The great divide between the Arab people and their leaders

The Arab public has grown disillusioned with its leaders’ broken promises

The modern Arab state emerged in the 20th century, roughly around the time of the Arab League’s establishment in 1945. Since then, it has been dominated by a small group of religious, military and aristocratic elites who avoid discussions about the role of religion in politics and society. To this day, there remains tension between the masses and the ruling class on the legitimacy of the state, and how and why it should act. In most Arab countries, the state quickly dominated religious institutions: Subservient clerics were appointed, religious opposition movements were suppressed and Arab leaders, whether monarchical or presidential, systematically used religion to legitimize their grip on power.

From Egypt, where Anwar Sadat preferred to be called the faithful president, to Sudan, where President Jaafar Numayri implemented Sharia law, Arab leaders haven’t shied away from publicly declaring their religiosity. But what sets the ruling class apart from the people is not differences in their levels of religiosity but the political environment in which the elite must operate. Arab leaders must navigate complex regional and international norms that demand that they relinquish some of their critical cultural values to hold on to their positions of power. The ensuing dichotomy between the two groups centres on their different views on pan-Arabism, justice, fairness and Islamic solidarity.

Arab leaders have always shown less enthusiasm for pan-Arab issues than the Arab public has itself. In 1946, King Farouk of Egypt invited the Arab heads of state to a summit in Alexandria to discuss Palestine’s deteriorating situation. The Arab public had high hopes that the meeting would lead to real change for the Palestinian people and the Arab world as a whole, but, although the Arab leaders committed to working closely to pursue joint interests, the summit did not live up to expectation. It did, however, establish a pattern for subsequent Arab summits.

Indeed, Arab leaders frequently make bold promises but fail to deliver. In 1964, they agreed to divert the Jordan River’s tributaries to reduce the flow of water into Israel. But in subsequent conflicts with Arabs, Israel was able to seize the river’s headwaters. In 2018, Arab states decided to allocate $100 million monthly to improve the quality of life of impoverished Palestinians in the West Bank, but the plan was never implemented. Earlier this year, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed peace agreements with Israel that undermined the Arab Peace Initiative – a proposal to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict – which was announced at an Arab League summit in Beirut in 2002. The Arab League even rejected a proposal by the Palestinian Authority to condemn the UAE and Bahrain for violating the Arab peace deal.

At a summit in Khartoum following the 1967 Six-Day War, wealthy oil-producing states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya) displayed unusual solidarity by pledging to give financial aid to Egypt and Jordan, which had suffered financial and territorial losses in the war.

Several other Arab countries – such as Iraq, Sudan, Algeria and Morocco – sent military contingents. But these were token gestures and did not contribute much to the war effort. In fact, the Saudis, who disliked Gamal Abdel Nasser intensely for supporting the coup in Yemen in 1962 that ignited a civil war between the Saudi-backed royalists and Egyptian-backed republicans, privately welcomed Egypt’s defeat in 1967.

In August 1990, one week after the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak convened an emergency summit in Cairo, ostensibly to find an Arab solution to the crisis. In reality, however, the Arab governments effectively paved the way for a U.S. military intervention. They could not agree on a draft resolution condemning the invasion by Iraqi forces and demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Mubarak himself supported the resolution and objected to a proposal allowing Iraq a face-saving exit from Kuwait. The Arab masses, however, sided with Iraq; massive demonstrations against the U.S.-led military build-up in Saudi Arabia erupted in many Arab countries, including Egypt.

When Operation Desert Storm began in January 1991, Iraq launched dozens of Scud missiles on Israel. Upon hearing of the news, the defense minister for Syria, which had sent an armoured division to Saudi Arabia to join the U.S.-led coalition, knelt in prayer to thank God for the missile attack. His response is an example of the clash between the behaviour that’s expected of Arab officials in diplomatic circles and the deeply held beliefs of many across the Arab world.

Arabs would argue that these beliefs should inform not just cultural practices but also policy in Arab countries. Justice, fairness and brotherhood are cardinal components of Islamic law. Religious principles like these heavily influence Arab political thought and approaches to foreign policy matters like the Palestinian issue. So whereas Westerners think about this issue in practical terms and try to find realistic solutions, Arabs see it as a question of right and wrong.

Thus, Arab leaders know that their populations will view the signing of normalization agreements with Israel through this lens. The best they can do to circumvent public opposition is to assert that such agreements can pave the way for a peace deal that would benefit the Palestinians. They are essentially deceiving their publics to avoid looking like they have lost interest in the Palestinians and their conflict with Israel.

This problem also extends to issues involving non-Arab states. The UAE ambassador to India recently described New Delhi’s move to strip Kashmir of its autonomous status as a step toward peace, a comment that didn’t sit well with the people of the UAE. And despite China’s persecution of Uighur Muslims, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its economic ties with China over the past few years, a move that has been criticized in Arab media and among Arab dissidents.

Human rights organizations and Arab media outlets have rebuked Saudi Arabia for its harsh treatment of Muslim Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar, some of whom were incarcerated for years in horrible conditions. Although Gulf states have given the Rohingya humanitarian aid, they have done so mainly to escape criticism for otherwise ignoring their plight. Arab Muslims are socialized to believe that all Muslims, regardless of their ethnicity, are part of a community of believers and therefore have a right to unconditional assistance from their fellow Muslims.

Arab people and Arab leaders do not see eye to eye on the role of the state. Arab governments have long been able to suppress their publics and the Islamist opposition thanks to their tools of coercion. But they are now in need of a new, mutually agreed upon social contract that can govern the relationship between the ruling elite and the people. The counter-revolutions defeated the Arab Spring uprisings, but critical societal problems and questions over the role of the state and ideology remained unresolved. Oil-rich countries in the Arab world were able to temporarily buy the loyalty of their citizens using their vast wealth, but instability will continue to plague them until their leaders realize that they need to reach a deal with the masses that respects their values. It will take only one country to break the cycle of elite domination; the others will then follow – which is precisely why counterrevolutionaries fight so hard to maintain the status quo.

Hilal Khashan is a Professor of political science at the American University of Beirut. www.geopoliticalfutures.com