Why Biden is racing to build a Trump-proof US alliance
Emanuele Scimia says return of Republican administration may weaken web of military links
The trilateral summit last Thursday between the United States, Japan and the Philippines had the semblance of a Trump-proof exercise. Incumbent administrations in Washington, Tokyo and Manila needed to secure one pillar of the anti-China system of alliances that US President Joe Biden has painstakingly rebuilt and reinforced after four years of Donald Trump’s presidency marked by tensions and disagreements with US allies and partners in the Western Pacific.
Polls give Trump a fair chance of winning the November presidential election, and alarm bells cannot but ring in Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Manila and Canberra. Indeed, Trump’s distrust of collective security could weaken the web of military connections the Biden team has devised to counter China’s geopolitical assertiveness.
Deepening security relations may minimise the risk of a turnaround by a new Trump administration. If the geostrategic bonds between the US and its friends are inextricably linked to America’s national interest, it will be more difficult for Trump to disrupt them.
Biden’s efforts to cement partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region have come at a time when appetite for bilateral, multilateral and minilateral cooperation against China’s advancements is growing.
Tokyo and Washington are taking steps to create a joint military command to deter China. And, despite Canberra’s denial, some sort of expansion of the Aukus security alliance between the US, Britain and Australia seems on the cards, as underlined by Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.
In a recent interview, Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the Atlantic alliance had to cooperate with other actors beyond its geography to counter a budding alliance of authoritarian powers formed by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. In this respect, he explicitly cited Japan and South Korea as potential partners in Nato’s focus.
Even New Zealand, which is traditionally careful not to antagonise China, despite being part of the Western camp, is playing the game. Foreign Minister Winston Peters said on April 5 that his country would work with Nato “to contribute to collective security” and would finalise a partnership deal with the alliance in the coming months.
That said, Trump’s possible return to power is agitating Biden’s Indo-Pacific interlocutors, who are rushing to calm domestic opinion. Kishida has emphasised that his country’s alliance with the US would remain unbroken even if American voters elect a new president. The Philippines says as much, as does South Korea.
For its part, the leadership in Taiwan availed itself of opportunities thrown up by Trump’s presidency, whether it was the phone call between Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen and Trump after his election in 2016, or Washington’s enhanced military support for the island, including arms sales and routine patrols of the Taiwan Strait, during his mandate.
The problem for US allies and partners in the vast region is that Trump’s backing in the confrontation with China cannot be taken for granted.
He recently caused concern when he said he would not defend Nato allies against Russia if they did not meet their financial obligations. If he were to abandon Ukraine in the conflict with Russia, as suggested by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban after his meeting with the former US president in March, US allies in the IndoPacific would not be counting on a new Trump administration to defend them.
To assuage concerns, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said there would be more joint patrols by the US, Australia, Japan and the Philippines, amid Manila’s territorial dispute with Beijing.
According to the joint statement after the three-way talks between Biden, Kishida and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr, the three countries’ coastguards “plan to conduct an at-sea trilateral exercise and other maritime activities in the IndoPacific” within the next year.
A military presence in the Western Pacific is a cornerstone of Washington’s China containment strategy. However,
Trump has never loved joint allied exercises and patrols. In 2019 he said a US-South Korea combined military drill was “unnecessary” and a “waste of money”.
To maintain Biden’s alliance architecture in the Western Pacific, Trump would have to find it attractive. This means Japan must deliver on its commitment to rearmament, which seems to put it in a bind, given that the Japanese government is planning tax increases to cover the rising military outlays. South Korea might have to pay a larger share of the cost of maintaining US troops on its soil, and Taiwan could be asked to invest more in the US chip industry in return for military assistance.
The Aukus deal is also likely to be in the firing line; Trump may expect more funds from Australia for the US shipyards building Virginia-class attack submarines. Under the Aukus partnership, Canberra should be able to buy between three and five of these subs from the early 2030s. However, the Biden administration is scaling down submarine production amid long-standing backlogs at US shipyards and funding problems, with US Navy secretary Carlos Del Toro working to attract Asian investment to US shipbuilding facilities.
Ultimately, Trump doesn’t just believe that US military might alone, rather than collective security, is enough to deter a Chinese armed adventure. He is also persuaded that he himself is the strongest deterrent to China. His unpredictability is a political factor US allies and partners will have to deal with again should he win re-election.
To maintain Biden’s alliance architecture in the Western Pacific, Trump would have to find it attractive