China, South Korea need cultural exchanges to avoid split

Jinwan Park and Zhuowen Li say more people-to-people interaction is vital to mend relations

On March 18, China condemned South Korea for inviting Taiwan to the third Summit for Democracy, an annual event spearheaded by the United States and its democratic partners. This took place only days after Beijing’s earlier warning to Seoul over its comments regarding maritime tensions in the South China Sea, laying bare the growing strains in China-South Korea relations.

The diplomatic salvo reflects challenges facing the Yoon administration’s efforts to reset relations with Beijing in the wake of the THAAD missile imbroglio and Seoul’s tightening security cooperation with Washington and Tokyo. China has made its displeasure clear, with its ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming bluntly warning Seoul last June not to bet against China.

Yet perhaps more worrying is the hardening of public sentiment on both sides. Polling reveals rising mutual antipathy between the South Korean and Chinese public, stoking concerns about one of Asia’s most consequential relationships.

A January survey by Hankuk Research found that fewer than 30 per cent of South Koreans viewed China favourably, placing it alongside North Korea and Russia. Strikingly, unfavourable attitudes towards China were strongest among South Korean youth aged 18 to 29. This hostility appears to be reciprocated on the Chinese side. A Tsinghua University study in 2023 showed just 14 per cent of Chinese respondents held positive views of South Korea.

These deteriorating mutual perceptions are fraying people-to-people ties with long-lasting consequences. One tangible manifestation is the declining educational exchanges between the two countries. According to South Korea’s Ministry of Education, the number of Korean students in China plummeted from 73,240 in 2017 to just 15,857 in 2023.

The trend cuts both ways. Although South Korea remains one of the top destinations for Chinese students, their share of the international student body has declined in recent years. Official youth exchange programmes between Beijing and Seoul have also waned since 2018.

Beyond education ties, the rapid decline in cultural influence and soft power projection between the two nations is equally stark. South Korean film and television exports to China, once a powerful engine of the “Korean Wave”, fell to just US$34.1 million in 2021 – less than half the 2016 figure of US$78.2 million. This unilateral stifling of cultural exports has deprived Seoul of a once-potent lever of influence.

The number of Chinese language-learners in South Korea has also dropped dramatically. While factors such as declining university language enrolments play a role, the decrease nonetheless deprives South Korea of a critical bridge for deeper mutual understanding.

Emblematic of the souring environment, anti-China and anti-Korea narratives have proliferated across social media in both countries. For South Koreans on Instagram and YouTube, content attacking China has gone viral. Their Chinese counterparts, fuelled by nationalist influencers, have amplified jeers at Seoul’s tightening cooperation with Washington and Tokyo.

While difficult to quantify, this deluge of antagonistic rhetoric appears to be aggravating societal distrust – a toxic spiral with no clear off-ramp.

Analysts have identified the THAAD maelstrom as the pivotal point catalysing this deterioration in China-South Korea ties. Beijing interpreted Seoul’s decision to host the US missile defence system – primarily aimed at Pyongyang’s threats – as compromising China’s security interests. The ensuing economic retaliation left South Korea whiplashed between preserving its alliance and its economic stability, fuelling a narrative of Chinese bullying.

The Covid-19 pandemic’s devastation provided another accelerant. As Covid-19 raged, South Korean public animus towards Beijing reached historic highs over perceptions of mishandling of the pandemic.

Now, Seoul’s tightening strategic alignment under President Yoon Suk-yeol risks entrenching these dynamics. Efforts to reset ties have foundered amid Beijing’s warnings over enhanced security cooperation with the US and Japan.

Amid the mounting strains between Beijing and Seoul, preserving robust people-to-people ties will be crucial for preventing a permanent break in ChinaSouth Korea relations. An absence of direct exposure can enable the entrenchment of hostile narratives and stereotypes.

As government-level tensions rise, avenues for direct interaction such as tourism, academic collaboration and cultural outreach could lay groundwork for greater trust between people. Moreover, future policymakers with first-hand cultural experiences could serve as invaluable voices, preventing hawks from steering ties onto a confrontational path.

To this end, Seoul and Beijing would be wise to prioritise engagement in relatively apolitical arenas such as youth exchanges, sport and working-level dialogue between governmental affiliates. The “ping-pong diplomacy” that helped thaw US-China ties half a century ago provides a model as the two nations seek to build sustainable ties resilient to geopolitical vicissitudes.

With the strategic bifurcation of two neighbours straining government-level relations expected to continue, maintaining durable societal linkages is the only way the overall bilateral relationship can endure, and potentially revive, when the winds of geopolitics shift again.

Seoul and Beijing would be wise to prioritise engagement in relatively apolitical arenas such as youth exchanges

Jinwan Park is a Washington-based foreign-policy researcher and an incoming Schwarzman Scholar at Tsinghua University, China. Zhuowen Li is a Washington-based researcher focused on Chinese political economy and international development