America’s Return to Central and Eastern Europe and its Implications

The Trump administration sees Central and Eastern Europe as a new regional strategic foothold in great-power competition and an extension of US grand strategic adjustment. With complex strategic considerations, the US return to the region will weaken the EU’S strategic autonomy and undermine the transatlantic ties, and also add uncertainty to CHINA-CEEC cooperation.

In recent years, the geostrategic importance of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has become increasingly prominent. On one hand, in the construction of the “17+1” cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s cooperation with countries in this region has been constantly improving in both breadth and depth. On the other hand, the US sees CEE as a new regional strategic fulcrum and intends to make it a strategic lever to contain China and Russia. In this context, the Trump administration’s policy adjustments toward the CEE countries (CEECS) will have a complex impact on CHINA-CEEC cooperation.

America’s Return to Central and Eastern Europe

Over the past decade, the US has to certain extent ignored Central and Eastern Europe under the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” policy. On July 16, 2009, 22 prominent figures from the CEE countries jointly signed a petition to the Obama administration, urging the United States not to forget the region.1 With its role in Washington’s global strategic layout constantly declining, Central and Eastern Europe has become a victim of the United States’ new global strategy,2 leading to a state of relative

estrangement between the two sides. Since US President Donald Trump took office, however, the US has returned to the CEE region as its strategic focus shifted eastward. The area is deemed a strategic foothold for the US to deal with great-power competition. The US foreign policy towards Europe has also been adjusted accordingly, with the intention of making CEE a new regional strategic fulcrum, and taking advantage of the asymmetry in their interdependence to compete with actors that challenge US interests. In terms of degree, the US return to CEE3 is not limited to the military and strategic fields, but also involves investment in diplomacy, energy, and security in the region.

Frequent high-level visits

Since Donald Trump came to power, the US has rediscovered the strategic importance of CEE, and the frequency and intensity of highlevel visits have therefore increased. In July 2017, Trump chose Poland as the first European stop of his first overseas tour, and attended the summit of the Three Seas Initiative in Warsaw. In October 2018, A. Wess Mitchell, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, put forward the idea of returning to CEE, and stressed that rivals of the US are expanding their political, military, and commercial influence while Western countries, including the US, had not paid enough attention to great-power competition in the region.4 Since 2019, high-level exchanges between the US and CEECS have become more frequent. In February 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. It was the first high-level visit of the US to Slovakia in 20 years and the first visit by a US Secretary of State to Hungary since 2011. From March to June 2019, leaders of the

Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland were invited to visit the US.5 In July 2019, Foreign Ministers of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic successively visited the US. Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz said it would be impossible to secure his country without the help from the US and strong ties with it. Péter Szijjártó, Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, noted that US ties with CEECS are strengthening after years of estrangement. Miroslav Lajčak, Slovakia’s Foreign Minister, said that it was necessary to strengthen the US-CEE and transatlantic relations. He also emphasized the significance of the transatlantic alliance in competition between Western and other civilizations.6 In October 2019, Pompeo visited Greece and called for careful consideration of Chinese investments in sensitive fields of science and technology. Given the United States’ low visibility before, the frequent high-level visits to CEE in recent years seem to indicate its desire to increase engagement in the region.

Strengthening cooperation in various fields

The US is returning to CEE in order to enhance security cooperation, strengthen political dialogue, promote investment and trade, and expand people-to-people exchanges. Maintaining a strategic presence in the CEE countries is the basic goal of the Trump administration’s return to the region. In July 2017, the US actively supported and joined the Three Seas Initiative, which is designed to connect the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. Projects under the initiative include: building Via Carpathia, the highway connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic sea; creating a digital platform for trade, transportation and logistics services; constructing a Bulgaria-romaniahungary-austria gas transmission corridor; and setting up investment funds

with an agreed list of priority projects, etc.7 The Initiative has become one of the strategic tools for the US to reshape its relationship with CEECS by which the two sides can strengthen cooperation in trade, energy, digital, and transportation infrastructure.

While the US military commitment to NATO remains intact, the Trump administration has built on it to strengthen the United States’ security guarantees for CEECS. In 2016, the US launched and built the Aegis missile defense system in Romania and Poland respectively, and also advanced the largest deployment of US military forces in more than 20 years by strengthening its military presence in Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the three Baltic states.8 Poland even invited the United States to establish a permanent military base (Fort Trump), purchased American combat equipment, and signed a strategic partnership with the US, with security and defense cooperation, energy, and trade and investment at the core. The United States also pressured CEECS to crack down on China’s company Huawei in the European market. Poland and Romania have signed a joint statement with the United States to consider excluding Huawei from 5G construction.9

If one looks at the volume of trade and investment, the US is not the main target country for CEECS’ trade and investment, as its investment in the region is mainly concentrated in the four Visegrád Group countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia).10 Since Trump took office, the United States has stepped up its trade and investment in the CEE region. In recent years, the import and export

volumes of goods between the US and Visegrád countries have shown an increasing trend. For example, the trade volume between the US and Poland has increased from $9.59 billion in 2016 to $14.34 billion in 2019.11 In the field of investment, in October 2018, the US passed the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act (BUILD Act), which merged the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Development Credit Authority (DCA) of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) into a new body, the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The new institution has increased the portfolio capability of the US from $29 billion to $60 billion, enabling America to compete in CEE and other regions with its main competitors.12 The bill is seen as a direct response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The Trump administration has made energy security and energy export important pillars of US economic security. The return of the US to CEE could help diversify its energy supplies, transform the region into a gas hub for Europe, and increase US participation in the region’s energy sector. At present, the energy policies of most CEECS are in line with that of the US. Poland and Lithuania have made LNG part of their national security strategies.13 In 2018, Poland signed a 24-year LNG import contract with the United States, and PGNIG, a leading Polish oil and gas company, will import as much as 9.4 billion cubic meters of LNG from the US from 2022.14 The United States has publicly opposed Nord Stream II and criticized large energy companies in Germany and other Western European countries because it believes that the German-russian cooperation on Nord Stream

II would deepen Europe’s dependence on Russian energy.15 In December 2019, the US government signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, which includes sanctions against businesses and individuals involved in Nord Stream II.16

Changing the way of value promotion

The way in which the US exports its values to CEECS is facing challenges, both in its channels of communication and in the changes in the subject of that communication. The United States has been actively engaging in public diplomacy and promoting “universal values” as well as Western ideas and values in CEE countries, and is committed to building a “democratic foundation” for its partnership with CEECS. Believing that democracy is the key to maintaining the West’s competitive advantage, the US deems it necessary to establish an informal or Track 1.5 diplomatic platform to address issues of democratic politics and values, such as the youth exchange program, in order to consolidate the transatlantic alliance and ensure that the CEECS are in line with US values.17

In addition to promoting its positive image in the CEE region, the US has also led the CEECS to be skeptical about China through NGOS and other means, undermining the social and public support for CHINA-CEEC cooperation. Since July 2017, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has initiated the project of Chinfluence in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Research from the project claims that China has established a network of contacts with politicians, businesses, media, think tanks, universities and other institutions in the CEECS through

bilateral negotiations, the “17+1” cooperation, and the Belt and Road Initiative.18 The US has played up the rhetoric of China’s “sharp power” and “influence penetration” in an attempt to awaken the CEECS’ historical memory of past political systems and to inculcate a negative view towards China’s investment and influence in the region.

Motivation behind the US Return to Central and Eastern Europe

The geopolitical importance of Central and Eastern Europe has attracted the attention of major powers in the world and therefore the region has become a key link in the US geopolitical strategy. There are complex strategic considerations behind the US return to CEE. It is an extension of America’s grand strategic adjustment, not only to cope with the change of order within Europe, but also to consolidate its sphere of influence, and to hedge against the influence of China and Russia.

Strengthening traditional sphere of influence

The United States’ return to the CEE region presupposes a return to great-power competition, a more unilateral and zero-sum strategic vision. According to Wess Mitchell, America’s rivals are expanding their political, military, and commercial influence in Central and Eastern Europe, but for too long the United States did not take competition seriously because it was satisfied with the post-war order and came to believe that history had ended.19 The 2017 US National Security Strategy defines allies and partners in terms of their role in advancing America’s geostrategic vision. American foreign policy no longer simply takes ideology as the sole criterion for partnership but also pays attention to realism in foreign policy. The “America First” National Security Strategy is an assessment

of US interests based on strategic principles to address challenges. It is a strategy of principled realism, guided by results rather than ideology. The purpose of the US return to CEE is not to preserve the international order, but to maintain US dominance by containing other “alternative centers of power.” Despite its differences with some CEE countries, the United States has continued to engage with them rather than isolate them. According to the 2017 National Security Strategy, a strong commitment and close cooperation with allies and partners is of vital importance as it sustains a favorable balance of power in the region, and helps magnify US power and extend US influence.20 This means that the US definition of the role of an ally and partner is increasingly conditional with a more transactional nature. If one expects to receive help or guarantees from the US, it must contribute a share to US interests.

Opportunities arising from the shift of order in Europe

In the context of the rise of Eurosceptic parties, the return of nationstates, the differentiated integration process, and the diversification of the European Parliament, it has been very difficult to maintain the unity and consensus politics necessary for European integration. And a new regional pattern of supplying public goods is likely to emerge in Europe. At present, there are multiple power centers in Europe, and no single European country has a dominant position in the region. The United States’ strategic adjustment, Russia’s military threat, Germany’s economic hegemony, China’s foreign relations, and many other factors are embedded in the European power balance. When the supply and demand of regional public goods in Europe is unbalanced, especially when the supply drops and the demand rises and becomes increasingly differentiated, competition in regional public goods are prone to take place and a new pattern of regional public goods is

likely to appear.

In general, the CEE countries rely on the US and NATO for security and on the EU for economics. While the EU remains an important economy in the world, the European integration cannot adapt to the changes in the post-financial crisis era and the increasing and differentiated demand for public goods, nor can it achieve greater unity and political integration or consolidate EU interests, social and economic well-being. Political differences, economic disparities and social inequalities among EU member states will lead to a negative spillover effect making the CEE countries particularly vulnerable to the influence of external actors. The Kindleberger Trap is most likely to occur in Europe when the United States fails to provide adequate public goods for European countries and the European integration fails to meet the needs of member states. In the CEE region, there are already signs that the zero-sum game may override winwin cooperation. By returning to Central and Eastern Europe, the US hopes to reshape Europe’s geopolitics by turning CEE into a region with multiple power centers.

Counteracting the influence of China and Russia

Across the Eurasian continent, where geopolitical competition and cooperation are complex, the United States wants to ensure a balance of power in East Asia and Europe by balancing or confronting competitors.21 It has accused both Russia and China of being revisionist powers seeking to “shape a world antithetical to US values and interests.” The United States sees serious challenges in Europe as the China-russia relationship has been deepened, and foreign policies of the two countries have converged in a new and synergistic way in Europe. For example, Russia continues to build up its military presence in the CEE region and poses a “hybrid threat” to Europe.22

China has increased its influence in the region through the CHINA-CEEC cooperation framework and the Belt and Road Initiative. While China does not pose a direct military threat to NATO, it is a potential threat to the alliance, using critical infrastructure such as ports and railways to disrupt NATO’S maneuvering capability and using its economic leverage to divide the CEE countries.23 In late October 2019, US Vice President Mike Pence wrote an article accusing China of investing in the Greek port of Piraeus for military purposes.24 In response to the impact of Chinese and Russian influence, the United States may adopt a more assertive approach, expand its support to the CEE countries, and attract new partners, building on its inherited and developed influence, so as to compete against its adversaries and gain a strategic comparative advantage.

The Impact of US Return to Central and Eastern Europe

The return of the United States to Central and Eastern Europe not only has an impact on the geopolitical competition in the region, but also reflects the changing trend of great-power game and the international order. The US focus on the CEE countries will weaken the EU’S strategic autonomy and undermine the transatlantic ties, and add uncertainty to CHINA-CEEC cooperation.

Increasing CEE’S global influence

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CEE countries have embarked on a comprehensive economic, political, and social transformation with returning to Europe or returning to the West as the primary goal, and gradually met the criteria for EU membership. After

becoming a member of the EU, the CEE countries benefited greatly from their integration into European and global markets, contributing to their higher GDP, lower unemployment, and rising living standards. At the same time, however, the CEE countries have been caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, they do not want to cede too much authority to the EU; on the other hand, they want to use external forces to balance the EU’S penetration. Thus, while CEE is a diverse region, most regional countries are happy with the US strategic realignment; after all, the region was not the focus of US diplomatic strategy for some time before. The CEE countries have more diverse roles and strategic options in the process of geopolitical changes and power shift than is usually assumed. They need to strike a balance in the changing international order and safeguard their own interests to the maximum extent. But whether America’s return to the region is truly based on its long-term interests or merely serves its shortterm goal, and to what extent it will continue to pursue the policy in the future, are all open questions.

Weakening the EU’S strategic autonomy

Although the US and Europe have always had different interests and priorities, and transatlantic relations have often been affected by economic competition and political difficulties, successive US administrations since the Second World War, from Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower to Barack Obama, have strongly supported European integration.25 A strong, prosperous, and united Europe is arguably America’s most important ally and an effective partner in advancing the post-war order. But the “America First” foreign policy has had a huge impact on great-power relations, and the relations between the US and Europe are no exception. Based on the current situation, European integration will enter a period of profound adjustment, and it is difficult for the EU as a whole to significantly enhance its influence

in the short term. The adjustment of European integration, which takes place against the background of an intensifying geopolitical game and the impact of American unilateralism, will undoubtedly aggravate the strategic anxiety of Europe. On the one hand, the EU is hardly immune from geopolitical competition between the major powers. On the other hand, the revival of great-power competition is not conducive to the EU’S vision of a multilateral world order. The EU’S difficulties and internal divisions offer an opportunity for the US to divide and rule.

The US return to Central and Eastern Europe is an attempt to take advantage of Europe’s internal divisions to challenge the EU’S strategic autonomy. In the wake of Brexit and with the emergence of Germanfrench “axis” or “twin engine” in European integration, the CEE countries have been leveraged by the US to counterbalance the leadership of France and Germany. On geopolitical and security issues, the EU’S mandate is more vulnerable to outside interference, especially from the US, which has enormous influence over EU members. As the US returns to the CEE region, the divide between the “new Europe” and the “old Europe” is widening, and this fragmentation will weaken Europe’s momentum, since EU members are largely concerned about their ability to exercise foreign policy, and most geopolitical issues still remain the province of individual states. Although European integration can enhance the ability of EU member states to compete effectively in fierce geopolitical competition and to resist threats and hostilities, the EU’S decentralized management mode on foreign policy will not help members to share and distribute power, and thus is unable to effectively support Europe’s interests and values. Therefore, the US is the most uncertain factor challenging the EU’S strategic autonomy.

Obstructing CHINA-CEEC cooperation

The return of the US to the CEE region will both change the pattern of interaction between regional countries and major powers outside the region, and create a new geostrategic environment for Europe. The zero-sum

game thinking of the United States tends to link the reshaping of CEE with the all-round strategic competition between China and the US, and frame it in the context of the two countries’ strategic rivalry over the global order and international rules. As the US hopes to hedge against the influence of China’s rise in a broader geopolitical context, the linkage of issues in different regions will affect the further promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative and increase various risks. In the view of the United States, if China’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe continues to grow, it will pose a direct threat to the competitiveness, the governance model, the ideological norms, and the strategic interests of the US. Therefore, cooperation between China and CEECS is closely watched by the United States in its strategic competition with China.

In recent years, cooperation between China and the CEE countries in various fields has yielded fruitful results. With the development of the Belt and Road Initiative and the improvement of the framework of CHINACEEC cooperation, China’s influence has become a target when the US returns to the region. China’s investment meets the CEE countries’ real need for infrastructure, but it conflicts with the strategic vision of the US in the region. The US assumes that China’s growing economic clout in Europe will translate into political influence. Thus, the US hopes to reduce the incentive for the CEE countries to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative by returning to the region. The US return has become a new interfering factor in the deepening “17+1” cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative in Europe.

The US is strengthening dialogue and cooperation with the CEE countries, especially in the field of business, energy, security, and values, to counter the advantage of China’s investment projects and growing influence in the region. In this way, the US is attempting to pressure the CEE countries to reorient their participation in the “17+1” cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative. First, the US is using the gap between the CEE countries’ expectations on the Belt and Road and actual outcomes of the cooperation to curb their enthusiasm to participate in

the Chinese-led initiative. Second, the US is putting pressure on China and placing obstacles in the way of CHINA-CEEC cooperation by setting high quality standards for infrastructure construction.26 Third, the US is playing up the disadvantages and risks of the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in terms of labor and environmental standards. Fourth, the US is pressing the CEE countries in the high-tech cooperation field to prevent them from using Chinese equipment in the construction of 5G networks. If the above measures are effective, the Belt and Road cooperation will face more obstacles and uncertainties in its promotion in the CEE region.

Conclusion

The strategic vision of the United States’ return to Central and Eastern Europe is still evolving, and the US is likely to continue to strengthen its geopolitical role in the region, exploiting divisions within Europe to undermine the effectiveness and coherence of EU policy. In the context of overall competition with China, the US return to CEE is aimed at squeezing the space available for China’s cooperation and development in the region, and adding uncertainty to CHINA-CEEC cooperation. China needs to maintain its strategic resilience, continue to deepen cooperation with the CEE countries, and provide more public goods that the region really needs with greater precision. Thus, the CEE countries will have a greater sense of gain from cooperation with China. At the same time, China should attach importance to cooperation with major European countries, accommodate the EU’S legitimate concerns, and engage in an open dialogue with the EU on CHINA-CEEC cooperation to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculations by the EU.