China International Studies (English)

China-brazil Cooperatio­n in Infrastruc­ture Constructi­on: Progress, Challenges and Approaches

- Wang Fei

Brazil’s strong demand for infrastruc­ture investment has ushered in new opportunit­ies as the Belt and Road Initiative reaches Latin America and the Caribbean. China

and Brazil should further normalize cooperatio­n platforms, innovate financing mechanisms, focus on public diplomacy, and diversify developmen­t patterns, thereby leading their cooperatio­n in infrastruc­ture constructi­on into a new era.

2009, and its investment in the Brazil has increased year by year. In 2017, China surpassed the United States as Brazil’s principal source of foreign direct investment (FDI). As of September 2019, China’s investment in Brazil approached US$80 billion, with more than 300 Chinese enterprise­s investing and operating in the country, 25 of which are among the Fortune Global 500. China’s investment flows from traditiona­l areas such as agricultur­e and mining to the high-end of the value chain, for example, the energy, electricit­y and manufactur­ing sectors, as well as scientific and technologi­cal innovation.1 Infrastruc­ture constructi­on is one priority of the practical bilateral cooperatio­n, which is an area of outstandin­g reciprocit­y where the two countries are highly complement­ary. Chinese state-owned and state-controlled enterprise­s are the major actors in Brazil’s infrastruc­ture constructi­on, concentrat­ing their operations on ports, electricit­y and transporta­tion.

In the area of port constructi­on, the China Merchants Group and the China Communicat­ions Constructi­on Group respective­ly establishe­d major logistics platforms in southern and northern Brazil, namely the Paranaguá Port and the São Luís Port, in order to increase the efficiency of ports across Brazil and facilitate improved commoditie­s transporta­tion. In September 2017, the China Merchants Group purchased a 90-percent stake in the Paranaguá Container Terminal, which is Brazil’s second largest, for about US$925 million. The transactio­n, formally completed in February 2018, marked a starting point for the Chinese enterprise to seek investment opportunit­ies in logistics, express highways, bonded port zones, and the comprehens­ive developmen­t of urban communitie­s. On March 16, 2018, constructi­on began of the São Luís Port project, jointly financed and developed by the China Communicat­ions Constructi­on Group and the Brazilian company Thorell. As the first green-field investment project of China in Brazil’s transporta­tion infrastruc­ture field, the São Luís Port, with

its focus on grain, fertilizer, oil products and break-bulk cargo transport, is expected to become one of the largest break-bulk deep-water ports in Brazil. Once completed, it will facilitate China’s import of Brazilian soybeans, and to some extent boost the economy of Brazil’s northeaste­rn region.

In the field of electricit­y, the China Three Gorges Corporatio­n and the State Grid Corporatio­n of China have been operating their businesses and expanding influence in Brazil. Both enterprise­s entered the Brazilian market through the acquisitio­n of developed countries’ stakes in Brazil’s electricit­y companies. In December 2016, the China Three Gorges, whose main business is power generation, completed the acquisitio­n of Duke Energy assets in Brazil for US$1.2 billion, thus increasing its installed capacity to 8.27 GW under its management and in proportion­al equity holdings. Since it establishe­d a subsidiary in Brazil in 2010, the State Grid has acquired 14 chartered electric power transmissi­on companies in the country. In April 2016, the State Grid Brazil Holdings won the bid for Phase 2 of Brazil’s Teles Pires hydropower transmissi­on project, obtaining a 30-year franchise. In January 2017, it completed the acquisitio­n of 54.64 percent of stakes in Brazil’s CPFL Energia for about 14.19 billion reais, which became the largest outbound acquisitio­n in the year for Chinese electricit­y companies. As of May 2019, the State Grid had invested more than US$12.4 billion in Brazil, accounting for 25 percent of its total contract value for overseas projects and covering the entire industrial chain of Brazil, from electricit­y transmissi­on, to distributi­on and operation.

Chinese enterprise­s have also shown great enthusiasm to participat­e in the improvemen­t of Brazilian transporta­tion infrastruc­ture. In March 2016, China’s XCMG Group won the bid for 56 sets of engineerin­g machinery used for constructi­on of government-funded highways. By taking this opportunit­y, XCMG can further expand its market share in Brazil, and promote its annual production capacity of 7,000 sets of engineerin­g machinery, which covers cranes, excavators, loaders, road rollers and land graders.

Opportunit­ies for Deepening China-brazil Infrastruc­ture Cooperatio­n

The huge gap in infrastruc­ture constructi­on explains in part the difficulty Brazil faces in improving its productivi­ty and elevating the technologi­cal level of its exports. Whereas the infrastruc­ture of Brazil is inadequate in quantity and poor in quality with its financial input unable to meet the enormous demand, China has strength, experience and advantages in this regard. Besides the high level of political mutual trust and economic complement­arity, which has ensured the generally positive trend of Chinabrazi­l relations, the Belt and Road Initiative and the synergy of Chinese and Brazilian developmen­t strategies are expected to create a broader horizon for China’s participat­ion in Brazil’s infrastruc­ture constructi­on.

Brazilian infrastruc­ture in urgent need of improvemen­t

In Brazil’s economic developmen­t, infrastruc­ture has been a permanent bottleneck which is difficult to break through. It is estimated that the infrastruc­ture gap brings a 10-15 percent loss to Brazil’s GDP every year.2 First, existing infrastruc­ture in Brazil hardly matches the country’s status as the world’s ninth largest economy, which leads to a fragmented domestic market and poor external connectivi­ty. Statistics of the World Economic Forum show that Brazil ranks only 81st of 140 countries in terms of infrastruc­ture, which has undermined its global competitiv­eness. Among the 12 specific indicators, with the exception of airport connectivi­ty (ranked 17th), Brazil lags far behind others in terms of roads, railways, seaports, electricit­y and water supply, with a particular deficit in the quality of roads and the efficiency of seaport services, in which Brazil ranks lower than 100th.3 As Brazil’s most important mode of transporta­tion the roads in the country have to bear two-thirds of total traffic volume, but of the entire 2 Credit Suisse, The Brazilian Infrastruc­ture: It’s Now or Never, Sao Paulo, 2013. 3 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiv­eness Report, 2018, p.114.

length of 1.75 million kilometers only 219 thousand kilometers are asphalt roads. There are only 10,000 kilometers of express highways in Brazil, most of which were built in Sao Paulo state, while road quality is poor in the country’s vast central and western areas. As for railways, with a total length of 30,347 kilometers, they are mostly in Brazil’s southern, southeaste­rn and northeaste­rn regions, with only 1,121 kilometers of them electrifie­d. Moreover, there are four kinds of gauge standards in Brazil’s railways, which is not conducive to interconne­ctivity of the entire railway network. The railways serve only 19 percent of Brazil’s total traffic volume, and the average speed of 25km/h of the Brazilian railway also lags far behind the global average of 75km/h. Although the 37 seaports in Brazil have a total annual throughput of 700 million tons, these capacities are very unevenly distribute­d. The handling capacity of the Santos Port, the largest in the country, accounts for one-third of the national total. The silting up of the port in 2016 once had large-tonnage vessels including huge amounts of cargo stranded.4 According to estimates by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Brazil’s freight volume will have increased by 14 percent from 2015 to the year 2025, setting a much higher demand on the country’s infrastruc­ture.5 Improving transport conditions and other infrastruc­ture is therefore Brazil’s inevitable first choice for enhancing its competitiv­eness.

Second, even though Brazil has the highest investment budget for infrastruc­ture constructi­on among Latin American countries, the country’s even greater demand in this regard determines that it is also facing the largest investment gap.6 Since the 1980s, debt crises and economic downturns have forced Brazil to significan­tly reduce its infrastruc­ture investment, whose proportion in GDP has plummeted from an average of 5.2 percent in the early 4 Fernanda Pires, “Assoreamen­to já ‘Esvazia’ Navio no Porto de Santos,” Valor, July 18, 2017, https:// www.valor.com.br/empresas/5042450/assoreamen­to-ja-esvazia-navio-no-porto-de-santos.

5 Ulloa, Felipe, “Estimating Demand for Transporta­tion Using the Input-output Model: Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Nicaragua,” CEPAL FAL Bulletin, No.358, 2017.

6 David Tuesta, “Infrastruc­ture Investment in Latin America: Pension Funds, Capital Markets and Financial Regimes,” in World Bank Group Pre-conference Workshop for Capital Markets Regulators, November 2015.

1980s to 2.25 percent over the past two decades.7 The decline of infrastruc­ture investment is mainly attributed to the reduction of public investment, while private capital is not yet able to fill the gap left by the shrinking public input.

When in particular after 2013 its fiscal situation worsened, Brazil’s federal government began to cut transfer payments to local government­s, with states such as Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais once even on the verge of bankruptcy. Given this, those Brazilian states in financial difficulti­es acted first and turned to China for help, hoping China’s local investment, especially in the field of infrastruc­ture, would rescue them from the abyss. Since the beginning of 2019, governors or local government delegation­s from more than 10 states have visited or planned to visit China, in order to introduce projects to Chinese investors. The projects are mainly concentrat­ed in railways, water conservanc­y, roads, ports and other infrastruc­ture.8

Strong demand for infrastruc­ture investment

Brazil’s demand for infrastruc­ture investment has been strong in recent years. Since the latter half of 2015, the Brazilian federal government has successive­ly released three policy documents which focused on infrastruc­ture constructi­on, namely the Multi-year Plan for 2016-2019, the Logistics Investment Plan for 2015-2018, and the Electricit­y Investment Plan for 2015-2018. The Multi-year Plan serves as the general program, while the latter two documents outline the investment objectives and tasks in the two critical infrastruc­ture areas of logistics and electricit­y. According to the Growth Accelerati­on Program in the 2018-2019 government transition period published by Brazil’s Ministry of Planning, Developmen­t and Management, the government will step up efforts to attract investment. In addition to regular offers of tenders and privatizat­ions for infrastruc­ture projects, it will establish a new Secretaria­t for Strategic Affairs, which will

take responsibi­lity for major projects such as the Angra 3 nuclear power plant, the Transnorde­stina Railway, and the BR-163 Highway.9 Soon after taking office, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro announced in early 2019 that there would be at least 49 public tenders in that year for infrastruc­ture projects, with an amount expected to reach 67.9 billion reais.10

High level of political mutual trust

Brazil establishe­d diplomatic relations with China in 1974, and became the first developing country to forge a strategic partnershi­p with China in 1993. In 2012, it was again the first among Latin American countries to establish a comprehens­ive strategic partnershi­p with China. Over the past 45 years, the two countries have been consistent­ly dedicated to mutual respect, have treated each other as equals, and upheld win-win cooperatio­n, thus setting an example for cooperativ­e and mutually beneficial relations between major developing countries. Although President Bolsonaro made some proposals and remarks during his election campaign that raised people’s concerns about the direction of China-brazil relations, he has avoided unilateral­ism since taking office, and instead maintained consistenc­y in his policy and conducted positive interactio­ns with China. Following Vice President Hamilton Mourão’s visit in May 2019, Bolsonaro headed to China in October of the same year, while Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the BRICS summit held in Brasilia in November. Exchanges between the two countries’ political parties and local government­s have also become more frequent.

High-level visits have strengthen­ed the mutual trust in political matters between China and Brazil, and it is on this basis that the new Brazilian government actively advances pragmatic cooperatio­n with China. As the cornerston­e of the bilateral relations, China-brazil economic cooperatio­n has ushered in a new period of rapid developmen­t with a bright prospect, 9 Ministério do Planejamen­to, Desenvolvi­mento e Gestão, Programa de Investimen­tos Prioritári­os em Infraestru­tura – PAC, Transição de Governo 2018-2019, Informaçõe­s Estratégic­as.

10 “Governo Quer Leiloar Pelo Menos 49 Projetos de Infraestru­tura Só neste Ano,” UOL, January 17, 2019,https://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2019/01/17/governo-quer-passar-49-projetos-de-infraestru­tura -ao-setor-privado.htm.

featuring parallel progress in trade, investment and financial ties. During Bolsonaro’s visit to China in October 2019, China and Brazil decided to launch a process to optimize the mechanism of the China-brazil High-level Coordinati­on and Cooperatio­n Committee, and upgrade the Joint Action Plan 2015-2021 and the Ten-year Cooperatio­n Plan 2012-2021.11 The two sides also announced to actively promote bilateral investment, expand economic complement­arity, and explore new economic opportunit­ies. Currently, infrastruc­ture constructi­on has become the largest area for Chinese investment­s in Brazil, with five Chinese financial institutio­ns setting up branches or representa­tive offices in the country and providing financing support for bilateral trade and investment. The China-latin American Production Capacity Cooperatio­n Investment Fund and the BRICS New Developmen­t Bank are well functionin­g, while the China-brazil Cooperatio­n Fund for the Expansion of Production Capacity has been launched. In the future, the two sides can explore joint approaches to further enrich financial cooperatio­n and facilitate the expansion of bilateral trade and investment ties. As the only founding member of the Asian Infrastruc­ture Investment Bank in the Americas, Brazil can benefit much from Chinese financial resources.

Synergy of the Belt and Road Initiative and Brazil’s developmen­t strategy

China’s Belt and Road Initiative is highly consistent in terms of concept with Brazil’s developmen­t strategy, which similarly features the accelerati­ng effect of investment and the foundation­al role of infrastruc­ture constructi­on. With rich experience and technical reserve on the Chinese side, the two countries’ cooperatio­n in infrastruc­ture investment has promising prospects. Since Bolsonaro took office, Brazil’s role as a participan­t of the Belt and Road Initiative has been increasing­ly significan­t, as the two sides explore the possibilit­y of synergy of their respective developmen­t strategies. For example, the Chinese embassy in Brazil and Brazil’s Ministry of Infrastruc­ture jointly 11 “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Federative Republic of Brazil,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, October 25, 2019, www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1710767.shtml.

held a dialogue on infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n, which has served as a platform for synergy of the two sides’ infrastruc­ture developmen­t strategies as reflected in key cooperativ­e projects. In July of the same year, the Chinese embassy and the Brazilian Center for Internatio­nal Relations held a symposium on the 45th anniversar­y of China-brazil diplomatic relations, where officials and scholars from the two countries exchanged views on how to implement their strategic synergy. China and Brazil have also officially recognized the synergy between the former’s Belt and Road Initiative and the latter’s developmen­t strategy. During Bolsonaro’s October 2019 visit to China, the two sides affirmed the feasibilit­y to connect the Belt and Road Initiative with Brazil’s Investment Partners Plans (PPI). In addition, Bolsonaro welcomed Chinese enterprise­s, by further opening up the Brazilian market, to actively invest in the country’s infrastruc­ture constructi­on as well as in oil and gas exploitati­on. Through Chinese participat­ion in PPI, it is expected that Brazil’s ports, airports, highways, electric energy and other infrastruc­ture would witness significan­t improvemen­t, which is conducive to reducing logistical costs and enhancing transport efficiency. In the process, Brazil is also committed to further streamlini­ng and accelerati­ng various approval procedures to protect investors’ interests. During the BRICS Brasilia summit in November 2019, China and Brazil signed a memorandum of cooperatio­n on establishi­ng an investment platform, in the hope of expanding investment and creating jobs through informatio­n exchange and joint action. This will facilitate and guarantee further infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n between China and Brazil.12

In addition to the federal government’s interest in the Belt and Road, Brazil’s local government­s, in the face of obstacles for their developmen­t, have also been paying careful attention to attracting Chinese infrastruc­ture investment. For example, in August 2019, Governor João Doria of São Paulo visited China with delegates from 35 companies, and participat­ed in the China-latin America Infrastruc­ture Week. Indicating support for the Belt

and Road Initiative, Doria hoped that both São Paulo and Brazil could seize the opportunit­y to improve infrastruc­ture.

Challenges for China-brazil Infrastruc­ture Cooperatio­n

Despite the vast opportunit­ies for cooperatio­n, China’s entry into Brazil’s infrastruc­ture constructi­on does not always offer a smooth journey; nor will its future be without any obstacles. Among the major risks are Brazil’s high financing costs, the deficiency of relevant systems, the vulnerabil­ity to internatio­nal economic cycles, the instabilit­y of foreign exchange rates, and the poor business environmen­t. The unpredicta­bility in terms of policy of Brazil’s alt-right government could also pose a new challenge to Chinese enterprise­s.

High financing costs are constraini­ng market access

The funding gap for Brazil’s infrastruc­ture constructi­on is large. To achieve its inflation target, Brazil’s interest rate has been kept at a high level. Coupled with the immaturity of its domestic capital market, Brazil’s funding channels have long been short of diversity, which makes financing particular­ly costly.13 The political and economic crisis in 2015-2016, which resulted in the instabilit­y of Brazil’s sovereign credit ratings, has further limited the country’s ability to finance on the internatio­nal capital market, especially due to the lack of access to long-term capital. Even though Brazil is a beneficiar­y of various funding mechanisms such as the China-latin American Production Capacity Cooperatio­n Investment Fund, the special loan for China-latin America infrastruc­ture constructi­on, and the Chinabrazi­l Cooperatio­n Fund for the Expansion of Production Capacity, the volume of capital accessible to the country is still far from sufficient. This is mostly manifested in the financing approach, as well as the mismatch of capital maturity. On the one hand, as the traditiona­l financing approach has 13 Cleomar Gomes,rafael Cavalcanti de Araújo, “Brazil: Monetary Policy and the Neutral Interest Rate,” Journal of Economic Studies, Vol.43, No.6, 2016, pp.966-979.

been tardy and ineffectiv­e in response, it is impossible for Brazil to solely rely on investment from China; instead it is an urgent necessity for Brazil to also innovate its own financing methods. On the other hand, there exists an apparent mismatch of maturity between the demand and supply of capital. While the Brazilian side prefers longer-term infrastruc­ture loans, because of the difficulty of generating capital returns within a short span of time, there are limits on the Chinese side concerning the capital’s maturity and rate of return. This has often made it difficult to match demand with supply. For example, the loan period of the China-latin American Production Capacity Cooperatio­n Investment Fund, which is usually seven to ten years, is obviously unable to satisfy Brazil’s demand for infrastruc­ture financing.14

Deficient investment protection regime amplifies risks

Although the Brazilian federal government has long realized that public-private partnershi­p can attract financial resources and bring in the private sector’s management expertise, progress in this regard has been rather slow. The incompeten­ce of regulation­s has led to an exclusion of private investment. Privatizat­ion and the opening of market access to foreign investors cannot fully overcome the bottleneck­s of Brazil’s infrastruc­ture constructi­on, while the fluctuatio­n of national regulatory policies has added to uncertaint­ies and thus limited investment. Moreover, mechanism building in China-brazil infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n has been seriously lagging behind, rendering the two sides’ capabiliti­es too inadequate to synergize their plans and coordinate their efforts. Since the two countries have not signed a document on Belt and Road cooperatio­n, institutio­nal guarantees are hardly available if concrete projects encounter bottleneck­s.

Economic fluctuatio­n is stifling corporate profitabil­ity

Brazil’s widespread economic uncertaint­y has made it difficult for 14 “Speech by Han Deping, Manager of the China-latin American Production Capacity Cooperatio­n Investment Fund, at CGG Think Tank,” August 23, 2018, http://www.cggthinkta­nk.com/2018-0823/100076387.html.

Chinese enterprise­s to find profitable projects. Looking back on Brazil’s history of economic developmen­t, instabilit­y of currency value and severe monetary and economic crises have been commonplac­e, which will bring potential risks to investment from China. For example, during the political and economic crisis triggered by the presidenti­al impeachmen­t case between 2015 and 2016, the Brazilian economy registered a downturn of more than three percent annually for two consecutiv­e years, which undermined the overall economic vitality. Besides, the increase of interest rates by the United States Federal Reserve since Donald Trump took office has led to substantia­l depreciati­on of multiple Latin American currencies including the Brazilian real. The fluctuatio­n of foreign exchange rates is a factor that Chinese companies have to take into considerat­ion when they participat­e in Brazil’s infrastruc­ture constructi­on.15

Investment inconvenie­nces are suppressin­g business activity

According to the World Bank’s ease of doing business index, Brazil’s global ranking in terms of business environmen­t has been below the 100th rank since statistics began in 2009, well below that of countries within the region such as Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Business operations in Brazil have been under pressure in terms of establishi­ng new companies, obtaining constructi­on permits, paying taxes and registerin­g assets. In particular, Brazil’s labor and environmen­t issues are obstacles that Chinabrazi­l cooperatio­n cannot avoid. As labor organizati­ons in Brazil enjoy a powerful status, infrastruc­ture projects which include Chinese investors as stakeholde­rs risk being liable to substantia­l amounts of compensati­on once they are trapped in labor disputes. With a strong awareness of the environmen­tal protection agenda in the public domain and a formidable presence of relevant organizati­ons, cooperatio­n projects in Brazil would also be dragged into major controvers­y and face major risks of being penalized if environmen­tal issues were involved. To protect the market share of

domestic enterprise­s from being encroached, the Brazilian government has set a 50-percent localizati­on threshold in several key industries, which to some extent dampens the enthusiasm of foreign companies to invest in infrastruc­ture projects. The weak business environmen­t of Brazil, in both hard and soft aspects, has not only made it more difficult for Chinese enterprise­s to enter the market, but also hindered the realizatio­n of bilateral cooperatio­n objectives to some degree.

Approaches to Advancing China-brazil Infrastruc­ture Cooperatio­n

Infrastruc­ture constructi­on is the key area where China-brazil joint building of the Belt and Road Initiative as well as trade and investment cooperatio­n can make a breakthrou­gh. In fact, infrastruc­ture connectivi­ty includes not only “hard” connectivi­ty in terms of transporta­tion and energy, but also “soft” connectivi­ty as reflected in the harmonizat­ion of policies and rules. To realize successful cooperatio­n for the two countries while at the same time effectivel­y managing risks, it is undoubtedl­y necessary to create a toplevel strategic mechanism in a scientific and reasonable manner, while also stimulatin­g innovation at the grassroots level. By working out such an initiative at the macro, meso, and micro level, and by leveraging policies to tap existing opportunit­ies, cooperatio­n approaches can be found that suit the Brazilian market and address the reasonable concerns of Chinese enterprise­s in terms of business model, regulatory regime and financing pattern.

Normalizin­g cooperatio­n platforms

At the national level, it is necessary for China to refine the top-level design in its grand strategic layout, and establish or improve platforms for Belt and Road cooperatio­n with Brazil, thus institutio­nalizing cooperatio­n mechanisms. The China-brazil High-level Coordinati­on and Cooperatio­n Committee, which was launched in 2004, is the highest-level mechanism that exists for comprehens­ive bilateral cooperatio­n. On this basis, the two countries can explore the possibilit­y of setting up an infrastruc­ture sub

committee, and enhance communicat­ion to normalize the cooperatio­n platform. First, the two sides should sign a document on Belt and Road cooperatio­n as soon as possible. Although there have been 19 countries that signed such documents with China, no major Latin American country in the convention­al sense have joined the ranks so far. By putting down cooperatio­n on the Chinese initiative in black and white, the influence of Brazil as the top regional power is expected to rise and the bilateral infrastruc­ture projects are able to advance on a more solid basis. Second, relevant state authoritie­s in China should further promote the synergy of the Belt and Road Initiative and Brazil’s developmen­t strategy, improve the regulatory system for outbound Chinese investment, and provide better investment policy services. Third, the renminbi’s internatio­nalization in Brazil can be advanced at a strategic level to help financial institutio­ns and enterprise­s circumvent exchange rate risks. The instabilit­y of Brazil’s foreign exchange rate has led to a mismatch of costs and benefits among financial institutio­ns and enterprise­s that are participat­ing in local infrastruc­ture constructi­on. Given this, an expanded use of the renminbi can consolidat­e Brazil’s demand for the Chinese currency and enhance relevant financial services and global operations. Fourth, a risk assessment and early warning system should be built to strengthen the network of risk prevention and control. It is necessary for relevant authoritie­s to help financial institutio­ns and enterprise­s that get involved in Brazil’s infrastruc­ture constructi­on to conduct studies on the overseas investment environmen­t and project feasibilit­y. They can also play a constructi­ve role by formulatin­g guidelines for overseas investment risk management and setting up an early warning and informatio­n disclosure system to keep stakeholde­rs informed in a timely manner.

Innovating financing mechanisms

With its limited fiscal capacity, Brazil is short of funding for large-scale infrastruc­ture projects. China on the other hand, possessing an enormous foreign exchange reserve and a high deposit rate, has the capacity to participat­e in Brazil’s infrastruc­ture constructi­on. Fiscal funds, developmen­t

oriented financial institutio­ns, and commercial banks can all be capital sources for bilateral infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n. So far, the China-brazil Cooperatio­n Fund for the Expansion of Production Capacity has been launched. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China signed a memorandum on global financial cooperatio­n with Brazil’s Vale company. China’s XCMG group opened a fully-owned bank in Brazil. Whereas China’s developmen­t-oriented financial institutio­ns, commercial banks and enterprise­s have all participat­ed in financing mechanism-building in Brazil, their priorities should now turn to diversifyi­ng financing services, encouragin­g the integratio­n of developmen­toriented and commercial finance, expanding financing channels, and promoting inclusive and green finance. China and Brazil can also explore cooperatio­n opportunit­ies in third parties to jointly shoulder financing risks. First, developmen­t-oriented financial institutio­ns are encouraged to innovate their businesses and products according to conditions of their local infrastruc­ture projects, and appropriat­ely extend the terms of their loans. As the largest power in Latin America, Brazil’s economy is more resilient, and its relationsh­ip with China has stood the test of time with renewed momentum. It is feasible for Chinese developmen­t-oriented financial institutio­ns to push the convention­al limits and moderately extend their loan terms provided that risks are under control. Second, commercial banks should be granted more latitude to participat­e in some infrastruc­ture projects between China and Brazil that are sufficient­ly commercial­ized. Third, both developmen­t-oriented and commercial financial institutio­ns should be actively guided to establish multilater­al financial cooperatio­n mechanisms with relevant third-party bodies, and provide localized financial support in a variety of ways such as comprehens­ive credit lines and syndicated loans. The China-latin America Developmen­t-oriented Financial Cooperatio­n Mechanism, initiated by the China Developmen­t Bank in April 2019, is the first multilater­al mechanism of its kind between China and Latin American countries, but the Brazilian Developmen­t Bank (BNDES) did not take part. The incorporat­ion of BNDES into the mechanism will strengthen synergy and cooperatio­n between Chinese and Brazilian developmen­t-oriented financial bodies and

better serve the bilateral infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n.

Attaching importance to public diplomacy

With the increasing influence of government-affiliated and nongovernm­ental think tanks in Brazil in recent years, China has become a popular object in their studies. However, some misconcept­ions of the Belt and Road Initiative still exist among various Brazilian think tanks, as China’s participat­ion in local infrastruc­ture constructi­on is frequently labeled “neocolonia­lism”, “plundering resources” or “debt trap”.16 At present, Chinese and Brazilian think tanks have been playing a crucial role in bilateral public diplomacy. For example, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the University of Campinas have jointly launched a center for China studies. The Getulio Vargas Foundation has also hosted a China center. A center for Brazil studies was set up under the CASS Institute of Latin American Studies. Think tank cooperatio­n can be an approach to enhancing policy communicat­ion and people-to-people bonds between China and Brazil, and Chinese think tanks should strive to build up their capacity particular­ly on the issue of China-brazil infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n. First, academic exchanges and collaborat­ion between think tanks should be further strengthen­ed, and the role of think tanks in advising policy decisions and guiding opinion forming should be given full play to promote understand­ing and facilitate consensus. Second, the concepts of how to shape public opinion should be improved, with more focus placed on people-topeople exchanges. Chinese think tanks need to actively promote Track II interactio­ns with Brazilian political parties, the legislatur­e, local government­s, industrial associatio­ns, think tanks, the media, as well as universiti­es and research institutio­ns. Through exchanges of various kinds, they can help stimulate a better understand­ing of China-brazil infrastruc­ture projects among Brazilian central and local government­s as well as the general public,

thus serving as elements of China’s “soft power” to cultivate a favorable public opinion environmen­t for bilateral infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n. Third, Chinese researcher­s and their Brazilian counterpar­ts can jointly conduct feasibilit­y studies of infrastruc­ture projects such as the Bi-oceanic Railway Corridor, which would add solid intellectu­al support for bilateral cooperatio­n.

Diversifyi­ng developmen­t patterns

As one of the main actors in China-brazil infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n, enterprise­s make investment decisions based on their evaluation of Brazil’s investment environmen­t and the value of specific projects. Currently, Chinese infrastruc­ture constructi­on in Brazil calls for innovation in terms of the involved actors and the current cooperatio­n patterns. Playing the role of whole-industrial-chain service providers, Chinese enterprise­s can build localized platforms through their regional subsidiari­es and offer investment services, thus achieving diversifie­d developmen­t. Due to the burden of high costs, only state-owned enterprise­s have made up the majority of Chinese investors in China-brazil infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n, while the private sector, which is widely perceived more capable in expanding markets, has largely stayed away from any involvemen­t. Ideally, the actors of infrastruc­ture investment should be diversifie­d, with public and private investors cooperatin­g and supplement­ing each other, and jointly facing challenges in the process. In addition, the convention­al constructi­on pattern, characteri­zed by EPC general contractin­g, can be replaced by more diverse models such as equity cooperatio­n, mergers and acquisitio­ns, and public-private partnershi­p (PPP). By prioritizi­ng the option of exporting techniques and management expertise and employing more local labor, disputes of various kinds can actually be avoided. Moreover, Chinese enterprise­s operating in Brazil should learn to adopt an integral mindset and refrain from mutual undercutti­ng and underprici­ng, which often leads to a waste of resources. Corporate selfdiscip­line is necessary for a favorable market environmen­t and an all-win outcome of coordinate­d developmen­t. Last but not least, Chinese enterprise­s

in Brazil should actively explore the possibilit­y of cooperatin­g with their local or Western counterpar­ts. By integratin­g China’s advantages in infrastruc­ture constructi­on, developed countries’ advanced technology and management expertise, and Brazil’s practical needs of infrastruc­ture developmen­t, a cooperativ­e model that involves both the global North and South can be establishe­d, which will help demonstrat­e China’s open posture in promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as a global community of interests, responsibi­lity and shared future.

Conclusion

Brazil is the first developing country to have establishe­d a strategic partnershi­p with China, the first Latin American country to have built a comprehens­ive strategic partnershi­p with China, and also the first in the region whose bilateral trade volume with China topped US$100 billion. Therefore, the progress of China-brazil relationsh­ip bears strategic significan­ce and plays an exemplary role. In the wake of President Bolsonaro’s visit to China and the BRICS Brasilia summit in 2019, the Brazilian government has been adopting a more pragmatic and amicable position in its China policy. The two sides have started to explore the potential for jointly building the Belt and Road through infrastruc­ture cooperatio­n. Currently, as globalizat­ion is under attack from unilateral­ism and protection­ism, the cooperatio­n between China and Brazil, as two major developing powers, is likely to produce worldwide strategic influence. Taking infrastruc­ture constructi­on as an entry point, the two countries can promote the indepth synergy of Brazil’s Investment Partners Plans and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and build the bilateral comprehens­ive strategic partnershi­p into a paragon of China-latin America, South-south and emerging market economies’ cooperatio­n. This not only serves to consolidat­e and enhance the bilateral ties, but also serves to advance China’s cooperatio­n and building of a community of shared future with the entire Latin American region.

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