Absolute rule in Arab monarchies dwindling
The world’s last remaining absolute monarchies are facing calls for reform
The Arab world’s eight monarchies are among the last remaining absolute monarchies on Earth. In some ways, they have proved surprisingly durable.
Compared to Arab republics, Jordan, Morocco and the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait) escaped the Arab Spring uprisings relatively unfazed. But some of the Arab kingdoms are also facing new challenges that threaten to end decades of monarchial rule.
The Role of Affluence
In 2010, Tunisian street vendor Mohamad Bouazizi set himself on fire after a police officer assaulted him for parking his produce cart in an unauthorised spot. This event was the catalyst for the Arab Spring protests that spread through large parts of the Middle East.
Despite the fact that the protesters were demanding democratic reforms, the spark for the movement was actually the region’s dire economic conditions.
In Tunisia and Egypt, organised labour unions spearheaded the demonstrations and mobilised the public.
In Syria, the uprising broke out in the southwest, a bastion of support for the Assad regime where the deteriorating economy reduced state welfare spending and alienated the population.
However, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries managed to weather the storm of the Arab Spring much better. That’s because their rentier economies guaranteed that their citizens enjoyed per capita i ncomes far exceeding those in the countries of the Arab uprisings.
Qatar boasts a per capita i ncome of $69,000; the UAE’s is $43,000. Even Oman’s $16,500 per capita income is much higher than Egypt’s ($2,500) or Tunisia’s ($3,450).
Right after the uprising in Egypt began in January 2011, Saudi King Abdullah spent $37 billion on the military, civil service personnel and religious foundations to maintain loyalty to the royal family.
The UAE spends more than 15 percent of its federal budget on financial and social support to the local population.
Cosmetic Changes
Opposition groups in Arab countries recognise the legitimacy of the monarchs – with the exception of those in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain – and tend to press only for political reforms. In general, however, Arab monarchies have resisted making such changes, fearing that they could usher in an accountable and transparent political system.
Instead, they have implemented cosmetic changes meant to appease the opposition, avoid criticism from international organisations and get Western countries off their backs.
For example, in 1926, Ibn Saud established the Consultative Council, a legislative body that advises the king on critical issues.
However, after the Saudi Cabinet was formed in 1953, the Consultative Council became mostly meaningless. King Fahd reactivated it in 2000 but gave it no executive or legislative powers.
Monarchs dismiss parliaments and cabinets at will, and in this regard, the Arab monarchies differ little from their Arab republic counterparts.
Despite claiming to be making progress on political participation and social inclusion, the monarchies’ democratic index scores are even worse than those of Arab republics.
In the U.K.-based Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, Saudi Arabia ranked 159 out of 167 countries, while Bahrain came in at 149 and the UAE at 145.
According to the index, Kuwait and Jordan are the least authoritarian countries among their peers, tied at 114th place.
Cultural and Religious Continuity
The failure of the political reforms can be explained in part by cultural and religious factors. As a religion that believes in the sovereignty of God and requires obedience to Allah, the Prophet Muhammad and the caliph, Islam is incompatible with democracy.
The principles of republicanism – liberty, civic virtue and the rule of law – therefore do not resonate with some Arab publics and rulers.
In the second half of the 19th century, Egyptian religious reformer Mohammad Abdu pleaded for the rise of an enlightened despot who could spread fairness and justice in Arab-Islamic societies, but he imagined his ideal state in the context of a caliphate, not a republic.
In 1919, the King-Crane Commission toured Greater Syria and concluded that its people wanted to create an Arab kingdom under the leadership of Faysal, son of Sharif
Hussein of Hejaz, who launched the 1916 Arab rebellion against the Ottomans and demanded the caliphate’s resurrection under an Arab king. In 1920, Faysal proclaimed himself head of the Syrian Arab Kingdom before the French defeated his army in the Battle of Maysalun, shattering his imperial ambitions and imposing artificial republican systems.
In Morocco, the king plays a religious role that extends legitimacy to his sovereign political position. The Alaouite dynasty that has ruled the country since 1666 tracks its origins to Imam Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth Rashidun caliph who presided over the Islamic community between 656 and 661.
Thus, the public has not revolted against the monarchy despite Morocco’s high poverty levels, poor human rights record and persecution of political activists.
Indeed, the royal family’s prestige and religious authority have thus far shielded it from potential uprisings. Textbooks assert the monarch’s rare qualities and magnanimity and celebrate the contributions of the state’s founders. The king’s commands come with divine sanctity. He provides largesse for his subjects and pardons wrongdoers. In 2005, he pardoned more than 7,000 prisoners on the day of Crown Prince Moulay Hassan’s royal
circumcision.
The GCC countries have deeper political roots in power than the Arab republics, all of whom are post-World War I creations. The first Saudi state, Oman’s al-Busaid dynasty, Kuwait’s House of Sabah, Bahrain’s alKhalifa, and Abu Dhabi’s al-Nahyan family all established their rule between 1744 and 1764. Al-Thani’s rise in Qatar goes back to 1847. All of them sought British protection to consolidate their power.
Showing Cracks
However, monarchical systems are showing cracks i n three Arab countries: Jordan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In Jordan, the Bedouins – the Hashemites’ traditional base of support – are beginning to turn their backs on the regime. The future direction of the Israel-Palestinian conflict will determine whether the country can survive i n its current state.
In Bahrain, the oppression of the Shiite majority and the monarchy’s refusal to implement equitable reforms has made the situation untenable. In 2011, the authorities, aided by Saudi and Emirati troops, crushed a Shiite uprising and killed dozens of protesters. Bahraini courts routinely issue harsh prison sentences for Shiite clerics who criticise the government.
The country, moreover, is highly dependent on Saudi Arabia for financial aid and security support.
In Saudi Arabia, the government faces a number of serious challenges. It has clamped down on all reform movements since the country’s founding in 1932, regardless of whether they were loyal to al-Saud or supporters of a constitutional monarchy.
The Shiite minority has long been a concern. Despite an uprising in 1979 in Qatif in the Eastern Province, the group has been excluded from public office.
One group that has been particularly concerning for the Saudis is Islamic fundamentalists. In 1979, Wahhabi Salafists, infuriated by what they considered the Saudi royals’ deviation from the path of pure Islam, seized Mecca’s Grand Mosque. In 1990, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait angered many Saudis who resented the presence of “infidels” in their lands.
Other Saudis saw in it an opportunity to effect political change, although Londonbased opposition groups such as the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights and the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia failed to attract a following at home.
The U.S. occupation of Iraq i n 2003 unleashed a spate of al-Qaida attacks that took the security forces three years to subdue. The regime then launched a relentless campaign against civil rights activists and clerics, both pacifist and radical.
Saudi Arabia’s cohesion rests on three factors: the religious establishment, comprehensive welfare provisions, and the unity of the royal family. But all three of these pillars are now under threat. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman weakened the religious establishment and ended its autonomy.
Dwindling oil revenues curtailed subsidies, necessitated the imposition of taxes and tariffs, and sharply reduced the state’s ability to provide welfare services, and the celebrated Vision 2030 is unlikely to deliver on its promise to reduce the kingdom’s reliance on oil rents.
Salman shattered the unity of the Saudi royals, detaining hundreds of princes and influential businessmen in 2017.