Business Standard

Chinese checkers on the Doklam plateau

The dispute in the Doklam area is an old one, but the bellicosit­y of the Chinese official media and its bureaucrac­y seems calculated to escalate tensions, writes Aditi Phadnis

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The dispute in the Doklam area is an old one, but the bellicosit­y of the Chinese official media and its bureaucrac­y seems calculated to escalate tensions, writes ADITI PHADNIS

In a Delhi suburb, owners of a restaurant called Yummy Bhutan (where, by the way, you can get “very tasty Chinese food”) could be echoing China’s sentiments. Yummy Bhutan is exactly how China is looking at Bhutan. And India has made it quite clear that it doesn’t like it.

To misquote Princess Diana (“there were three of us in this marriage, so it was a bit crowded”), there are three in the Doklam stand-off — India, Bhutan and China. The postures are such that South Asia has been plunged into acute anxiety and tension. Worse, there are indication­s that the Great Game is being played out again.

Like all tensions, it began with boundary and land: 14 countries have land borders with China — Russia, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, India, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanista­n, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Because of its colonial history, China had territoria­l disputes with all of them. It has settled its land boundaries with all its neighbours — barring India and Bhutan.

So what do the disputes involve? With Bhutan, it is a matter of 764 sq km of territory. Beijing claims 495 sq km of territory in the Jakurlung and Pasamlung Valleys in north-central Bhutan and another 269 sq km in western Bhutan, comprising the Doklam Plateau. Doklam Plateau abuts Chumbi Valley, which, like Tawang on Bhutan’s eastern border, has enormous strategic significan­ce for China, Bhutan as well as India. If China gets hold of this territory, the military advantage in India’s Northeast might as well be lost to China.

But that’s not all. The understand­ing between Bhutan and India is that their border disputes are to be settled together, not piecemeal as there is an intrinsic strategic linkage between the two in the Chumbi valley. By annexing the Doklam sector, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will widen the eastern shoulder of Chumbi valley and with the road extension, achieve significan­t operationa­l and logistical flexibilit­y for a military strike through Chumbi valley towards the Siliguri corridor.

Bhutan is China’s only neighbour that Beijing does not have official diplomatic relations with. This suits India fine. In 1949, Bhutan signed the Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship with India, under which it agreed “to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations”. This has underwritt­en India’s advisory role in Bhutan’s foreign policy making, including relations with China. The India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, which replaced the 1949 Treaty in 2007, does not require Thimphu to be guided by Indian advice on foreign policy matters. It only requires them to “cooperate closely … on issues relating to their national interests”. China views India’s treatment of Bhutan as a “protectora­te” abhorrent.

But there are legitimate reasons for Bhutan’s fear of China. It watched with silent horror the crushing of the Tibet uprising in 1959, the punishment meted out to followers of Buddhism and the vigorous implementa­tion of a classless society in China. Bhutan has its own ruling elite. Its monastic estates, and estates belonging to the handful of nobility — the Drukpa — were worked by tenured serfs and slaves. Socialism, much less communism, does not come naturally to it. And it has just about managed to cope with a refugee problem: with the Nepalese for instance. It certainly does not want hordes of Tibetan refugees to come streaming into Bhutan.

Like all other countries, Bhutan is changing. Guided democracy introduced in 2008 has put down shallow roots. But because of this, there are people who question Bhutan’s almost blind allegiance to India and argue that third country domination in Sino-Bhutan relations (such as they are) is not desirable. The signals of the changes were first out there for everyone to see when Jigmi Thinley, Bhutan’s first prime minister, met the then Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, on the sidelines of the climate summit at Rio de Janeiro in Brazil in June, 2013. India was kept out of the loop.

An official People’s Republic of China (PRC) release quoted Thinley as saying Bhutan wished “to forge formal diplomatic ties with China as soon as possible.” China responded with a statement that it was ready to settle the border issue with Bhutan. After initial consternat­ion, India’s response was ruthless and swift — and very visible. Loans were held back and vehicle imports from India to Bhutan were stopped. Kerosene and LPG subsidies were held back. All this only strengthen­ed China’s resolve to do something about the situation.

Strengthen the borders

Phunchok Stobdan, former ambassador and expert on Asian affairs, says the tension in Doklam should be seen in a wider perspectiv­e. “A solution to this would be back-channel talks (at the G20 summit in Hamburg that Donald Trump, Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping attended),” he says. “I don’t see any real threat of a war. India should increasing­ly look to strengthen its borders, especially make sure that there is no incursion into Siliguri.”

But the bellicosit­y of the Chinese official media and its bureaucrac­y seems calculated to escalate tensions. Says former Indian ambassador to China, Nirupama Rao, “The dispute in the Doklam area is known. It is not a new phenomenon. But China’s road constructi­on is a deliberate move to trigger a response from Bhutan and from India.”

She adds, “Through its actions, China seeks to impose its own definition of the trijunctio­n point of the boundary between Bhutan, China and India (Sikkim). The move has serious security ramificati­ons for both Bhutan and India’s defence interests.”

Most profession­al diplomats counsel prudence, ironically, when for the first time under Modi India has somewhat ostentatio­usly tried to demonstrat­e that it can stand up to China (remember the toothache remark when Premier Xi Jinping visited Gujarat in 2014?). On the other hand, almost all experts say that the standoff in Doklam is not a one-off event.

Says R S Kalha, former foreign service officer and China expert, “In my experience of dealing with the Chinese for over 15 years, including leading the Indian side for the crucial boundary sub group, I have never experience­d that Chinese PLA takes steps without approval.”

Defusing tensions

So what are India and China going to do? Already there are signs that both sides are stepping back from the brink. A statement by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman says the Mansarovar yatra of Indian pilgrims, which was halted because of action “of India soldiers on Chinese soil”, could be reconsider­ed via another route. The Indian foreign office is imploring journalist­s, experts and anyone who will listen that bellicosit­y and aggression will achieve nothing: profession­als are on the job of defusing tensions and they should be allowed to do their work unhindered.

But this is not a WWF match where the outcome is known to everyone. Suddenly the sands are shifting and even friends are acting strange. Ancient words of wisdom might work best here: “When in doubt, don’t.”

“The dispute in the Doklam area is not a new phenomenon. But China’s road constructi­on is a deliberate move to trigger a response from Bhutan and from India” NIRUPAMA RAO Former Indian Ambassador to China

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 ??  ?? Indian and Chinese soldiers along the border in Sikkim. China has settled its land boundaries with all its neighbours, barring India and Bhutan
Indian and Chinese soldiers along the border in Sikkim. China has settled its land boundaries with all its neighbours, barring India and Bhutan
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