The Middle East as a powder keg
The region is seeing escalations on multiple fronts
In response to the Hamas attack on October 7, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to change the Middle East. An Israeli army spokesman confirmed that Israel is willing to act anywhere in the Middle East to achieve its security interests.
There are no indications of a resolution on the horizon, as the situation in Gaza will probably linger for the foreseeable future. But Israel remains determined to oust Hamas and replace it with symbolic Palestinian rule.
With the U.S. presidential election approaching, this will likely have to wait until next year. But it is no exaggeration to say that the future of the Middle East rests mainly on the future of Gaza.
The Palestinian issue is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the region’s crises, but all neighboring countries and regional and international powers realize that solving the region’s many issues depends on a comprehensive answer to the Palestinian question. Resolving the region’s issues – the wars in Syria and Yemen, the crisis in Iraq, the collapse of the Lebanese state and Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony – will be on hold pending resolution of the conflict in Gaza.
Addressing economic stagnation in moderate countries such as Egypt and Jordan and spurring ambitious development projects in the Gulf states, namely Saudi Arabia, also hinge on the outcome of the Israel-Hamas war.
Regional Military Escalation
As tensions rise in several areas of the region, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently warned that the Middle East is a powder keg about to explode. The U.S. is cautiously leading regional efforts to isolate Iran because of the subversive activities of proxies like the Houthis in Yemen and Shiite militias in Iraq.
Earlier this month, Washington intervened militarily in the Red Sea to deter the Houthis from launching more missile and drone attacks against ships heading to the Israeli port of Eilat. The U.S. did not resort to the military option enthusiastically, knowing it might not wholly deter the Houthis. Despite the strikes, the Biden administration said it was not at war with the group.
Last month, an Israeli missile attack killed the top commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria. Israel also killed five IRGC officers in an airstrike in Damascus last week, the same day that Iran launched air defense drills.
Also last week, the IRGC attacked targets in Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan region, and Idlib, northwest Syria, with longrange ballistic missiles. It then launched strikes against a separatist group called Jaish al-Adl inside Pakistani territory – prompting the Iraqi foreign minister to say that Iran bombed friendly countries because it could not strike Israel.
Iran’s attack was in response to bombings claimed by the Islamic State in the southeastern city of Kerman and an attack in the town of Rask in Sistan and Baluchistan province, claimed by Jaish al-Adl.
The Iranian strikes came amid internal criticism regarding the regime’s lack of direct response to Israel’s actions. It appears that one of the goals of the IRGC attacks was to confirm that Iran’s policy of strategic patience and avoiding full-scale involvement in military conflict does not mean weakness.
The strikes also attest to the regime’s isolation and empty threats that disillusioned many of its Shiite supporters in the region. Iran could have ordered its proxies to avenge the attacks that targeted the Iranian heartland.
But it chose instead to send a message to Israel and the U.S. that their firepower would not deter its regional ambitions. Tehran realizes that the Middle East is undergoing fundamental changes and wants to ensure they do not compromise its regional interests.
Ultimately, however, Iran’s attacks against U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria and the disruption of transit through the Red Sea are making noise without impacting the course of events.
There are indications of cracks in Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance” – which the U.S. perceives as positive indicators. Moderate Arab countries are now pinning their hopes on peacemaking as the ultimate solution to the region’s crises and economic difficulties.
Peak Iranian Influence
Iran’s recent actions mark the culmination of years of expansion for Tehran. Former U.S. President Barack Obama’s reluctance to intervene in the Syrian conflict in 2011, his announcement of the U.S. intention to withdraw from Iraq that same year, and his conclusion of a nuclear deal with Tehran in 2015 indicated to Iran that it could prevail in the Middle East.
Even the administration of his successor Donald Trump, which adopted a hardline approach toward Tehran and helped Israel emerge from its regional isolation by concluding the Abraham Accords in 2020, did little to demonstrate that the U.S. presence in the Middle East would continue to dominate.
But fomenting regional tensions does not benefit Iran anymore. The current escalation weakens its regional allies and puts them out of service in pursuit of its broader interests. Tehran’s proxies have exceeded their ability to support its influence. The U.S. has called on the Houthis to stop obstructing navigation in the Red Sea, and whether or not they comply, the result will be the same: The Houthis will no longer serve Iran’s regional project.
Hezbollah, which decided to modestly support Hamas after its October attack, also missed the point that Israel would escalate the military situation in the north and turn the fighting into a war of attrition. It looks as if military escalation will continue until Iran accepts that it is an ordinary country, not a regional superpower.
No Solutions on the Horizon
It does not seem that this year will lead to political breakthroughs in the Middle East, as the fallout of Hamas’ attack is still unfolding. Though Arab countries and Israel are intent on making peace, progress is slow given the regional situation and the complexity of the political issues standing in their way.
Talks on resolving the Palestinian issue began from the first moment of the war, reviving the peace process that had stalled for decades. Discussions focused on the aftermath of the Israel-Hamas war and how to ensure a sustainable peace that could end the region’s conflicts.
U.S. President Joe Biden realizes that the final year of his term in office may give him a historic opportunity to achieve peace in the Middle East. But this goal, which has preoccupied every American president for more than seven decades, is unlikely to be achieved this year. Israel will not undertake fundamental changes while the fighting continues.
The composition of the Israeli government and Iran’s regional proxies make peace an enormously challenging endeavor.
Nevertheless, Arab leaders – specifically those in Saudi Arabia who believe success of the NEOM megaproject hinges on close cooperation with Israel – welcome regional integration with a focus on security and economics. They also want to corner Iran by neutralizing its regional proxies.
Saudi Arabia has made normalization with Israel contingent on establishing a Palestinian state, which Israel still opposes. Though Netanyahu reportedly told Biden in a call that he did not oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state if it is demilitarized, Netanyahu soon thereafter publicly reiterated his rejection of the establishment of such an entity.
In response to Israel’s opposition to statehood, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Arab countries are not keen to rebuild Gaza only to have it leveled again in a few years. Officials in the U.S. State
Department have argued that Israel will have to make tough choices to ensure Arab states are willing to participate in the process.
The Middle East is inching toward formulating a major regional deal that includes stopping the war in Gaza, establishing an inclusive government there that does not exclude Hamas as a political movement, and ensuring long-term stability
The package will not necessarily lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state but will allow Saudi Arabia and other Arab and Islamic countries to save face and continue to pursue normalization with Israel. Israel will accept a clearly defined path for Palestinian political rights, without specifying the nature of these rights in advance, as a precondition for normalizing relations.
American diplomats have said that Netanyahu, regardless of his defiant populist rhetoric, will have to face the regional reality. If his government fails to make concessions, it alone will have to deal with the chaos in Gaza.
The Biden administration thinks Netanyahu’s shaky political situation at home requires him to heed U.S. pressure.
Biden, whose own approval ratings are declining, is bracing himself for an uphill battle against a surging Donald Trump, his likely Republican presidential challenger. He wants to reassure critics within his party that he understands Palestinian grievances and is not giving Israel the green light for unrestricted war. His administration believes there is a path to comprehensive peace in the region, but it has yet to crystallize its starting point.
Any peace process will probably have to wait until the military escalation subsides and Iran’s regional goals are curbed. For
Saudi Arabia, stopping Iran and ensuring unimpeded maritime traffic are more important than Israel’s willingness to make concessions to the Palestinians. Last week, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan reiterated his country’s willingness to recognize Israel pending resolution of the Palestinian issue.
Biden also recently announced that Saudi Arabia and Israel are on the verge of reaching a peace deal.
For the Saudis, encouraging beneficial interaction between Middle Eastern states is one way to prevent the powder keg from exploding, at least for now.