The tragedy of US-Turkish relations
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Recep Tayyip Erdogan will soon start his third term as Turkey's president. There will be much hand-wringing over whether he regained power through “free and fair elections” (he didn't), what this means for democracy in Turkey (not good) and whether his victory was really better for stability in the region and Greece's security (it isn't).
Since Erdogan's first-round victory on May 14, there have been several analyses of what type of foreign policy he will pursue. Perhaps a more pressing question is: “What will he be allowed to get away with?” The answer to that question largely depends on how the relationship between Washington and Ankara develops.
The best moniker for the dysfunctional alliance between the US and Turkey still comes from the Council on Foreign Relations' aptly titled report: “Neither Friend nor Foe” (or the adjustment to that title that the report's author, Steven Cook, has made in recent years, to “More Foe than Friend”). This sentiment is held in both countries. It was an “open secret” that the Biden Administration was hoping Erdogan would lose. The week before Turkey's elections members of congress were harshly criticizing Erdogan and publicly hoping for change in Turkey. Erdogan and the AKP effectively campaigned against President Joe Biden by labeling the opposition as his preference.
From here on out, there will be much talk of “reset,” reminders that Erdogan has switched course before and even talk that Erdogan may have a comfortable enough mandate to make courageous decisions on foreign policy.
All of this is nonsense. Erdogan will not change. He will certainly pretend that he is changing because he knows that pretense often works on American diplomats who have a short tenure and an inherent belief that they will be the secretary or assistant secretary or ambassador who will finally achieve a diplomatic breakthrough.
During the reign of Erdogan, no US administration has disabused him of his deep-seated belief that time is on his side and that if he is obstinate enough, America will blink. Despite evidence that pressure works (the Pastor Brunson case; recent cooperation by Turkey on restricting certain shipments) the United States has not applied – or even threatened to apply – pressure consistently enough for Erdogan to take Washington seriously.
There is in fact an opportunity to reset relations with Turkey, but that opportunity can only be realized if Washington sheds its image of “appeaser” when it comes to Turkey. Here are some immediate opportunities:
Russia: Tense relations with Erdogan turned into a rupture because of how close he got to Russia. The S400 controversy shocked even most Turkey fans in the US. And although there was initially hope that Turkey would be an asset in supporting Ukraine, it is a liability even more often because it needs Russia on several fronts. If we are to keep the war in Ukraine from becoming another “forever war,” Ankara must choose sides. Especially given the economic cliff Turkey is facing, it should be made clear that serving as a sanctions-evading mechanism for Vladimir Putin will have costs.
NATO: Everyone is anticipating a quick turnaround for Turkey to approve Sweden's accession to NATO. Erdogan has so masterfully and cynically dragged this issue out so as to treat it as a major concession on his part. It is not. This is a necessary – but insufficient – step towards Turkey demonstrating its solidarity with NATO. What the rest of the alliance – especially the US – should make clear is that they are ready to effectively treat Sweden as an ally whether Ankara approves or not, maybe even to pledge to send weapons that would otherwise be meant for purported allies like Turkey. Speaking of NATO solidarity and weapons…
End belligerence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's intransigence against Sweden's NATO membership has rightfully raised the ire of Ankara's Western allies, but the prospect of a Greco-Turkish war is a far more serious threat – an existential threat – to NATO. A pause in overflights should not be confused with a change in policy, and the failure of the US and the EU to get Ankara to roll back its casus belli against Greece or pull back its absurd formal challenges to Greek sovereignty is negligent in that it relies on extraordinary Greek restraint to prevent an inter-NATO conflict. The Biden Administration must openly condition its support for F-16s to Turkey on ending this belligerence within NATO. Without such conditions, America will effectively be arming Ankara to wage war against American allies and partners.
Erdogan will only change if he is forced to. For the first time in a long time, he may finally realize that Ankara needs Washington more than Washington needs Ankara. The US has considerable leverage at this point and time: the ability to influence IMF assistance; F-16s; the amount of penalties to be imposed in the Halkbank case; energy diplomacy. If the Biden Administration can't utilize this leverage, not only will any opportunity to reset be missed, but relations will go from bad to much worse.
During the reign of Erdogan, no US administration has disabused him of his deep-seated belief that if he is obstinate enough, America will blink