A US lens on India’s world view

before Chandragupta in referring to the Mauryan empire.

The Schaffers find the ethos of India’s foreign policy in the expansive vision its elite has of “India’s role in the world, one that regards India first and foremost as the heir to a great civilisation”. This in turn, they claim, leads to a world view, whose “centerpiece has always been the idea of a unique and exceptional India”. In the many encounters between India and the US they often see American exceptionalism coming to odds with its Indian counterpart, resulting, until recently, at mostly talking past each other. In fact, much of the book relates to how the drivers of India’s foreign policy have impacted the country’s relations with the US. There are only brief and somewhat telegraphic sections on India’s relations with other major powers and its neighbours.

How does this broader vision translate into India’s foreign policy behaviour? The authors’ thesis is that the two parallel and running themes in the country’s post-Independence external relations are the search for strategic autonomy and the quest for regional primacy. The manner in which these twin objectives have been pursued has changed over time as India itself has been transformed and as has its geopolitical environment, but the objectives themselves have remained remarkably consistent. The book argues that continuity is the hallmark of India’s foreign policy. Non-alignment was designed to retain India’s room for manoeuvre in the polarised geopolitics of the Cold War just as strategic autonomy in the currently contested geopolitical space is only a variation on the same theme. The authors also emphasise the continuing preoccupation with maintaining India’s predominant role in the Indian sub-continent and the reluctance to allow, much less seek, outside intervention in India’s conflicted relations with some of its neighbours, in particular Pakistan. There is little to disagree with in this broad description of India’s foreign policy behaviour.

There are three distinct strands that the authors discern in current Indian foreign policy thinking: These are represented by the “Non-Alignment Firsters”, who place themselves in the tradition of the leaders of the country’s Independence movement, in particular, Jawaharlal Nehru; then there are the “Broad Power Realists”, who see India as having graduated into “an emerging power should instead strive to maximize India’s options and ability to operate independently,” including by “picking up strong strategic relationships” in the short run. They regard India’s growing economic capabilities as an instrument of foreign policy and are utilitarian in their approach to bilateral and multilateral relationships. The third strand is represented by the “Hard Power Hawks”, who place emphasis on military strength and exercise of power in pursuit of strategic aims, unrestrained by moral or ethical considerations.

While this categorisation is useful, there are elements of all three strands intertwined in India’s foreign policy practice but the last is perhaps the least influential. Even though there is a perception that Prime Minister Narendra Modi appears to be more inclined towards the Hard Power Hawks, he has been, as the authors acknowledge, making economics rather than military power the central element in his foreign policy.

An interesting part of the book relates to the authors’ evaluation of negotiating tactics adopted by Indian diplomats and senior officials. From an American perspective, Indian negotiators are regarded as being well prepared, with mastery over details and willing to play hard ball in defence of Indian interests. They may sometimes seem rigid and inflexible and mostly negative in their approach. However, in the detailed chapter analysing the complex negotiations on the Indo-US nuclear deal, the authors concede that the same negotiators successfully worked together with their US counterparts, to find creative solutions to difficult and seemingly insurmountable differences.

The book poses the question whether India’s attachment to strategic autonomy may remain tenable as its own emergence as a substantial power compels it to make strategic choices, including the “need to choose close relationships and how much to invest in them.” India has not shied away from close relationships with other powers when interests are convergent. It is being a subordinate military ally that remains a step too far. The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy H B Schaffer and T C Schaffer Harper Collins 384 pages; ~599