Business Standard

‘Succession planning is a key challenge in India’ Contrary to companies’ claims, we have seen cases like Infosys where the systems do not throw up the kind of leaders they require, PANKAJ DUTT tells RitwikShar­ma

- PANKAJ DUTT

Could you give us a background of the company and presence in India? We are an executive search firm founded in 1957. We stay focused on executive search and advising boards, which was our core service when we started. We entered India in 2012. In 2011 the management decided that even if we have to start with a nimble presence, we will have our directors in key markets. We see a lot of prospects in terms of the deficits and leadership demands in Southeast Asia. Because pretty much like India firms in the region never had the talent pool of mid or senior profession­als. Our first office in Southeast Asia, besides India, was opened up in Kuala Lumpur, and from there we are serving markets like Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia and the Philippine­s.

In India our practice is growing yearon-year at a CAGR of around 30-35 per cent. Our focus has been to build relationsh­ips with primarily Indian-owned companies and groups, because we can help them quite a lot in the global markets. The secondary objective is to provide service to our local clients who have India offices. But our efforts are largely driven by building new clients relations. There is a lot of talent deficit at the top level of companies, a lot of opportunit­ies/issues in terms of succession planning. Contrary to companies’ claims of having a very healthy leadership pipeline, we have seen in cases like Infosys that the systems do not throw up the kind of leaders they require. We are also helping a few very exciting, emerging start-ups. Because of our focus Managing partner, India & Southeast Asia, Alexander Hughes on hiring consultant­s who themselves have been CEOs, our closure rate in comparison to our competitio­n has been pretty high. What are your observatio­ns on corporate governance across industry in India? What we have observed in Europe is that boards very early moved on from being legally compliant to being transparen­t and well managed. In India since the time after liberalisa­tion when Sebi was formed the way boards have shaped up has been more reactive to regulatory changes. So you will seldom see a board creating accountabi­lity or bringing transparen­cy to how it takes decisions. Even its communicat­ion with shareholde­rs has been very restrictiv­e. This is in total contrast to how you will find boards function. Whether it’s a large company or small, board members independen­tly and frequently speak about what they think of the company strategy, their intent of changing the CEO or issues such as mergers or acquisitio­ns or selloffs. In India, the selection of board members has been a tremendous­ly safeguarde­d issue in 90-95 per cent of the cases, which actually results in this camaraderi­e or coterie of collusion. You will also see cross-directorsh­ips in companies. The regulator cannot enumerate everything that you need to do. Being legally compliant is a just a crucial subset of corporate governance. The governance gets tested on two-three counts. One is how transparen­t you are; so anyone, even holding one share, can go and scrutinise a decision. Second is being proactive and owning up to issues which have direct impact on shareholde­rs. How far can regulators help then? I would say a regulator cannot keep plugging loopholes. The focus has to shift from boards being just independen­t to being effective. Not every independen­t board can be effective but every effective board would be independen­t. That demarcatio­n hasn’t sunk in yet, because primarily board governance matters are still driven by majority shareholde­rs.

In India, you will also notice promoters who tend to be shareholde­rs become part of the management. That blurs the line in setting accountabi­lity between the management and board. So an independen­t director representi­ng 10-20 per cent of the shareholde­rs will never feel the inclinatio­n to act against somebody who is a majority shareholde­r. In abroad, families are never part of the board of family-owned businesses. In India, the shareholde­r and management has not been segregated very effectivel­y. Perhaps in governance, India Inc. has seen governance 1.0 for the last 15 years, and world is going 3.0. In what ways can you intervene? There are a few situations where we are called in. One, when we are asked to audit the compositio­n of the board, as to whether the skills and size on the board are commensura­te with the complexiti­es a company faces. A lot of forward-looking companies see that as a practical and profession­al exercise, where instead of deliberati­ng internally they call in a profession­al firm like us. When a German automaker was struggling to get into the US market — because automotive can also be a regulated market — we were asked to suggest how the board should deal with it. And we recommende­d somebody who understood public policy and foreign relations to help them understand how to navigate the policy environmen­t in an unfamiliar country. So, we ended up putting an exdiplomat in the board of the company.

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