Russia’s Black Sea Fleet ventures into the Mediterranean

The fleet plays a key role in Russia’s Mediterranean strategy.

In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, which compelled the U.S. Navy and other NATO countries to demonstrate their overwhelming land-attack capabilities in the Black Sea. Their combined resources and capabilities frightened Russian decision-makers to the point that military officials informed President Vladimir Putin that the Black Sea Fleet would not be able to stop Western forces from destroying Sochi – southern Russia’s unofficial capital, where Putin (like Stalin before him) stays for up to six months each year – and striking any Russian targets throughout the Black Sea Basin.

The Russian leadership then set out to strengthen the Black Sea Fleet, including by restoring submarine-deployed cruise missiles and introducing a Bastion coastal defense missile system. But the modernization efforts failed to alter the overall balance of power in the Black Sea that had been in place since the collapse of the Soviet empire, in part because Russia did not yet have full control of Crimea and in part because the Black Sea Fleet’s operations have expanded widely over the past several years.

To change the balance of power in the Black Sea region, the Russians would need to be able to block the passage of NATO ships through the Bosporus. To achieve this goal, they need a forward sea presence at the southern European perimeter beyond the Bosporus in the Mediterranean. If this could be achieved, the Turkish Straits could be defended from Western navies, which could then be blocked from entering the Black Sea. The Bosporus would then become the first bolted position on the outskirts of the Mediterranean, turning the Black Sea Basin essentially into an additional buffer against the West and shielding Crimea, the Don and Volga areas – the soft underbelly of Russia – and of course the southern capital, Sochi.

The Soviet Union tried to create such a buffer by establishing a Mediterranean squadron that would operate separately from the Black Sea Fleet. At its peak, the squadron numbered 30-50 ships. Its primary task was to block the freedom of action of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea as well as to support Arab client countries. Essentially, its goal was to keep the Turks below the 43rd parallel (in the southern Black Sea) and the Americans behind the 23rd meridian (west of the British Isles).

When the Soviet Union, which was never a real naval power, collapsed, the Black Sea squadron’s escapades into the Mediterranean also ended. The Black Sea, like the Baltic, was no longer dominated by the continental empire. That opened these waters to U.S. influence and began the process of Western expansion into Eastern Europe that brought with it the establishment of democratic systems.

The Russians used the civil war in Syria as a convenient excuse to make a grand return to the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean. The focus was on securing the port of Tartus and providing air cover for land operations and sea communication to the air base in Hmeimim, Syria. Generally speaking, the Russian fleet coped poorly with the task set for it in Moscow. This is evidenced by the fact that within the Russian armed forces, which are undergoing major organizational shifts, the navy does not wield sufficient influence among the top brass.

In Syria, the Russian navy has produced mixed results.

Frigates, corvettes and submarines have been deployed and have launched Kalibr missiles at a number of enemy targets. Perhaps the navy’s most impressive strike early in the campaign came on Oct. 7, 2015, Putin’s birthday, when four flotilla corvettes in the Caspian fired 26 Kalibr NK 3M14 missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) over Iranian and Iraqi airspace at targets in Syria. A total of about 25 volleys and 140 missiles were fired, some by Black Sea Fleet frigates located in the Mediterranean approximately 160 kilometers from the Syrian coast. On average, one salvo consisted of 4-8 missiles.

Kilo-class submarines also fired cruise missiles – a total of about 40 pieces at an average distance of 400-900 kilometers deep into Syria. Though Kalibr missiles have proved to be a good weapon system, the Russians do not have enough of them in stock, a problem the French have also had to deal with in their operations in Libya and Syria. It’s noteworthy, however, that the Syrian factions on which the Kalibr missiles were tested do not have anti-aircraft defense or modern radars, so the weapon has not been properly tested against a professional, sophisticated opponent. They are also rather expensive, costing up to $6.5 million per piece. And although they are theoretically difficult to detect, their overall effectiveness, beyond demonstrating to the U.S. and other Western countries Russia’s capability to strike from a distance, is difficult to gauge.