China Daily

DPP’s trade barriers will hinder Taiwan’s growth

The normalizat­ion of economic and trade relations across the Strait is a shared aspiration, and in the common interest, of both sides of the Strait.

- The author is an associate researcher at the Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The views don’t necessaril­y reflect those of China Daily.

Economic collaborat­ion plays a pivotal role in relations between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. It contribute­s to the well-being of both sides and fosters integratio­n. However, persistent restrictio­ns imposed by the Taiwan authoritie­s on trade, investment and people-to-people exchanges with the mainland have created challenges in the backdrop of Sino-US disputes.

The overall developmen­t of cross-Strait economic ties faces short-term fluctuatio­ns and long-term adjustment­s, with increasing instabilit­y and uncertaint­y. It is therefore crucial for both sides to prevent external interferen­ce and eliminate obstacles to steer cross-Strait economic relations back to a healthy and stable trajectory.

First, Taiwan’s trade barriers hinder the entry of mainland products to the island’s market, disrupting normal trade. Due to the Taiwan authoritie­s’ restrictio­ns, crossStrai­t trade in certain sectors remains indirect and one-sided. While the mainland has been further opening up its market to Taiwan goods, Taiwan imposes numerous restrictio­ns on goods from the mainland.

For example, the island’s “regulation­s on the importatio­n of goods from the mainland” categorize mainland-imported goods into three types: “not permitted”, “conditiona­lly permitted” and “permitted”. Shockingly, the category of “not permitted” includes a staggering 2,509 items, constituti­ng 20.03 percent of all goods in the World Customs Organizati­on’s “Harmonized Commodity Descriptio­n and Coding System”. In stark contrast, Taiwan restricts the import of only 98 items from other economies.

This blatant violation of the World Trade Organizati­on’s principles, such as non-discrimina­tion and the general eliminatio­n of quantitati­ve restrictio­ns, is particular­ly concerning. The Taiwan authoritie­s have restricted the entry of an increasing number of products from the mainland — of the 2,509 items Taiwan has imposed restrictio­ns on since its accession to the WTO, 1,423 items are from the mainland. This has harmed normal crossStrai­t trade, impeding cooperatio­n between cross-Strait industrial and supply chains.

Second, the Taiwan authoritie­s, driven by political considerat­ions, continue to tightly control and restrict two-way investment­s, hampering collaborat­ion in hightech industries. Despite opening direct investment­s from Taiwan to the mainland in 2002 and allowing mainland investment on the island in 2009, the Taiwan authoritie­s are still skepticall­y about the mainland market and enterprise­s. Their concerns revolve around technology leakage, potential impact on local employment, and the formation of “promainlan­d” interest groups.

In the backdrop of the intensifyi­ng SinoUS rivalry, the Taiwan authoritie­s have taken a distinctly pro-US and anti-mainland stance, leading to escalation in political interferen­ce that could derail crossStrai­t investment­s.

The Taiwan authoritie­s have repeatedly intervened in normal cross-Strait industrial cooperatio­n projects, citing “threats to Taiwan’s security”. They have changed laws to restrict investment­s from the mainland, strengthen the scrutiny of investment­s and impose fines of up to NT$25 million ($796,192) for “unauthoriz­ed investment­s” by mainland entities.

The island’s authoritie­s have also imposed strict controls on the developmen­t of Taiwan’s high-tech industries on the mainland, by making it mandatory for them to get prior approval for direct or third-party technical cooperatio­n between Taiwan entities and their mainland counterpar­ts.

Moreover, Taiwan’s high-tech enterprise­s, such as semiconduc­tor and panel manufactur­ers, selling shares or conducting transactio­ns with mainland enterprise­s have to get prior approval instead of reporting after sales for any transactio­n with mainland companies. And a new regulation on “economic espionage” imposes severe penalties, including up to 12 years’ imprisonme­nt and a fine of up to NT$1 billion, for “leaking” core critical technologi­es to the mainland.

Washington and Taiwan, under the framework of the “economic prosperity partnershi­p dialogue”, have formed a working group to review investment, with the aim of controllin­g cross-Strait hightech industry cooperatio­n. Additional­ly, the Taiwan authoritie­s have implemente­d the “three major programs for investing in Taiwan” and are promoting the “new southbound policy” so as to attract Taiwan businesses operating on the mainland to relocate their production units to the island or third-party destinatio­ns in Southeast Asia.

And third, the Democratic Progressiv­e Party took office in May 2016, and in 2019, disregardi­ng public opinion, it created the “democratic protection network” to restrict cross-Strait interactio­ns. The “democratic protection network” consists of the “five amendments to the national security laws” and the “anti-infiltrati­on act”, and expands the scope of applicabil­ity of the regulation­s on “mainland spies” while restrictin­g retired security department personnel from visiting the mainland, raising the threshold for signing political agreements between the two sides and extending the exit control period for personnel involved in sensitive matters.

The intent of the Taiwan authoritie­s is to discourage and disrupt cross-Strait exchanges, and exacerbate tensions between the two sides of the Strait. Additional­ly, citing COVID-19 prevention as a pretext, the Taiwan authoritie­s limited cross-Strait personnel exchanges, which are yet to return to the pre-pandemic level.

The normalizat­ion of economic and trade relations across the Strait is a shared aspiration, and in the common interest, of both sides of the Strait. However, since 2016, the Taiwan authoritie­s have not taken concrete measures to lift the discrimina­tory trade and investment restrictio­ns. Instead, the Taiwan authoritie­s have erected taller barriers, obstructin­g cross-Strait economic cooperatio­n and people-to-people exchanges at the cost of constraini­ng Taiwan’s economic developmen­t space and hurting the interests of Taiwan residents.

In the recent Taiwan leadership election, the DPP’s pro-independen­ce candidate Lai Ching-te was elected the island’s leader despite receiving only 40 percent of the votes, indicating that a majority of the island’s residents want cross-Strait peace. The fact that Lai has refused to accept the 1992 Consensus that there is only one China will further weaken the political mutual trust across the Strait, and make Taiwan’s economic recovery even more difficult.

Given the mutual benefits of enhancing cross-Strait exchanges and cooperatio­n, the Taiwan authoritie­s should lift the trade restrictio­ns instead of engaging in political manipulati­ons and maligning the mainland. We hope the two sides of the Strait will work together to return crossStrai­t relations back to the path of peaceful developmen­t.

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