The United States’ New Africa Strategy: Changes and Continuations

As part of its global strategy, the United States’ new Africa policy covers its core interests in Africa and witnessed more continuations than changes. With restraining and counterbalancing China becoming a core objective, the policy will eliminate the achievements of and narrow down the space for China-us thirdparty cooperation in Africa, and cast shadow on African countries’ hard-fought pursuit of independent development.

With the unveiling of its new Africa strategy at the end of 2018, the Trump administration’s basic policy framework for Africa began to take shape. Generally speaking, this new Africa strategy does not offer any innovative content. Compared to previous policies, adjustments or changes are mainly reflected at the strategic level, where countering China has become the major objective of Washington’s considerations regarding Africa. For China, a systematic analysis of Trump’s new Africa strategy is of genuine significance to properly handle the US factor in its own Africa diplomacy.

Features of Trump’s New Africa Strategy

On December 13, 2018, the Trump administration’s new Africa strategy was unveiled by then National Security Advisor John Bolton in his speech at the Heritage Foundation.1 The strategy mostly covers what Washington considers its three core interests in Africa, namely economy and trade, counterterrorism, and foreign aid. As a look into the details will verify, there is mostly a continuation of the same rather than any change in Trump’s Africa policy.

First, Trump’s economic and trade policy for the African continent does not go beyond the direction and framework of America’s Africa policy

in the post-cold War era. The Prosper Africa initiative, launched under Trump’s new Africa strategy, claims to concentrate on two core issues of enhancing investment and the business environment in Africa, with the aim of substantially increasing the development of Us-africa economic and trade ties. However, the offered policy measures are short of any substantially new content. On the one hand, it has always been a major direction of Washington’s post-cold War Africa policy to promote economic and trade ties, especially investment, with African countries, and all successive US administrations before Trump have introduced correspondent measures. During President Obama’s tenure (particularly his second term), efforts were even made to develop trade into a highlight of diplomacy with Africa. But on the other hand, it has been Washington’s consistent practice in its Africa policy to couple any American investment with the “restructuring” of African economies. In this regard, there is no essential distinction between Prosper Africa and earlier American initiatives or mechanisms for Africa like the African Growth and Opportunity Act.2 While under that Act, the United States’ concessionary trade terms were conditioned upon the “macro environment” of sub-saharan African countries including their performance on the rule of law, labor rights and human rights, as a lever to interfere with their domestic and foreign policies, Trump’s Prosper Africa initiative, besides consolidating the Act as a policy tool, demands even further requirements concerning the “regulatory environment” of African countries, tying cooperation with African partners to the precondition of lowering trade barriers and helping to create a welcoming free business climate on the continent.

Second, Trump’s security policy toward Africa is lacking proactive measures. Since taking office, Trump has proposed a 10% reduction of US troops stationed in Africa, and has cut down support for the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions in African nations. By deliberately downsizing the scale and intensity of direct participation in African counter-terrorism

operations, the Trump administration is now compelling African countries to combat terrorism increasingly with their own forces. The relative passivity regarding Washington’s security measures in Africa was the reason why counter-terrorism was not on top of the agenda in Bolton’s speech. Though criticizing the failure of previous US administrations’ security and aid policies toward Africa, Bolton has not put forward any new proposals from his own side.3 Some believe that Trump’s Africa security policy is targeting his domestic, not an African, audience.4

Third, although efficiency and performance are highlighted in Trump’s aid policy toward Africa, there is no innovation in corresponding specific measures. Trump has cast doubts upon the necessity of US aid projects in Africa on different occasions. In the proposed budget for the 2018 fiscal year, the Trump administration requested a reduction of funding for the United States African Development Foundation (USADF) by more than two-thirds, and slashed expenditure by about 17% to the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).5 Besides, Trump has deliberately terminated some aid programs for Africa launched by his predecessor, an approach which has been endorsed by the new US Africa strategy. In his speech, Bolton criticized the failure and low effectiveness of previous administrations’ aid policies toward Africa, and indicated that Trump’s targeted support for a number of selected “key countries,” instead of granting general aid and assistance for all, was more consistent with US strategic interests. However, this is to a great extent political distortion, rather than an innovation in approach, because it has already been Washington’s long-held practice to focus on “key countries” when giving aid to Africa. According to statistics released by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), from

2014 to 2017, the United States’ aid for ten African countries, mostly subregional powers with strategic importance, accounted for 56.4% of its total aid for the entire African continent.6 Trump’s aid policy toward Africa, instead of introducing innovative steps, is only a consolidated version of equivalent policies already employed by previous administrations.

On the other hand, the identifiable changes in Washington’s Africa policy under the Trump administration are mainly strategic in nature, with restraining and counterbalancing China becoming a core objective.

First, China is now positioned as a strategic competitor by the United States. The first US National Security Strategy of the Trump administration, released in December 2017, explicitly labels China as a strategic rival. In terms of its guiding ideology, the new Africa strategy is in complete agreement with the National Security Strategy. Bolton blames many of the major problems in Us-africa relations on China, accusing China of utilizing its “competitive advantage” in economic and trade cooperation with African countries to limit US investment opportunities in Africa, interfering in US military operations on the continent, and threatening US national security interests. This, as Bolton claimed in his speech, has not only led to sluggish progress in Us-africa economic and trade ties, but has also wreaked havoc on the economies, rule of law and healthy governance of African countries. Moreover, the Bolton speech compared China to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, charging that China had destroyed the balance of power in the Horn of Africa region, to justify the necessity of a US policy adjustment in the face of an alleged “Chinese domination” in Africa.

Second, the US is now committed to a competition with China over who possesses the better development model. Since the beginning of the new century, African countries, based on experience and lessons gained in postindependence years, have declared the rejuvenation of the entire continent

their development goal. It has become a prevailing trend to look to the East, in particular towards China.7 In this context, the Trump administration’s Africa policy has declared a competition of development models between the United States and China. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo discussed at great length the issue of development model rivalry in his speech at the Detroit Economic Club in June 2018, proposing to introduce the “American model” to Africa and “achieve an Africa that has interests that are much more closely aligned to […] the West than in China.”8 Correspondingly, the Prosper Africa initiative encourages African leaders to preferably choose US investment projects that are said to be of higher quality, superior transparency and better sustainability, wielding strong and modernized development instruments to replace China’s “state-directed initiatives.” By highlighting the differences between the American and the Chinese model, the Trump administration’s Africa policy is aimed at curbing the growing influence of China on the African continent.

Third, the US is sabotaging the advance of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Africa. In recent years, with the continuous deepening of their comprehensive strategic partnership, cooperation between China and Africa has become a highlight of the Belt and Road Initiative.9 Given this background, some Western countries, headed by the United States, have concocted the “debt trap” and “geopolitical instrument” rhetoric to discredit the Belt and Road Initiative, in an attempt to create discord between China and African countries. In his March 2018 visit to Africa, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson fabricated a causal relationship between China’s Belt and Road construction and Africa’s debt issue. In November of the same year, US Vice President Mike Pence, in his speech at the APEC CEO summit, mocked the Belt and Road Initiative as a “constricting belt” and a

“one-way road.”10 In the above mentioned speech in December of the same year, Bolton drew on the cases of foreign debt in Zambia and Djibouti to denounce the “disturbing effects of China’s quest to obtain more political, economic, and military power.”

Furthermore, Trump’s Africa policy has a highly unilateralist character. On the one hand, it aims to pass the buck and shirk its due responsibilities, thus reducing its burden in Africa. On the other hand, it intends to get away from the “shackles” of multilateralism and instead focus on major-power competition. It is the US administration’s world view, that great-power competition from China and Russia poses a more severe strategic threat to the US than extremism and terrorism,11 and that US funding must be accordingly targeted “toward key countries and particular strategic objectives” through bilateral channels.12

Influencing Factors of Trump’s Africa Policy

As a component of the US’ global strategy, Trump’s Africa policy is fundamentally impacted by America’s global strategic adjustments and the perception of US interests in Africa.

First, the changes in the United States’ Africa policy under the Trump administration are mainly reflections of the shift of US global strategy. As Africa is located in a peripheral position in Washington’s diplomatic reach, the policy toward the continent mostly follows the adjustments taking place in the US’ global strategic vision.13 Throughout the Cold War,

geopolitical considerations directed against the Soviet Union dominated America’s Africa agenda,14 while in the decade following the end of the Cold War, Washington focused primarily on economic matters in its Africa policy. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the US shifted its emphasis to security affairs in Africa to support its global counter-terrorist operations. Under the Obama administration, the post-cold War Africa policy of the US was reorganized, with democratic transformation, counterterrorism and economic cooperation becoming the three parallel drivers of the US’ Africa strategy. However, this approach was abandoned in the later period of Obama’s second tenure, when he began to position the US in a more intensive competition with China in Africa, without working out its details in a strategic sense. The unveiling of Trump’s new Africa policy has confirmed the return of such a focus in the US Africa strategy. As African scholars have pointed out, the US has long considered Africa merely as a battleground against its own perceived enemies, without making efforts to develop genuine ties with the continent.15 It can be stated that Trump’s Africa policy change or adjustment originates from the shift in the overall US global strategy, and does not amount to a shift in the Africa policy in and of itself.

Second, the United States’ overall interest in Africa remains intact. Access to African oil and mineral resources was once an important driver of Washington’s promotion of ties with Africa. In the past decade, however, US imports of crude oil from Nigeria, Angola and other sub-saharan African sources have witnessed a continuous decline, from a daily average of 1.8 million barrels in 2005 to fewer than 250,000 barrels in 2015.16 By the end of 2018, the US had transformed into the largest oil and gas exporter in the world, which further impacted its economic and trade relations with Africa. Even though successive US governments after the Cold War have introduced

their respective trade policies toward Africa, and attempted to strengthen Us-africa economic ties through investment, the effects have been far from evident. The low purchasing power of African countries makes it difficult for American enterprises, which are competitive in the high-tech and service sector industry, to enter the African market on a large scale. Meanwhile, job opportunities provided for the United States’ domestic economy by its long-time trade with the entire African continent only amount to the same number of job vacancies created by trade between the US and Central American countries, whose total population is only 50 million.17 The decline in economic cooperation has cast Africa into a fundamentally marginal position in Washington’s foreign policy, further limiting the US’ willingness to continuously participate in counter-terrorism, aid and other operations in African governance. The low-level presence of overall American interests in Africa is one of the major reasons why the US’ new Africa strategy has witnessed more continuation rather than alteration.

Third, Trump has not paid sufficient attention to Africa. Due to a lack of comprehension, and in response to the meagre returns on bilateral trade, Trump has demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward Africa on multiple occasions since taking office. Soon after being inaugurated, he signed two travel bans on the entry of citizens from a selected number of nations into the US, half of which were African countries. Trump did not immediately after entering his post nominate an assistant secretary of state for African affairs, the ambassadors to major African countries such as South Africa, or a senior director for African affairs at the National Security Council, all of which are key positions for Washington’s Africa diplomacy. At the G20 summit in July 2017, Trump was absent from a session on African migration and health, instead briefly letting his daughter Ivanka take his seat, a move which was widely criticized by African countries. In September of the same year, Trump made a number of missteps regarding Africa in his speech at the United

Nations General Assembly. At the luncheon held specifically for African national leaders, Trump wrongly pronounced the name of the southwestern African country Namibia as “Nambia”. At a meeting with lawmakers at the White House regarding immigrants in January 2018, Trump even reportedly referred to some African nations as “shithole countries”, generating outrage across Africa and the international community. In August of the same year, Trump posted a tweet sympathetic to apartheid, in which he instructed the US government to “closely study the South Africa land and farm seizures and expropriations and the large scale killing of farmers.” Trump’s neglect of, even contempt for, Africa has to a great extent made it difficult for the current US government to take a positive direction in its Africa policy. After all, the Trump administration does not feel properly concerned about Africa; it is not Washington’s strategic focus in its own right, but only something for the US to count on if and when needed.

Prospects of the United States’ Africa Policy

Under the “America First” principle and the logic of great-power competition, Trump’s new Africa policy, if implemented, will eliminate the achievements of and narrow down the space for China-us third-party cooperation in Africa. It will also convey the negative message that the US is committed to restraining and counterbalancing China in Africa and beyond, and cast shadow on African countries’ hard-fought pursuit of independent development. Meanwhile, the implementation of Trump’s Africa policy faces a series of constraints, with its prospects remaining uncertain.

First, it will cause irritations for the China-africa joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative. Currently, the Belt and Road joint construction has entered the stage of fine-tuned development cooperation. The Beijing summit of the Forum on China-africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in September 2018 clearly pointed out that the synergy of the Belt and Road Initiative and development strategies of African countries “will lend new impetus to the win-win cooperation and common development between

China and Africa.”18 In this context, the Trump administration is highly likely to target the China-led initiative in their attempt to contain and oppose Chinese influence in Africa, while simultaneously seeking to achieve breakthroughs in bilateral diplomacy with individual African countries. This will to some extent create obstacles for the desired synergy of Chinese and African development strategies under the Belt and Road framework.

Second, major disputes remain within the Trump administration on the direction of the United States’ Africa policy. At the government level, the Feed the Future initiative and the Power Africa initiative, both launched under the Obama administration, had been welcomed by African countries, but Trump has mostly disregarded his predecessor’s policies and wants to suspend activities under the two initiatives. This position was not supported by Congress or even by officials bearing responsibility within the government.19 In his February 2019 remarks at the US Global Leadership Coalition Dinner, Tibor Nagy, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, still touted the initiatives of previous administrations like Power Africa and the Young African Leaders Initiative as relevant accomplishments of the US Africa policy.20 In his testimony at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in May of the same year, Nagy incorporated the so-called “3D framework,” namely the integration of diplomacy, development and defense, into Trump’s new Africa strategy, without putting forward any specific measures.21 This to some extent reflects the absence of a clear consensus on specific Africa policies within the Trump administration.22

At the social level, the Carter Center’s exclusion of Trump’s senior advisors from the Track II dialogue on China-us cooperation in Africa, a

project it jointly leads with the South African Institute of International Affairs, demonstrates to a great extent how various political and academic elites handle their opposition to the Trump administration’s conservative stance and zerosum thinking on Africa policy.23 Moreover, Trump’s policy swing between his intention to withdraw troops and reduce the United States’ burden on the one hand and the US strategy to restrain China and counter terrorism on the other has caused major unease for the US military.24 For Trump’s Africa policy to move forward, domestic disputes need to be settled first, and it remains to be seen in which way and to what extent the policy’s strategic objectives, in particular the goal of holding back China in Africa, can be implemented and fulfilled in the future. Under any circumstances, the execution of this policy will inevitably be watered down due to the above-mentioned obstacles.

Third, African countries refuse to choose sides between China and the United States. In carrying out international cooperation, African states value effectiveness rather than ideology, or, as a comment by an African scholar sharply points out: “Will the United States commit to build and fund better stadia and state houses, roads and bridges and railways, dams and power stations than the Chinese? […] On a continent full of Chinese concrete, calling Beijing corrupt and self-interested will not wash.”25 With little interest in Africa but much hostility toward China, Trump’s Africa policy not only ignores the positive response of African countries to China’s diplomatic engagement, but also turns a blind eye to their strong desire for independently choosing a development path suitable for each of their respective national conditions.26 It has been proved in practice that China’s cooperation with Africa, led politically by friendship, directed economically by the market, supported by the state, and

based on enterprises, is both encompassing and sustainable, which is suitable for Africa’s development reality. Moreover, with memories still fresh about the simultaneous dysfunction of the market and the state caused by the “structural adjustments” in the 1980s, some African countries remain skeptical about the US invitation for development cooperation.27

Fourth, the United States’ Africa policy has lost touch with reality, as it is hardly taking concerns from African countries into account. In terms of economics and trade, the Trump administration announced that its new Africa strategy would deepen Us-africa economic ties by carrying out the African Growth and Opportunity Act.28 However, trade statistics have shown that 80% of Africa’s exports to the US come from only four countries, namely Angola, Nigeria, Chad and South Africa, with South Africa alone accounting for nearly 25% of African exports of non-energy products to the US. In fact, the overwhelming majority of African states could not benefit from the African Growth and Opportunity Act.29 With regard to security, Bolton, taking the G5 Sahel Joint Force as an example, pointed out that the goal of the US’ new Africa strategy is to help African countries achieve peace and security through regional cooperation, while at the same time the US has in fact been strongly opposed to the G5’s counter-terrorism cooperation under the UN framework. Within a highly unequal power relationship and in the absence of any international supervision, it is commonly believed by African countries that the US’ pursuit of bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation with individual African states (or Us-supported regional mechanisms) would not effectively address Africa’s security challenges, but might instead create new security problems.30 Regarding financial

investments and assistance in Africa, the Trump administration proffers the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act as their major policy tool.31 With the establishment of a global development fund worth US$60 billion, the Act is aimed at countering China’s overseas development projects.32 In the opinion of African countries, however, the Act lacks the needed credibility and offers insufficient targeted measures compared to China’s investment pledges for African development.33

Furthermore, African integration has been the dream and original aspiration of nations on the continent. On May 30, 2019, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement formally came into effect. In this context, the Trump administration’s emphasis on bilateralism in Us-africa relations explicitly contradicts the trend of African integration, which in the long term will cast severe doubts on the success of America’s Africa policy.

Conclusion

The inherent defects and fundamental limitations of the Trump administration’s Africa strategy lies in its core objective of countering China, instead of strengthening Us-africa cooperation. In contrast to the US’ Africa strategy, China has demonstrated pragmatism in its cooperation with African countries and taken their concerns into consideration. For China’s diplomatic guidelines, Africa is the “foundation of foundations.”34 In this regard, China should on the one hand squarely face up to the challenges posed by the US, and on the other hand properly handle any emerging problems in cooperation with Africa, to ensure steady and sustainable development of China-africa relations.