“The foundation of U.S. strategy in the Arab world is the Arab monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula. Most of these, Qatar excepted, are terrified of Iranian power, particularly at a time when oil prices are still not high enough to make up for the years of

It is not at all clear that the Russians will want to satisfy Israel’s needs, or even that they could. On the ground, as opposed to in the air, Iran has more substantial capabilities in Syria than the Russians, and certainly more in Lebanon. What the Russians would be asking of the Iranians is to abandon a powerful strategic position. It is not clear that the Russians have anything to offer the Iranians as compensation, or even that the Russians are troubled by the Iranian position. It poses substantial problems for the Americans in the Arab world, and that isn’t something the Russians would want to give up.

This poses a serious problem for Israel. It also poses a serious problem for Turkey. Whatever temporary arrangement Turkey has with Russia and Iran, no Turkish relationship with either is stable. The Russians have been historic enemies of Turkey in the Caucasus, and in the end, this is a region where Russian interests will not go away. And the Turks have historically dueled with Iran over the domination of the Arab world.

For the moment, Turkey is focused on the Kurdish threat to its territorial integrity. However, in the long run, allowing Iran to solidify its position around Turkey’s borders pits a manageable problem — the Kurds — against a potentially unmanageable problem — the Iranians and the Russians.

Russians might indicate a willingness to cooperate with the Israelis to limit the Iranians, but will do nothing decisive. The United States has no appetite for getting seriously involved in any of this, but will be content to hold its position on the Arabian Peninsula while dueling with Iran. If this problem is to be solved for Israel, the trip Netanyahu will have to make will be to Ankara, not Moscow. Netanyahu undoubtedly knows this, and discussions with the Turks are underway, but each country wants the other to take the first risk.

Given this situation, Iran’s position should solidify. The one weakness in this scenario is Iran’s internal situation. In the wake of Iran’s recent unrest, the magnitude and purpose of which is still somewhat obscure, the classic question rises: Does Iran have the domestic base to support its foreign adventures? At the moment, the answer appears to be yes.

For Israel, the period of strategic invulnerability is ending. The willingness not to interfere with the Russians has created a threat Israel did not anticipate. The presence of the Iranians, not only in Lebanon but also in Syria, opens the door for conflicts Israel lived happily without. As this unfolds, the place to watch is Lebanon. Torn by civil war in the 1980s, the possibility of another civil war is increasing. As that danger increases, Russia faces the problem that anyone who wins a war in the Middle East faces: What should it do with the next war? Russia has won the first, but easy, round. The next one gets harder.