The measure is aimed as much at Syria’s patrons as it is Syria itself
By Hilal Khashan
Last December, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act – with strong bipartisan Congressional support – to hold the Syrian regime accountable for atrocities committed by security forces against protesters who demanded political reforms. The measure was born from a report prepared by the Syria Study Group of the United States Institute of Peace arguing that to safeguard its national security, the U.S. ought to quit downplaying its role in shaping the outcome of the Syrian conflict. The report rejected Bashar Assad’s claim that his government had won the war and that the world must accept its legitimacy as the sole representative of the Syrian people.
The Caesar Act took effect earlier this month as the familiar battle lines in the war are wearing down. Russia has consolidated its naval and air presence along the coast and reached terms with Turkey to deescalate tensions in northwestern Syria. The Kurds control most of the northeast. The Islamic State is defeated, and its remnants have gone underground. The U.S. has been criticized for years for being able to articulate what it didn’t want in Syria but never what it wanted. The Caesar Act means to fix this, not just in Syria but also in Lebanon.
The origins of the act are nearly as old as the Syrian conflict itself. In June 2012, the Action Group for Syria held a peace conference in Geneva, during which it issued a roadmap for peace that called for an immediate halt of the violence. The Syrian government ignored it. Later, in 2015, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2254, which affirmed its commitment to the June 2012 Geneva communique, advocating free elections and encouraging exiled Syrians to participate in the peace talks. The communique also entitled them to an unobstructed and safe return to their original place of residence in Syria. The Caesar Act means to compel Syria to abide by the U.N. resolution.
The Caesar Act is more stringent than all the sanctions that came before it because it lumps in the countries that cooperate with Damascus. However, it gives Damascus the option of ending the sanctions campaign provided it implements unequivocal measures to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict. It does this in part by targeting the Assad regime’s supporters, its Alawite constituency, and its regional backers. It doesn’t spare the Syrian people, but since it applies unprecedented pressure on the regime and its foreign backers, the Caesar Act’s impact on Lebanon threatens to speed up the country’s total economic collapse and exploits its inherently flawed political system.
The repercussions of the Caesar Act on the Syrian regime are staggering. It will aggravate the social and economic crisis to the point where it may actually affect the powerbrokers in the Alawite community. It may also deepen the family feud already underway in the Assad clan, including the rivalry between Bashar Assad and his maternal cousin, Rami Makhlouf. The rivalry has stunned the Alawite community since it is over entitlement to material resources and not the preservation of the sect’s political power. Assad is keen on transferring control over Syria’s economic assets from Makhlouf, sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, to the family of Assad’s wife Asma al-Akhras, who is not under sanctions. For years, Makhlouf served as the business front for the regime after it adopted economic neoliberalisation and privatization. His business endeavours are extensive and cover a broad range of domains.
One would expect the poorer Alawites who fought and died in droves for Assad to rethink their loyalty to a government obsessed with personal wealth. It’s difficult for Alawites to accept the imposition of sanctions after the regime deluded them into believing they won the war. The Alawites are growing increasingly restive and disillusioned with the regime. There is muted anger and frustration over the casualties they’re taking. More than onethird of all Alawites in the Syrian army have died since the war began.
Lebanon, another pillar of Assad’s power, is meanwhile facing its gravest economic and financial crisis since its independence in 1943, and Hezbollah is under more pressure to pull out from Syria. An increasing number of Lebanese, including Shiites, are unable to make ends meet. Hezbollah’s constituency is mostly poor working class. If it continues to support the Syrian regime, Hezbollah will put Lebanon face to face with the United States, which expects Beirut to take a clear stand on sealing its border with Syria.
The Caesar Act could make the situation in Lebanon go from bad to worse. Assad expects Hezbollah to continue to provide Syria with badly needed supplies. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah pledged to keep open the line of supplies to Syria: “Those who offered martyrs to keep Syria united and free from falling to America and Israel will not allow it to succumb to the Caesar Act.” In a dramatic and unprecedented escalation apparently against Israel, Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah would not allow the Caesar Act to hurt Lebanon and threatened to kill whoever tries to starve its people.
The Russian military intervention in 2015 to save Assad added to the complexity of the Syrian conflict. It elevated the Russian position as the dominant actor in Syria without dislodging Iran, which became a second-tier actor. The war degraded Assad’s regime, and Syria devolved into a proxy battlefield. But Iran’s loss of dominance in