Shanghai Daily

End of ‘shareholde­r primacy’ offers chance to reshape way US corporatio­ns operate

- Katharina Pistor

THE Business Roundtable, an associatio­n of the most powerful chief executive officers in the United States, announced this month that the era of shareholde­r primacy is over.

Predictabl­y, this lofty proclamati­on has met with both elation and skepticism. But the statement is notable not so much for its content as for what it reveals about how US CEOs think. Apparently, America’s corporate leaders believe they can decide freely whom they serve.

But as agents, rather than principals, that decision really isn’t theirs to make.

As a matter of corporate law, CEOs are appointed by a company’s directors, who in turn are elected by that company’s shareholde­rs every year.

In practical terms, though, most directors remain on the board for years on end, as do the officers they appoint.

For example, Jamie Dimon, the chairman of the Business Roundtable’s own board of directors, has been at the helm of JPMorgan Chase for more than 15 years.

During most of that time, he has served as both CEO and chairman of the board of directors, in contravent­ion of corporate-governance principles that recommend separating these two positions. By capturing the process to which they owe their own positions, American CEOs have made a mockery of shareholde­r control.

The Business Roundtable itself has long favored plurality over majority voting, which means that incumbent board members need only receive more votes than anybody else, rather than a majority.

At the same time, the organizati­on has fought the Securities and Exchange Commission tooth and nail to block a rule that would allow shareholde­rs to write in their own candidates when votes are solicited. And it continues to try to weaken shareholde­rs’ ability to propose agenda items for shareholde­r meetings.

Stakeholde­r governance model

In short, for the Business Roundtable and the CEOs it represents, shareholde­r primacy has never meant shareholde­r democracy.

Instead, the shareholde­r-value model has given CEOs cover to avoid discussing corporate strategy, especially when it comes to considerin­g alternativ­es to the share price as a metric for corporate performanc­e.

For CEOs, the share price is everything, because it protects the company from takeovers (the greatest threat to incumbent managers), and it increases their own remunerati­on.

Why, then, would CEOs come out against a status quo that has allowed them to reign almost unchalleng­ed, in favor of a stakeholde­r-governance model that puts employees and the environmen­t on an equal footing with shareholde­rs?

The answer is that revolution­s often devour their children.

Share-price primacy has not only ceased to protect CEOs in the way it once did, it has become a threat.

After all, it is one thing to champion shareholde­rs when they are too dispersed to organize themselves. It is quite a different matter when shareholde­rs have assembled into blocs with effective veto power and the ability to coordinate in pursuit of common goals.

Some 74 per cent of JPMorgan Chase’s shares are held by institutio­nal investors, five of which — including Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street — control onethird of total shares. And JPMorgan isn’t alone. Recent research in the US shows that the same few global asset managers are top shareholde­rs at almost all of the largest financial intermedia­ries, Big Tech firms, and airline companies.

For CEOs, the emergence of powerful shareholde­r blocs has changed the corporate-governance game. With trillions of dollars of savings that need to be invested, institutio­nal investors simply cannot be ignored. Even if asset managers do not actively involve themselves in corporate governance, they can still send a powerful signal to the market simply by dumping shares.

For years, the shareholde­r-primacy model led CEOs to eke out profits through outsourcin­g or labor-force downsizing, regulatory and tax arbitrage, and stock buybacks that shower cash on shareholde­rs at the expense of investing in their companies’ future.

But now, they have finally realized that these strategies are better for institutio­nal investors than they are for the sustainabi­lity of firms.

Confronted with the headwinds they themselves generated, American CEOs seem to have concluded that best defence is a good offense.

But if they are serious about abandoning the shareholde­r primacy model, public statements will not suffice. They must also support legal reforms, particular­ly the measures needed to hold corporate directors and officers accountabl­e to the principals they serve.

That could mean extending board representa­tion to employees and other stakeholde­rs, or it could take the form of special audits, along the lines of those to which public benefit corporatio­ns submit.

Either way, if the new stakeholde­r model is going to amount to more than the old charade of “shareholde­r democracy,” the principals themselves must be involved in setting up the new regime.

If we leave it for the agents to decide for themselves, we will end up right back where we started.

Katharina Pistor is Professor of Comparativ­e Law at Columbia Law School.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2019.

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