State secession is a scenario if Biden wins
Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explains why the possibility of division after the US presidential election is no longer inconceivable
He was born in Athens, the son of Donald Kagan, a prominent classicist and expert in the history of the Peloponnesian War. However, Robert Kagan did not follow his father's academic path, but instead worked at the State Department under the Ronald Reagan administration, as a speechwriter for the then secretary of state George P. Shultz, and a member of the United States Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, before ending up at the Brookings Institution as a senior fellow and as a regular analyst for the Washington Post. A few days ago he participated in the Delphi Economic Forum and spoke about American democracy, the dilemmas of the West and the war in Ukraine. Part of the discussion at the forum follows below.
– In your famous book, you argue that the jungle is growing back, posing a threat to the entire postwar liberal system. Are you really worried about this now, especially considering events like those in Ukraine and the rise of China?
The jungle is always growing back. We've lived through an exceptional era in human history where democracy and individual rights are respected, and we've had tremendous economic wealth extending from the 20th century to the present day. And the world has experienced a prolonged period of peace in terms of major conflicts among powerful nations. But it's good to remember that this is a rare circumstance in history. In fact, I think it's not a natural circumstance. In order to have that world, you have to be actively creating that world. Much like tending to a garden to prevent it from succumbing to nature's control. And so the jungle is always pressuring this world, because human beings are divided in their impulses. While they cherish freedom, they also like other things, more than they care about being free. So these pressures are always there. And the jungle is growing back, but we're not necessarily going to be overrun by it. The basic structure of the international system that we've been living in for the past several decades remains intact. But a lot will depend on developments in Ukraine, on what choices are made in East Asia. But right now, I think it is feasible to preserve the garden we've created. But it requires real work and real solidarity, and, unfortunately, it requires fighting, because this world was created by war and it will be changed by war.
– So do you think war is inevitable, with China for example?
I don't think it's inevitable. Inevitable is a strong word. Obviously, there's going to be continuing pressure and tension depending on what course China decides to take, but also, the United States as well. I believe that China can be successfully deterred if the people who need to deter it are determined to do so. And I also believe China can be encouraged to move in the direction of increasing its wealth, increasing the well-being of its people, and perhaps discouraged from a kind of atavistic desire for territory, even territory that they think is theirs.
– When we examine the situation in Ukraine, it's really hard to see how Ukraine can win this war. With the latest developments – they're
running out of electricity, USAID is held up on the Hill – can you see a positive endgame from Zelenskyy's point of view?
Wars are unpredictable. As are the politics of wars. Ukraine, now, does not have what it needs to continue its fight, to hold on to what it already has. This is a failure on the part of the United States, and to some extent, all those who have tried to help Ukraine. But should Ukraine hold on, Putin has turned Russia into a military state. But I wonder how long that's sustainable. And it's very unfortunate, because there were real questions about the sustainability of it in the first year. But for a variety of reasons, and certainly because we were slow in getting the kind of weaponry Ukraine needed, we gave Russia a chance to get back in the game, which is where they are right now. But I don't think it's a foregone conclusion. And what does victory mean? I won't speculate on whether Ukraine should concede the Donbas. That is not where Ukraine is right now. We could talk about endgames, but how about we just do what needs to be done right now? Let's start with that. So, let's do what's necessary and give Ukraine a chance to hold on.
Because at a certain point, Russia also has to take into account the cost that it's bearing, the countless lives affected by it. I don't know that they can go on indefinitely.
– If Trump wins, do you anticipate a significant shift in terms of policy towards Russia and Ukraine?
Yes, I do. Trump's intentions are quite clear: He's laid out his secret peace plan, which is no secret. Essentially, Ukraine complies with Russia's demands. I don't know whether he realizes that with Russia, with Putin, any agreement is only a pause. It's not the end of the story. It's where Putin consolidates before he makes his next move. I think that's very clear. I don't know if Trump understands that. The thing about Trump is he doesn't have any beliefs. There's nothing that he's absolutely committed to. Everything is transactional for him. Everything is about particularly money for him. If I were advising governments on how to deal with Trump, if he's elected, I would say give him lots of money. Not to America, to him personally or his family, as this seems to influence his foreign policy decisions. But what he lacks, is what every president until him has had since World War II, which is a sense of America's role in the system, a sense of responsibility, a sense of closeness to allies. Trump has no closeness to anyone in his personal life and certainly not in his diplomatic life.
– Now, I've heard two theories. One is that this time Trump is going to be unhinged and he'll have the Michael Flynns of the world around him. There's the other theory that good old establishment figures like Mike Pompeo will come back, and
that you'll have more of a predictable foreign policy. Which one you would you buy?
I definitely believe the first. Trump is well aware, as are his potential cabinet members, that during his previous term as president, his agenda was often thwarted by internal opposition. While I may not hold Mike Pompeo in high regard, there were individuals within the government who actively impeded Trump's initiatives – chief of staff, national security advisers. However, they will not be there this time. Trump will likely surround himself with individuals who not only carry out his directives but also pre-emptively anticipate his desires. These advisers will have their own agendas to advance, reminiscent of figures like Michael Flynn. Therefore, a second Trump term would be characterized by the dominance of such individuals, rather than the return of establishment figures like Pompeo. While some may attempt to paint a more reassuring picture by highlighting Pompeo's potential role, because they want to justify their support for Trump, the reality is likely to be far more threatening.
– What happened to the old enlightened Republican Party? Even Dick Cheney looks very enlightened to me.
They've headed for the hills. The dominance and aggressiveness of the Trump movement within the party have instilled fear, causing individuals to toe the line. This conformity extends even to thinkers, think tanks, and intellectuals, who find themselves justifying and rationalizing the current state of affairs.
– Let's delve into Trump as a phenomenon
because even if he's defeated, this influence is likely to persist. How much does white anxiety have to do with the Trump phenomenon?
It has everything to do with the Trump phenomenon. I think that Trump has tapped into it. Everybody knows it's there. It's been there throughout American history, by the way. White status anxiety has been a major feature of American politics from the very beginning, even during the period of slavery. And now I think it's back. But Trump has both benefited from it, but he's also spurred it. He's also made it acceptable. He's made it legitimate. Let's not forget that he ran in his first campaign in 2012 as a white supremacist. He ran on the Obama birther conspiracy, which is to say the first American black president is not really an American. And everybody knew what that meant. And all the people who have this white status anxiety immediately glommed onto him. He's the avatar of Christian nationalism in America. The evangelicals are completely in with him, despite potential disagreements on issues like abortion.
– Do you believe that the rise of woke culture acted as a multiplier or amplifier for Trump's appeal?
It's always woke culture in America. It isn't a new phenomenon. Similar sentiments of white anxiety have surfaced throughout history, notably following significant events like the Brown vs Board of Education ruling in 1954 and desegregation efforts. The same white anxiety existed in the post-Civil War period. This is an ongoing phenomenon. I don't like the word wokeism. It has all kinds of connotations. But there was a time,
for instance, in the late 19th century, when Irish Americans were depicted in national cartoons as ape-like creatures with a bottle of whiskey in one hand and a club in the other. There was a time when Italian Americans were treated like dirt. And all of these groups used the American system first to demand their rights and then to demand respect. And a lot of what woke is about is asking for respect. Now, can it go too far? Yes. Can it turn into language control? Is cancel culture ridiculous? Yes. But I think those things are also self-correcting. And I wouldn't get overly concerned about the fact that African Americans want to be treated not only equally under the law, but they also desire equal treatment in society, much like Jewish Americans, Irish Americans, and Italian Americans. It's not about “wokeness”; it's about how people react to it. [...] But, I don't accept the argument “the left made me do it, the left made me support a fascist dictator.”
`The thing about Trump is he doesn't have any beliefs. If I were advising governments on how to deal with Trump, if he's elected, I would say give him lots of money. Not to America, to him personally'
– Now, who's going to win?
If pressed, I'd lean towards Biden winning. However, I'm far from comfortable because I see significant chances for a Trump victory. And I think it's an apocalyptic event, if Trump is elected.
– Can you see any unforeseen development, like the Democrats changing a candidate?
That's not an unforeseen development. That's a development that was hoped for and has not happened and is not going to happen. Unless it's a health issue, it's too late to change. Moreover, I'm one of those who question whether there's a single individual out there whom the entire Democratic Party will unequivocally support. I