FLUCTUATING SECURITY SITUATION IN THE VALLEY

Militants killed 550 844 819 1,310 1,596 1,332 1,209 1,075

999 1,082 1,520 2,020 1,707 1,494 976 917 591 472 339 239 232 100 72 67 110 108

-- Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*

Security personnel killed/injured 387 693 904 1,095

973 1,026 731 606 747 1,148 1,346 2,200 1,624 1,198 981 677 666 458 265 199 298 95 80 127 131 142

-- Civilians

killed/ injured 1,297 1,577 1,971 2,073 2,597 2,762 2,984 2,090 2,154 2,056 2,200 3,218 2,764 2,382 2,217 1,657 1,441 581 375 202 270 105 80 65 112 107

-- Incidents

related tomillitancy 3,744 3,544 4,495 4,855 5,279 5,389 4,499 3,101 2,894 2,989 2,948 4,118 3,594 3,023 2,330 1,791 1,438 897 534 385 368 195 124 113 151 143

-- On the ground Initial years of high-tempo militancy, army learns counter-militancy, counter-infiltration Rashtriya Rifles inflict high militant casualties; civilian fatigue generates dialogue opportunity 1996 elections held but weak central government missed political moment for dialogue Kargil conflict, along with stepped-up militancy radically increases violence. Operation Parakram, active LoC, put focus on security. No opportunity for outreach Cease-fire, LoC trade opens after Vajpayee’s “insaaniyat”outreach Successful 2006 elections. Indo-Pak back-channel talks lead to 4-point J&K peace proposal Musharraf ousted, 4-point proposal falls through. LeT strikes in Mumbai, Indo-Pak dialogue collapses, street violence consumes J&K Post-street violence peace, militancy falls, but another good opportunity for political outreach missed Public alienation in absence of talks, floods in J&K, rising Hindutva tide. Burhan Wani killing is only a trigger for outburst * Figures not known