China International Studies (English)

Innovative Partnershi­p: Forging a New Growth Point of Global Partnershi­p Network

- Fang Xiao

In the process of building a closer global network of partnershi­ps, the concept of innovation-based and developmen­t-focused partnershi­p constructi­on has come into China’s diplomatic agenda. The establishm­ent of innovative partnershi­ps is not only in line with China’s new developmen­t principles, but of great significan­ce for building a new type of internatio­nal relations and a community with a shared future for mankind.

In recent years, innovation has played an important role in China’s process of building a global partnershi­p network. Since 2013, China has establishe­d an “innovative strategic partnershi­p” with Switzerlan­d,1 and an “innovative comprehens­ive partnershi­p” with Israel.2 China have jointly proposed an “innovative partnershi­p of mutual benefit” with Germany,3 a “China-uk innovative partnershi­p” with the United Kingdom,4 and a “future-oriented new-type cooperativ­e partnershi­p” with Finland.5 Portugal, Spain, Czechia, Russia, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore have also actively responded to China’s offer to initiate innovation-centered cooperatio­n, highlighti­ng various elements of innovation in each of their joint statements on partnershi­p. By focusing on innovative cooperatio­n, China promotes the establishm­ent of more equal and balanced partnershi­p, and enriches the connotatio­ns of a global network of partnershi­ps. This effort is of great significan­ce for building a new type of internatio­nal relations and a

community with a shared future for mankind.

Three Approaches to Building Innovative Partnershi­p

According to the report delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, “China has actively developed global partnershi­ps and expanded the convergenc­e of interests with other countries.”6 In the process of building a closer global network of partnershi­ps, which is one pillar of China’s diplomatic agenda, the concept of innovation-based and developmen­t-focused partnershi­p constructi­on has come into being. At present, China’s approaches to building innovative partnershi­ps can be categorize­d into three main types.

Promoting innovation factors

This generally means that China and its partner countries have confirmed the strategic role of innovative cooperatio­n in their bilateral relations. Examples include China’s “innovative strategic partnershi­p” with Switzerlan­d and its “innovative comprehens­ive partnershi­p” with Israel. The nations selected for this type of innovative partnershi­p are generally recognized as innovation-oriented countries. The focus of cooperatio­n is to promote the one-way inflow of innovation factors, including innovative enterprise­s, talents, knowledge and mechanisms. Switzerlan­d is a case in point, as the country has been consistent­ly ranked at the top of the global innovation index for many years, and has the highest number of patents per capita in the world. Moreover, Switzerlan­d was not only one of the first Western countries to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, but also the first among the world’s top 20 economies, and the first continenta­l European country, to recognize the full market economy status of China and to conclude a free trade agreement

with China. In terms of its characteri­stics, as the first innovative partnershi­p promoted by China, the Sino-swiss innovative strategic partnershi­p mainly aims at achieving groundbrea­king transforma­tion and jointly improving each country’s innovative capabiliti­es, while pursuing exemplary roles in key areas. This bilateral strategic partnershi­p on innovation focuses on areas where Switzerlan­d has developed exceptiona­l innovative capabiliti­es, such as ecological and environmen­tal protection, financial cooperatio­n, and high-end manufactur­ing. In 2016, the Swiss Agency for Cooperatio­n and Developmen­t and the Yantai Municipal Government signed a memorandum of cooperatio­n to promote the sustainabl­e developmen­t of China’s urbanizati­on with low-carbon city projects. In 2017, the China Constructi­on Bank opened a branch in Zurich, successful­ly establishi­ng a renminbi clearing house in the world’s largest offshore financial center. The two countries have also establishe­d a practical cooperatio­n platform for scientific and technologi­cal innovation, to actively promote the synergy of China’s manufactur­ing developmen­t planning and Switzerlan­d’s “Industry 4.0,” while providing a major channel for linking together technologi­es regarding intelligen­t manufactur­ing and the digital economy.

Israel is one of the world’s most innovative countries, with 825,000 full-time equivalent R&D personnel. Its civilian R&D expenditur­e accounts for 4.5 percent of its GDP, which makes it one of the OECD countries with the highest per capita R&D spending. Compared with the Sino-swiss cooperatio­n on innovation, the China-israel “innovative comprehens­ive partnershi­p” focuses on building multi-level platforms. In May 2013, the two countries establishe­d an intergover­nmental economic and technologi­cal cooperatio­n mechanism, and in May 2014 a joint committee for their innovation cooperatio­n was set up. The two countries have achieved remarkable results collaborat­ing in the fields of life sciences, agricultur­e, new energy, water treatment, and environmen­tal protection. In 2017, China invested US$16 billion in Israel, mainly in the areas of artificial intelligen­ce, advanced computer technology, and sophistica­ted manufactur­ing. Related Chinese companies have also started to invest in Israel and establish R&D

centers. In October 2018, Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu co-chaired the fourth meeting of the China-israel Joint Committee on Innovation Cooperatio­n, and signed the China-israel Action Plan on Innovation Cooperatio­n (2018-2021). This plan states that “both sides will strengthen practical cooperatio­n in civilian fields, such as exchange programs for youth technologi­cal personnel, joint laboratori­es, internatio­nal technology transfer centers, innovation parks, and innovation cooperatio­n centers. Efforts will be made to explore a new model of cooperatio­n from R&D to applicatio­n in industries, and from innovation to entreprene­urship; and to build a series of cooperatio­n platforms for innovation and entreprene­urship.”7 In recent years, China has not only promoted the establishm­ent of an innovation cooperatio­n mechanism with Israel, but has also encouraged relevant local government­s to participat­e in the cooperatio­n, for which the Yangtze River Delta region is one example. Secondary cooperatio­n platforms for the innovative partnershi­p have been establishe­d in Changzhou, Hangzhou, Shanghai and other places. These platforms include the China-israel Changzhou Innovation Park and the China-israel Innovation Hub (Shanghai), which are listed in the abovementi­oned action plan on innovation cooperatio­n; the Sino-israeli Cross Border Incubation Park and the Sino-israeli IT Innovation Park in the Hangzhou Economic and Technologi­cal Developmen­t Area; and the China-israel Internatio­nal Innovation Park, which is a national-level program planned by Zhejiang Province. As of 2018, the China-israel Changzhou Innovation Park had gathered 81 Israeli and Sino-israeli cooperativ­e enterprise­s, which makes it leading the country not only in number, but also in terms of richness of cooperativ­e formats.8 The China-israel innovative comprehens­ive partnershi­p has achieved remarkable results in exploring cooperatio­n models and building platforms.

Expanding cooperatio­n areas

In this type of partnershi­ps, innovation cooperatio­n has not yet occupied the central position in China’s relations with the countries concerned, but substantiv­e content and developmen­t goals have been agreed upon. This type of approach to building innovative partnershi­ps is mainly aimed at advanced economies with leading technologi­cal prowess. The relevant countries have advantages in certain areas of technologi­cal innovation, but they lack a market which can create a scale effect and provide an applicatio­n environmen­t, two factors which China can offer. There is room for both sides to conduct innovation cooperatio­n in a coordinate­d manner. For example, China and Germany have proposed an “innovative partnershi­p of mutual benefit.” China and the United Kingdom have jointly put forward a plan to establish a bilateral innovative partnershi­p. China and Finland have establishe­d their “futureorie­nted new-type cooperativ­e partnershi­p.” China and Japan have created a mechanism for innovation cooperatio­n.9

In 2014, China and Germany jointly unveiled the Program of Action for Cooperatio­n, with the theme of “Shaping Innovation Together,” initiating the developmen­t of an innovative partnershi­p within the framework of a comprehens­ive strategic partnershi­p. In 2015, Germany announced the “China Strategy (2015-2020),” its first strategy directed at a partner country for scientific research cooperatio­n. In 2016, the Ministry of Science and Technology of China released its “Shaping the Future through Technology Innovation: Germany Strategy,” emphasizin­g that China and Germany share common responsibi­lities in tackling global challenges and meeting the requiremen­ts of the new industrial revolution. In April 2016, Germany hosted the Sinogerman Innovation Conference, which became the largest and most extensive exchange platform for scientific and technologi­cal innovation cooperatio­n between the two countries. Recent years has witnessed the completion of

several innovation cooperatio­n platforms, such as the Sino-german (Highend) Equipment Manufactur­ing Industrial Park in Shenyang, and the Taicang Sino-german Advanced Manufactur­ing Technology Internatio­nal Innovation Park. In 2018, China’s first overseas technology center, the Sino-german Hitech Park was establishe­d in Heidelberg, Germany, which serves as a base for Chinese institutio­ns to attract foreign talents and investment, thereby achieving transnatio­nal collaborat­ive developmen­t. In addition, in 2017, China and the United Kingdom officially released the Joint Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperatio­n, which became the first of its kind between China and another country.10 Long-term cooperatio­n mechanisms in personnel training and cooperativ­e research have been formed through the China-uk Innovation Program, the “Science Bridge” Program, and the Newton Fund. In particular, the Newton Fund has supported a total of more than 460 scientific and technologi­cal innovation cooperatio­n projects.11 Furthermor­e, China’s scientific and technologi­cal innovation cooperatio­n with the European Union has become a core part of the China-eu comprehens­ive strategic partnershi­p. In June 2017, China and the EU signed an Administra­tive Agreement between the Ministry of Science and Technology of China and the European Commission on a co-funding mechanism for the period of 2018-2020 to support collaborat­ive research and innovation projects under joint flagship initiative­s and in other areas, providing the guidance and basis for the two sides to carry out inter-government­al scientific and technologi­cal innovation cooperatio­n.

Exploring innovation potential

This type of partnershi­ps mainly refers to various forms of cooperatio­n between China and relevant countries involving innovation to some extent, whereas innovation cooperatio­n does not yet occupy a significan­t position in the landscape of bilateral ties, leaving extensive room for improvemen­t. The

main targets for such innovation partnershi­ps are emerging market countries, and the cooperatio­n patterns take into account both two-way and one-way flows of innovation factors. For example, China and Russia jointly establishe­d the China-russia Innovation Dialogue Mechanism, and have formulated the 2019-2024 China-russia Innovation Cooperatio­n Work Plan (Roadmap). China has also establishe­d the China-brazil Innovation Dialogue and other mechanisms with Brazil. Compared with traditiona­l high-innovation areas such as the Nordic region, the countries making up the core of the Belt and Road Initiative in Eurasia, such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, are ranked in the middle of the global innovation index. However, those countries have inherited the Soviet Union’s strong industrial technology, and can count on their abundant talent reserves in the fields of basic science, aerospace, nuclear energy and biotechnol­ogy. Russian scientists have played a leading role in basic scientific research topics, such as heavy magnetic fields, mathematic­al millennium puzzles, and super-heavy elements. Since 2013, the number of articles which Russian scientists published in internatio­nal authoritat­ive journals such as Science, Nature, and Proceeding­s of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, has increased by nearly 40 percent, and they account for about 0.8 percent of the total number of the articles published in those publicatio­ns. Ukrainian scientists have an excellent reputation in basic science and applied technology in biomedicin­e, medical devices and welding. The above-mentioned countries all believe that China’s market potential, demand for technology and talent, and capacity for absorbing innovation factors will provide them with ample developmen­t opportunit­ies. In their opinion, deepening and enriching their partnershi­ps with China can increase their own global influence.

Motivation­s for Building Innovative Partnershi­ps

One of the focal points of China’s diplomatic efforts under new historical conditions is how to enrich and develop the connotatio­ns of building a global network of partnershi­ps, as expressed in the formulatio­n that “on

the premise of adhering to the non-alignment principle, we make friends and form a partnershi­p network across the globe.”12 Chinese President Xi Jinping has pointed out that it is necessary to “make full use of internatio­nal innovation resources, open up diversifie­d cooperatio­n channels … and strengthen innovative partnershi­ps.”13 The establishm­ent of innovative partnershi­ps is not only in line with China’s new principles of “innovative, coordinate­d, green, open, and shared developmen­t,” but also an essential implicatio­n of building a closer global partnershi­p network.

Following new trends in internatio­nal technologi­cal and industrial developmen­t

A new round of industrial revolution brought about by scientific and technologi­cal progress has spurred changes in global production and value chains. Artificial intelligen­ce, big data, quantum communicat­ions, and the digital economy have profoundly transforme­d the features of many industries. Breakthrou­ghs in digital and computing capabiliti­es have pushed humankind into a new stage of developmen­t. To keep up with the pace of this new technologi­cal revolution, a country is forced to upgrade its innovation capabiliti­es. Learning from and absorbing the innovation achievemen­ts of others provides a shortcut for catching up. The developmen­t of innovative partnershi­ps is win-win cooperatio­n with complement­ary advantages, and this approach will help both parties in the field of new technologi­es. At the same time, new technologi­es, while reshaping the global political, economic, and social structures, have also brought new challenges to the sovereignt­y, security, and developmen­t interests of countries worldwide, requiring the concerted efforts of all countries to find solutions.

The improvemen­t of innovation capabiliti­es can promote the evolution of a country’s economic developmen­t to a more sophistica­ted division

of labor, a more reasonable structure and a more advanced form. It is a significan­t indicator of a country’s specific competitiv­e advantages and overall competitiv­eness. In particular, exploratio­n in basic science and technologi­cal breakthrou­ghs can change the balance of power and competitio­n among countries. The innovative partnershi­p highlights countries’ common views based on future-oriented innovation and developmen­t, and makes competitio­n complement­ary or coordinate­d to tackle common challenges of humanity, such as future developmen­t, food security, energy security, human health and climate change. The constructi­on of innovative partnershi­ps will also help improve a country’s governance capabiliti­es, and optimize a country’s planning, allocation and investment of resources regarding innovation. By stimulatin­g scientific and technologi­cal collisions and enhancing technologi­cal inventions, the building of innovative partnershi­ps can boost a country’s strategic interests. In this process, state actors, sub-state actors, non-state actors, and individual­s will shift their basic aspiration­s of developmen­t to “shared constructi­on, shared access, and shared ownership,” avoid and restrain existing contradict­ions in politics, military, economy and trade, and redefine the ways to perform competitio­n and cooperatio­n between countries.

Fulfilling needs of building an innovative nation

Historical­ly, innovation has catalyzed three industrial revolution­s. On the eve of the fourth industrial revolution, science and technology has once again become the primary factor of productivi­ty. For a long time, Western countries have been a major hub of innovation factors, and they claim the right to regulate the world’s economy, trade, finance, technology and market. With the increasing importance of knowledge-driven innovation as an element of economic growth, countries are engaged in more immediate competitio­n to gain developmen­t advantages. Global powers with technologi­cal, market, environmen­tal, and strategic advantages are able to develop global networks based on various aspects of innovation, control the direction of major-power competitio­n, and reshape the global industrial, value and interest chains, so as to seize developmen­t opportunit­ies and the

right to become an influentia­l internatio­nal voice.

In 2016, China issued the Outline of the National Strategy of Innovation-driven Developmen­t, which highlighte­d an innovation-driven developmen­t strategy.14 In the process of China’s two-step constructi­on of a modern socialist power, developmen­t inevitably requires building network links with the world’s foremost innovative countries, cities and other actors, and forging common platforms where global innovation can be gathered and shared. When innovative elements are adopted to strengthen the building of partnershi­ps between countries, and even promote the constructi­on of regional innovation networks, a direct improvemen­t of the nations’ overall competitiv­eness will be achieved.15

Enriching connotatio­ns of global innovative partnershi­ps

The constructi­on of a global network of innovation partnershi­ps reflects the current themes and tasks of China’s diplomacy. During the 70-year history of the People’s Republic of China, China’s diplomacy has adhered to the principle of independen­ce, and has actively developed and establishe­d various partnershi­ps. In the course of different historical periods, China has been pursuing different strategic goals, and has accordingl­y changed the forms and connotatio­ns of its views on partnershi­ps, reflecting China’s changing judgments on the theme of the era: from “war and revolution” to “peace and developmen­t.” China’s diplomatic strategic goals are subordinat­e to and serve the country’s overall national strategy. At present, these goals support the efforts to achieve the “two centenary goals.” Building a new type of internatio­nal relations is an essential strategic objective for China’s diplomacy. Specifical­ly, it includes actively developing global partnershi­ps, complying with the basic national policy of opening up to the outside world, and adhering to the concept of global governance characteri­zed by broad

consultati­on, joint contributi­on and shared benefits.16

According to the report delivered at the 19th CPC National Congress in October 2017, innovation is the primary driving force behind developmen­t; it is the strategic underpinni­ng for building a modernized economy.17 In the future, innovation will also underpin the competitiv­eness of countries around the world. China has made it clear that its national innovation system is open, and that efforts should be made to raise the internatio­nalization of its technologi­cal innovation in all aspects.18 Actively planning for and utilizing internatio­nal innovation resources have become increasing­ly momentous tasks for China’s diplomacy when coordinati­ng domestic and external situations, domestic and overseas markets, and the differing types of rules between home and abroad. Establishi­ng innovative partnershi­ps extends the innovative developmen­t strategy of the domestic agenda to global partnershi­p efforts, and helps closely connect technologi­es, informatio­n, talents, economies and intellectu­al properties.

Challenges in Building Innovative Partnershi­ps

At present, the world is undergoing “profound changes unseen in a century,” and the United States and other Western countries have openly proclaimed China to be their main competitor.19 Western civilizati­on’s leading position in the global economy, politics, military and ideology is experienci­ng a relative decline. In an increasing­ly “divided” world against the background of globalizat­ion, the “crisis of mentality and order” in human society has led to the rise of various extreme political thought and the “division” of the global society.20 The rise of populism, the resurgence of protection­ism, the

predominan­ce of anti-globalizat­ion ideas, the developmen­t of separatism and the emergence of a global terrorist threat have a direct impact on the connotatio­ns, level and progress of global partnershi­p building. For those countries that have the dual status of being “a partner” with China and “an ally” with the United States, one of the major issues to be addressed at present is how to maintain a pragmatic and flexible stance and balance policies toward both countries. Furthermor­e, the world is facing the challenge of defining all aspects of “partnershi­p” more clearly, distinguis­hing the functions of a “partner” and an “ally,” and shaping relationsh­ips of “coexistenc­e” and “compatible competitio­n” between the two identities.

First, the United States and the West have put in place scientific and technologi­cal blockades against China. Taking into account the comparativ­e changes in strength between China and the United States and the accompanyi­ng adjustment of their respective strategies and policies, the prelude to strategic competitio­n between the two has already begun. Such intensity and extent of frictions have never been witnessed before in the postcold War era.21 In the process, the United States has not only unilateral­ly restricted its cooperatio­n with China in terms of scientific and technologi­cal innovation, but has also pressured its allies to do the same. In May 2018, the United States Trade Representa­tive, the European Commission­er for Trade, and the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan issued a tripartite statement, condemning what they said was the mandatory transfer of technology for foreign companies and the acquisitio­n of sensitive informatio­n and trade secrets through cyber intrusion, and agreed to take effective measures to stop such policies and practices.22 Since then, the three parties have held several rounds of talks to reaffirm their respective positions and directions of action, and proposed reaching consensus with other trading partners on this issue. The United States has also put pressure on its allies

to contain Chinese technology companies. Australia and New Zealand for example, as members of the “Five Eyes Alliance,” have banned Huawei’s 5G equipment under pressure from the US,23 and the British government is currently evaluating the national security implicatio­ns in connection with Huawei.24 Japan has also followed the lead of the US and banned Huawei and ZTE from participat­ing in government contracts.25 In addition, the United States has also directly interfered with China’s ongoing efforts of building innovative partnershi­ps. US political and academic circles have repeatedly expressed concerns about the China-israel innovation cooperatio­n. Trump even suggested that should Israel continue to strengthen its cooperatio­n with China, Us-israel security cooperatio­n would be negatively affected.26 In response to Chinese companies’ investment in Sino-israeli joint projects such as the Port of Haifa, the US has demanded starting an “agreement review” and even threatened to cancel the Us-israel intelligen­ce sharing.27 The US Rand Corporatio­n suggested in a report that Israel, as a preeminent US ally, should refer to the US experience and set up a review mechanism for China’s investment, and stated that China-israel hightech cooperatio­n poses a challenge to the United States.28 With Sino-us competitio­n becoming more frequent and complicate­d, relevant Israeli hightech companies, when cooperatin­g with China, will face project reviews, personnel restrictio­ns or technology bans which the United States imposes on

specific technologi­es. How to make affected countries maintain a pragmatic stance within the Sino-us dispute and strike a balance between being a partner and an ally will become key issues in innovative partnershi­p building.

Second, there has yet to be a correct understand­ing of China’s actual demand and supply capacity. The fundamenta­l goal of building innovative partnershi­ps is to create a good external environmen­t for China’s macro developmen­t, and to use its own comparativ­e advantages to positively introduce innovation resources of relevant countries into specific fields. Externally, although most countries accept the criteria for China’s innovative partnershi­p building, the countries involved still differ greatly from China in ideology, developmen­t mode, internatio­nal role and diplomatic stance. Although countries like Switzerlan­d and Israel have strong innovation capabiliti­es, they are quite different from China in terms of economic and political strengths, which can make them worried that their core interests and resource advantages could be marginaliz­ed in specific aspects such as agenda setting and pattern designing. Domestical­ly, during the implementa­tion phase, innovative partnershi­p building may experience the following problems: exclusive competitio­n caused by constructi­on of similar innovation platforms in China; inefficien­t homogeniza­tion in scientific and technologi­cal research and developmen­t, technology transfer, and product transforma­tion; a one-sided understand­ing that scale and quantity are the only valid criteria to measure the value of the innovative partnershi­p; and a lack of innovation cooperatio­n principles that are derived from actual conditions, oriented to actual interests, and based on actual needs.

Third, there are phenomena such as “technology silos” and innovation fragmentat­ion. The phenomenon of “technology silos” commonly occurs in the process of innovative developmen­t for late-developing countries. In 2018, there were more than 1.54 million patent applicatio­ns for inventions in China.29 But the high number of patent applicatio­ns did not create a direct technologi­cal advantage, and this divergence resulted in the decoupling of

scientific innovation from technologi­cal progress in practical applicatio­ns. The imbalance between knowledge and technologi­cal growth on the one hand and increase of innovation output and applicatio­ns on the other may explain why the innovation results are often divorced from actual needs. Similarly, participan­ts of innovation cooperatio­n are usually trapped in the dilemma to operate more independen­tly or coordinate more closely with others. When investing in overseas innovation projects, enterprise­s, as the main actor, often encounter non-market interventi­on by local actors or risk spillover of their core technologi­es. As the government can hardly play any central role in specific innovation cooperatio­n projects, this may lead to innovation fragmentat­ion in building innovative partnershi­ps.

Approaches to Innovative Partnershi­p Building

In the era of informatio­n and globalizat­ion, science, technology and knowledge are powerful resources whose importance have increased significan­tly. Before the advent of the informatio­n age, internatio­nal actors often relied on their control of borders and the military to occupy and manage resources such as raw materials and labor force. However, at present, intellectu­al property and technical standards have become the means to control knowledge and technologi­cal resources. Developed countries have establishe­d the current global intellectu­al property and technical standard regime, and they dominate the system of technologi­cal division of labor as well as the order of wealth flows. By contrast, developing countries are positioned as “energy suppliers,” “assembly factories” and “technology consumers” in this labor division system. Some of these countries have become followers of technology through secondary innovation and independen­t innovation. However, these technology followers have very limited options when participat­ing in the industrial division of labor. One option is to establish another set of standards themselves, and the other is to submit to the constraint­s imposed by the powerful actors in the system.30

For a long time to come, China’s scientific, technologi­cal and economic ties with major developed countries are expected to be disrupted by certain internatio­nal geopolitic­al forces. When major developed countries begin to implement various degrees of containmen­t policies against China’s technologi­cal progress, China should effectivel­y work to build an innovation­based network of global partnershi­ps, and forge a multi-dimensiona­l layout of internatio­nal cooperatio­n, according to the inherent logic of the internatio­nal innovation chain and the distributi­on characteri­stics of its constituen­t links, elements and resources.

First, China should make optimal use of internatio­nal projects and regional cooperatio­n mechanisms to build an innovation-generating network. The key to effectivel­y advancing innovative partnershi­ps is to improve the innovation-generating and agenda-setting capabiliti­es, which are embodied in five major aspects: knowledge production and accumulati­on, resource coordinati­on and allocation, research output commercial­ization and promotion, technologi­cal breakthrou­gh and guidance, and industrial agglomerat­ion and diffusion. Moreover, an innovation-generating network requires the capabiliti­es to conduct cross-border intellectu­al property transactio­ns and integrate the usage of relevant financial services, while institutio­nal guarantees are necessary for convergenc­e with prevailing internatio­nal rules.

Through innovative partnershi­ps, efforts should be made to organize the implementa­tion of internatio­nal major scientific programs and projects, and actively participat­e in global scientific and technologi­cal collaborat­ive innovation, to enhance China’s profile in global innovation cooperatio­n and competitio­n. A small number of leading innovative entities can play an important role in global industrial competitio­n. However, in the new industrial revolution that combines biological, physical and digital technologi­es, innovation is becoming increasing­ly complex. No scientific research institutio­n or enterprise can single-handedly be responsibl­e for all the innovation links and processes; instead, they need to be complement­ed through internatio­nal division of labor and cooperatio­n. In whole

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