Turkey and Greece extend olive branches
Renewed engagement likely won’t overcome their deep divisions
It was a busy week for Turkey’s representatives at the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Elon Musk to explore the possibility of opening a Tesla manufacturing site in Turkey. Then came meetings with officials from Israel – which has been at odds with Turkey for more than a decade – to explore joint energy projects and possible normalization.
But the most notable meeting was between Erdogan and Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the prime minister of Greece, Turkey’s greatest rival in the Mediterranean. More than a year ago, Ankara and Athens suspended talks on de-escalation.
Following last week’s meeting in New York, however, the two sides announced plans for a series of high-level negotiations through the winter.
From mid-October until a high-level summit in the Greek city of Thessaloniki on December 7, Greek and Turkish officials will convene several times in search of common ground and confidence-building measures.
But while domestic political considerations, natural disasters and new economic priorities have opened the door to discussions, too many political, territorial and security disagreements remain in the way of meaningful cooperation.
Last year’s negotiations marked Turkey and Greece’s first attempt in five years to turn the page on their long-standing rivalry. Relations had been worsening for years because of disagreements over territorial rights in the Mediterranean, Greece’s militarization of Aegean islands, the status of Cyprus and migration.
Erdogan abruptly called off negotiations in May 2022 after
Turkey accused Greek aircraft of violating its airspace and after Mitsotakis spent much of a visit to Washington trying to persuade the U.S. Congress not to approve the sale of F-16s to Turkey.
Circumstances have changed in the intervening months. For starters, Mitsotakis and Erdogan both secured reelection earlier this year, boosting their political legitimacy and reducing the political incentives to bash the other. Both countries also suffered catastrophic natural disasters.
In February, a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck Turkey, killing more than 50,000 people and causing as much as $84 billion in damage. Meanwhile, Greece endured historic wildfires followed by flooding, prompting the European Union to provide more than $2 billion in emergency funding. The countries’ shared experience of natural disasters has fueled a debate around cooperation to prevent and respond to future events.
Another change is that Erdogan’s new government has been much more accommodating, from the Mediterranean to the Gulf.
Under the pressure of worsening economic conditions and a potential financial crisis, Ankara is seeking economic diversification and opportunities for joint projects – even if that means making nice with old enemies. Turkey has engaged former rivals such as the United Arab Emirates, Israel and Syria on topics including joint energy corridors and direct investment.
Rapprochement with Israel is especially urgent because Turkey wants to establish an energy corridor from Israel’s Leviathan offshore gas field to Turkey and then to Europe. The project would help Turkey reduce its dependence on natural gas imports and support its ambition to become a Mediterranean gas hub, but among other things it hinges on the approval of Cyprus and Greece.
Despite the new tailwinds, Turkey’s rivalry with Greece runs deeper than its problems with countries like Israel and Syria. A case in point is the proposed Turkish-Israeli gas pipeline. For all its signaling about dialing down tensions with Athens, Ankara has not adjusted its stance on the defining issues between them – namely, the lack of a political settlement on the island of Cyprus, which is divided between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
Therefore, Turkey and Greece may make progress this winter on issues like disaster prevention and response, but outside of these relatively low-stakes topics, they will be fortunate even to agree on an agenda. Substantive agreements on lingering security, economic and political issues remain a distant prospect.