A new EU enlargement proposal, Ukraine edition

France and Germany’s submission is a riff on older plans – but this time, Ukraine is the trigger

Last week, all eyes were on the conflict in NagornoKarabakh, where an escalation of forces threatens to disrupt the tenuous equilibrium among Russia, the Caucasus and, less directly, Eastern Europe. Also last week, tensions emerged between Ukraine and Poland, which refused to lift a ban on Ukrainian grain exports as the European Commission let it expire on September 15.

Warsaw even said it could consider no longer allowing Ukraine-bound military equipment to pass through Poland after President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Poland, Slovakia and Hungary of “helping Moscow” by hindering his country’s grain exports.

All of this points to a sense of Ukraine fatigue at the same moment that the EU begins discussions on how to budget for the country’s reconstruction, a process that is inexorably tied to its potential accession to the European Union. It’s no coincidence, then, that Brussels also started deliberating what reforms it needs to enact ahead of its next expansion.

Circles

On Sept. 20, foreign ministers at a European Council meeting discussed a report commissioned by France and Germany and written by “independent” experts calling themselves “the Group of 12.” The report proposed structural reforms and was released ahead of a council meeting in October, where EU enlargement is expected to be on top of the agenda.

And though the conclusions do not match the official positions of France and Germany, the fact that the report is being presented at a ministerial meeting of the council suggests tacit government support.

It proposes restructuring the EU into four concentric circles. This is not an entirely new idea. In 2006, after the bloc’s first crisis of confidence, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt and Edouard Balladur, the foreign policy head of the French parliament, had similar visions of a radial EU enlargement.

Though both considered the eurozone to be the inner circle, each believed the outer circles would develop differently. Verhofstadt proposed that the EU ultimately become a sort of federation by slowly integrating each outer circle into a single larger one.

Balladur proposed that the EU evolve through policy convergence and coordination, emphasizing that EU member states are not equal and therefore should not be regarded as equals in decision-making processes – instead, the eurozone reigned supreme and should thus quarterback EU integration.

Later, during the EU’s second crisis of confidence, French lawmaker Vincent Le Biez advocated a new strategy.

Proposed in 2014, Biez’s three concentric circles plan placed the eurozone’s six most important countries by gross domestic product in the inner circle, surrounded by a second grouping of the eurozone states, which would act as an “economic zone based on coordination and cooperation.”

The third circle comprised a “free market zone governed by the rule of law.” His proposal died on the vine when EU policymakers realized the periphery was an integral part of the eurozone.

The proposal submitted by France and Germany last week incorporates parts of the previous ones but boasts four circles, two of which incorporate countries working with the EU, not necessarily members of the EU proper. The inner circle would consist of members of the eurozone and the Schengen area.

Notably, there is no reference to which country or countries would lead this grouping.

The second circle would consist of all EU members, which, as it happens, benefit from cohesion funds and redistributive policies. These two circles would cover the entire bloc and constitute the “core EU.” Membership in either of these circles would be predicated on policy reform.

The third circle would comprise EU-associated countries. The EU has established association agreements with countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and others in the Western Balkans, but the third circle wouldn’t necessarily include these states.

According to the report, countries included here would have to meet certain requirements, including a commitment to comply with the EU’s common principles and values, participate in the single market, and contribute, albeit less than core members, to the EU budget for fewer benefits. All of this would need updated association agreements.

The fourth circle would be an envisioned European political community. For countries in this circle, the only requirement is the willingness to cooperate in policy areas of “mutual importance and relevance such as security, energy or the environment and climate policy.”

The proposal notes that because geopolitical factors are the biggest reasons for EU enlargement, those willing to become members would need to align with the EU not only on its security strategy but also on its sanctions policy.

In this way, the EPC would serve as a platform for

potential EU candidates. Notably, not all countries that currently have an association agreement and seek EU membership have joined EU sanctions policy toward Russia.

Complex Reforms

The proposal focuses on the effects enlargement should have on the EU and the reforms that are necessary to strengthen cohesion. It states that membership in the European core – that is, the first two circles – should at the very least be based on “acquis communautaire,” the EU’s set of governing rules and regulations.

It recommends further that current members accept a “stricter enforcement of the rule of law” by launching sanctions against those states that violate this principle, with the agreement of four-fifths in the European Council. It’s unclear if sanctions would lead to the expulsion of members from the inner two circles or de facto EU banishment.

What’s clear is that the proposed reforms mean to make the EU more normative, compelling its members to respect EU rules and regulations, and be more beholden to the power of “experienced” states. One of the major reforms proposed by the report is to change the rotating European Council presidency from three to five members, each spanning half of an institutional cycle. That the report recommends “at least one larger member state with greater administrative capacity and experience” be part of each quintet suggests a clear hierarchy.

The report also proposes several important, if arcane, reforms to EU institutions and procedures. It suggests that the number of European Parliament members not increase beyond the current 751; only after the bloc expands should a new system be devised.

In the event of expansion, the commission will either need to reduce the size of the College of Commissioners to twothirds of member states or develop a hierarchical model.

Moreover, the report recommends that the European Council’s voting system be changed to give qualitative majority voting more weight. While there are several ideas under discussion – including one that places more emphasis on the European Parliament – they all want the same thing: that policy-related decisions, save those related to foreign, security and defense policy, be approved by a qualified majority rather than unanimity.

In theory, this would avert deadlocks and allow for faster decision-making, but it could also Balkanize the parliament as countries team up on certain issues or create a situation in which some are inadvertently pushed out of the “core” of the new system. Any decision that would affect member states’ fiscal policy (on budget deficit rates, for instance) could create this very situation.

Finally, the proposal asks for a new way for the EU to define and defend its resources. Apart from tying things such as respect for the rule of law to budgetary funding, the paper also suggests a profound reform of how the EU budget is adopted and spent.

If the changes are passed, expect an overhaul of funding programs such as the common agriculture policy and cohesion funds for disadvantaged regions, especially considering Ukraine is both a major agricultural producer and currently the most disadvantaged region of Europe.

Indeed, Ukraine is the basis for the report and the inspiration for many of its suggested reforms. But the report’s contents illustrate the challenges the EU would face if it seriously considered Ukraine’s membership.

There’s broad consensus that EU expansion (and even integration) needs to be reformed to make the process more fluid and flexible, but no state wants to surrender any of its power to make this happen. The report highlights one way that limited powers could work to make the EU more effective while integrating Ukraine. There may be other ways to do that, but all of them have the same result: European states will lose some of what they have gained.

Expect this to be the beginning of a long debate not only on EU reforms but also on the relationship between the EU and Ukraine.