THINKING EAST AND WEST

站在邊境檢查站內的哲學家The knotty problem of nationality, belonging and identity國族、歸屬感與身份認同之間錯綜複雜的糾結

How do we define our identity and nationality? The philosophers discuss

說東道西

兩位哲學家討論如何界定身份認同與國籍

Last year, British Prime Minister Theresa May made an extraordinary claim: ‘If you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere.’ This was quite a slap in the face for the increasing number of people who do feel they are citizens of the world first and of a nation second, if at all. The clearest examples of this are the third culture kids (see cover story, page 34) who have parents from different countries and often have lived in more than one nation by the time they are adults.

But May’s jibe touches on a genuinely difficult issue: to what extent must we hold onto our national and local identities? The history of Western philosophy exemplifies one wrong answer to that question.

The Western mind is characterised by its aspiration for a universality that transcends time and place. This ideal was first fully expressed by Plato, who believed that true knowledge not only rose above geography but also the planet itself. According to Plato, everything we see and touch around us is an imperfect copy of a ‘form’ which is timeless, placeless, eternal and unchanging. No actual circle, for example, matches the perfection of the ideal ‘form of the circle’, and no human embodies all that it means to be human. What exactly these forms are is a matter of some debate, but they reflect an enduring ideal of knowledge that belongs to no land or culture.

Plato’s ideas might have become less relevant were it not for the way in which Christianity adopted and adapted many of them as part of its own quest for universality. In Christianity, religion ceased to be national or tribal. The Promised Land of the Israelites morphed into the Kingdom of God for the one family of man.

It’s easy to see the attractions of this universalist impulse. Indeed, for a long time it was assumed that moral progress depended on embracing it. Philosophers such as Bertrand Russell advocated world government as a way of transcending the nationalism that had led to bloody war after bloody war. The ideal of ‘one world’ became the rallying call of peace activists. Transnational organisations such as the

European Union were seen as first steps towards a globe without borders.

However, universalism also has a darker side, all too often illustrated in the history of Christendom. In the name of the one truth, Christian kingdoms conquered and subjugated those who followed supposedly lesser falsehoods. They showed how the warm universal embrace can easily descend into a crushing, hegemonic iron grip.

Western philosophy fell into a similar trap. Believing itself to be universal, it didn’t recognise that it emerged out of a particular history and culture. As a result, it felt free to ignore anything that came from beyond the West. To the philosophers Jay L Garfield and Bryan W Van Norden, this is astonishing and indefensible. What could justify talk of Indian, Chinese, Islamic and African philosophy but calling what is taught in Europe and North America ‘philosophy’ without any qualification? Their suggestion that ‘any department that regularly offers courses only on Western philosophy should rename itself Department of European and American Philosophy’ seems perfectly reasonable: but it has been widely dismissed or ignored.

The bogus universality of Western philosophy illustrates the real pitfall of aspiring to transcend nationality. Believing we are nothing other than citizens of the world can lead us to forget that we are also first and foremost citizens of a part or parts of it. The result is a kind of cultural colonialism in which claiming membership of the global club becomes a cover for taking it over.

The remedy is not to give up on our more cosmopolitan citizenship but to recognise that our local and global identities are different but complementary. Local identities are built up of a thousand quotidian details, such as a familiarity with local streets, buildings and slang, with a particular cuisine, and only two or three degrees of separation to most of the people around you. Our global ones are based on our most general shared human characteristics. Recognising these is vital in an increasingly globalised world where we need to find as much common ground and purpose as possible. But this

WE SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT OUR LOCAL AND GLOBAL IDENTITIES ARE DIFFERENT BUT COMPLEMENTARY我們要認清本土和世界公民的身份是相而異又互補的

adds to rather than replaces more local attachments. Indeed, there is a sense in which parochial ties can provide the foundation for more universal ones: feeling that somewhere is home makes us more comfortable about visiting the homes of others and letting them into ours.

All our identities are multiple. We can and should be both citizens of our towns or villages, our regions, our countries and the whole world. May’s choice between being a citizen of somewhere or nowhere is a false one.

去年國，英 首文相 翠珊語出人驚地宣稱：「果如 你認為自己是世界公民，你就是無處歸屬的公民。」現在愈愈來 多人認為自己首先是界世 公民，然後才是某個國族的公民；這句話對而無他們 言， 異被人在臉上摑了一巴掌。顯最明 的例子，就是「第三文化小孩」的出現（參閱34頁封故面 事） ；這些人的雙親均來自不同國家，而他們在成年以前，往往已經在多個國家生活過。

不過，文翠珊的冷嘲熱諷卻道出了一個真正的難題：我們對國族和本土的身份應抱持多大的認西同？ 方哲學史就為這個問題示範了一個錯誤的答案。

西思方 想的特質，求是追 超越時和間空間的共相。此理念首先由柏拉圖提出，他認為真理不僅超越地域，甚至凌駕地球本身；他認為我們所見感所 的一切，皆由一個永恆不變、不受時空限制的「理型」投射出來，是完不 美的膺品如。例 世上沒有一個圓形可媲美「圓形型理」；更沒有人能完整具備人類有應 的全部特質。理型的廬山真面目至今尚無定論，但映反 出的是一種朽不 的理念，並不從屬於任何地域或文化。

要是柏拉圖的理論沒有基被督教採納、改應修 並 用於本身對共相的追尋，或許就會變得不合時宜。教基督 擺脫了宗教原有的國族或部落色彩；希伯來人的應許之地蛻變為上的帝 國度，成為屬於全人類的樂土。

這種追求相共 的衝動吸，其 引力顯而易見；長久以來，人們都深信擁護普世主義，是進道德 步的不二法門。羅等學素 哲 家主張成立一個世界政府，從而超越引致戰禍年連 的民族。主義 「世界大同」的理想，成為社運家提倡和平和反對貧窮的口號。歐盟等國跨 組織，更被視為全球邁向無國

界的第一步。

然而，普世主義也有其黑，暗面 在基督教歷屢史中 見：不鮮 信奉基督教的王國打著唯一真理的旗號，大肆征討謂端所 異 的信眾。此舉揭示了大愛容的普世觀念，很容易就淪酷為殘 的鐵腕霸權。

西方哲學亦墮進類似的陷阱，對自身的普遍性深信不疑，忘記了它源於特定的歷史和文化背，景 因而肆憚無忌 地無視所來有自西方以外的事物。哲學家Jay L Garfield和Bryan W Van Norden對此先是感驚，到訝繼而認為這是站不住腳的：歐洲和北美的大學堂而皇之其課地將 西學 程稱為「哲學」，教、、印度國中 伊斯蘭和方洲哲學情何以堪呢？他們提議有所 只提供西方哲學常規課程的學系都正名為「歐美哲學系；」 這建議似乎再合理不過，但卻一直遭到漠視和忽略。

西方哲學虛假的普世性，揭示了超越國族這個理想背後的隱患，在於自詡為世界公民之際，很容易就忘掉我們首先是世界某上 個部分的公民，催結果 生出一種文化殖民主義──打著世界公民的旗實號，際上卻以此來掩飾稱霸世界的企圖。

解決之道，並方摒棄世界公民的身份同認 ，而是要清認 本土和世界公民的身份，際實 上是既相異而又互補的。本土身份認同由無數平凡的日常細節建構而成，例如悉街熟 的 道和建築物、流利運用本地的俚語、別具本地色特 的烹飪，以至與絕大部分人有緊密的聯日。至於世界公民的身份認同，則是建基於最為普遍、人皆有之的人類特質；我們必須清釐 這些特質，才能在全球化的路上尋求更多共通點和共同目標。這不但不會取代對本土的歸屬感，反能而 夠將之進一步。鞏固 本土聯日能夠為普世聯日提供基礎：以某地為家的歸屬感，令們我 更安心造訪別人的家園，並且容許他人來訪。

所有身份認同均具有多元性。我既們有能力，應也 當成為自己的城、、鄉 地區、國家以至全世界的公民。文翠珊要人選擇當某地個 方的公民，不然就是無處歸屬的公民這， 種選擇是不能成立的。

When Theresa May took aim at the ‘citizens of nowhere’ (as Julian mentioned), I wonder if she knew she had nearly half of her voters in her sights? A multinational poll conducted in 2016 by the BBC World Service and public opinion research consultancy GlobeScan found that 47 per cent of Britons identify themselves as more a global citizen than a British subject.

They didn’t disown their compatriots or their country, despite what the British prime minister tried to imply. They did not reject their status as British citizens; they identify with both affiliations, but with a stronger tie to being British.

According to the same poll, 71 per cent of Chinese respondents see themselves as more global than Chinese citizens – which is interesting at a time when the government is leading a revival of traditional pursuits such as calligraphy, ancient instruments and Confucianism to build what its president calls ‘cultural confidence’.

Is ‘global citizenship’ an idealised, but ultimately wrong, way of understanding our being, then?

The sense of national identity and the sense of belonging are two sides of the same coin. You have both moral and cultural values; they are developed through your experience of your homeland. To be a citizen of a country without harbouring a sense of belonging towards it is unthinkable. Human beings are social animals who form families, clans, communities and countries according to kinships, traditions, customs, religions and ethics. These bonds generate an identity, which in turn strengthens social cohesion. They do this by isolating one group from another. This psychological isolation stresses ‘otherness’ rather than superiority or discrimination. It is the unwillingness to include the other in what belongs to us.

Immigration restrictions, increasingly favoured by governments of free democracies as well as one party states, give that impulse towards isolation official approval. Even in the multicultural United States, the ‘isolating’ identity prevails: immigrants have developed a sense of

belonging and identify themselves as US citizens, differentiating themselves from other ‘non-US citizens’. Their Americanness strengthens their sense of camaraderie.

Is the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy bad? A straightforward answer to this complicated question is that it might not be so if social cohesion alone, not discrimination, is the motivating factor.

In ancient China, the Sino-Barbarian dichotomy was in-your-face discrimination based on a sense of cultural superiority. It has lost much of its influence over time. That said, the hierarchical creed of Confucianism lingers, where moral codes follow a neatly arranged order of family and social relations.

The Confucian sense of belonging can only exist among people with real social ties: hence it is unthinkable to treat everybody as ‘family’.

Not so in the Taoist worldview. As observed in The Writings of Chuang Tzu: ‘Heaven, Earth and I were produced together, and all things and I are one.’ And in Buddhism, ‘all beings can become enlightened’. However, the former creed is strong in primitivist traits, without much of a nod to cultural evolution, whereas the latter stresses the personal practice of mindfulness. Neither offers much support for the global citizen.

So global citizenship remains an ideal. True, all people are living on the same planet and have a lot in common; but that common ground is not firm enough to bind them together. Perhaps only when aliens land on Earth might we see its citizens think and act as one.