If Belarus falls

Russian military control of Belarus would be an existential threat to Poland

In recent years, Russia’s hand has stretched farther and farther – into Georgia, Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, Donbass, Armenia, the Black Sea, Syria and Libya. But Belarus, a country about the size of Kansas, has deftly maintained its strategic autonomy through 26 years under President Alexander Lukashenko. Now, however, Lukashenko’s leadership – and Belarus’ independence – is in doubt after months of protests following the country’s disputed presidential election.

If Belarus were to fall to Russia, the impact on the countries between the Baltic and Black seas – especially Poland – would be on par with Germany’s absorption and partition of Czechoslovakia before World War II. To put it bluntly, there is a fundamental difference if Russian combat units, particularly the 1st Guards Tank Army, are stationed in Belarus, with all the necessary heavy logistics units, versus the status quo where they can only “rotate into” allied maneuvers, have unreliable air defenses, and are reliant on long-range reconnaissance. Such a transformation on Poland’s eastern front would force Warsaw to change its force posture, its contingency planning and possibly its force modernization plans.

A Precedented Threat

Warsaw has seen threats like this before. In the interwar period, until the fall of Czechoslovakia, Germany could credibly attack Poland only from Western Pomerania. No other area offered the strategic depth and operational basis to support large German units and logistics lines for an assault on Poland. East Prussia did not provide such a basis and could support only an auxiliary strike. Connections between Brandenburg and Greater Poland were poor because of the swampy areas around the Warta River. But German Silesia had none of these issues. What it did have, however, was a threat to the south from Czechoslovakia, which was allied with France. Thus, Germany could not launch a strike on Poland from there, fearing a Czechoslovak intervention, or that the Polish army might attack its rear or wing and cut it off from the German core.

Germany’s inability to strike Poland from more than one main direction greatly improved Poland’s strategic position and aided its defensive preparations. Moreover, it was relatively far from Western Pomerania to Warsaw and the Upper Vistula River Valley, which could be a strategic line of defense in the event of a longer war.

That changed in 1939 with the collapse of Czechoslovakia. Germany could now launch a main attack on Poland from both Western Pomerania and Silesia. And it did. Hitting out from Silesia, German forces defeated the Lodz Army and then the Modlin Reserve Army on their way to Warsaw. In addition, Germany launched an auxiliary strike from East Prussia – the closest launching point to Warsaw – crossing Poland’s defensive lines near Mlawa.

Thanks to the partition of Poland’s southern neighbor, Germany was also able to execute an auxiliary strike from Slovakia, outflanking the Krakow Army, which was crucial to Poland’s war plan. (The Germans also demanded access to Subcarpathia – today mostly part of southwestern Ukraine – from Hungary after the partition of Czechoslovakia, but Hungary refused, risking Hitler’s anger.) By the second day of the war the Krakow Army was in retreat, which left the flanks of the other Polish armies vulnerable, creating a cascade effect. Having lost the border battle on the entire long front, Warsaw ordered a retreat across the Vistula and San rivers for all its armies.

Beyond the battlefield, the geopolitical conditions on the eve of the war created a hopeless situation for Poland. Leaving aside the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which made Poland an object in the balance-of-power game (and not an actor, as Warsaw mistakenly thought), Poland’s leadership concluded that the Polish army had two military tasks to fulfill to support the country’s political goals: not to be destroyed west of the Vistula, and thus to continue the fight, escalating the situation until allied France and Britain could join and turn the conflict into a European war. For Poland’s leaders, such an escalation had to end in the defeat of Germany, since Germany was, after all, much weaker in general than the Western powers. In this way, Warsaw decided to call Hitler’s bluff when he issued an ultimatum for Poland to subordinate its policy to his own.

The two tasks required the Polish army to have a forward presence along the long German border, ensuring that Western powers didn’t get the impression that the Poles weren’t willing to join the war effort by defending themselves. The army was successful in both tasks – it stood firm west of the Vistula and tied up the bulk of German forces with the Battle of the Bzura and the Siege of Warsaw. The only thing missing, of course, was the intervention of Poland’s allies, which was made nearly impossible by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which enabled Germany and the Soviet Union to partition Poland.

Compromised Security

As things stand today, without the stationing of major forces and logistics in Belarus, Russia is unable to launch an attack on Poland, even from the bordering Kaliningrad region. It could attack the Baltic states from northwestern Russian cities like Pskov and St. Petersburg, or threaten to cut Polish communication lines to the Baltic states, but it could not launch a full and serious assault on Poland, unless Warsaw sent most of its forces across the Niemen and Daugava rivers. (The Kaliningrad region is even less convenient as an operational base than East Prussia was for the Germans. The Russians were rather concerned that Poland would try to invade the region; hence, contrary to popular belief, they did not station any important forces there.)

But with the presence of a full-blown Russian army in Belarus, the Russians could, from at least two directions (Grodno/Wolkowysk and Brest/Damachava-Slawatycze), launch a major attack on Warsaw via several roads leading to the cities of Biala Podlaska, Radzyn, Siedlce, Miedzyrzec and

Minsk Mazowiecki, and then on to the suburbs of Warsaw on the eastern side of the Vistula.

The Russians would also be able to (as they have done several times throughout history) bypass Warsaw from the south, beginning in Wlodawa on the Belarusian border and making their way to the Vistula between Radomka and Pilica. They could also move through Ukraine to create another operational line through Chelm, Lublin and Pulawy, thereby dispersing Polish defenses.

The Russians could then conduct an auxiliary strike from the Kaliningrad region along the Vistula valley, further dispersing Polish forces in the vast eastern part of the country, which is divided by the three main Polish rivers: the Vistula, the Bug and the Narew.

With Belarus in Russian hands, it would be impossible to cross the Suwalki gap – the tiny area where Poland and Lithuania share a border, between Kaliningrad and Belarus – to defend the Baltic states in the event of a war with Russia, making their security dependent on the will of Moscow. It would also pose yet another Russian threat for Ukraine, on its northern border fairly close to the capital, Kyiv, and to major roads in the west, which, if lost, could cut Ukraine’s communication lines with Poland and the West. Poland would also have to reconsider its defense plans, as its security, particularly on its eastern border, would be severely compromised.

In the meantime, Western European states’ apparent inability to replace the American military presence in Eastern Europe, if the Americans choose to leave, creates an even more insecure condition for countries in Russia’s neighborhood. If Belarus is absorbed by Russia, these countries would be subject to Russia’s will and capability to project power. In such a scenario, it’s conceivable that Western European states would be either unable or unwilling to defend Poland’s security and territorial integrity, let alone that of the Baltics. It’s time to wake up to that possibility before it becomes a reality.