Constitution’s stance against dual citizen MPs did not take account of a number of variables

Dear Editor,

First of all this is to congratulate Mr. Carl Greenidge for making the bold decision to renounce his British Citizenship.

At the same time it is arguably an unnecessary decision; and while many will posit that the Constitution requires a singular nationality as evidence of loyalty to country, there is the view that, in retrospect the formulation of the provision did not take account of a number of variables; while at the same time appearing to restrict the citizenship disqualification to who constitute Parliament.

Meanwhile, it is not as if over the years administrations and oppositions have not been on record as utilising remigrant Guyanese advisors, without reference to their actual citizenship status.

Nor can it be successfully contended that the decision-making regarding the welfare of this nation remains only within the purview of Parliamentarians, when in fact they are all advised and supplemented by a range of senior public servants, amongst whom are not unlikely to be ‘dual citizens’.

Is it unreasonable to conceive that variations of this model could extend to public sector organisations who make critical decisions about managing aspects of the economy?

Who then amongst the realistic spread of decision-makers that impact on the nation’s survival cannot be regarded as suspect?

It is reasonable to conceive that this contagion could spread as far as the Justice Sector, where there have been hints of ethnicity, however subconscious, being detected in judgements.

All along the fundamental fault line must be seen to be the absence of trust, which imputes the lack of loyalty; and not the quality of decision-making.

Should not one also be sensitive about the proportion of remigrants who are contracted into public service employment? By what formula does one evaluate their devotion to duty? The argument becomes even ridiculous when it is considered that the latter are in fact voters.

Does it end there however? Should dual citizens have more the right to vote than to be voted for?

But one is still left to investigate the types of ‘dual citizenships’. Understandably those who make the choice when adults could earn disqualification.

But what if tertiary education not available in the home country, had to be pursued in countries like the USA and it becomes necessary to fulfill legal requirements on the way to achieving selected professional goals? How can such a situation be avoided when our institutions still cannot produce skills required at the highest level.

In terms of his education development therefore, how is it that Mr. Greenidge, at age six years, had a choice? So where is the explicit provision in the Constitution which penalises this category of alleged duality?

At the most illogical end of the spectrum is another type of ‘no choice’ duality – being born in the United Kingdom. It would probably take the CCJ to convince the UK Supreme Court that Mr. Dominic Gaskin can erase, with impunity, the place of his birth from any legal document that requires such information.

Commonsense may well argue that any ‘native’ who is at the decision-making level in the political arena in Guyana should be similarly disqualified.

What has cumulated from all the variables is a situation which could not possibly have been envisaged by the framers of the Constitution at the time. There was certainly no anticipation of the emergence of the critical human resources dilemma the country now faces, with increasingly depleted local content, moreso in the face of the projected (counter-productive) inundation of identifiably single foreign citizenships.

After all did we not have a foreign-born President?

Yours faithfully, E. B. John