Revisiting the Rupununi uprising of 1969
In the contemporary discourse regarding the Guyana-Venezuela boundary controversy, there is a marked absence of public attention to key events that have significantly affected this contested region of Guyana’s territory. Notably, there is a relative lack of attention given to previous instances of Venezuelan aggression against Guyana, such as the 1966 invasion of Ankoko Island in the Cuyuni River, during which Venezuela seized control of half of the island. Another substantial event is the 1969 rebellion against the Guyana nation state in the Essequibo region, commonly referred to as the “Rupununi uprising.”
Considering earlier evaluations, which included David Granger’s thorough analysis of the Rupununi event in the Stabroek News in 2009, this article seeks to adopt a more restricted perspective, that is, a succinct chronological account of the uprising primarily relying on Guyanese newspaper reports.
The attack
On January 2, 1969 the Guyana Graphic published a report implicating Venezuela in an armed insurrection in the Rupununi district of Guyana, resulting in the death of at least four policemen and one civilian. According to the report, the insurrectionists initiated the operation with a burst of gunfire that “sent policemen in the outpost of Lethem running from the station only to be moved mowed down in cold blood by men believed trained in the use of modern weapons.” The casualties included Inspector Whittington Braithwaite, Sergeant James
Anderson, Constables James Mackenzie and Egbert Horton. Additionally, two civilians, Victor Hernandez of the Guyana School of Agriculture and Walter Michael, lost their lives in the incident.
The insurrectionists then began patrolling the area, capturing several civilians, including the district commissioner or other government employees, whom they confined in an abattoir. The rebel group also blocked airstrips in the area, held civilians hostage with “modern weapons,” including “submachine guns and bazookas.”
Police radio equipment was confiscated, disrupting communication between
Lethem and Georgetown. However, information became public when two individuals, risking their lives, managed to depart with a small aircraft, which was fired upon as it took off from Lethem.
The initial reports of the uprising inn the press were characterised by caution: “The Guyana government declined to confirm or deny the Venezuelan link with terrorist activities in the beef-producing territory but disclosed last night that troops of the Guyana Defence Force had recaptured the border town of Lethem and stormed to free a number of people held as hostages.”
According to the Graphic, the “secessionist movement backed by Venezuela
was in operation for some time.” The revolt led to the flight of hundreds of Amerindians to the Kanuku and Pakaraima mountains. Many returned to their villages after the GDF had crushed the rebellion.
The assault on the Lethem police station prompted GDF detachments from the Demerara bases to swiftly move into the area, equipped with grenades and flamethrowers. The army could have landed only at Manari, approximately nine miles from Lethem as they were hindered by rebel blockades on other airstrips in the area. Confined to Manari for nearly a day, the soldiers eventually reached Lethem and successfully reclaimed the town. Media reports suggested that a rancher and several civilians unsupportive of the foreign elements assisted the troops in their journey to Lethem. Upon arrival, the GDF discovered the bodies of four policemen and one civilian.
Col Desmond Roberts (a Captain at the time of the uprising) provided an account of the first GDF assault on the insurrectionists:
“After the nine-mile approach march from Manari to Lethem (since we had no trucks), we could see the rebels looking down at us from the water tower, as we adopted our final assault positions. My unit first cleared the houses along the main axis and then began moving quickly across the open ground leading uphill to the main rebel positions. Halfway up the long hill, we saw thick dust, created by several vehicles driving off: The rebels had opted to run rather than to stand and fight. Not a single round had been fired. Even though they had heavier machine guns, mobility and better knowledge of the ground, they were not prepared to fight an aggressive, organised and determined force.”
Other key GDF commanders involved