Analysis of the United States’ New Central Asia Strategy

The United States’ new Central Asia strategy, issued in the context of increased efforts by the US government to contain Russia and China with both elements of continuity and changes, will inevitably have an impact on the development of the Central Asian countries and major-power relations in the region. However, constrained by various factors, the new strategy will hardly yield the expected goals.

On February 5, 2020, the Trump administration released the United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity.1 Observers have dismissed it as “sour wine in an old bottle” and “an old recipe for a new situation,”2 but some of the changes elaborated in the document deserve more attention. This strategy was issued in the context of increased efforts by the US government to contain Russia and China, reflecting its intention to put pressure on China and Russia by using countries in Central Asia. The implementation of this strategy may have a significant impact on the evolution of the situation in Central Asia and surrounding regions.

Background of the New Central Asia Strategy

The United States has been an important player in Central Asia for some time. The Trump administration therefore had a vested interest to launch a new Central Asia strategy in the year 2020. The growing power imbalance between the US, China and Russia in the region, new opportunities to

engage with Central Asia due to fluctuations in the political dynamics, and the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, have all been important factors and motives.

US eagerness to increase influence in Central Asia

When the Trump administration came into office, the United States adjusted its global strategic outlook and explicitly marked Russia and China as rivals. This new position was corroborated and reiterated in several leading policy documents such as the US National Security Strategy Report in December 2017, the US National Defense Strategy Report in November 2018, and in the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community in January 2019.3 In line with the theme of “America First,” the United States is pursuing a policy of containment for both China and Russia, imposing greater pressure on the two countries. Although during its initial phase the Trump administration had attempted to improve relations with Russia, Us-russian ties plunged to the “freezing point” and into the state of a “New Cold War” after the Ukraine crisis had triggered the Western containment and sanctions against Russia, and with the US Congress launching an investigation into Trump’s alleged collusion with Russia. This was coupled with an anti-russian sentiment among US political, academic, and media circles, and aggravated by increasing Usrussia conflicts over Syria and Venezuela issues and NATO’S eastward expansion.4 With regard to China, the United States proposed the Indopacific strategy to contain China through a quadrilateral security dialogue (Quad) involving the US, Japan, India and Australia. At the same time, the US has also assaulted China in areas such as science and technology, economy, and ideology, resulting in a tremendous increase of tensions in

bilateral relations.5 It is evident that US policymakers, perceiving China and Russia as threats, are constantly spreading prejudices and sparing no effort to defeat them anywhere on the international stage.

The United States regards Central Asia as a primary battleground for its containment efforts against China and Russia. For US policymakers, the geostrategic importance of Central Asia as the “heart of the Eurasian land mass,”6 together with its proximity to China and Russia, makes it a prime location for weakening the influence of China and Russia. The United States has in fact already worked out a comprehensive plan of how to reduce Russian influence in Central Asia. The US hopes to strengthen its relations with Ukraine and Belarus to the west of Russia and with Central Asian republics to the south, thereby reducing their support for Russia correspondingly. This deployment was reflected in US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s successive visits to the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in February 2020.7 To hedge against China, the United States has stepped up its relations with Central Asian countries after the introduction of the Indo-pacific strategy, making up for the missing links in the containment of China in its neighboring regions. In fact, US politicians make no secret of their motives for targeting China in the new Central Asia strategy. During his visit in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Pompeo accused the Chinese Communist Party of being the “central threat of our times,” and made clear that the Trump administration would relentlessly counter China in many fields, including commerce, technology, military, and diplomacy. Disregarding diplomatic etiquette, he made groundless accusations on China’s human rights in front of the host countries he visited, slandered the Belt and Road Initiative, and encouraged

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the Central Asian countries to deepen cooperation with the United States in trade and investment.8 Judging from the itinerary of Pompeo’s visits to the five countries, his words and actions during the tour, and the text of the new Central Asia strategy, it is apparent that an important purpose of this strategy is to confront China and Russia and expand US influence in Central Asia.

The power shift in Central Asia between the United States on the one side, and China and Russia on the other has indeed been a more immediate and urgent factor for the US to introduce the new Central Asia strategy. In recent years, China and Russia have strengthened bilateral cooperation and upgraded their relationship in 2019 to a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era. On May 8, 2015, the two countries signed the Joint Statement on Cooperation on the Construction of Joint Silk Road Economic Belt and Eurasian Economic Union Projects, kicking off the process of synergizing the two initiatives. In 2018 they and other countries jointly announced the building of a community with a shared future within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the view of US policymakers, the deepening of China-russia cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels has put the United States in an unfavorable position in the Central Asian power structure. Therefore, a new Central Asia strategy and increased investments in Central Asia will effectively enhance US influence in the region. In recent years, US think tanks have been calling on the government to introduce a new Central Asia strategy to reverse the declining US influence.9 The release of this new Central Asia strategy reflects the Trump administration’s recognition of the concerns voiced by the strategic circle.

Opportunities presented by the changing situation in Central Asia

In recent years, Central Asian states have effectively managed to maintain national stability and consequently create an overall stable situation in the region, based on their experience in nation-building since independence and guaranteed by the support of major external countries. Meanwhile, however, the region is facing a number of challenges such as downward pressure on economic development, the return of extremist groups from deployments in the Middle East back to their home countries, and a power struggle between the new and old leadership in Kyrgyzstan, all of which are offering the US means to engage with the Central Asian region. In the past three decades, the United States have cooperated with the Central Asian countries in a great variety of areas, including regional security, democracy advancement, energy export, border defense, counter-terrorism, drug control, international trade and investment, social development, and educational and cultural exchanges. Under the new circumstances, the Central Asian states feel a pressing need to strengthen their cooperation with the United States to quickly upgrade national and regional economic development and safeguard overall stability. This is providing the United States with ample opportunities to advance all-round cooperation with these countries and further enhance its presence. In addition, US policymakers have interpreted the messages coming from the two recent Central Asian summits held in March 2018 and in November 2019 as signals that the Central Asian countries are seeking to diminish the influence of Russia and China. They believe that strengthening US ties with Central Asian states will help these countries in keeping a greater distance from Russia and China, therefore reducing Russian and Chinese impact on the region. Thus, they have concluded that greater US support for the Central Asian countries in terms of regional cooperation is an effective way to increase US influence and reduce Russian influence within the region.10

The political dynamics in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two Central Asian powers, are regarded by the United States as particularly favorable opportunities to have a greater impact on the region. In January 2018, then Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, and in May of the same year Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev both visited the United States, signing strategic cooperation documents with the US to endorse an upgrade of their mutual relationships. US Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit to both countries immediately before the announcement of the new Central Asia strategy further illustrates not only their importance to the United States, but the intention to even turn them into a regional fulcrum for US strategic goals. As far as Us-kazakh relations are concerned, the United States has always been in support of Kazakhstan’s diversified and balanced foreign policy, as exemplified by their historically positive cooperation in the fields of nuclear ban, energy development, and counter-terrorism.11 During his visit to Kazakhstan, Pompeo made appreciative remarks about the political and economic transformation of the country, describing the US and Kazakhstan as reliable partners in economic and trade cooperation and for maintaining world peace. This “enhanced strategic partnership” between the US and Kazakhstan has continued even after Kassym-jomart Tokayev succeeded Nazarbayev as Kazakh President. With regards to Us-uzbek relations, a series of reforms initiated by President Mirziyoyev have provided opportunities for the improvement of bilateral relations. Since Mirziyoyev came to power, he has put in place domestic and foreign policies to launch more open and liberal reform projects. In terms of external relations, Uzbekistan explicitly hopes to maintain friendly relations and strengthen overall cooperation with China, Russia, the United States, and other major powers. In addition, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy focusing on its regional neighborhood has also

greatly improved its relations with neighboring countries, making it even possible to co-sponsor two Central Asian summits with Kazakhstan.12 The United States is convinced that active participation in Uzbekistan’s political adjustment process will not only help in shaping its internal and external policy orientation, but will have a synergistic effect on other regional countries, thereby expanding US influence in the entire region.

Promoting stability in Afghanistan

Although the Operation Enduring Freedom, the military intervention directed against Al-qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, had already been launched in 2001, the United States has not been able to completely wipe out Al-qaeda and stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. As Alqaeda and the Taliban continue to put up stiff resistance, the situation in Afghanistan remains turbulent, and the United States has suffered from a heavy financial burden and personnel losses.13 A hasty withdrawal of US troops without leaving behind an effectively stabilized Afghanistan would not only turn the country back into a refuge for terrorists, but more importantly, severely undermine the United States’ international prestige and reputation. In light of this critical outlook, the United States cannot simply walk away from Afghanistan. The Trump administration has been committed to withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places, but the deteriorating regional situation has forced the US to continue to allocate even more resources. Under mounting pressure, the Trump administration had to start negotiations with the Taliban. On November 28, 2019, Trump made a surprise Thanksgiving Day visit to Afghanistan to boost the morale of US forces. During his visit, he announced a cut in US troops size stationed in Afghanistan from 12,000-13,000 down to 8,600. He also made public the resumption of negotiations with the Taliban, with

the obvious hope that the United States could forge a ceasefire deal with the Taliban as a precondition to pull US troops out of Afghanistan.14

However, it will remain a difficult task for the United States to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan even under the circumstances of a successful reconciliation agreement with the Taliban. In his February 2020 State of the Union address, President Trump vowed again to “bring our troops back home,” without laying out a specific timeline. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has described the current situation in Afghanistan as a “strategic stalemate.”15 By mid-february, the United States and the Taliban had reached at least a partial reconciliation, to which the Afghan President gave his consent. According to the agreement, the United States would grant the Taliban a seven-day “trial period”, requiring demonstrable evidence of the latter’s will and capacity to significantly reduce acts of violence. If the Taliban were able to fulfil this condition, then the US would start cutting its number of troops in Afghanistan at the end of February and open talks on a complete ceasefire.16 However, considering the twists and turns throughout the Us-taliban talks, and the intention of the Afghan government to join the negotiations and reach a comprehensive ceasefire agreement, it is difficult for the US government to bring all involved parties to agree on a complete ceasefire deal in a short time and to have it implemented smoothly. Even if the United States managed to begin the process of troop withdrawal at a relatively early date, it would be a major challenge to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. The United States must plan on how to maintain stability in Afghanistan after the pull-out. Therefore, the launching of the new Central Asia strategy is meant to prompt the support of the Central Asian countries, by working

together to offset any spillover of turbulences from Afghanistan.17

Characteristics of the New Central Asia Strategy

The new Central Asia strategy contains both elements of continuity and changes when compared with previous US Central Asia policies. Its continuity is mainly reflected in four aspects. First, the three US strategic goals in Central Asia remain unchanged, which are: to contain Russia, China and Iran; to incorporate the Central Asian countries into the Western liberal order; and to shape their development direction and geopolitical orientation.18 Second, the agenda and policy objectives remain largely unmodified, which are issues of democracy, economy (mainly the energy sector), and security. Third, the philosophy behind the US Central Asia policy remains the same, namely a hybrid of “zero-sum game,” “clash of civilizations,” and the “democratic peace” theory. Fourth, the role and significance of the “C5+1” mechanism initiated during the Obama era has been recognized and strengthened by the Trump administration.19 Despite these aspects of continuity, changes in the new Central Asia strategy are even more noteworthy.

Rising importance of Central Asia in the US global strategy and emphasis of regional independence

Since the Trump administration came to power, geopolitical competition between major powers has intensified, and with it the geopolitical vision of the US for Central Asia has undergone important

changes. Ever since its military operations began in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States has spared no effort to promote the integration of Central Asia and South Asia, irrespective of all the historical ties Russia had developed with Central Asia. The Obama administration employed the same philosophy of the Bush administration when it put Central Asia, Afghanistan and South Asia in one package and proposed the New Silk Road Initiative in 2011,20 which promoted the integration of South Asia and Central Asia with Afghanistan at the center.21 Therefore, the United States’ aspiration for Central Asia has been continuously changing parallel to the development of its global strategy and its prioritized policy objectives in the region. As America is now strengthening its containment efforts towards China and Russia, it has once again adjusted its Central Asia policy and begun to emphasize the independence of the region. In the new Central Asia strategy, there is no mention of the integration of Central Asia and South Asia, nor does it comment on the previous government’s New Silk Road Initiative. Instead it declares that “Central Asia is a geostrategic region important to United States national security interests, regardless of the level of United States involvement in Afghanistan.”22

There are at least three considerations for why to abandon any strategic integration of Central Asia and South Asia. First, the United States’ relationship with Russia, China, and Iran, the three major neighboring countries of Central Asia, is rapidly declining. Therefore, it is necessary to raise the importance of Central Asia as a frontier to contain the three countries in the interest of achieving the strategic goals of containment. Second, given the severe crisis in the Us-pakistan relationship and the inclusion of India in the Quad mechanism, furthering the integration of South Asia and Central Asia may cause confusion and overlap at the strategic level. Third, there has been no quantifiable progress

in the Us-proposed projects to integrate the two regions, which may be seen as proof that the Central Asian countries are not enthusiastic about promoting integration with South Asia, so that further advancement of integration may erode their enthusiasm and confidence in the cooperation with the United States. The new Central Asia strategy takes the Central Asian region as an entity in its own right, which will convince people of the rising importance of Central Asia in the United States’ global strategy, and may stimulate the regional countries’ motivation and readiness to cooperate with the US. Moreover, it gives clearer guidance for US global strategic activities, to better engage itself in competition with Russia, China, and Iran in the region. Against this background, it remains to be seen whether the US State Department agencies will be restructured accordingly.

Regarding Afghanistan as part of Central Asia and shifting geopolitical focus in the region northward

While the United States is committed to bring its troops back home from Afghanistan, it must also consider the stability of the Afghan situation after the pull-out. As the new strategy regards Central Asia as a geopolitical bloc in its own right, Afghanistan needs to be carefully positioned. During the Bush and Obama administrations, Afghanistan was used as a bridge and hub for the United States to promote the integration of Central Asia and South Asia. The Trump administration now considers Afghanistan as part of Central Asia, and is promoting connectivity and mutually beneficial cooperation between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries. Such planning is not explicitly expressed in the text of the new Central Asia strategy, but can be found in the interpretations of the strategy by the leaders of the US State Department, the National Security Council, and the Agency for International Development.23 In alignment

with this idea, the new Central Asia strategy not only emphasizes the necessity and prospects of strengthening cooperation between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries, but also lays out plans for specific projects to promote the integration process. Apart from CASA-1000, a Central Asia-south Asia electricity transmission cooperation project launched during the Bush administration, the United States has strongly supported the “Lapis Lazuli Corridor” initiative,24 and has also applauded Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan for the construction of rail and electricity lines to connect Afghanistan. The United States are working to bring Afghanistan into the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement signed by the United States and the Central Asian countries, first as an observer and eventually as a full member. It also plans to establish the Joint Border Security Academy in Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe; to construct a mechanism covering Afghanistan and its three neighboring Central Asian countries for promoting economic, political and humanitarian cooperation; and to improve infrastructure in the region through the help of the US Agency for International Development and various multilateral international agencies with strong US influence. In general, the US sees “Central Asia as providing critical ballast to a peace, that Afghanistan effectively needs to be stitched back into the neighborhood through economic ties, education ties, the trade, the historic, the interconnectivity that that region enjoyed needs to be resuscitated.”25

According to the new Central Asia strategy, Afghanistan is now an integral part of Central Asia rather than the geopolitical center of Central and South Asia. First and foremost, the focal point of US geopolitics in Central Asia and neighboring areas has moved northwards, turning Afghanistan into a component and “appendage” rather than the previous “hub” of Central Asia. Given that Uzbekistan may be conceived as the

fulcrum to engage with Central Asia, as the country has a large population and strong military force, the United States is likely to shift its geopolitical focus in Central Asia from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan. Second, the United States spares no effort to promote connectivity between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries and appeals to those Afghan decision-makers who are likewise seeking the identity of a Central Asian country. Finally, and most importantly, the United States may end its military presence in Afghanistan as soon as possible once the country is conceived as the southern component of Central Asia instead of the pivot of Central and South Asia. Since both the Bush and the Obama governments used to regard Afghanistan as the center and hub in the integration of Central Asia and South Asia, countries in the region had high expectations that the United States would make large-scale investments in regional integration programs. However, to their disappointment, these programs have remained largely a lip service. Under the Trump administration’s slogan of “America First,” the top priority for the United States in the region has been to withdraw its troops. It is difficult to anticipate whether the US will pay great attention to the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal. With increasing connectivity between Afghanistan and Central Asia, Central Asian countries will presumably take over some of the obligations to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. It is, however, not a major concern of the United States as to whether the Central Asian countries are capable of doing so.

Targeting China and Russia with increasing geopolitical competition

Compared with previous US Central Asia policies or initiatives, the new Central Asia strategy is a zero-sum game, attempting to exclude the influence of other major countries in Central Asia, especially China and Russia. In previous policy documents the United States often implicitly warned Central Asian countries about the influence of China, Russia, and Iran, while sporadically also emphasizing the necessity of cooperating with