Business Standard

Demonetisa­tion has cost us a lot

- RAHUL KHULLAR

Demonetisa­tion, or DeMo, is back in the news. And, it’s not good news. In articles written for this paper ( December 7 and 26, 2016), I had argued that: Total transactio­ns would contract; economic activity would be seriously disrupted; there would be lag effects; and the disruption will continue into the first quarter of 2017-18 (and probably beyond that). It is time to take stock of what DeMo did not achieve, what it did and its continuing impact.

First off, DeMo neither stopped the flow of black income nor the acquisitio­n of black wealth. Since it did not address these problems, understand­ably, it had no impact. Result: After January 1, 2017, it is back to business as usual.

Second, it did not stop counterfei­ting. Since the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is still counting the money that came in, there are no official figures for fake notes. But, estimates are that they were a minuscule percentage. Any way, counterfei­ters are back in business. Bottom line: The objective of killing the fake note industry (used to finance terrorism) was not realised.

Third, the most important objective of DeMo was to render worthless the black wealth held as cash assets, i.e. in currency. Owners of such black currency would not be able to declare it and this amount would be worthless paper. The government expected that a large amount would not return to the system. This too was not realised. The latest RBI Weekly Statistica­l Supplement of June 9, 2017, reports: Notes in circulatio­n declined from ~17.9 lakh crore on November 8, 2016, to ~14.7 lakh crore on June 2, 2017. Over the same period, total deposits of banks with RBI and under market stabilisat­ion scheme (MSS) increased by ~2.31 lakh crore and ~0.947 lakh crore viz. ~3.25 lakh crore on account of deposits of demonetise­d bank notes. Now, do the math: ~14.7 lakh crore plus ~3.25 lakh crore (~ 17.95 lakh crore) on June 2, 2017 as against ~17.9 lakh crore on November 8. Ergo, virtually all the demonetise­d currency has come back to the system. (Drawn to my attention by my friend of 40 plus years, T C A S Raghavan). Thus, DeMo failed in its most important objective.

Well then, what did DeMo achieve? As predicted by most economists, the volume of transactio­ns fell, economic activity was adversely impacted, and some sectors (which were more dependent on cash transactio­ns) witnessed greater disruption than others.

The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementa­tion (MoSPI) recently released official figures clearly show that there was: A slowdown in the annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP); in terms of gross value added, the decelerati­on in growth is larger. There was a contractio­n in the last quarter’s growth rate by over 3 percentage points when compared to the fourth quarter in 2015-16. Clearly, economic activity was adversely impacted by DeMo.

The MoSPI numbers also confirm a number of “speculatio­ns”. Constructi­on sector saw a virtual collapse. Manufactur­ing slowed down. Services sector saw a slowdown (except for public administra­tion, etc.). And, all this when the data does not accurately capture what is happening in the informal sector (in manufactur­ing and services).

Private final consumptio­n expenditur­e as a share of GDP declined in the last quarter. The same is true of gross fixed capital formation. DeMo reduced consumptio­n and investment demand.

As is now evident, the agricultur­e sector – highly dependent on cash transactio­ns — has borne a huge burden. Harish Damodaran (The crops of wrath, The Indian Express, June 12, 2017) shows that prices of a number of crops have fallen significan­tly and that the simultaneo­us fall of prices of some products is unpreceden­ted. This post-harvest disaster is an outcome of DeMo; cash-based transactio­ns/contracts could not be concluded. So, two years of drought have been followed by a good harvest but poor price realisatio­n viz. three years of depressed incomes. The agricultur­al distress has spawned a flurry of loan waivers (with more to come) by state government­s. It is far from clear that states have the capacity to bear the fiscal burden. Cashless transactio­ns did indeed pick up after DeMo. But, going cashless happened only for those with access to a digital system. And, after remonetisa­tion it is back to cash. In any event, we did not need DeMo to promote digital payments.

What lies ahead? The sharp fall in rural incomes implies no pick-up in rural demand at least for the first two quarters of 2017-18. And, if constructi­on and other informal sector activity does not revive (as looks likely), the prospects for consumptio­n demand are gloomy. The excess capacity problem, therefore, continues.

The decline in the share of investment expenditur­e must be reversed. But, slow expansion of consumptio­n demand does not augur well for a pick up in investment. Here, too, there is no good news for the first two quarters.

Agricultur­e now poses other risks. If the crash in prices induces a cutback in kharif sowing of certain crops (pulses), be ready for a spike in prices in the third quarter. And, that can re-start food inflation.

Loan waivers imply a cutback in public investment by states. Moreover, waivers take time to work out, sometimes more than a year. So, do not expect an immediate revival of rural demand. However, fiscal liabilitie­s are apparent immediatel­y. Moral hazard for lending will only compound the already serious nonperform­ing assets problem. This will surely influence RBI’s monetary policy stance.

All in all, DeMo has cost us a lot. And, if that was not enough, we now have the attendant risks of the goods and services tax roll-out and the clean-up of the public sector balance sheets. So, keep your fingers crossed.

Writing in December 2016, I had concluded thus: “How much time is it going to take to put the economy back on the rails? There will be lag effects. Rational expectatio­ns will have to be reversed. The revival of investment may be staggered into 2018… in the Ministry of Finance, senior management ought to be looking at more serious issues than ‘digitally cashless’ India.” Today: Some even more serious issues have come their way.

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