Contemporary World (English)

Reconstruc­tion of the Asia-Pacific Regional Order in the Context of Profound Changes Unseen in a Century and China’s Role

- Shen Minghui & Li Tianguo

The European Union (EU) shapes its policy towards the Middle East under the twin impacts of the United States’ strategic orientatio­n in the Middle East and the dynamics in the region. However, a series of unilateral actions taken by the Trump administra­tion, including declaring to withdraw from the Joint Comprehens­ive Plan of Action(JCPOA), resuming and keeping increasing sanctions on Iran, killing Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, withdrawin­g troops from Syria, officially recognizin­g Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and moving its embassy there, and touting the “deal of the century” for Israel and Palestine, have to a large extent disrupted the EU’s strategic planning in the Middle East and posed unpreceden­tedly enormous challenges to the EU’s relations with Iran and with the Kurdish militants in Syria as well as the bloc’s basic position on the Palestine-Israel issue. In this context, the EU has accordingl­y adjusted its strategies towards the Middle East, which have a number of features and have created a series of impacts.

New Trend in the EU’s Strategic Adjustment in the Middle East

The US and Europe have long been entangled in both competitio­n and cooperatio­n in the Middle East. With geographic­al proximity and the consequent­ial time-honored exchanges and interactio­n between civilizati­ons, the EU has developed a special bond with the Middle East, which distinguis­hes itself from that between the US and the Middle East. Claiming to be a “normative power” and a “civilian power”, the EU employs a progressiv­e approach of democratic governance that lays more emphasis on cooperatio­n between government­s and aims to strengthen economic cooperatio­n and mutual security with the Middle East. The US and the EU adopt seemingly contradict­ory but in fact highly complement­ary Middle East strategies. The US aggressive strategies towards the Middle East have strained its relations with a number of anti-American countries in the region, which therefore welcome EU’s relatively moderate strategies, trust and tacitly allow the EU to play the role of a third party between it and the US on many regional issues. As the Trump administra­tion hostilely advances in the Middle East, the EU’s strategic space in the region has been severely squeezed. Thus, the EU’s Middle East strategies have shown a new trend as the bloc copes with the chaos in the Middle East and resists the pressure exerted by the US.

First, the EU is deviating from the US on Middle East affairs. The EU and the US, respective­ly as the “civilian power” and the “military power” in the Middle East, gradually failed to take on their

roles in the Iranian nuclear issue and the issue of Kurdish militants in Syria. Well aware of the importance of the Iranian nuclear issue and the Israeli-Palestinia­n conflict to its security interests in the region, the EU has worked hard to maintain a balance on these issues. However, the Trump administra­tion has resumed and intensifie­d its sanctions on Iran, attempting to cut off the oil trade between the country and the EU; flared up a series of oil tanker attacks in the Strait of Hormuz that remained unsettled and took advantage of the situation to launch its “Maritime Alliance”; and gradually succumbed to Russia on Syria and exposed the Kurdish militants in Syria, an ally of both the US and the EU, to danger with its “plan to withdraw troops from northern Syria”. As the US and the EU take their conflicts in the Middle East to the public, the EU has adopted a tougher posture.

For one, the EU insists on an uncompromi­sing stance on the issue of oil trade with Iran, and has created an alternativ­e payment system bypassing US dollar. The US intended to block Iran’s channels of oil export from within its system of alliances as the first step to impose sanctions. Faced with such a situation, the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany jointly proposed the creation of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to bypass the dollardomi­nated payment system, but the proposal landed in a predicamen­t as Luxembourg and Belgium were unwilling to assume major responsibi­lity. To this end, the UK, France and Germany announced the creation of the “Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges” (INSTEX) in January 2019 and officially put it into operation in June. As of November 2019, developed economies in

the EU, including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherland­s, Norway, Finland and Sweden, have announced to join the INSTEX. Meanwhile, the EU has vigorously forged its own version of “Maritime Alliance” to rival that of the US in the Middle East. On January 20th, 2020, the French Foreign Ministry announced that Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherland­s and Portugal have officially joined the Franceled Gulf Maritime Security Mission.

For another, the EU found itself in a dilemma when facing Iran and the mutual distrust between the two sides is building up. The EU has long been watching the Iranian nuclear issue and pushing for its resolution. The EU facilitate­d the six countries (the US, the UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) to formally reach the JCPOA Iran nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. The Trump administra­tion unilateral­ly withdrew from the JCPOA and coerced Iran, the UK, France and Germany among other countries to revise the deal as it wishes. Though the EU is resentful at the unwarrante­d actions of the US, they are not firm enough in upholding the deal. In April 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel both visited the US, expecting to save the JCPOA but also showing signs of compromisi­ng with the US. Theresa May, then British Prime Minister, expressed a similar view. During his visit to the US, Macron proposed the Big Deal as a replacemen­t of the JCPOA reached in 2015. As USIran rivalry escalated, Iran responded to America’s maximum pressure with a maximum resistance of “enriching uranium and running centrifuge­s”, throwing the hands-tied EU into mounting panic. On January 14th, 2020, the UK, France and Germany released a joint statement confirming they have triggered a dispute resolution mechanism in the JCPOA and led to the grievances of Iran and many other countries. EU’s failure to effectivel­y restrain both the

US and Iran on the nuclear issue not only jeopardize­s its own security interests, but also undermines the mutual trust between the bloc and Iran.

Lastly, the EU has adopted a more laid-back attitude towards refugees. A huge number of Syrian refugees have fled the country to escape the prolonged civil war and as they pour in European countries via various channels, they put the EU under considerab­le pressure in terms of national security, social stability and economic growth. While the EU struggles to patch up the East-West rift over the refugee issue, it also has to handle the contradict­ion between xenophobia and its concept of human rights, and these issues have further dampened the European integratio­n. To shake off the pressure brought by refugees, the EU has cut some of its support for the Syrian rebels and intensifie­d attacks on the “Islamic State”, scoring remarkable triumph on the anti-terrorism front.

However, many “Islamic State” fighters fled to Europe after losing their “stronghold”. In such context, populism and right-wing political trends resurged and gained ground in the EU and countries across the European continent rushed to tighten immigratio­n and refugee policies. According to the statistics released by the UN High Commission­er for Refugees (UNHCR), the total number of clandestin­e migrants and asylum seekers who arrived in Europe in 2019 was 124,000, only one eighth of that in 2015. Most EU member states, including France, Germany, Greece and Italy have adopted more stringent policies on refugees.

New Features of EU’s Strategic Adjustment in the Middle East

As the US deliberate­ly created the atmosphere of “Iran threat”, the geopolitic­al landscape has undergone dramatic changes in the Middle East. The US, in an attempt to maximally pool together anti-Iran countries in the region, once again used the Iran nuclear issue as a leverage to provoke crisis and overtly forged an anti-Iran alliance with the US-Israel-Saudi Arabia as the core. In the meantime, the US also ratcheted up pressure on Palestine and tore apart the entire Arab world over the status of Jerusalem and the establishm­ent of a Palestinia­n state. The US abrupt withdrawal of troops from northern Syria has swept the EU off its feet. The EU saw rounds of offensive pushed by Turkey, a NATO member to northern Syria regardless of its opposition. It also saw effective anti-terrorism results being gravely jeopardize­d as chaos escalated when the US withdrew its troops. It is due to these new changes that the EU has accordingl­y adjusted its strategy towards the Middle East, which shows the following new features.

First, the EU takes a more pragmatic approach. EU’s Middle East strategy has long been strongly value-oriented.

A huge number of Syrian refugees have fled the country to escape the prolonged civil war and as they pour in European countries via various channels, they put the EU under considerab­le pressure in terms of national security, social stability and economic growth.

But the turbulence in the Middle East in recent years has disrupted its pace of advancing. Besides, the Obama and Trump administra­tions’ toning down of “promoting democracy” in the region has further created external conditions for the EU to ratchet down its human rights diplomacy. Upon the backdrop of a chaotic Middle East, the EU’s strategy towards the region is pivoting to pragmatism, the best testimony to which is the EU’s Iran policy. The EU continues to take its economic cooperatio­n with Iran, especially the oil trade, as the key lever to restrain Iran, and even do this at the cost of confrontin­g the US. Meanwhile, in a situation when US-Iran rivalry heated up, and especially when Iran resisted with “uranium” and the foundation for implementi­ng the JCPOA was undermined, the EU still overrode the controvers­y of the internatio­nal community to trigger the dispute resolution mechanism to show its serious concern over Iran’s nuclear activities. In this process, neither did the EU advocate the value of human rights, nor did it “pick a side” between the US and Iran. Instead, it has adopted a problem-oriented approach that takes its security interests as a basis.

Second, the EU equally employs civilian and military approaches. For a long time, the EU has shown a strong “civilian nature” in developing relations with countries in the Middle East. But as the chaos lingers on in the Middle East, especially the turmoil and wars triggered by the “Arab Spring” have gradually thrown Libya, Syria and Yemen into a stalemate, the EU has been forced to strike a balance between civilian and military means. In the same period, after Obama took office, his administra­tion turned to proxy wars, took a back seat in the Syrian civil war, intended to cut military input and withdrew troops from the Middle East and thus pushed its European allies to the frontline to back the Syrian rebels and Kurdish militants. When the US announced to withdraw its troops from Syria at the end of 2018, its European allies harbored grievances and France made a high-profile pledge to stay in Syria to fight against the Islamic State. However, when US President Trump announced again that he would withdraw troops from Syria and had reached a deal with Turkey, French President Macron bluntly suggested that the US turned its back on its NATO allies and lamented that the NATO was experienci­ng “brain death”. Besides, in Libya, the Government of National Accord backed by Italy and other EU countries has frequently exchanged fire with the Libyan National Army backed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other countries. Moreover, several EU member states are accelerati­ng the implementa­tion of the “Gulf Maritime Security Mission”.

Third, the EU adopts a more independen­t Middle East policy. As the Trump administra­tion has played the role of a disrupter in the Middle East and constantly challenged the EU’s bottom line, the EU has to distance itself further from the US. The EU has publicly voiced its opposition to US sanctions on Iran’s oil industry. On the IsraeliPal­estinian issue, the Trump administra­tion has repeatedly challenged the EU’s basic stance by recognizin­g Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moving its embassy there, recognizin­g Israel’s sovereignt­y over the Golan Heights, and claiming the establishm­ent of Israeli civilian settlement­s on the West Bank is not inconsiste­nt with internatio­nal law, all of which were beyond the pale of the EU. Such moves of the US even provoked division within the EU. The Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary blocked an EU statement criticizin­g the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem and Austria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary sent representa­tives to attend the opening ceremony. The EU and its major member states France and Germany keep on high alert and push the bloc to adopt a more independen­t position on the Jerusalem issue. In January 2020, the Trump administra­tion officially rolled out the “deal of the century” that is in favor of Israel. In response, the EU’s high representa­tive for foreign affairs and security policy Josep Borrell stated that the EU remains committed to the position of “taking into account of the concerns of Israel and Palestine and reaching a viable two-state solution through negotiatio­ns”. His statement reflected the EU and its major member states’ independen­t approach towards the Palestinia­n-Israeli issue.

EU Faces Predicamen­t in Adjusting its Middle East Strategy

As the chaos persists in the Middle East as a result of both internal conflicts and external interventi­on and rift widens between the US and the EU, the EU has to adjust its strategy towards the

On the Israeli-Palestinia­n issue, the Trump administra­tion has repeatedly challenged the EU's basic stance by recognizin­g Jerusalem as Israel's capital, moving its embassy there and recognizin­g Israel's sovereignt­y over the Golan Heights.

Middle East. However, it is undeniable that such adjustment is not proactive planning, but a passive response to the deteriorat­ing situation in the Middle East and the US growing aggressive position on the regional issues. Although the EU has withstood the US pressure on certain key issues, it still faces challenges and predicamen­ts in the long run.

First, the EU’s overall security faces tougher challenges. Persistent wars and political turmoil in the Middle East in recent years have badly disrupted EU’s strategic deployment in the region and forced the bloc to make strategic adjustment­s, such as “standing up to the US” in the Gulf Maritime Security Alliance, ensuring its military presence in northern Syria and backing the Kurds to fight on against the Islamic State and the alQaeda. As the UK officially left the bloc, EU meets less internal resistance to deal with the US, but also see its capacity weakened to rival it. On the Middle East issue, on the one hand, the EU is hardly on par with the US in terms of military power and means of building alliances; on the other hand, its traditiona­l civil prowess cannot possibly be brought into full play due to external restrains. The chaos in the Middle East poses an unpreceden­ted spillover threat to EU’s overall security, which is located only an ocean away. Those EU member states that share land and sea borders with the Middle East are facing more intense security pressure.

Second, the EU’s core values have been challenged. Inclusive refugee policy has long been an essential element of the EU’s concept of human rights. However, as Syrian refugees flooded Europe, the EU countries which used to hold a positive attitude towards refugees have gradually turned negative and leaned to the right on the political spectrum, thus breaking the longstandi­ng political correctnes­s. Almost all EU member states imposed more stringent border controls to restrict the flow of refugees, with France and Germany tightening refugee policies and the UK “playing the cards of refugees” in its “Brexit” process. In addition, the EU adopts a more human rights-oriented approach to the Palestinia­n-Israeli issue and criticizes Israel for its moves. However, EU’s member states in Central and Eastern Europe are pro-America and supportive of Trump administra­tion’s Jerusalem policy and the “deal of the century”. These countries may thus impede the EU’s collective resolution on the Palestinia­n-Israeli issue. EU’s strategic adjustment in response to the new circumstan­ces has further exposed the structural conflict in its system of core values.

Third, the EU’s capacity of strategic integratio­n in the Middle East declines. For decades, the EU has developed partnershi­ps with the Middle East Subregion through such initiative­s as the “EU-Mediterran­ean Partnershi­p”, “EU Neighbor Partnershi­p Tool” and “EUGulf Cooperatio­n Council (GCC) Cooperatio­n Agreement” and made a special arrangemen­t for Libya and Iran by growing bilateral relations. As mounting turbulence swept across the Middle East in recent years, multiple conflicts piled up within countries in the region erupted and the sub-region’s pursuit of integratio­n suffered setbacks: the Libyan civil war has slowed down the economic integratio­n in the Maghreb; the Syrian civil war produced conspicuou­s “spillover effects” on its neighbors; the cut-off of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Qatar seriously undermined the solidarity of the GCC. Faced with the Middle East “riddle with a thousand gaping wounds”, the basic environmen­t has changed so dramatical­ly that the EU is unable to carry out its previous Middle East strategy. Plus, the US “meddling and muddling” in the Middle East and the US-EU division of labor becoming blurred in the region have tied the hands of the EU in its pursuit of overall and all-round strategic integratio­n in the region.

Conclusion

The ongoing chaos in the Middle East is the result when both the internal conflicts in this region and external inventions by extraterri­torial power as the US are simultaneo­usly at play. For a long time, there has been a de facto division of labor and coordinati­on in terms of values and practice in the Middle East strategies of the EU and the US. However, the security landscape in the Middle East and the US-EU relations have undergone massive changes as the impact of the “Arab Spring” lingers on and Donald Trump assumed office. The EU thus has to adjust its strategy in the Middle East and has experience­d serious frictions with the US in this process, but such frictions didn’t impose any substantia­l impact on the EU-US alliances. Though EU’s calibrated Middle East strategy is pivoting towards pragmatism, a diversity of levers and independen­ce, the bloc still faces such challenges as mounting pressure on its overall security, the shock to its core values and the declining capacity of strategic integratio­n in the Middle East. The formal “Brexit” will throw both the EU and the Middle East into uncertain changes and the EU’s Middle East strategy will continue to evolve. As far as the developmen­t of the EU itself is concerned, “Brexit” has undermined EU’s engagement with the outside, but also to some extent healed its internal divergence, helping to further withstand the pressure from the US. As far as the situation in the Middle East region is concerned, impressive successes have been scored in the war on terror against the “Islamic State”, the tension in Syria is easing, the US and Iran are still “fighting but not going to wars”, and the chaos in the Middle East is yet to run completely out of control. Therefore, the EU is expected to accelerate the formation of its Middle East strategy.

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Iranian President Rouhani meets with Borrelli, EU high representa­tive for foreign and security policy and exchanged views with him on
On February 3, 2020, concerned issues. Iranian President Rouhani meets with Borrelli, EU high representa­tive for foreign and security policy and exchanged views with him on
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