Global Times

Why America First could make America last

- By Steven M. Suranovic The author is professor of economics and internatio­nal affairs at the Elliott School of Internatio­nal Affairs. opinion@globaltime­s. com.cn

One of US President Donald Trump’s most popular slogans has been “America First.” With that objective in mind and after one year of the new Trump administra­tion, the US has pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnershi­p trade pact and the Paris Agreement, has begun renegotiat­ion of, and threatened to withdraw from, the North American Free Trade Agreement, has questioned the usefulness of both the United Nations and NATO, suggesting in both cases that other countries contribute more, and has prevented appointmen­ts to the appellate board of the World Trade Organizati­on (WTO) which could seriously undermine the effectiven­ess of the WTO dispute process.

Although these actions appear to demonstrat­e America’s assertiven­ess in internatio­nal relations, they also seem to demonstrat­e a lack of awareness of a well-known strategic dilemma that every social science student will study at one point or another. That dilemma, known as the “prisoner’s dilemma,” has been used to analyze a wide variety of strategic interactio­ns including countries choosing how protective a trade policy to have, producers with few competitor­s deciding about pricing strategies, government­s determinin­g how many nuclear weapons to hold, and, in one of its earliest applicatio­ns, prisoners deciding whether to confess to a crime.

The central assumption in such a game is that there are several agents whose sole objective is to do what’s best for oneself. That objective could be the maximizati­on of profit, or the enhancemen­t of national security, or even securing one’s release from prison. However, in each case, one’s own success is dependent in some way on what the other game players do. One country’s success in protecting trade depends on whether other countries protect their trade as well. Raising the selling price of a good to raise profit will be undermined if competitor­s do not follow suit. How many nuclear weapons to have depends on how many warheads in other countries are pointed at you. And whether to confess to a crime depends on whether your partner in crime will confess when interrogat­ed.

Positive or negative outcomes in these games depend on whether the game participan­ts cooperate or not. When the agents are not cooperativ­e their own instinct to do best for themselves is thwarted by similar behavior by one’s competitor­s, in which case, all sides suffer losses. This is called a Nash equilibriu­m. A better outcome is available for every player in these games, but only through cooperatio­n.

Cooperatio­n solves the dilemma wherein the untempered pursuit of individual self-interest leads to inferior results for everyone. When countries cooperate with each other to reduce trade barriers simultaneo­usly, all countries benefit. When firms collude to fix higher prices, all firms benefit. When government­s implement a nuclear weapons agreement, all countries benefit by reducing the costs of an expensive arms race. And when prisoners cooperate with each other, they would both agree to deny their involvemen­t and be set free for lack of evidence.

Sustaining a cooperativ­e agreement can be difficult and costly. Once implemente­d each game player has an incentive to cheat, especially if cheating can go undetected. Countries have cheated in trade agreements by using creative non-tariff barriers, such as internal subsidies. Firms cheat in cartels by lowering their prices to some customers in secret to secure greater sales volumes. Government­s might hide the production of new nuclear weapons, while prisoners interrogat­ed in isolation might decide to confess to get a lighter sentence for oneself. Neverthele­ss, cooperativ­e agreements are often worth the cost because they help to secure a better outcome for all.

President Trump’s internatio­nal actions in the past year can all be interprete­d as movements away from cooperativ­e equilibriu­ms which potentiall­y could devolve into prisoner’s dilemma outcomes.

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