What next?

Now that the Venezuelan National Assembly has passed a law naming Essequibo as the 24th state of Venezuela, and President Maduro has issued six decrees relating to the administrative measures to be applied there, the question arises as to how Caracas intends to go about incorporating into its territory what is, and always has been, our patrimony. At a practical level, as everyone recognises, that is only possible by the use of force. So what precisely is it that Venezuela proposes to do, and when does it propose to do it?

The first thing to be noted is that Essequibo covers a very large area, huge sections of which are not easily accessible. There is no network of roads down which tanks could roll, and other than along the littoral, settlements are scattered, sometimes with substantial distances between them. They are reached either via air, or along the riverways. Even allowing for the fact that invading forces might not bother initially about some large areas of forest despite the fact they might have settlements in them, occupation would still be heavy on manpower given the challenge of the terrain and the distribution of the population. At a time of instability in Venezuela one wonders if the government there would be willing to commit so many troops for what essentially would be a lengthy and difficult exercise when they might be needed at home.

This does not mean they would not occupy a portion or portions of Essequibo, but that aside for the moment, there may be other reasons why they might not take on the whole of the county in the first instance, at least. Apart from anything else, Brazil claimed the Rupununi in the nineteenth century, but in the 1904 Arbitral Award by the King of Italy it went to Guyana (or British Guiana as it then was). It is difficult to see the Brazilians, who up to now have not believed in a rectification of borders on this continent, accepting a Venezuelan occupation of this area in particular. Then there is the Iwokrama forest reserve which is managed by an International Centre under the joint mandate of the Government of Guyana and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Would Venezuela really want to engage directly with the Commonwealth at this level?

There are one or two other superficial observations which could be made such as the difficulty of flying aircraft in the interior of Guyana. It is not as if there is radar other than in places like Timehri, and that does not extend to the hinterland. Our bush pilots, therefore, have to be very familiar with the terrain, and to cover the whole of Essequibo the Venezuelans would be required to fly in personnel in the daytime, but without the benefit of our experienced pilots. One cannot think either that Venezuela expects – or ever expected – to get the whole of Essequibo; that is a negotiating starting point.

So if, hypothetically speaking, we might be

talking about occupying portions of Essequibo, which parts would be involved, and how would it be accomplished? The area which has always most interested Venezuela would be a section or the whole of Region One, because that has an Atlantic façade which potentially would ground a claim to oil-rich marine areas. That said, the most accessible part of Guyana from Caracas’s point of view, would be our side of the Cuyuni, where Guyanese miners are constantly harassed and all manner of intrusions have occurred.

A straightforward invasion, particularly in Region One, would present the Venezuelans with some preliminary problems. In the first place, significant GDF bases are not located in Essequibo at all, and these would have to be neutralised first to eliminate any sources of military resistance. They might conceivably even direct attention to our two international airports to impede the arrival of any foreign assistance. Any action outside Essequibo, however, is effectively to take on Guyana as a whole, as opposed to ‘recovering’ the county as they want the world to believe. And for that, ideally they would need a certain international climate or at least support from key backers. They would too have to blame Guyana for something egregious, and although they have been trying hard to paint us as aggressors they have not yet ratcheted up much success where that is concerned.

But one possibility is that they operate in stages, starting in the Cuyuni, as has been suggested before, with marauding Sindicato miners displaced from their bank, whom they could then send troops after, or implement some other stratagem. It is significant, perhaps, that the arrangements in relation to the ‘annexation’ of Essequibo are centred on Tumeremo and San Martín, on the Venezuelan side of the Cuyuni. Where Region One is concerned, that is where most of the migrants from next door enter this country, and we really know nothing about them – which is not the same thing as to say that the majority are not genuine. But we have no way of knowing how many are gang members say, sent in to create incidents when it suits Venezuela’s programme for acquisition. At a minimum, we should not be issuing identity cards to them.

All of that said, given the illogicality which reigns in Caracas circles, it is very difficult to predict either what will happen, or when it will happen. Certainly when Diosdado Cabello presented the bill about Essequibo to the National Assembly, he said that body would exercise legislative power, until the “dispute” with Guyana is resolved. In terms of timelines, exactly what that means, however, is unclear. Then there was the announcement by President Nicolás Maduro on Thursday that the Great Venezuela Housing Mission was to construct homes in ‘Guayana Esequiba’. Not immediately it seems, because the first 120 for ‘Venezuelan Essequibans’ are to be built near San Martín “on the edge of the Cuyuni River” – but in Venezuela. Is this some kind of pretence game, or does it mask something more ominous?

What is difficult to read is how Venezuela sees the situation as developing, and whether if it does manage to install itself in a part of Guyana, it would be with the aim of facilitating ‘peacekeepers’, say, so the area would really be seen by the outside world as one in dispute and in need of bilateral negotiations.

Whatever the case, Guyana is in danger and requires an across-the-board response. President Irfaan Ali has certainly been doing what he can at