The new Middle East order
A tripolar system has emerged with Israel, Turkey and Iran at the helm
A new Middle East order is emerging that will soon supplant pan-Arabism as the dominant regional force after decades of failure by Arab states to resolve long-running disputes and pursue shared interests.
The new order – a tripolar system with
Israel, Turkey and Iran at the helm – is also ushering in a new era in regional politics, evident through the shifting relations between states.
Last week, for example, Saudi Arabia and Syria resumed full diplomatic relations, and Saudi King Salman invited Syrian President Bashar Assad to the upcoming Arab summit in Jeddah.
This comes as several Middle Eastern governments work toward normalisation with the Syrian regime, which was readmitted this week to the Arab League after 12 years of isolation.
Lack of Arab Cooperation
The emergence of this new order followed years of dysfunction among the Arab establishment.
In the 1950s, a sort of Arab cold war erupted between radical pan-Arab regimes and conservative monarchies, dampening cooperation among countries of the region. It subsided after the 1967 Six-Day War, as Israel’s Arab neighbors became preoccupied with their loss of territory in the conflict.
In 1970, Hafez Assad led a coup to overthrow the government in Damascus, following Syria’s losing bid to rescue the Palestine Liberation Organisation from full-scale war launched by Jordanian King Hussein, leading to the PLO’s expulsion to Lebanon.
Assad won the presidency in an uncontested election, eliminated the radical elements in the government and embarked on a domestic and regional policy of pragmatism, predicated on the principle of nonintervention in Arab countries’ affairs.
The death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser a few weeks before the coup facilitated the transition to an Arab political order, which promoted stability and security cooperation.
In 1978, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat reached a peace treaty with Israel in violation of an agreement among Arab states that any comprehensive peace deal would be negotiated by a united Arab bloc. The move led to the suspension of Egypt’s membership in the Arab League and the resumption of the Arab cold war, which continued, to varying degrees, until now.
Arab countries, along with Turkey and Iran, are putting their differences aside and focusing again on their economic and security imperatives.
Syria at the Center
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said, “The Arabs can’t make war without Egypt, and they can’t make peace without Syria.” This maxim is true now more than ever.
Syria is a fulcrum of Middle East power politics. The Arab rapprochement with the Syrian regime is aimed not at ending the conflict there but at making sure Syria will remain an arena for settling international and regional issues without directly affecting external parties.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries engaged in the Lebanese civil war for similar reasons. That conflict didn’t end until 1989, when Arab countries realised they couldn’t settle their differences by waging war in Lebanon.
Today, Middle Eastern states have a keen interest in keeping the Syrian conflict a controlled battleground through which Israel can vent its anger without it leading to a general war against Iran, which would threaten the security of the Gulf states.
Thus, the changing Arab regional outlook coincides with the resumption of SaudiIranian relations, reflecting the desire to confine the IsraeliIranian conflict to Syria without negatively impacting other countries.
However, the recent wave of reconciliation does not reflect what’s happening on the ground in Syria. Turkey will keep its current positions in the north under the pretext of securing its national interests, and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces will maintain their control in the east, protected by U.S. troops.
Russia and Iran, meanwhile, will continue to prop up the Assad regime, which has neither the will nor the ability to curtail Iranian influence – though it doesn’t seem that the Arab countries are asking Assad to do so anyway. Arab governments want to achieve fruitful cooperation with Iran in Syria to protect their future investments in Syria’s reconstruction from government corruption.
Iran and Arab countries also have a shared interest in restoring security in the war-torn country. As for Russia, it can benefit from the Arab-Syrian rapprochement by using it to bolster relations with Arab states at a time when it is increasingly isolated.
Investors will still be wary about investing in Syria, even if the U.S. turns a blind eye to attempts to circumvent sanctions under cover of humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, the Gulf countries believe committing financial resources to
Syria’s reconstruction will have stabilising effects.
Tehran is also looking to benefit economically from Syria’s recovery. On a recent trip to Damascus, Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi wanted to focus on their economic relations, characterised by complete Iranian control over real estate, electricity and milling sectors.
The push to restore Arab countries’ embassies in Damascus hasn’t translated beyond a diplomatic level. One day before announcing Damascus’ return to the Arab League, Jordan launched a military operation inside Syrian territory to combat drug smuggling.
The move sent a message to Assad that his return to the grouping does not give him free rein. Oman, which played an essential role in mediating the rapprochement, added figures close to the Syrian regime to its terrorism watch list the same day that the Arab League announced it was restoring Syria’s membership.
Syria’s rehabilitation also means little in terms of the integrity of the Arab League, a grouping made up of countries with their own questionable human rights records.
Many Arab governments did not intervene in the Syrian conflict to support the uprising and even disrupted opposition forces by using them to pursue their own agendas at the expense of the Syrian people.
Iran, for its part, considers the war in Syria over. It’s now focused on a strategy, known as frontal defense, aimed at constructing sectarian military barriers as its first line of defense in any future war.
The strategy also aims to ensure that the Iranian regime can maintain supplies to and communications with Iranlinked militias. Tehran must therefore secure safe transportation routes by purchasing land in Greater Damascus to build a buffer and establish reliable and permanent access to its most prominent ally, Hezbollah.
The Arab openness to the government in Damascus has no effect on this plan.
Saudi and Emirati Defensive Posture
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been gradually developing a new regional policy to ease tensions in the Middle East, starting by improving relations with Turkey and Qatar and developing dialogue with Iran and the Assad regime.
Abu Dhabi has adopted a more aggressive regional policy predicated militarily and economically on the peace agreement with Israel. Its rulers understand that the Biden administration’s Middle East policy does not hinge on the Gulf countries or Egypt, in part because of their dismal human rights records. Instead, the U.S. bases its vision for the Middle East on Israel, which it views as a reliable ally.
The UAE thus reformulated its regional policy in line with this vision and withdrew from the costly conflicts in Yemen and Libya. Saudi Arabia belatedly followed suit, pulling out of the conflict in Yemen, a costly affair that exposed Saudi military weakness. It didn’t take long for the kingdom to realise that the only way out of its miscalculated military adventure was a rapprochement with Tehran.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia are now increasingly focused on economic development, as they transition away from oil dependence and costly foreign misadventures.
The Middle East is witnessing an awakening under a new regional order that will combine cultures, nationalities, religions and ideologies. This could lead to separatist conflicts in the future and will alter the cultural and intellectual fabric of Arab society.
Regardless of Turkey’s domestic political polarisation, it will emerge as an active partner in the Gulf region and among the Arab Sunnis in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
Iranian influence will also hold more weight because of Tehran’s close relations with Shiites in the countries of the Arab world. Israel will hold significant sway as a pivotal regional state, serving as a role model for modernisation and an effective liaison with the West.
Egypt, meanwhile, will continue to coordinate among Arab countries, calming conflicts as they arise – which they inevitably will.