India’s soft-power diplomacy in the region. Scholars in Central Asian countries generally recognize India’s “soft power,” including a number of universities and technical institutions with a considerable competitive edge in the world, and profound culture and knowledge base.31 Indian scholars also agree that soft power and non-military contacts provide an opportunity for India to tap a greater potential of its Central Asia policy.32 Therefore, India’s Central Asia policy has always emphasized its historical and cultural ties with Central Asian countries, and is committed to expanding cooperation on IT, medicine, education and training.

India’s disadvantages

In pushing forward its Central Asia policy, India can count on its own

advantages, but it also has obvious disadvantages. The first is its relative lack of hard power; the second is that India, as a latecomer, has yet to catch up; the last one is that India is restricted by its relations with Pakistan and the situation in Afghanistan.

First, India’s relative lack of hard power has generated problems in policy implementation and policy effectiveness. India is a developing economy with a relatively limited capacity for foreign investment. According to statistics by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as of 2018, India’s foreign direct investment (FDI) stock was about $166.2 billion, while the FDI stocks of the EU, the US, China, Japan and Russia were as high as $11.5 trillion, $6.47 trillion, about $1.94 trillion, $1.67 trillion, and $344.1 billion respectively.33 Compared with other major countries, India’s foreign investment capacity is obviously insufficient. Indian scholars argue that India’s ambitions for the INSTC is hampered by inadequate capacity and funding, and even envisage the ROK and Japan to participate in the project, as their funds and technologies can help develop large-scale infrastructure projects more rapidly.34 Therefore, despite India’s willingness, there is uncertainty about its ability to invest a large amount of economic, military and diplomatic resources in advancing the CCAP. Moreover, India’s “Look North” and “extended neighborhood” policies have only yielded modest outcomes, which has not only slowed down India’s policy objectives, but also made Central Asian countries feel uncertain about India as an important partner in future regional arrangements.

Second, India is a new player in Central Asia. Whether in the building of bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms or in terms of cooperation results, India undeniably remains behind the United States, Russia, China and the EU. The US has increased its strategic

input in Central Asia through the “C5+1” and the Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. Russia relies on the EEU and the CIS CSTO to influence Central Asia. China has intensified cooperation with Central Asian countries through the BRI. At present, three echelons of major-power competition have taken shape in the region. The first is led by China and Russia, the second is dominated by the US and Europe, and the third group includes India, Turkey and Japan. The third-tier countries have not yet gained an authoritative position in fields like security, energy, economy and trade, but are seeking opportunities to realize their own interests in great-power plays.35 Therefore, although India became a full SCO member in 2017 and formed a “C5+1” dialogue mechanism with Central Asia in 2019, it will still need to catch up as a latecomer for a long time. In this regard, many scholars have given the objective evaluation that India lags behind other major powers in terms of expanding geopolitical space and economic interests.36 Insufficient hard power even blocks India to convert its great soft power into a real advantage in Central Asia.37

And finally, the discord in India-pakistan relations and the situation in Afghanistan have restricted regional connectivity. To connect with Central Asia is the most direct goal of India’s CCAP, and also serves as the basic precondition for India to realize its interests in Central Asia. The land route via Pakistan and Afghanistan is the shortest and most direct for India to connect with Central Asia. However, due to the dual impact of the India-pakistan tensions and the insecure situation in Afghanistan, any transit route crossing Pakistan is confronted with serious risks and uncertainties. In the context of long-term confrontation with Pakistan, India regards Central Asia as a strategic rear area, and considers Pakistan’s influence in the region as a security threat, while viewing Afghanistan as the frontier to prevent Pakistan’s influence from spilling over to Central

Asia. Therefore, the geographical and strategic barrier of Pakistan has largely weakened India’s ability to connect with Central Asia.38 If the security and political problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan can be solved, India’s trade with Central Asia may increase by about 5 to 10 times.39

Conclusion

India is a latecomer with several shortcomings to the great-power plays in Central Asia. The Trump administration’s policy of maximum pressure on Iran has affected cooperation between India and Iran; the US withdrawal from talks with the Taliban has left the Afghanistan peace process in sharply increased uncertainties; India’s constitutional amendment to the status of India-controlled Kashmir brought about a heightened risk of confrontation with Pakistan; and India’s economy has witnessed a slower growth rate. Because of the above factors, India faces rising difficulties to realize its objectives of upgrading connectivity, enhancing security and promoting development set forth in its CCAP. In this context, opportunities for China-india cooperation in Central Asia have increased. In fact, China and India held their first dialogue on Central Asia as early as 2013. Decision-makers of the two countries reached the consensus that China and India should embrace development opportunities with greater openness and seek mutual benefits and winwin results with broader cooperation. Moreover, the “China-india+” cooperation has been carried out in Afghanistan. The future of Chinaindia cooperation in Central Asia should rely on the SCO’S multilateral mechanisms, seeking the greatest common denominator among the interests of CCAP, BRI and EEU, and establishing a “C5+N” cooperation mechanism in the region.