Kenya’s attempt to woo the West
The president is embarking on a long-term strategy that may not reach its full potential
On a recent tour through Africa, I got the chance to meet academics, diplomats and other industry experts on behalf of Charles University. I also had the pleasure of visiting Nairobi, perhaps the most developed city in the most developed economy of East Africa.
But though the Kenyan capital punches above its weight in many ways, it still suffers from problems endemic to Africa and pursues certain foreign policy goals accordingly.
The Africa Climate Summit, which concluded just before I arrived, illustrates where Kenya stands now and where it hopes to be in the future. At the event, leaders from across the continent, as well as some from Europe and the United States, met to tackle some of the issues associated with climate change.
Absent from the conference were Nigeria and South Africa, which believe the transition from fossil fuels will hurt their economies. Their concerns aren’t unfounded: Nigeria is a massive crude oil exporter, and South Africa relies on coal-fired power stations to generate over 80 percent of its electricity. Kenya, on the other hand, gets some 85 percent of its energy through renewable sources and is thus more open to working with the West (and less hostile to listening to its lectures on the environment).
This tendency can be applied to Kenyan policy more broadly. In fact, many of the officials I spoke with seemed to corroborate the idea that Kenya is looking to become the key spokesperson for the continent as an ally of the West. It’s a bit of a departure for Nairobi, which has tended to balance between different actors, remaining friendly with Europe, the U.S. and even China. Former President Uhuru Kenyatta was eager to cooperate with Beijing on infrastructure projects, and under his watch the country became an important cog in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It also racked up massive amounts of debt that it is struggling to pay off at a time when the Chinese economy is slowing down.
Kenyatta’s successor, current President William Ruto, has been critical of this arrangement but has yet to fully turn his back on China. In the lead-up to the Belt and Road Summit in Beijing last week, Ruto indicated that he would ask for an additional $1 billion loan and a repayment restructuring plan for the outstanding debt. The additional loan is meant to cover stalled road construction projects that remain unfinished under BRI.
In fact, Kenya has about $70 billion in debt. It owes a little over $6 billion to China, which represents 64 percent of its bilateral debt but just 17 percent of its total external debt. All told, the government in Nairobi spends roughly half its revenue servicing old debt. This is at least partly why Nairobi is looking to the West for support.
That $2 billion worth of Eurobonds will mature in 2024 and that China’s economic slowdown has curbed Chinese lending are also factors.
The EU and U.S., meanwhile, are looking for partners in which they can invest capital, particularly in green energy and tech, and that can support military operations across the continent.
Kenya qualifies as both. It is relatively stable, uses green technology, is experienced in combat and is in dire need of debt relief. Hence why at the Africa Climate Summit Ruto assured world leaders that Kenya was ready to push forward a green agenda for the continent and was uniquely positioned to do so.
In some respects, the strategy has already paid off. Kenya is already a beneficiary of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and negotiations for the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership progressed this month to include congressional meetings.
More, the EU-Kenya Economic Partnership Agreement, which was concluded in June, will boost bilateral economic cooperation, with immediate full liberalization of the EU market for Kenyan products and incentives for EU investment in Kenya.
Other examples of Kenya’s availing itself to the West abound. The country has opposed Russia since the war began, choosing to publicly condemn Moscow for blocking the grain deal and declining to send a representative to the Russia-Africa forum in St. Petersburg in July. Nairobi has also voiced its support for Israel, aligning with key U.S. talking points.
The government will deploy some 1,000 security forces to Haiti by the end of the year, pending approval from the U.N. Security Council, and a separate defense agreement was signed involving material support for the Kenyan military and U.S. deployments at Manda Bay.
Kenya also maintains good relations with the U.K. The two signed a new strategic partnership in 2020, citing a desire to build on their historical ties. London is the largest European foreign investor in Kenya, and there are currently more than 100 British investment companies based in Kenya.
King Charles III will visit Kenya at the end of the month to further strengthen ties, marking his first visit to the country since his coronation.
Anecdotally, many of the Kenyans I spoke with seemed to have a positive opinion of the U.K.
But for Kenya’s outreach to the West to work, it will have to at least passably manage some of its domestic problems. Inflation is stubbornly high, even if it dropped to 6.8 percent according to the latest data, and the cost of living is also high. This bodes poorly for a president like Ruto who campaigned on a platform of economic repair.
While the academics I spoke with in Kenya hold Ruto in high esteem, most of the ordinary citizens tended to criticize him for preoccupying himself with foreign affairs at the expense of their economic well-being. As inflation takes hold and as the value of the shilling continues to decline, there is a risk that the economic benefits of Ruto’s realignment may not have time to materialize.
The president seems to understand Kenya’s potential; this is just the beginning of a long-term strategy to realize it.
The question is whether Kenyan voters will give him the time to see it through.
Ronan Wordsworth is an analyst for Geopolitical Futures.