A new order in the South Caucasus

It’s not clear that the new regional balance can survive its own contradictions

When Armenia and Azerbaijan started fighting late last year, it looked like another episode in their interminable conflict.

But beneath the surface, three important things happened: First, Turkey gained a seat at the table. Second, Russia and Turkey blocked Western (i.e., American and French) participation in the diplomatic settlement. And third, they laid the groundwork for an alternative regional order that includes the three South Caucasus countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – as well as Russia, Turkey and Iran.

Whether this new order can survive Turkey’s rise and its own inherent contradictions is a critical question for the South Caucasus and relations between the three major powers.

The Platform of Six

In December 2020, right after the signing in November of the Russia-brokered cease-fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed the establishment of a six-party grouping to end hostilities in the region and avert another war. Like most regional frameworks, the so-called Platform of Six faces several challenges. Most obviously, there’s the rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which at this point have bookended years of low-level fighting with two wars since the late 1980s. Then there’s Armenia, which has been at odds with Turkey for more than a century due to the 1915 mass killing of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. Finally, there’s the Russo-Georgian issue. A U.S. partner with ambitions to join NATO, Tbilisi is wary of Moscow, which invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy parts of the country.

In a sign of just how precarious the new arrangement could be, on June 15 Azerbaijan and Turkey signed the Shusha Declaration, which established the two countries as strategic allies. The agreement stipulates that, in the event of an attack by a third country, the two will take joint initiatives to address the threat and provide each other with the necessary aid and military cooperation. It also left open the possibility of Ankara establishing a military base in the Azerbaijani city of Shusha, despite Moscow’s strict prohibition of such a base. Russia agreed only to let Turkey operate with it a joint center to monitor the ArmenianAzerbaijani cease-fire.

Notably, the Shusha Declaration also contains a pledge to support pan-Turkish collaboration and to coordinate the work of Azeri and Turkish diasporas – a particularly unnerving prospect for Russia and Iran, both of which host sizable Azeri populations.

To gauge the feasibility of the new diplomatic model, we need to examine the perspectives of the potential participants.

Turkey

As its power grows, Turkey sees an opportunity to make itself the gatekeeper between Europe and the Greater Middle East and Central Asia. For the past decade, an increasingly neo-Ottoman government in Ankara has spread its influence across the region, with the exception of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Recent Turkish actions in the South Caucasus and Ukraine suggest that may be changing. During last year’s Armenian-Azerbaijani war, very public Turkish military assistance to Azerbaijan’s armed forces proved decisive on the battlefield. Azerbaijan’s victory was also a win for Turkey and highlighted to both sides the benefits of a deeper relationship.

Turkey’s South Caucasus approach has two parts: a strategy of regional cooperation via the Platform of Six plan, and bilateral military and political alliances with strategic partners based on pan-Turkism. Through these endeavors, Ankara hopes to increase its influence in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, and potentially to create a transport corridor from Turkey through Azerbaijan to Central Asia.

However, a stronger Turkey in the South Caucasus and Central Asia raises the possibility of Ankara challenging Russia’s traditional spheres of influence. This would be unacceptable for Moscow and would seriously undermine Russo-Turkish relations. Washington, on the other hand, would approve. The U.S. has an interest in preventing Iran and Russia from expanding their influence in Central Asia, but it doesn’t want to make any serious commitments of its own. Further, Turkey can increase its bilateral military agreements with Ukraine and Georgia, thereby supporting NATO interests even though these two states are not members of the bloc.

Russia

Russia played a decisive role in containing the ArmenianAzerbaijani war and designing and implementing the subsequent peacekeeping mission. The results largely serve Russian interests. But instead of asserting itself as the sole arbiter, Moscow welcomed some level of Turkish participation in order to take some of the burden off itself and avoid direct confrontation with Ankara.

Moscow is not ready to accept Turkish dominance in the South Caucasus, but it is open to an increased role for Turkey that in turn helps stem direct Western influence in the region. From the Kremlin’s perspective, it is better to establish a balance of power and spheres of influence among the regional powers than to let the West dominate the Caucasus. Russia won’t tolerate Turkish interference everywhere, especially not in the North Caucasus, Crimea or eastern Ukraine, but it sees more opportunities for coordination with Ankara than with the West. An added bonus for Russia is that Turkey and Iran can balance each other.

From Russia’s perspective, the Armenian-Azerbaijani war enabled it to achieve several goals. First, Russia increased its military influence in the area by sending thousands of peacekeepers to the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Second, Armenia’s defeat greatly reduced the risk of an Armenian outreach to the West. Third, through the Dagestan region, Russia can create significant zones of economic cooperation with Iran, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. (Moscow would also like to reopen Yerevan-Baku-Dagestan transit routes, including oil railways between Baku and Nakhchivan.) Fourth, the potential for diplomatic and economic cooperation among the regional players could entice Georgian elites to reconsider their hostility toward Moscow. Finally, the war and its resolution created a highprofile precedent in which non-Western powers were able to settle an international conflict on their own.

Iran

From the beginning, Tehran abstained from supporting any side in the conflict because it could not afford to get drawn in. It issued boilerplate diplomatic statements regarding the cessation of hostilities and the importance of Armenia’s territorial integrity (and thus Iran’s own security), but it accepted Baku’s right to reclaim lost areas. Iran proposed its own version of the platform called the “3+3” model, differing mostly in name only, through which Tehran emphasized the importance of regional economic cooperation and integration. Both, after all, would help Iran to circumvent U.S. sanctions.

Iran’s geographic location makes its participation essential for any six-member framework to take root. It is the only country that has diplomatic relations with the rest of the members, but its ties go even deeper. For example, Iran is the one territory through which Baku can reach Nakhchivan without crossing Armenia. More, Iranian companies are preparing to help in the reconstruction of war-torn areas. Iran feels that settlement of the decadeslong regional conflict is clandestine of geostrategic opportunities. The revival of economic cooperation in the South Caucasus can reanimate projects meant to connect the communication corridors in the Persian Gulf with the Black Sea region.

Tehran, always keenly aware of geopolitical consequences, doesn’t want Turkey and Azerbaijan to develop a strong military and economic alliance. Instead, Iran favors a strong Russian presence and a stable Armenia.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan remained pragmatic in its approach to waging war and waging peace. It understood Russia’s limitations, and it knew no one in the region wanted a confrontation between Russia and Turkey. But it also understood that without Russia’s presence in the region it would risk surrendering to Turkish geopolitical projects. Baku therefore agreed to return the territories that were occupied in the 1990s and to mitigate the risks of revolution. In other words, Azerbaijan helped maintain the status quo after the fighting.

Georgia

Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey are very concerned with the prospect of revolution in the South Caucasus, especially in how the uprisings could invite Western intervention. And even though President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly said that the Nagorno-Karabakh question has been answered, the fact that so many territories are populated by ethnic Armenians still in control of NagornoKarabakh argues otherwise.

Armenia

Armenia is the weakest economic and military power in the region, one that relies strongly on Iran for its political needs and entirely on Russia for its defense needs. It’s little wonder, then, that it lost the recent war. To some degree, the platform was predicated on Armenia’s legislative elections, as everyone relied on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to honor the cease-fires signed last November. (Pashinyan’s party won a majority in parliament, and Pashinyan himself will continue to fulfill the commitments he personally signed.)

In theory, Yerevan may try to engage Western countries, particularly the U.S. and France, and even boycott the peace process. However, the presence of Russia and Azerbaijan (backed by Turkey) doesn’t change how it feels about Armenia. So everyone is essentially waiting for Yerevan to fulfill its commitments to the peace agreement. Toward that end, the next move is to allow the construction of the so-called Zangezur corridor from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, which will include railway and transport connections. It may even include oil and gas pipelines. (The Russian FSB will likely control the corridor.) Moreover, all sides must delimit and demarcate their borders, but only after the peace deal is in place. Without a settlement between Yerevan and Baku, it is simply impossible to build greater projects, short of Azerbaijan building the corridor with the help of its army.

Of all the countries involved in the platform, Georgia is perhaps the most reluctant, given its strong ties to the West and its problems with Russia. Turkey has already started a diplomatic campaign to address its reticence, claiming Georgian participation in the platform may become an opportunity to eliminate the problems between Tbilisi and Moscow. The government in Tbilisi has sent mixed signals over the platform proposal. Though the president acknowledged Georgia must be involved in the platform’s creation, the Foreign Ministry clarified by saying how difficult it will be to engage with a country (Russia) that occupies territory (Abkhazia) that Georgia considers its own.

For Georgia, the increased role of Turkey guarantees a strategic balance against Russian influence. However, Georgia’s alignment with the West and its desire to join NATO will likely rankle the other members that want to limit Western participation. Either way, the Russia factor remains pivotal for Georgia’s participation. Tbilisi is risking being ousted from the regional projects while jeopardizing its potential NATO membership. For decades, Georgia has benefited from the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, so as relations between Yerevan and Baku improve, Georgia may become a much less attractive market, especially for oil and gas companies.

In sum, the platform, and thus the regional balance of power, is still in flux. Georgia is unlikely to join it, and Iran and Armenia have to approach it pragmatically, rather than enthusiastically. And the region will fail to see the potential of its economic development if Armenia and Azerbaijan don’t sign the peace agreement. The big question is the limits of Turkish-Russian cooperation. While their respective interests may favor stability at the moment, the two countries have a history of warfare. Iran’s presence mitigates the risk of a confrontation between them.

Even so, there may be room for gains under current conditions because all three understand the West could use these conflicts to its benefit. It’s in their interests to resolve conflict where possible. The same can’t be said of the U.S.

Ridvan Bari Urcosta is a Geopolitical Futures analyst with experience in the Black Sea region, Russia and the Middle East, Ukraine and Crimea. and Eastern Europe. He is a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Warsaw www.geopoliticalfutures.com